A glorious day in Brazil: former president Lula da Silva expected to be sent to jail soon.
Contrary to what the Washington Post says, there is no “political chaos” in Brazil. Former president Lula was ordered to jail, plunging Brazil into cosmos ahead of a presidential election.
Also contrary to the Guardian, Brazilian democracy is not connected to Lula. The country’s democracy will be alive and well without him. As for the “parliamentarians, academics and others” who say “Lula should be allowed to stand in the presidential elections,” please, be my guest: take him to run in your country.
A good day for Brazil, Latin America, and the world!
Derril Watson offer some critical remarks on my short post about populism in Latin America. In short, Watson is arguing that (1) I’m stating something obvious (populism diminishes economic freedom) and (2) that I’m wrong when I say that populism fails to produce economic growth.
Seems I haven’t been quite clear, because I state none of the above. The intention of my post is not to show that populism decreases economic freedom, I think this is uncontroversial. The point of the post is to show, with a very simple calculation, how fast economic freedom is reduced. I might be wrong, but I have the impression that most individuals do not realize how fast they can loose their economic liberties under this type of government. This is the message carried in the title of the post “How fast does populism destroy economic freedom in Latin America?” rather than “Does populism destroy economic freedom in Latin America?”
With respect to the second point, my claim is not that under populism there is no growth of GDP, my claim is that “populist governments failed to increase GDP per capita consistently faster than the region.” My original post is just a small bite of a paper that is still work in progress and I’ll share in due time. I wasn’t expecting this claim to be controversial. Still, the figure below shows the ratio of GDP per capita (PPP) of each of he countries I observe with respect to Latin America. All countries are centered in year 0 as the first year of populism as defined in my original post. That’s the first dot in the graph. The second dot shows either the last data available or the end of populism. None of these countries show a consistent higher growth rate than the rest of the region.
It seems to me that Watson is confusing growth with recovery. The fact that economic growth produces a growth in GDP does not mean that a growth in GDP is due to economic growth. The recovery mentioned by Watson in Argentina happens after the largest crisis in the history of the country and the largest default worldwide at the time. As I mentioned in my post, Argentina hits stagflation in 2007. This suggests to me a rapid recovery with no significant growth and built upon an unsustainable policy (for instance, Argentina fails to improve its relative income with respect to the region, it rather stagnates in 2007 and starts to fall a few years after.) I can show a large increase in my personal GDP as measured by consumption by depleting my savings (consuming my capital stock at the country level). I wouldn’t call that personal economic growth. The Kirchner government, for instance, failed to reduce poverty below the levels seen in the 1990s. It does, of course, if that is compared with the poverty levels around the years of the crisis (which is what Watson’s table is doing.) It should also be kept in mind that official poverty measures in Argentine were hampered by the government.
There’s still another important issue regarding GDP measures of Argentina. As it became well known, GDP series were hampered by the government (also inflation and poverty rates were hampered.) By 2014 official GDP values were overestimating the size of the economy by 24%. Another sign is the evolution of real wages in Argentina, which hits a ceiling again in 2007 with a level similar to the one at the end of 2001 (just before the crisis). In 2008, 2009, and 2010 real wages decline.
As a final comment, I’m not sure to what comment of mine Watson refers to. I don’t see a comment entry of mine in my original post, nor I remember doing so. In any case, I don’t get into the definition of populism precisely for how difficult that task can be. The problem of defying populism is one of the areas covered in my yet unfinished paper.
TL;DR summary: The one thing most populist governments studied had in common was a declining protection for property rights. Focus there next time.
Nicolás Cachanosky explained that populism in five Latin American countries had led to a rapid deterioration in their economic freedom, intimating that this also led to a relative drop in living standards compared to other South American countries. Given that the two primary economic strategies of populism are control and spend (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991 quoting Carbonetto et al. 1987), it would be shocking if a populist government did not reduce economic freedom. That’s the idea! However, there is more we could learn about how populism reduces economic freedom by doing a little more to identify exactly what it was that populist governments did. First, I think it’s useful to go a little further back, to compare how trends were looking before* populism (say by 1991) to how those trends changed with the election of a populist government. Second, I’m going to take a more careful look at how and why economic freedom decreased.
