The Sovereign Sea, Part 4: A Coalition of the Whaling

12. Why America Should Embrace Marine Mammal Diplomacy

The United States can help secure its strategic future in the Arctic by lifting its import bans on marine mammal products like seal pelts and whale meat to support the Arctic’s traditional economies. This could be particularly advantageous to America’s ambitious but troubled diplomatic engagement with Greenland, and to its long but recently strained strategic partnership with Canada

As climate change thins the polar ice caps, Greenland has transformed from a remote frozen landmass into the geopolitical center of the North Atlantic. The island commands the vital sea lanes of the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) Gap, hosts critical American aerospace defense infrastructure at Pituffik Space Base, and sits atop some of the world’s largest untapped reserves of rare earth minerals. Russia continues to militarily harden and refurbish its northern bases, and China continues to eye the region through its “Polar Silk Road” initiative. In this contested environment, Washington can no longer treat Greenland as a passive strategic outpost.

But true and enduring security in the Arctic requires a deep partnership with the people who live there. To win the long-term trust of Greenlanders, the United States must move beyond military agreements and offer meaningful economic partnership. The most effective way to do this is to open the U.S. market to Greenland’s traditional, sustainable marine products: seal pelts and whale meat.

13. The Cultural and Economic Reality of Arctic North America

For centuries, the Inuit have relied on the sea for survival. Sealing and whaling were not, strictly speaking, commercial endeavors; they were the foundation of Inuit culture, food security, and local economies. In remote settlements along the vast Arctic coast, alternative economic opportunities were practically nonexistent. Hunting marine mammals provided vital protein and generated local income through the sale of skins and meat.

In Greenland, the management of these resources is highly regulated, scientifically monitored, and strictly sustainable. The government sets conservative quotas based on rigorous environmental assessments to ensure that wildlife populations remain stable and healthy.

Greenlandic hunting methods are deeply rooted in Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK), prioritizing respect for the animal and minimizing waste. The same is true across Baffin Bay in the Canadian Arctic.

Despite this sustainable model, the Inuit traditional economy continues to face severe hardship due to sweeping Western trade restrictions.

14. The Damage of Well-Intentioned Western Bans

For decades, well-meaning but misguided Western environmental campaigns have devastated Arctic communities. The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) imposes a blanket ban on the import of all marine mammal products into the United States. Similarly, the European Union’s bans on seal products have crippled the global market for pelts.

These policies were designed to target large-scale, industrial commercial exploitation. Instead, they caught Indigenous subsistence hunters in the crossfire. By destroying the export market for seal skins, Western nations inadvertently hollowed out the economies of small Arctic villages. This created widespread economic distress and a deep sense of cultural alienation among Inuit, who felt judged and penalized by distant Western capitals.

When Washington approached Nuuk strictly to talk about military radar installations while maintaining laws that effectively criminalize Greenland’s traditional way of life, it created an atmosphere of hypocrisy. This economic and cultural friction left a vulnerability that foreign adversaries are eager to exploit.

Canada’s isolated Arctic communities experienced the very same traumatic and enduring dislocations from the seal ban, and would equally benefit from America’s restoration of markets for marine mammal products.

15. The Strategic Threat of Adversarial Soft Power

But as the West kept its marine mammal markets closed, America’s competitors kept looking for ways to gain influence in Nuuk. I have long urged America to step up its game in marine mammal diplomacy—the idea being that non -Western actors could exploit Western environmental rigidity to build new alliances with Arctic peoples.

A few years back, China pro-actively and with foresight attempted to finance airport expansions, mining projects, and research stations across Greenland. Beijing presented itself as an economic partner willing to invest without lecturing Greenlanders on their cultural traditions. If the United States and its European allies continue to isolate Greenland economically, Nuuk may eventually find such promises of non-Western investment too lucrative to turn down. Its Arctic Strategy takes a balanced approach to the East-West balance, seeing opportunities from both.

Securing Pituffik Space Base, and keeping Chinese state-owned enterprises away from critical infrastructure, will require more than diplomatic pressure. The U.S. must prove that alignment with the West delivers tangible, everyday economic benefits to ordinary Arctic citizens.

16. A Framework for a Targeted U.S. Market

Opening the United States to seal and whale imports does not require abandoning America’s core commitment to marine conservation. Instead, Washington can create a strictly regulated, bilateral trade framework tailored specifically to Greenland and Canada.

Amending the MMPA: Congress can introduce a specific, narrow exemption to the Marine Mammal Protection Act for certified, sustainably harvested products originating from Greenland and Canada.

A Certified Origin System: The U.S., Greenland and Canada can co-create a strict certification system. Every seal pelt or unit of meat exported to the U.S. would carry verification proving it was harvested under Greenland’s official, science-based quotas by licensed hunters and Canada’s collaborative co-management systems wedding TEK and western science.

Strict Anti-Commercialization Guards: The exemption would apply exclusively to Greenland’s regulated, small-scale hunters and Canada’s indigenous subsistence hunters. This will prevent the revival of unregulated, large-scale industrial sealing or whaling by other nations.

By taking these steps, the U.S. can create a highly controlled niche market that honors conservation while providing a massive boost to Greenland’s and Canada’s remote coastal communities.

17. Overcoming the Domestic Political Hurdle

The primary obstacle to this strategy is political friction within the United States. Domestic environmental lobbying groups will likely oppose any modification to marine mammal protections, fearing a slippery slope.

The White House and Congress must counter this pushback with a clear, education-focused narrative. They must explain that supporting Greenland’s and Canada’s sustainable seal and whale hunts is an act of environmental and social justice that aligns with modern indigenous rights frameworks, such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Championing Arctic North America’s traditional hunters will allow Washington to correct decades of economic harm caused by broad-brush Western policies.

18. A Coalition of the Whaling

Furthermore, our national security leaders can frame this policy change as a geopolitical necessity. The long-term strategic cost of losing influence in the Arctic far outweighs the political discomfort of updating domestic conservation laws.

Moreover, by taking the lead on this vital economic front, the United States can forge a powerful new coalition with its traditional maritime (and fellow whaling) allies—Norway, Iceland, and Japan. These nations share a deep-seated cultural understanding of sustainable marine mammal harvesting and possess the existing infrastructure, processing capabilities, and consumer markets necessary to sustain a global trade network. 

19. Life Imitating Art

In what appears to be a coincidental case of life-imitating-art, my advocacy for pro-active American marine mammal diplomacy earlier this summer (appearing in an earlier version of this post here on August 2) has found powerful advocates at the highest levels of Greenland Energy, who came out publicly in late August for what they call “Sealskin diplomacy.” This took form in a proposal to President Trump to lift the unpopular ban on sealskin imports in a bid to improve relations with Greenland while building local support for its oil drilling program.

As reported in the Financial Times, Greenland Energy’s chair, Larry Swets Jr., oversaw development of a 36-page white paper calling upon Washington to modify the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 to permit the sale of sealskins from animals already harvested for food by local Inuit hunters. His sealskin diplomacy initiative followed this summer’s dispute with Nuuk after the company prepositioned unauthorized drilling equipment at the Jameson Land basin without first attaining the necessary permits, earning the Greenland government’s rebuke:

“The plan is to generate income for remote communities and defuse local anger over Trump’s repeated declarations that the US wants to take control of the autonomous Danish territory. Greenland Energy intends to spend $60mn on initial drilling alongside UK mining company 80 Mile to exploit what it claims is ‘a trillion dollars’ of oil lying beneath Greenland. ‘The US has a rare opportunity to strengthen its relationship with Greenland without spending taxpayer money, without touching Greenland’s political status, without increasing the number of seals taken, and without asking Greenland to do anything at all,’ said the ‘white paper’ by Swets that has been produced for Trump …

‘If seals are harvested for food, why should Greenlanders be prevented from selling the skins to Americans? I wouldn’t tell my brothers, nephews and friends they must stop using deer hides or Americans they can’t use cattle leather,’ Swets told the FT. Greenland Energy’s pragmatic approach to indigenous rights and prosperity comes after the company suspended its oil exploration when the island’s authorities said it had no right to drill. Undeterred, Swets is now lobbying Trump to lift the sealskin ban as a way to generate millions of dollars for Greenland’s 55,000 inhabitants.”