It is funny to me that when Cachanosky’s response to his first commenter is to ask for a definition and a measure before being willing to debate a correction; that suggests he really ought to have been more careful to define populism in his post. In fairness, that’s a tall order*: much of the literature on populism has been trying to define it and there is still no consensus as far as I can tell. Are we focusing primarily on increasing statism, whether it is called populism or progressivism or socialism or cronyism? Or is there something special about the populist brand of statism that we should be looking out for? To the extent populism is a “power to the people” movement, Libertarianism itself could try to appropriate the populist brand and claim they are taking power back from the government for the people! I don’t think this is what Cachanosky has in mind. :). I tend to think that he is focused mostly on statism and for the purposes of his post, it doesn’t matter whether it’s populism or socialism that caused it, so please assume when I say “populism” hereafter, I mean increased state control over the economy.
Even given that, populism/statism exists on a continuum. There is a marked difference between a determined populist government that nationalizes wide swathes of an economy rapidly in order to redistribute riches to the common people and someone in an unnamed developed country who uses populist rhetoric to get elected and keep his base happy only to turn around once in office and enact largely pro-business deregulations and strengthen conservative social mores.
Because of this, it’s important to make distinctions between the 5 countries in question (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela). To demonstrate that, let me focus on Argentina and Brazil. Mueller and Mueller (2012) contrast Brazil and Argentina’s responses to the global food price crisis in 2006-08, during this populist period in both countries. There have been very few checks and balances on executive power in Argentina, allowing the Kirchners to enact “opportunistic price controls and intrusive export bans, generating significant discontent and investment disincentives” (pg 3). In Brazil, the checks on the presidency to prevent a repeat of the late 80s/early 90s inflation led to “the surprising conversion of President Lula once in office in 2003, reneging the leftish policy agenda his party had defended for years in the opposition, only to continue the fiscally disciplined macroeconomic policies of his predecessor” (pg 5). These kinds of difference are very important to understand what happens and when and why.This table shows how Heritage’s Economic Freedom in the World survey ranked the five countries Cachanosky singles out as populist in 1995 when the survey started, the year when they elected a populist government, and 2015; I then add five other South American countries for comparison. 10 represents high economic freedom and 1 very low freedom. The astute reader will notice that I am using the raw scores rather than country rankings as Cachanosky does because I suspect it matters more for economic growth what happens within my country rather than thinking economic growth will collapse because a handful of other countries on other continents become more free while I stay put where I am: I will look worse by comparison, but not be worse.
To delve into the Argentina/Brazil comparison again, the survey shows Argentina scoring markedly higher than Brazil in 1995. This situation had already reversed itself by 2003 and the start of populism. Since then Argentina has continued to fall rapidly while Brazil has turned reversed its progress. Delving deeper into those numbers, Argentina has become markedly less free in terms of almost every category Heritage measures (respect for property rights in 2001-2003, government integrity 2006-2008, tax burden, government spending since 2011, business freedom in 2002, and monetary, investment, and financial freedom in 2003), while Brazil’s primary sin was an increase in spending in 2006 and an increase in taxes to pay for it. That’s it. This shows a real deterioration in Argentinian freedom before populism, a trend only continued and exacerbated by the Kirchners, while Brazil has shown both improvement and decline, with a much different, constrained form of policy making. Argentinian populism and Brazilian are far from the same phenomenon.
In Bolivia and Ecuador, property rights fell in 2001 and investment freedom by 2005 before populism in either country and both slid down steadily after electing a populist government; both countries have improved in government integrity, taxes got worse in Ecuador in 2008 with spending increasing massively in 2010, and financial freedom worsened after populism started. Venezuela saw the largest decrease in respect for property rights right after electing Chavez and again in 2008. In contrast to other countries, Chavez initially reduced government spending and kept taxes roughly constant, with spending not increasing again until after 2008. Business and financial freedom declined steadily, investment freedom plummeted in 2004, and monetary freedom only declined in 2014.