I welcome (and salute) Greenland Energy’s proposal, though believe America should not limit its effort to lifting the unpopular seal ban, which has proven devastating not only to Greenlanders, but to Inuit across the circumpolar Arctic, but to simultaneously advance circumpolar trade in whale products as well, creating a more diversified marine mammal market with a wider “coalition of the whaling,” as I described it.

Whaling need not only be part of America’s glorious past but part of our present and future glory as well, and a bridge to a unified circumpolar world, whose unity will be strengthened by our mutual embrace of both sealing and whaling, and the strength, determination and independence they represent. Together, under American leadership, this “coalition of the whaling” can dismantle the restrictive trade barriers of the past, outmaneuver our authoritarian rivals, and build an unshakeable, prosperous future that permanently secures the hearts, minds, and northern borders of Greenland.

20. Winning Hearts, Minds, and Markets

Opening American doors to Greenland’s traditional exports would be a massive diplomatic victory. It would send an undeniable signal to Nuuk and Ottawa that the United States respects the sovereignty, culture, and economic self-determination of its Arctic North American allies.

The economic impact on the U.S. market might be small, but the positive impact on Greenland’s and Canada’s Arctic communities would be transformative. It would revitalize local economies, restore dignity to traditional hunters, and build immense goodwill toward the United States and its whaling partners.

True security in the Arctic cannot be built on military contracts alone. It requires genuine partnership, mutual respect, and shared prosperity. By opening our markets to marine mammal products like seal and whale, the United States can outmaneuver its global rivals, secure its northern flank, and win the enduring loyalty of the people of Greenland and the Canadian Arctic. 

References

  • Freeman, M. M. R., Wein, E. E., & Keith, D. E. (1992). Recovering Rights: Bowhead Whales and Inuvialuit Subsistence in the Western Canadian Arctic. University of Alberta Press, Occasional Publications Series, Issue 2 of Studies in Whaling.
  • Zellen, B. S. (2008). Breaking the Ice: From Land Claims to Tribal Sovereignty in the Arctic. Lexington Books.
  • Zellen, B. S. (2013). State of Recovery: The Quest to Restore American Security after 9/11. Bloomsbury Academic.
  • Zellen, B. S. (2020). Tribe-State Collaboration and the Future of Arctic Cooperation: Moderating Inter-State Competition through Collaborative Multilevel Governance. The Polar Journal (Taylor & Francis) (September 1).
  • Zellen, B. S. (2022). Co-management as a Foundation of Arctic Exceptionalism: Strengthening the Bonds between the Indigenous and Westphalian Worlds, The Yearbook of Polar Law XIII (Brill), 65–92.
  • Zellen, B. S. (2024). Arctic Exceptionalism: Cooperation in a Contested World. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
  • Zellen, B. S. (2025). Co-management, Knowledge Co-production, and the Re-empowerment of Arctic Indigenous Peoples. The Arctic Institute.
  • Zellen, B. S. (2026). A Proposed Compact of Free Association (COFA) Between the United States of America and Greenland. Academia.edu Working Draft.

The Sovereign Sea, Part 3: Maritime Foundations of Tribe-State Collaboration

5. Rebound in Arctic Indigenous Whaling

Canada’s Historic 1982 Withdrawal from the IWC

In 1982, Canada took a decisive diplomatic step by formally withdrawing from the International Whaling Commission. This move was driven by a clear recognition that international bodies were becoming too dogmatic to accommodate the constitutional obligations the Canadian state owed to its indigenous peoples under the newly repatriated Constitution Act of 1982 (Zellen 2008).

By stepping outside the constraints of the IWC, Canada established an internal, localized co-management system for the bowhead whale. Under this framework, wildlife management boards—composed of both government biologists and indigenous hunters—set strict quotas based on a combination of rigorous scientific data and Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK). The hunters themselves enforce the quotas, monitor the health of the whale pods, and collect biological data for scientific study (Zellen 2022). This approach demonstrates that local empowerment can effectively replace top-down global prohibitions.

The Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC)

In the United States, the creation of the Alaska Eskimo Whaling Commission (AEWC) in 1977 provides another important model. When the IWC attempted to impose a complete ban on the subsistence hunting of bowhead whales by the Inupiat, the hunters did not simply accept the decree. Instead, they organized politically, formed the AEWC, and negotiated a historic co-management agreement with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (Zellen 2008).

The AEWC took charge of managing the harvest. It established its own weapons improvement program to ensure quicker, more humane kills, instituted strict reporting requirements, and funded independent scientific research to accurately count the bowhead population. The resulting data proved that the whale stocks were far healthier than the IWC’s distant analysts had estimated, vindicating the traditional observations of the elders and securing sustainable hunting quotas

6. The Geopolitical Bridge: The Arctic-Japan Nexus

The defense of whaling also opens up valuable avenues for global diplomacy. We live in an era of intensifying great power competition, particularly in the maritime domains of the Arctic and the Pacific Oceans (Zellen 2026). As polar ice recedes, the competition over shipping lanes, mineral resources, and fishing rights threatens to destabilize regional peace (Zellen 2013). In this complex landscape, nations must identify shared cultural and economic touchpoints that foster mutual understanding.

This brings us to the strategic case of Japan. For decades, Japan faced intense international pressure over its scientific whaling program, eventually choosing to exit the IWC in 2019 to resume commercial whaling strictly within its own territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

While Western media frequently criticizes Japan’s stance, a closer look reveals a strong parallel to the indigenous struggles of the global north. Japan’s connection to whaling is not merely commercial; it is deeply rooted in the history of its coastal communities, such as Taiji and Ayukawa. For these towns, whaling serves as an economic anchor and a core component of regional heritage.

When we view Japan not as an environmental outlier, but as a fellow maritime nation defending its historical relationship with the sea, a geopolitical bridge emerges (Zellen 2024). There is a quiet solidarity between the indigenous hunters of the Arctic and the traditional coastal whalers of East Asia. Both groups share a worldview that views the ocean as a harvestable commons rather than an untouched wilderness.

By recognizing and validating these shared traditions, we can build international frameworks grounded in realism rather than Western idealism (Zellen 2024). Japan’s active engagement in Arctic affairs—including its contributions to polar science and marine research—is reinforced by this shared understanding of maritime resource reliance (Zellen 2025). In an increasingly fragmented international order, pushing nations out of multilateral forums over emotional issues like whaling is counterproductive. We should instead integrate these traditional maritime economies into robust regional security and trade architectures.

7. The North Atlantic Arc: Greenland, Iceland, and Norway

To fully map the geopolitical geometry of maritime realism, we must extend our gaze from the Pacific and Western Arctic across the North Atlantic ridge. In Greenland, Iceland, and Norway, the defense of whaling is integrated into the constitutional, economic, and ecological architectures of state sovereignty. These three distinct societies demonstrate how whale harvesting can be effectively managed across a spectrum of modern contexts—ranging from post-colonial indigenous self-determination to advanced European social democracies.

Greenland: Home Rule and Aboriginal Subsistence

In Greenland (Kalaallit Nunaat), the hunt is the historical foundation of the Kalaallit identity. Under the modern Greenlandic Home Rule and Self-Government frameworks, marine resource management represents a crucial step toward full decolonization from Denmark. Greenland navigates its position within the IWC under the category of Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling (ASW).

Unlike the idealized Western view that expects indigenous hunters to use archaic tools to prove their “authenticity,” Greenlanders utilize modern harpoon cannons mounted on small, community-owned fishing vessels (Zellen 2026). This approach reflects a practical adaptation that balances modern efficiency with ancient cultural imperatives.

The harvest of minke, fin, bowhead, and humpback whales is managed through a complex municipal distribution system. The meat is shared within localized kin networks and sold through open-air markets (brættet), ensuring that high-quality, local proteins remain accessible to urbanized Greenlanders in Nuuk, Sisimiut, and Ilulissat. Greenland’s stance demonstrates that modern indigenous self-determination cannot exist without the recognized right to sustainably harvest marine assets (Zellen 2026).

Iceland: Economic Autonomy on the Edge of Europe

Iceland (Ísland) presents a compelling case study in the intersection of resource management and national economic sovereignty. For this island nation situated along the Mid-Atlantic Ridge, control over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is viewed as a vital national interest. This foundational focus on resource security is precisely why Iceland historically resisted joining the European Union, fearing the loss of local control over its rich fishing grounds to centralized European management.

Iceland’s relationship with the international whaling regime has long been a diplomatic chess match. After leaving the IWC in 1992 to protest the organization’s rigid preservationist drift, Iceland rejoined in 2002 with a formal reservation against the permanent moratorium.

The Icelandic harvest—primarily targeting fin and minke whales—is conducted by highly specialized, technologically advanced domestic fleets. Rather than operating as an unregulated enterprise, the harvest is strictly limited by national quotas tied to scientific assessments provided by the Marine and Freshwater Research Institute (MFRI) and the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO). For Icelanders, maintaining the right to whale is a core assertion of Westphalian sovereign equality: a statement that a small, highly developed nation possesses the scientific capacity and ethical standing to manage its territorial waters without outside interference.

Norway: Persistent Objection and Democratic Legitimacy

Norway (Norge) provides perhaps the most significant structural challenge to the global anti-whaling consensus. Unlike nations operating under indigenous exemptions or those that recently left the IWC, Norway has maintained a continuous, legal commercial harvest of the common minke whale within its territorial waters. This was achieved by formally registering a persistent objection to the IWC’s 1982 moratorium at the moment of its adoption.

The Norwegian whaling model is integrated into the nation’s broader democratic framework and its highly regarded social-democratic state. The hunt is performed by multi-purpose, small-scale coastal fishing vessels operating in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. It is strictly regulated through a digital, satellite-monitored tracking system that tracks harvests in real time.

The quotas are set using the IWC’s own Revised Management Procedure (RMP), a mathematical framework developed by scientific consensus to guarantee that a harvest cannot deplete a specific animal population.

In the Norwegian worldview, harvesting abundant species like the minke whale is a logical component of sustainable ocean management (høsting). To ban the harvest of a stable marine mammal while permitting the industrial trawling of fish stocks is viewed by Norwegian policymakers as an unscientific and illogical contradiction. Norway’s model demonstrates that an advanced, environmentally conscious nation can maintain a sustainable commercial marine harvest that meets rigorous conservation standards.

8. Socio-Economic Realities and Food Security

For remote coastal and polar communities, marine harvesting is a necessary economic reality. In these isolated locations, the cost of importing food is extraordinarily high. A single gallon of milk or a modest supply of fresh meat must be flown in at immense expense, leaving local populations vulnerable to supply chain disruptions and inflation (Zellen 2008).

Traditional whaling provides an abundant source of high-quality protein and essential nutrients that are perfectly suited to the local climate. A single harvested whale can provide tons of nutrition, feeding an entire village through a long winter.

Furthermore, traditional whaling has an incredibly low carbon footprint compared to the industrial agriculture networks required to transport processed foods to remote regions. Forcing a coastal community to abandon local marine harvesting in favor of imported, factory-farmed food is ecologically counterproductive. It replaces a sustainable, localized harvest with an energy-intensive, corporate supply chain. True environmental sustainability requires evaluating the full lifecycle of our food systems, and localized marine harvesting remains an efficient, low-impact method of feeding human populations.

9. Environmental Ethics and Scientific Wildlife Management

A common argument against whaling is the claim that modern environmental pressures, such as climate change and habitat loss, make any harvest unsustainable. However, this argument misinterprets how modern hunting communities adapt to ecological shifts.

Climate change is transformationally altering the marine environment, particularly in the polar regions. In the Arctic, unpredictable ice conditions, thinning floes, and shifting migration patterns have made hunting more dangerous and complex. Yet, the response from whaling communities has not been reckless over-harvesting. Instead, it has led to increased caution, more careful monitoring, and technological adaptation.

Modern whaling communities utilize GPS, advanced communication systems, and improved safety equipment to navigate these changing environments safely. Crucially, their harvest rates remain a tiny fraction of total whale populations. The quotas allocated to Alaskan and Canadian indigenous groups are designed to ensure that whale populations continue to grow and thrive, even alongside the challenges of warming waters.

Sustainable whaling relies on a combination of applied science and traditional insights. By using satellite tracking alongside generational observation, co-management boards can adjust quotas in real time based on environmental shifts (Zellen 2022). This responsive approach ensures protection for vulnerable stocks while permitting sustainable harvests from robust, healthy populations.

10. Reforming the International Whaling Regime

The current international framework for regulating whaling is broken, but it can be repaired. To resolve the ongoing conflict within global environmental diplomacy, the International Whaling Commission must move away from its rigid, preservationist stance and return to its original mandate as an effective regulatory body.

A reformed international framework should implement three key structural changes:

  • Adopt a Science-Based Quota System: Replace the blanket moratorium with flexible, data-driven quotas that reflect the true health of specific whale stocks.
  • Decentralize Management Authority: Establish regional sub-commissions that allow Arctic, Pacific, and North Atlantic nations to manage local stocks according to their specific regional realities.
  • Elevate Local and Indigenous Voices: Provide formal voting status to indigenous organizations and coastal community alliances, ensuring that those directly affected by maritime policies have a hand in shaping them.

By transitioning from a centralized, prohibitive system to an inclusive, adaptive co-management model, the international community can create a more durable and respected regulatory framework for the world’s oceans (Zellen 2024).

11. Conclusion: The Realist Imperative for a Collaborative Ocean Order

The defense of whaling is ultimately a defense of human diversity, local sovereignty, and political realism (Zellen 2024). It addresses a fundamental question in international relations: Who governs the maritime commons, and who decides how its resources are utilized?

For too long, the answers have been dominated by distant, urbanized majorities imposing their values on coastal and peripheral populations. This approach creates unnecessary friction, causes political alienation, and disrupts practical conservation efforts. Whether it is an Inupiat hunter tracking a bowhead through the shifting ice of the Beaufort Sea or a Japanese fisherman departing from a historic coastal port, these individuals are engaged in an ancient, honorable relationship with the natural world. They live in equilibrium with their environment, taking only what is needed to sustain their communities while respecting ecological limits.

As we face an uncertain geopolitical future characterized by environmental change and shifting power dynamics, we must move beyond the emotional divisions of the past. We must replace top-down ideological prohibitions with flexible, localized co-management systems (Zellen 2020). By embracing the principles of neotribal fusion, we can combine the precision of modern science with the deep insights of traditional knowledge (Zellen 2008).

As the global community stands on the cusp of the 35th anniversary of the September 3, 1991 Inuvialuit bowhead hunt, we are reminded that local resilience can successfully dismantle rigid, top-down international gridlocks. The success of that hunt over more than three decades demonstrates that traditional ecological sovereignty is not an unguided, chaotic free-for-all. Instead, it is a highly ordered, collaborative, and scientifically validated system of maritime custody.

Respecting the sovereign rights of maritime and indigenous peoples to sustainably harvest the resources of their own shores does not diminish our planet’s oceans. Instead, it strengthens the international legal order, respects human diversity, and ensures that these vibrant, resilient cultures can continue to thrive for generations to come (Zellen 2024).

The Sovereign Sea, Part 2: Cultural Survival, Ecological Realism, and the Geopolitics of Whaling

By Barry Scott Zellen, PhD

1. Introduction: The Ideological Deadlock of the Maritime Commons

For over half a century, the international discourse surrounding the harvesting of cetaceans has been trapped in a state of paralysis. This structural deadlock is driven by a stark division between distinct worldviews. On one side stands a dominant, highly urbanized Western orthodoxy that treats the whale not as a biological resource to be managed, but as a sacred, untouchable symbol of environmental purity. On the other side stand historic coastal and indigenous communities—stretching from the icy shores of the Beaufort Sea to the traditional fishing villages of Japan—who view the ocean as a home, an active habitat, and a primary foundation for human survival.