We see then five rather different patterns, even though most of them saw the same sort of decline of 1.2-1.4 points. The key feature in all but Brazil is the decrease in respect for property rights shortly after the election of a populist government. Spending also tends to be higher in these five countries, though all happened during the global food price crisis and the US/EU financial crisis when spending also increased by many non-populist countries as well. Otherwise, there is very little in common among the five countries, with some embracing freer trade and others fleeing it, some cracking down on monetary and financial freedoms with others largely ignoring them. Our five ‘control’ countries saw an improvement in economic freedom from 2005-201, particularly in Colombia. Colombia and Peru reduced their respect for property rights in 2002, but later repented; Paraguay has not held property rights in even modest esteem since 1998.
All of this suggests the place to look in future research is to the importance of declining respect for property rights among populist governments as a driver of economic freedom and economic growth.
And that brings us to the second of Cachanosky’s points – that this drop in economic freedom in those five countries led to shrinking economies compared to other economies in the region. First off, to be clear, all five of these populist economies experienced rapid economic growth during the time period in question, and this economic growth was much higher than the economic growth enjoyed in the decade before populism started. This would lead pro-populists to conclude that populism was actually quite good. Cachanosky admits that even though Argentina fell farther in the economic freedom rankings than its peers, its GDP/capita actually increased. He excuses this as being “largely explained as recovery after the 2001 crisis and by consuming capital stock, not as an expansion of potential output.” Unfortunately for his story, Argentina’s GDP/capita in terms of real USDollars not only surpassed its pre-crisis level (around $12300 in 1998), but rose to $17500 – a 42% increase during its populist period. (All numbers from www.gapminder.org are PPP$ inflation-adjusted.) In every single case he cites, GDP/capita rose while the headcount poverty rate fell dramatically.
However, compare their growth to the five control countries, and compare the time period before and after in each case:
|GDP/cap (PPP$)||Growth||poverty (% below $3/day)|
|GDP/cap (PPP$)||Growth||poverty (% below $3/day)|
The 2003-2015 period was good across the board in South America, with most growing at least 30% more from 2003ish-2015 compared to 1991-2003. Similarly, poverty rates fell markedly from 2003-2014 in every country for which I have Gapminder data. So the claim is not that populism resulted in negative economic growth. The issue is that the average growth in the non-populist countries was around 1% per year higher than in the populist countries. Thus, to the populist-supporter who points to the high growth of Argentina et al as proof that populism works, the response is that growth was even higher in their non-populist neighbors and poverty is lower in them as well.
Now the unfortunate thing for drawing a clear causal interpretation from these correlations is that economic growth was also higher in the non-populist countries in the before period as well, perhaps due in part to having higher economic freedom to begin with. Growth in the freedom-preserving countries was slightly more than 1% per year higher, and that is driven predominantly by Chile. If Chile had had a more average 11-13% growth during that time period, we would be able to show more conclusively that the economic growth gap increased after populism. So, really, the claim that populism caused a lower economic growth in those countries doesn’t hold up very well – economic growth was lower in those countries before populism as well. It may well be that economic growth would have been higher in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela had they maintained or improved their respect for property rights, but the raw data doesn’t tell us that without significantly more controls and doing some proper regressions.
* – One of the problems of this exercise is that to get “before” populism, you need to go back a hundred years or so. Ah well.
The turn of the twentieth century has seen an increase in populist government in Latin America. That populism is no friend of free markets is well known. And even if their movement against free markets if fairly quick, it is common for individuals to loose track of how fast they are loosing their economic freedoms.
There are five cases of populist governments in Latin America that can work as benchmarks for the region. In particular, we can look at the behavior of governments in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela for the time frames depicted in the following table.
During this time period, populist governments failed to increase GDP per capita consistently faster than the region. The only exception is Argentina. But its fast increase in GDP is largely explained as recovery after the 2001 crisis and by consuming capital stock, not as an expansion of potential output. It is no accident that Argentina met stagflation in 2007. In the last three issues of the Economic Freedom of the World (Fraser Institute) Argentina ranks among the bottom 10 free economies in the world.
The following figure shows the fall in ranking of each country in the Economic Freedom of the World.
We can translate the information shown in the above into loss of ranking position per year of populist government. This is what is shown in the next table.
This table offers a few readings:
- Argentina is the country that fall in the ranking of economic faster than its peers.