This treatise challenges the preservationist framework that shapes modern international environmental diplomacy. As an IR theorist who has spent decades studying Arctic sovereignty, indigenous rights, and the intersection of state and non-state actors in the global commons, I argue that the global anti-whaling regime does not first and foremost protect marine mammals. Instead, it systematically erodes local autonomy, ignores historic rights, and weakens the co-management frameworks required to stabilize our world’s oceans (Zellen 2024).

We are fast approaching an historic milestone: the 35th anniversary of the historic September 3, 1991 Inuvialuit bowhead hunt. Occurring decades after top-down bans attempted to sever indigenous subsistence relationships with marine mammals such as whales and seals, this singular event stands as a foundational victory for decolonization. It offers an enduring template for how local communities can safely and justly exercise their ecological stewardship.

To move beyond the current international impasse, we must re-evaluate whaling through three core theoretical lenses anchored in the legacy of that historic 1991 hunt:

Indigenous Sovereignty and Decolonization: Restoring the fundamental rights of communities to govern their historical assets.

Neotribal Fusion and Co-Management: Merging traditional ecological knowledge with modern constitutional structures.

Constructive Realism: Understanding how shared maritime harvesting practices can serve as diplomatic bridges between distant nations in an era of great power competition.

2. The Theoretical Foundations of Neotribal Fusion

To understand how traditional practices can survive within modern international relations, we must examine the concept of neotribal fusion (Zellen 2008). Throughout my field research, I have defined this process as the functional blending of indigenous traditions, ancestral rights, and historical patterns of governance with modern, sovereign legal and constitutional frameworks.

For centuries, the relationship between central nation-states and indigenous populations was defined by subjugation. Settler states viewed tribal sovereignty as an existential threat to Westphalian territorial integrity. However, the arrival of modern land claims agreements—such as the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971 and the Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA) of 1984—completely flipped this dynamic (Zellen 2008).

Neotribal fusion shows that respecting local harvesting rights does not lead to ecological chaos. Instead, it creates highly stable, self-regulating partnerships (Zellen 2022). When a state devolves management authority to regional co-management boards—where indigenous hunters and government biologists sit at the same table—the local population gains a direct stake in preserving the ecosystem (Zellen 2025). The hunter is no longer an outsider breaking a distant central law; they become an active custodian of the resource.

3. The Cultural Core: Whaling as an Anchor of Identity

In the high Arctic, among the Inupiat of Alaska’s North Slope, the Inuvialuit of the Northwest Territories, and the Inuit of Greenland, the whale is the central organizing foundation of society. The bowhead hunt requires absolute cooperation, binding generations together through a shared test of skill, courage, and mutual reliance. The sharing of the muktuk (the whale blubber and skin) is an essential communal act, ensuring that elders, widows, and vulnerable members of the community are provided for first.

When international bodies or distant federal agencies issue blanket bans on these hunts, they are not just regulating a diet. They are dismantling a social structure.

A clear turning point occurred in the Canadian Arctic with the September 3, 1991 Inuvialuit bowhead whale hunt (Freeman et al. 1992). For nearly seventy years, the Inuvialuit had been barred from hunting the bowhead (Zellen 2008). This restriction was forced upon them due to the historical damage caused by Western commercial whaling fleets in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Zellen 2020). The indigenous population was forced to pay the price for an ecological crisis they did not cause.

When that single bowhead whale was harvested in 1991 under a carefully negotiated co-management framework, it served as a powerful act of cultural and psychological reclamation (Freeman et al. 1992). It demonstrated that these communities could revive their ancient traditions within a modern legal architecture. The return of the hunt brought an immediate revival of toolmaking, linguistic terms, and oral histories, restoring local pride and countering decades of assimilationist policies.

4. Green Colonialism and the Fallacy of Universal Morality

The primary opposition to whaling is rarely based on modern population data; instead, it relies on a Western-centric moral absolutism. The International Whaling Commission (IWC), originally established by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling in 1946 to manage a commercial industry, gradually shifted its core mission. Over the decades, it transformed into an organization focused on maintaining a permanent, unyielding moratorium. In doing so, it changed from a science-based resource management body into an ideological battleground.

This shift represents a clear form of green colonialism. Wealthy, industrialized nations—having already cleared their own forests, urbanized their landscapes, and depleted their own historic ecosystems—frequently seek to impose a singular aesthetic appreciation of nature upon global populations. They attempt to dictate to the Inuit hunter or the Japanese coastal fisherman which species are acceptable to harvest and which must remain untouched.

This perspective ignores the basic principles of ecological balance. Marine ecosystems are dynamic, complex, and finite. Whales, as apex predators, consume immense quantities of fish and marine organisms. In a world facing systemic food security challenges, a rigid, emotional prohibition on marine harvesting prevents the balanced use of sustainable ocean resources. If a specific whale stock is scientifically proven to be healthy and capable of sustaining a calculated, conservative harvest, there is no rational, resource-based reason to ban its use.

The Sovereign Sea, Part 1: Remembering the Great Bowhead Hunt of 1991

By Barry Scott Zellen, PhD

For over four decades, my work as an Arctic scholar has been animated by a single, foundational truth: the global arena is not merely a collection of Westphalian states competing for structural dominance.

While classical international relations theory fixates on over simplified structures such as Kenneth Waltz’s classic “three images”—the first looking at the individual, the second at the internal structure of the state, and the third at the anarchic international system—it leaves an analytical void at the foundational level of human organization.

To fill this gap, I have advanced 4th Image Theory. This framework recognizes that beneath and before the modern state lies a deeper, older reality: the tribal, sub-state, and indigenous polities that have survived millennia of change. These are not mere domestic minorities; they are enduring sovereign entities whose governance models, land claims, and cultural practices provide a platform for enduring regional stability.

Nowhere is the intersection of state sovereignty and indigenous self-determination more sharply defined—or more routinely misunderstood—than in the deep blue waters of our global commons. For decades, the international community, led by urban activists far removed from the realities of life on and by the sea, has viewed the harvest of cetaceans through the singular lens of prohibition. Whaling has been falsely cast as an archaic, ecologically destructive relic of a bygone era.

This view is profoundly flawed. It ignores both the success of modern conservation and the deep, constitutional evolution of native land claims. When we look past the emotive rhetoric of anti-whaling campaigns, a startling paradox emerges: the sustainable management of whaling is not a point of permanent division. Instead, it offers a powerful framework for bridging the gap between sovereign nation-states and indigenous peoples, forging a shared, collaborative international order.

To understand how whaling can unite rather than divide, consider the 1991 revival of bowhead whaling in the Western Arctic, 35 years ago. In 1982, Canada made the calculated decision to withdraw from the International Whaling Commission (IWC). This move was not an act of environmental defiance; it was a pragmatic recognition of domestic political realities: Ottawa was deep in negotiations over comprehensive land claims agreements with Arctic indigenous peoples—treaties that would ultimately reshape governance of the Northwest Territories and lead to the creation of Nunavut.

By stepping away from the rigid, often deadlocked dictates of the IWC, Ottawa cleared a path to restore the traditional Inuvialuit and Inuit bowhead whale hunting. It replaced distant, centralized and neocolonial governance with an innovative domestic model based on co-management. Through boards composed of both indigenous hunters and federal biologists, decisions on quotas, sustainability, and ecosystem monitoring were co-produced. Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK) was elevated to equal standing with Western empirical science. The foundational proving ground for this paradigm shift occurred on September 3, 1991, when an Inuvialuk harpooner named Titus Allen struck a bowhead whale in the waters off Shingle Point, a summer whaling camp along the Yukon North Slope.

For over half a century, the Inuvialuit had been denied the right to hunt a bowhead whale (arviq), a restriction born of global conservation anxieties that completely ignored the ecological balance maintained by the original inhabitants of the coast. The 1991 hunt was one of many fruits of the historic 1984 Inuvialuit Final Agreement (IFA)—the first Canadian comprehensive land claim settlement north of 60. This treaty did not merely grant land rights; it erected a revolutionary, constitutionally protected architecture for wildlife co-management. When the Inuvialuit Game Council and the newly formed Fisheries Joint Management Committee approved a license for a single bowhead, they were putting the constitutional teeth of their land claim to the test.

The hunt itself became a masterclass in cross-generational, cross-cultural collaboration. Because a full fifty-four years had passed since the last local bowhead harvest, the Inuvialuit faced a profound rupture in practical whaling knowledge. To bridge this historical chasm, they looked across the border to their Inupiat kin in Alaska. Experienced whaling captains from the North Slope traveled to the Mackenzie Delta, bringing with them modern safety protocols, traditional tracking techniques, and specialized harvesting equipment, including penthrite projectile bombs designed to ensure a humane, efficient kill.

After striking the leviathan the day before, on September 4th, a crew led by Inuvialuit whaling captain Danny A. Gordon successfully landed a 36-foot, 40-ton bowhead whale at Shingle Point. The event was a profound cultural awakening, but its political implications were even greater. The processing of the whale on the beach required the mobilization of whole communities—Aklavik, Inuvik, Tuktoyaktuk—distributing muktuk (skin and blubber) across the region according to ancient laws of sharing that reinforce social cohesion.

For the Canadian state, this was a watershed moment in regulatory flexibility. Federal fisheries officers worked alongside indigenous hunters, not as adversarial enforcers, but as technical partners. The 1991 harvest proved to a skeptical international community that an indigenous polity, armed with modern legal authority and rooted in traditional ecological wisdom, could safely manage a protected species without state paternalism. It transformed the concept of conservation from a top-down mandate into a collaborative, treaty-based partnership between indigenous peoples and the state.

This historical lesson demonstrates that when a nation-state respects the maritime traditions of its indigenous peoples, it does not weaken its own sovereignty; it strengthens the fabric of its domestic peace. The restoration of bowhead hunting in the Western Arctic did not spark ecological collapse. Instead, it revitalized community cohesion, strengthened food security in an economically marginalized region, and integrated indigenous governance directly into the structural machinery of the state.

In recent years, we see history repeating itself, with Tokyo’s decision to exit the IWC in 2019, following proudly and boldly in Canada’s footsteps so Japan, too, could resume coastal whaling within its own territorial waters and EEZ. Japan’s pivot offers a compelling point of alignment with northern indigenous communities. Small, historic whaling towns of coastal Japan—such as Taiji, Wada, and Ayukawa—possess a deep maritime heritage that mirrors the subsistence culture of the Inuvialuit. For coastal communities of both the Arctic and the Pacific, the whale is not merely a resource unit to be extracted; it is an economic anchor, a dietary staple, and the focus of deep cultural veneration.

When modern states like Japan, Iceland and Norway defend their right to utilize abundant marine resources sustainably under international law, they are fighting the exact same battle against eco-colonialism that indigenous communities have waged for generations. By reframing the whaling debate around the principles of sustainability, food security, and cultural survival, we create a powerful common denominator: sovereign nations defending their maritime rights and indigenous polities protecting their ancestral subsistence traditions find themselves standing on the same side of the geopolitical ledger. They are united by a shared commitment to what I call constructive realism—a pragmatism that recognizes that real-world stability requires balancing ecological limits with human survival and cultural continuity.

The international community must stop viewing whaling as a binary conflict between conservationists and exploiters. Instead, it must be recognized as a sophisticated arena for co-management, where the sovereign rights of coastal states and the inherent rights of First Nations converge. By honoring Native traditions through robust, collaborative, and scientifically sound frameworks, we do not fracture global unity. Instead, we ground it in the realities of our shared environment, proving that international relations are at their most resilient when they honor the tribal foundations upon which our world was built.

A Coalition of the Whaling: Why America Should Embrace Marine Mammal Diplomacy for the Arctic

The United States can help secure its strategic future in the Arctic by lifting its import bans on marine mammal products like seal pelts and whale meat to support the Arctic’s traditional economies. This could be particularly advantageous to America’s ambitious but troubled diplomatic engagement with Greenland, and to its long but recently strained strategic partnership with Canada

As climate change thins the polar ice caps, Greenland has transformed from a remote frozen landmass into the geopolitical center of the North Atlantic. The island commands the vital sea lanes of the GIUK (Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom) Gap, hosts critical American aerospace defense infrastructure at Pituffik Space Base, and sits atop some of the world’s largest untapped reserves of rare earth minerals. Russia continues to militarily harden and refurbish its northern bases, and China continues to eye the region through its “Polar Silk Road” initiative. In this contested environment, Washington can no longer treat Greenland as a passive strategic outpost.

But true and enduring security in the Arctic requires a deep partnership with the people who live there. To win the long-term trust of Greenlanders, the United States must move beyond military agreements and offer meaningful economic partnership. The most effective way to do this is to open the U.S. market to Greenland’s traditional, sustainable marine products: seal pelts and whale meat.

The Cultural and Economic Reality of Arctic North America

For centuries, the Inuit have relied on the sea for survival. Sealing and whaling were not, strictly speaking, commercial endeavors; they were the foundation of Inuit culture, food security, and local economies. In remote settlements along the vast Arctic coast, alternative economic opportunities were practically nonexistent. Hunting marine mammals provided vital protein and generated local income through the sale of skins and meat.

In Greenland, the management of these resources is highly regulated, scientifically monitored, and strictly sustainable. The government sets conservative quotas based on rigorous environmental assessments to ensure that wildlife populations remain stable and healthy.

Greenlandic hunting methods are deeply rooted in Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK), prioritizing respect for the animal and minimizing waste. The same is true across Baffin Bay in the Canadian Arctic.

Despite this sustainable model, the Inuit traditional economy continues to face severe hardship due to sweeping Western trade restrictions.

The Damage of Well-Intentioned Western Bans

For decades, well-meaning but misguided Western environmental campaigns have devastated Arctic communities. The U.S. Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) imposes a blanket ban on the import of all marine mammal products into the United States. Similarly, the European Union’s bans on seal products have crippled the global market for pelts.

These policies were designed to target large-scale, industrial commercial exploitation. Instead, they caught Indigenous subsistence hunters in the crossfire. By destroying the export market for seal skins, Western nations inadvertently hollowed out the economies of small Arctic villages. This created widespread economic distress and a deep sense of cultural alienation among Inuit, who felt judged and penalized by distant Western capitals.

When Washington approached Nuuk strictly to talk about military radar installations while maintaining laws that effectively criminalize Greenland’s traditional way of life, it created an atmosphere of hypocrisy. This economic and cultural friction left a vulnerability that foreign adversaries are eager to exploit.

Canada’s isolated Arctic communities experienced the very same traumatic and enduring dislocations from the seal ban, and would equally benefit from America’s restoration of markets for marine mammal products.

The Strategic Threat of Adversarial Soft Power

But as the West kept its marine mammal markets closed, America’s competitors kept looking for ways to gain influence in Nuuk. I have long urged America to step up its game in marine mammal diplomacy—the idea being that non -Western actors could exploit Western environmental rigidity to build new alliances with Arctic peoples.

A few years back, China pro-actively and with foresight attempted to finance airport expansions, mining projects, and research stations across Greenland. Beijing presented itself as an economic partner willing to invest without lecturing Greenlanders on their cultural traditions. If the United States and its European allies continue to isolate Greenland economically, Nuuk may eventually find such promises of non-Western investment too lucrative to turn down. Its Arctic Strategy takes a balanced approach to the East-West balance, seeing opportunities from both.

Securing Pituffik Space Base, and keeping Chinese state-owned enterprises away from critical infrastructure, will require more than diplomatic pressure. The U.S. must prove that alignment with the West delivers tangible, everyday economic benefits to ordinary Arctic citizens.

A Framework for a Targeted U.S. Market

Opening the United States to seal and whale imports does not require abandoning America’s core commitment to marine conservation. Instead, Washington can create a strictly regulated, bilateral trade framework tailored specifically to Greenland and Canada.