- Ecuador shows a very slow fall. This is due to two reasons: (1) Ecuador already starts from a low ranking position. (2) The last year of the index (2015) shows an improvement (without this improvement the fall is quite sharp as well.) Ecuador does not represent a case of “good populism.”
What this table is showing is that if an individual is born in any of these countries ranking 1st in economic freedom the same year a populist government takes office, then the same country will rank at the bottom of the world before he retires. In the case of Argentina, in 27.8 years the country will be at the bottom of the list, this means that by the time this individual starts to work, Argentina will already have a very repressed economy. By retiring time, this individual will have no experience of living and working in a free economy.
This numbers are not just descriptive of populism in Latin American countries. They also serve as a sort of warning for Europe and the United States, regions that have already seen some signs of populist behavior in their governments and political groups in the last few years. Populism can be emotionally attractive, but is very dangerous for our economic freedoms.
Below is an excerpt from my book I Used to Be French: an Immature Autobiography. You can buy it on amazon here.
The Paris in which I grew up (outside of the long summer vacations), was a gray, dank and dark place. It was an easy locale from which to fantasize about the sun-drenched tropics. Palm-trees were our favorite trees because we never saw any except at the movies. Of all the tropics, the Latin American tropics took pride of place. Perhaps that was because France had negligible colonial entanglement there and therefore, no colonial retirees to mug our fantasy with their recollections of reality. Or perhaps, it was because, well after the emergence of rock-and-roll in France, close dancing was still taking place to the sound of Latin music: Rumba, Samba, Tango. One sensuous experience easily becomes grafted onto another; the clinging softness of girls’ flesh became associated in our minds with that particular kind of music and thence, with a whole unknown continent. This cocktail of sensations biased me until now in favor of that continent.
At one of the stops where several foreign student buses met, I became smitten with a Bolivian girl and she with me. We were to each other the most exotic thing ever touched. She had luscious brown skin, thick, black, lustrous Indian hair, swinging hips, and a lovely round chest. Our buses met again several times and the passion was renewed each time. Although those encounters involved little more than many sloppy deep kisses and some furious mutual groping, indirectly, they were to shape an important part of my mental life, a favorable disposition toward the otherness of others, “xenophilia,” if you will.
With his “The Problem with Conservatism in Latin America,“ Bruno Gonçalves Rosi brings to NOL a very interesting debate on politics and history. In the case of Hispanic America the controversy is quite severe: during the 17th-century Spain and its colonies were undergoing an incremental process of liberalization and modernization known as “Bourbon Reforms.” These reforms implied a language unification (adopting Castilian – later named “Spanish” – as the national language), an increasing centralization of political administration, and free trade between Spain and its colonies, among other aspects.
In the case of the Spanish colonies in America, the Bourbon Reforms implied that Spanish-born subjects were preferred over American-born ones to take up public duties, and also that American products could not compete with Spanish ones. Up until then, commerce among Spain and its American colonies was restrained to gold and a narrow scope of goods. Free commerce had been allowed only in cases of extreme scarcity (for example, between Buenos Aires and South Africa) and for a very short lapse of time. The Bourbon Reforms put a severe strain on the incipient local production of the Hispanic American colonies that had flourished as consequence of closed markets. Sometimes inefficient local processes of production were outperformed by more competitive Spanish goods. But in other cases, efficient local industries were banned because they were regarded as a menace to Spanish ones.
Thus, the reactions to the Bourbon Reforms were of two opposite kinds: the Liberals rejected them because they limited the free trade only to Spain and its colonies and the modernization process was too slow. Liberals demanded free trade with all countries. On the other side, the Conservatives sought to go back to the Habsburg era: they rejected Modernity and free trade and demanded protectionism. The Emancipatory process of Spanish America was carried out by the conjunction of the Liberal and the Conservative reaction against the Bourbon Reforms. Once independence was fulfilled, the two parties became acutely antagonist to each other…perhaps up until today.
The history of Latin American Conservatism and Liberalism is worth our attention not only because of political history itself, but because it gives us a model to ponder the processes of departure from political and economic commonwealths that have been seen in the recent years -and perhaps are not closed yet.