Amending the MMPA: Congress can introduce a specific, narrow exemption to the Marine Mammal Protection Act for certified, sustainably harvested products originating from Greenland and Canada.

A Certified Origin System: The U.S., Greenland and Canada can co-create a strict certification system. Every seal pelt or unit of meat exported to the U.S. would carry verification proving it was harvested under Greenland’s official, science-based quotas by licensed hunters and Canada’s collaborative co-management systems wedding TEK and western science.

Strict Anti-Commercialization Guards: The exemption would apply exclusively to Greenland’s regulated, small-scale hunters and Canada’s indigenous subsistence hunters. This will prevent the revival of unregulated, large-scale industrial sealing or whaling by other nations.

By taking these steps, the U.S. can create a highly controlled niche market that honors conservation while providing a massive boost to Greenland’s and Canada’s remote coastal communities.

Overcoming the Domestic Political Hurdle

The primary obstacle to this strategy is political friction within the United States. Domestic environmental lobbying groups will likely oppose any modification to marine mammal protections, fearing a slippery slope.

The White House and Congress must counter this pushback with a clear, education-focused narrative. They must explain that supporting Greenland’s and Canada’s sustainable seal and whale hunts is an act of environmental and social justice that aligns with modern indigenous rights frameworks, such as the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Championing Arctic North America’s traditional hunters will allow Washington to correct decades of economic harm caused by broad-brush Western policies.

A Coalition of the Whaling

Furthermore, our national security leaders can frame this policy change as a geopolitical necessity. The long-term strategic cost of losing influence in the Arctic far outweighs the political discomfort of updating domestic conservation laws.

Moreover, by taking the lead on this vital economic front, the United States can forge a powerful new coalition with its traditional maritime (and fellow whaling) allies—Norway, Iceland, and Japan. These nations share a deep-seated cultural understanding of sustainable marine mammal harvesting and possess the existing infrastructure, processing capabilities, and consumer markets necessary to sustain a global trade network. 

Together, under American leadership, this “coalition of the whaling” can dismantle the restrictive trade barriers of the past, outmaneuver our authoritarian rivals, and build an unshakeable, prosperous future that permanently secures the hearts, minds, and northern borders of Greenland.

Winning Hearts, Minds, and Markets

Opening American doors to Greenland’s traditional exports would be a massive diplomatic victory. It would send an undeniable signal to Nuuk and Ottawa that the United States respects the sovereignty, culture, and economic self-determination of its Arctic North American allies.

The economic impact on the U.S. market might be small, but the positive impact on Greenland’s and Canada’s Arctic communities would be transformative. It would revitalize local economies, restore dignity to traditional hunters, and build immense goodwill toward the United States and its whaling partners.

True security in the Arctic cannot be built on military contracts alone. It requires genuine partnership, mutual respect, and shared prosperity. By opening our markets to marine mammal products like seal and whale, the United States can outmaneuver its global rivals, secure its northern flank, and win the enduring loyalty of the people of Greenland and the Canadian Arctic. 

Code Blue: How America Can Help Heal Greenland’s Rural Health Crisis

The vast, ice-locked expanse of Greenland is facing a quiet, structural rural health crisis. While global powers look north to debate emerging shipping lanes, untapped deposits of rare-earth minerals, and increasingly salient geopolitical positioning in the Arctic, a human crisis is unfolding across the territory’s remote coastal settlements. Greenland’s rural healthcare system is straining under the weight of persistent staffing shortages, extreme geographic isolation, and an overwhelming infrastructural deficit.

As America expands its diplomatic and strategic footprint in the Arctic and High North Atlantic, Washington can no longer afford to view Greenland solely through the lens of national defense and radar stations. Addressing Greenland’s rural health crisis is not just a moral imperative; it is a critical opportunity for the United States to practice meaningful, localized diplomacy that secures long-term stability and goodwill in a vital region.

The recent public rejection of a U.S. hospital ship by Greenlandic and Danish officials was a triumph of nationalist pride, but a tragedy for the island’s most vulnerable residents. The political friction began on February 21, 2026, when U.S. President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that he was deploying a “great hospital boat” to Greenland, claiming the population lacked proper care.

The response from Nuuk and Copenhagen was immediate. As ABC News reported, “‘It’s a no thank you from here,’ Greenlandic Prime Minister Jens-Frederik Nielsen said,” just hours after President Trump’s generous offer: “‘President Trump’s idea of sending an American hospital ship here to Greenland has been noted. But we have a public healthcare system where treatment is free for citizens. That is a deliberate choice — and a fundamental part of our society. That is not how it works in the USA, where it costs money to see a doctor.'” But as all residents of Nordic states know, it costs money to see doctors there too, through higher taxes and in the specific case of Greenland, Danish subsidies.

Denmark’s leadership quickly reinforced this message. As the New York Times reported, “Troels Lund Poulsen, the Danish defense minister, told Denmark’s public broadcaster, DR, that his government had not been made aware of the plan. He said that there was ‘no need for special health care efforts, in Greenland.'” Perhaps he needs to spend more time in rural Greenland before making such a bold but dubious claim.

Danish PM Mette Frederiksen — who barely survived Denmark’s March parliamentary elections by assembling a four-party minority coalition government 69 days after her party, the Social Democrats, delivered their worst electoral performance in over a century — responded similarly but indirectly to President Trump’s generosity, writing on Instagram “I’m happy to live in a country where there is free and equal access to health care for everyone,” as the New York Times also reported, “The same approach exists in Greenland.”

In dismissing the U.S. President’s generous offer so quickly and cavalierly as an unnecessary political stunt, these Greenlandic and Danish leaders touted Greenland’s free, national healthcare system. Yet, their defensive reaction masks a grim reality familiar to anyone living outside the capital of Nuuk: for Greenland’s remote and isolated settlements, access to that “free” healthcare is often a distant, and at times dangerous, illusion.

Just look at the dispararity in life expectancies in Greenland and Denmark: in Greenland, the average life expectancy is 69.3 years for men and 73.9 for women, while in Denmark it’s 79.9 for men and 83.7 for women—nearly a full decade of precious life longer for both men and women (for those lucky enough to have survived Denmark’s decades-long policies of Greenlandic population suppression). Outside of Nuuk, whose life expectancy numbers enjoy a boost from its high concentration of non-Greenland born residents, life expectancies are even lower by some three to four years.

While elite urban leaders lean into their ideological purity from modern, state-of-the-art “Potemkin” facilities, rural Greenlanders continue face severe doctor shortages, long transport times for emergencies, an ongoing specialist crisis, and heartbreaking levels of suicide. In a vast, Arctic nation where geography is the ultimate barrier to the practice of medicine, a floating, fully-equipped hospital ship is not an insult to sovereignty—it is a highly practical, life-saving solution to the undeniable failures of rural Arctic healthcare.

Anatomy of an Arctic Health Crisis

Greenland operates a universal healthcare system that is free at the point of use. However, equity in theory does not translate to equity in geography. For most of the island’s 57,000 residents—scattered across dozens of isolated villages accessible only by plane, helicopter, dog sled, or boat—access to basic medical care is akin to a lottery. The system is suffocated by an unsustainable reliance on short-term, rotational medical professionals traveling from Denmark. These practitioners rarely stay long enough to learn Greenlandic or understand local cultural nuances. This in turn exhausts the few permanent, bilingual local health workers, driving severe burnout and rapid turnover.

In the remotest of settlements, basic lifesaving tools like defibrillators are frequently absent. When emergencies strike, the territory relies on expensive, logistically complex medevacs. At a rate of 7.7 evacuations per 1,000 inhabitants every year, these flights drain tens of millions of dollars from an already strained public budget. Because preventive care is practically non-existent in the rural periphery, chronic conditions like cardiovascular disease and cancer are routinely diagnosed at late, terminal stages.

Compounding these structural challenges is a profound legacy of historical trauma. The revelation of protracted, forced contraception campaigns enacted by Danish authorities in recent decades has left deep scars. It has fostered a persistent, understandable distrust of institutional medical systems among Indigenous communities.

Washington to the Rescue


For decades, America’s relationship with Greenland has been transactional, anchored by the strategic outpost of Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base). However, in an era of renewed Arctic competition, hard military power is no longer enough to maintain durable alliances.

The Greenlandic government currently faces an estimated one-billion-kroner (US $150 million+) deficit just to modernize its clinical infrastructure and bridge the health equity gap between rural settlements and the capital, Nuuk. By actively intervening to help close this gap, the United States can deploy a strategy of medical diplomacy. This approach will alleviate human suffering while demonstrating that American partnership brings tangible, life-saving benefits to everyday Greenlandic citizens.

An Action Plan for American Medical Diplomacy

The United States possesses the exact technological, logistical, and clinical infrastructure needed to revolutionize rural health care in Greenland. To achieve maximum impact, Washington should deploy a targeted, three-tiered action plan:

1. Scale AI-Powered, Pan-Arctic Telehealth Collaboration

The greatest barrier to rural healthcare in Greenland is distance. Rather than trying to solve this in isolation, the United States should integrate Greenland into a broader, pan-Arctic telehealth network. By creating a collaborative digital medical grid between Alaska’s tribal health organizations—which have decades of experience in remote, sub-zero care—and Greenland’s regional clinics, providers can seamlessly share best practices, billing efficiencies, and translation strategies.

Crucially, this pipeline can be supercharged with Artificial Intelligence. American technologists like Elon Musk can help develop and deploy automated AI diagnostic software to rural Greenlandic nursing stations. These algorithms can instantly evaluate X-rays, spot early-stage oncological abnormalities on skin scans, and read basic blood work without waiting days for a specialist in Nuuk or Copenhagen. By pairing low-Earth orbit satellite arrays with AI triage tools, minor health issues can be resolved locally, stopping the financial bleed of avoidable medical evacuations.

2. Deploy Seasonal U.S. Hospital Ships for Direct Care

While digital health addresses daily care, Greenland’s immense surgical backlogs require physical intervention. The United States Navy maintains the world’s most capable floating medical platforms. Washington should institutionalize annual, seasonal deployments of U.S. hospital ships (such as the USNS Comfort or Mercy, or newly designed agile medical vessels) to the High North Atlantic and Arctic during the ice-free summer months.

Operating as high-profile medical diplomacy, these ships would anchor off regional hubs like Qaqortoq, Sisimiut, or Ilulissat. Over a multi-week deployment, American naval surgeons and dental corps could perform hundreds of elective surgeries, joint replacements, and advanced dental procedures that rural Greenlanders currently wait years to receive. This surge of direct, high-impact clinical aid would immediately relieve the strain on Greenland’s domestic budget while forging deep cultural goodwill directly with the populace.

Indeed, commissioning a new, dedicated medical icebreaker designed for maritime health delivery to Arctic coastal villages would provide a critical, helpful new layer to the region’s much-needed rural healthcare infrastructure. Geopolitical grandstanding aside, achieving this logistical breakthrough requires cooperation over pride. America can genuinely help by offering specialized maritime medical expertise and use of its hospital ships, but Denmark can and must do more too, leveraging its substantial wealth and sovereign responsibility to co-fund a permanent mobile care solution for the citizens it aims to protect.

3. Establish a High North Atlantic and Arctic Medical Scholarship Program

True healthcare sustainability cannot be imported; it must be grown from within. The U.S. State Department should launch a scholarship and residency pipeline inviting Greenlandic students to train at top-tier American medical and nursing schools, funded by allied donors who will all benefit from a healthier and more secure Arctic.

This program must place special emphasis on rural medicine, telehealth deployment, and culturally informed community health care. In exchange, graduates would commit to returning to Greenland’s rural clinics for a designated period. This initiative would systematically build a permanent, bilingual, and Indigenous medical workforce, directly dismantling the cycle of foreign medical dependency.

Rx for Change

True Arctic security is impossible to achieve when the region’s inhabitants are left vulnerable to preventable systemic health crises. The structural deficiencies in Greenland’s rural healthcare network require resources, technology, and logistical capabilities that Nuuk cannot assemble alone.

By stepping forward with an innovative blend of AI-driven pan-Arctic telehealth networks, seasonal hospital ship deployments, and long-term educational pipelines, the United States can help heal a profound humanitarian rift in the High North Atlantic and Arctic. In doing so, America will prove that its commitment to the Arctic is measured not just in military muscle, but in the health, dignity, and longevity of the people who call the Arctic home.

“Must Liberalism be Atomistic?” by Jacob Rodriguez

During his inauguration ceremony, the newly elected mayor of New York City Zohran Mamdani pledged to run the city as he had run his campaign, as a committed socialist. He stirred much discussion during his speech when he claimed that “We will replace the frigidity of rugged individualism with the warmth of collectivism.” A variety of public thinkers and politicians commented on this statement, taking it as a moment to reflect on what they perceived as a referendum on uniquely American ideals.


[Click here to read the entire essay]


Jacob Rodriguez is a PhD candidate in political science at Baylor University. Email him at jacob_rodriguez12@baylor.edu.

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“Of Lamb and Man” by Onyinyechi Ndukaire

Most lambs were born of flesh.

But not me.

I was born with a word.

“Let the land produce living creatures according to their kinds: the livestock, the creatures that move along the ground, and the wild animals. Each according to its kind.” I didn’t know who said it, but I began to live somehow. At first, I was a microscopic cell that grew and divided; my cells formed into tissues, which then developed into organs, and systems emerged afterwards. All these vital parts of mine were sewn up together into a body clothed in white fur, and hooves that made a closing to the ends of my limbs.


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Onyinyechi Ndukaire is a writer residing in Lagos, Nigeria. She believes in the power of stories and how it has and will shape the world; that is why she tells them. Her works have been published in Isonomia Quarterly, Brittle Paper, Arts Lounge, and elsewhere. Write: ndukaireonyinyechi@gmail.com.

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“The Twelve Delusions of the Lollards” by Lucy Swan

Beginning in about late fourteenth-century England, a movement of Christians known as the Lollards challenged many of the doctrines of the medieval Church. They raised questions about who possessed the legitimate authority to interpret Scripture, administer sacraments, compel oaths, and govern Christian life. They insisted on the primacy of Scripture over ecclesiastical hierarchy and disputed church dogma on transubstantiation, clerical celibacy, pilgrimages, and prayers for the dead. The movement unsettled the religious, legal, and political structures through which the ecclesiastical authorities exercised rule.

The poem below adopts the voice of an orthodox clerical opponent responding to such challenges.


[Click here to read the whole thing]


Lucy Swan studies history and poetry. Her poetry appears in The Clayjar Review and The Aerie, where she also serves as an editor. Send her mail.

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“Incorrigible Rudeness, The Strategy For Social-Political Impotence” by Paul Poenicke

Isonomia Quarterly readers have likely asked the following question: Why are Hayekian ideas so unpopular? Equality under the law and global federalism—two of Hayek’s most cogent ideals—are consequential from numerous perspectives and justified by many strong arguments. A dozen phrases pass through the mind—”The best arguments persuade,” “The truth will out,” “Survival of the fittest beliefs,” “Truth emerges from the marketplace of ideas”—to accost reality. Unfortunately, society is not a truth table, where the input of truth entails the output of further truths. Truth tables are constructs of logic, and reality is not beholden to the results of formal logic and its apparatuses.


[Click here to read the entire essay]


Paul Poenicke is a trained philosopher, specializing in social epistemology and social-political philosophy. Send mail to him at ppoenicke@gmail.com.

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The Cruel, Conceited Follies of Trump’s Foreign Policy: 2026 Edition

A neo-expressionist painting of Trump jamming an American Flag into the Globe with "Yours Win Ours" written in blood in the background, a bald eagle, and pastiches of factories and oil refineries.

Trump has now taken extralegal military action in Venezuela. Trump is strongly considering such action in Iran. And Trump keeps flirting with aggressive globally destabilizing military annexation of Greenland, a NATO ally. Many people are acting perplexed. After all, didn’t libertarian “genius” and totally-not-delusional-reactionary Walter Block tell us back in 2016 that libertarians should vote for Trump because he is anti-war? After this proved to be false the first term, didn’t totally-not-delusional-reactionary Walter Block then tell us again case for libertarianism was that he was anti-war and anti-foreign intervention, and that he was super cereal this time?

Sarcasm aside, I think it is worth revisiting why Trump’s foreign policy turn towards a radical sort of imperialist interventionism is so evil and unsurprising. I was confident back in 2016 that he was always going to be an old-school imperialist who uses US military conquest purely for resource extraction in a way that would be far worse than neocon warmongering. I wrote at the time, following Zach Beauchamp (who continues to emphasize this point), that Trump’s foreign policy was neither the neo-conservative interventionism of the Clintons and Bushes of the world, nor the principled anti-interventionism of libertarian scholars like Christopher Coyne and Abigail Hall, nor even the nationalist isolationism of paleoconservatives like James Buchanan. Instead, Trump’s foreign policy has always (quite consistently, since he was still a pro-choice democrat in the 90s) been about advancing inchoate national economic and political interestswhich really just means the interests of the politically connected.

This connection between Trump’s completely crankish economic nationalism and his imperialist foreign policy is even tighter now than it was then. It seems Trump is likely facing a rejection of his unconstitutional overreach of unilaterally applying economically suicidal tariffs from SCOTUS. The tariffs, which originally, might I add, were based on perhaps the single dumbest attempt to do economics I have ever seen, appeared to be lifted straight from ChatGPT, given that his main economic advisor on these matters, Peter Navarro, is literally a fraudster. As a result, he now seems to be manufacturing a national security crisis so he can impose tariffs without congress’ blessing.

But I do not want to revisit Trump’s imperialist foreign policy just to gloat. I also want to revisit and restate why this foreign policy is unbelievably unjust and self-destructive. What I wrote back in 2016 is still worth reposting at length:

First, Trump’s style of Jacksonian foreign policy is largely responsible for most of the humanitarian atrocities committed by the American government. Second, Trump’s economic foreign policy is antithetical to the entire spirit of the liberal tradition; it undermines the dignity and freedom of the individual and instead treats the highest good as for the all-powerful nation-state (meaning mostly the politicians and their special interests) as the end of foreign policy, rather than peace and liberty. Finally, Trump’s foreign policy fails for the same reasons that socialism fails. If the goals of foreign policy are to represent “national interest,” then the policymaker must know what that “national interest” even is and we have little reason to think that is the case, akin to the knowledge problem in economic coordination.

… This is because the Jacksonian view dictates that we should use full force in war to advance our interests and the reasons for waging war are for selfish rather than humanitarian purposes. We have good reason to think human rights under Trump will be abused to an alarming degree, as his comments that we should “bomb the hell out of” Syria, kill the noncombatant families of suspected terrorists, and torture detainees indicate. Trump is literally calling for the US to commit inhumane war crimes in the campaign, it is daunting to think just how dark his foreign policy could get in practice.

To reiterate: Trump’s foreign policy views are just a particularly nasty version of imperialism and colonialism. Mises dedicated two entire sections of his chapter on foreign policy in Liberalism: The Classical Tradition to critiquing colonialism and revealing just how contrary these views are to liberalism’s commitment to peace and liberty. In direct opposition to Trump’s assertions that we should go to war to gain another country’s wealth and resources and that we should expand military spending greatly, Mises argues:

“Wealth cannot be won by the annexation of new provinces since the “revenue” deprived from a territory must be used to defray the necessary costs of its administration. For a liberal state, which entertains no aggressive plans, a strengthening of its military power is unimportant.”

Mises’ comments on the colonial policy in his time are extremely pertinent considering Trump’s calls to wage ruthlessly violent wars and commit humanitarian crises. “No chapter of history is steeped further in blood than the history of colonialism,” Mises argued. “Blood was shed uselessly and senselessly. Flourishing lands were laid waste; whole peoples destroyed and exterminated. All this can in no way be extenuated or justified.”

Trump says the ends of foreign policy are to aggressively promote “our” national interests, Mises says “[t]he goal of the domestic policy of liberalism is the same as that of its foreign policy: peace.” Trump views the world as nations competing in a zero-sum game and there must be one winner that can only be brought about through military conquest and economic protectionism, Mises says liberalism “aims at the peaceful cooperation between nations as within each nation” and specifically attacks “chauvinistic nationalists” who “maintain that irreconcilable conflicts of interest exist among the various nations[.]” Trump is rabidly opposed to free trade and is horrifically xenophobic on immigration, the cornerstone of Mises’ foreign policy is free movement of capital and labor over borders. There is no “congruence” between Trump and any classically liberal view on foreign policy matters in any sense; to argue otherwise is to argue from a position of ignorance, delusion, or to abandon the very spirit of classical liberalism in the first place.

…Additionally, even if we take Trump’s nationalist ends as given, the policy means Trump prefers of violent military intervention likely will not be successful for similar reasons to why socialism fails. Christopher Coyne has argued convincingly that many foreign interventions in general fail for very similar reasons to why attempts at economic intervention fail, complications pertaining to the Hayekian knowledge problem. How can a government ill-equipped to solve the economic problems of domestic policy design and control the political institutions and culture of nations abroad?  Coyne mainly has the interventionism of neoconservatives and liberals in mind, but many of his insights apply just as well to Trump’s Jacksonian vision for foreign policy.

The knowledge problem also applies on another level to Trump’s brand of interventionism. Trump assumes that he, in all his wisdom as president, can know what the “national interest” of the American people actually is, just like socialist central planners assume they know the underlying value scales or utility functions of consumers in society. We have little reason to assume this is the case.

Let’s take a more concrete example: Trump seems to think one example of intervention in the name of national interest is to take the resource of another country that our country needs, most commonly oil. However, how is he supposed to know which resources need to be pillaged for the national interest? There’s a fundamental calculation problem here. A government acting without a profit signal cannot know the answer to such a problem and lacks the incentive to properly answer it in the first place as the consequences failure falls upon the taxpayers, not the policy makers. Even if Trump and his advisors could figure out that the US needs a resource, like oil, and successfully loots it from another country, like Libya, there is always the possibility that this artificial influx of resources, this crony capitalist welfare for one resource at the expense of others, is crowding out potentially more efficient substitutes.

For an example, if the government through foreign policy expands the supply of oil, this may stifle entrepreneurial innovations for potentially more efficient resources in certain applications, such as natural gas, solar, wind, or nuclear in energy, for the same reasons artificially subsidizing these industries domestically stifle innovation. They artificially reduce the relative scarcity of the favored resource, reducing the incentive for entrepreneurs to find innovative means of using other resources or more efficient production methods. At the very least, Trump and his advisors would have little clue how to judge the opportunity cost of pillaging various resources and so would not know how much oil to steal from Libya. Even ignoring all those problems, it’s very probable that it would be cheaper and morally superior to simply peaceably trade with another country for oil (or any other resource) rather than waging a costly, violent, inhumane war in the first place.

Having said all that, there is plenty I got wrong in picturing Trump as an old-school imperialist. During Trump’s first term, I underestimated the extent to which institutional constraints would stop him from acting on his worst nationalist and imperialist impulses. But this term, those constraints are gone. The Mattises, Tillersons, Boltons, and Pences of the world have been replaced with the Vances, Noems, Rubios, and Hegseths. As a result, thinking of Trump as an old-school imperialist and nationalist is becoming more accurate since he is allowed to act on his irrational, deranged impulses.

Second, I failed to distinguish sufficiently between resource extraction through indirect means of violent regime change, tariffs, weapons supply, and 19th-century colonialist-style direct annexation versions of it. I do still think that if Trump really did what he most consistently wants he would do quite a bit of annexation and old school colonialism (see his comments on Greenland and Canada), but he seems a bit more content than I projected back then to use military force to install stooges and puppet regimes for resource extraction (as he has sought to do in both Gaza and now Venezuela). Which, to your point, is not as different from the Nixon/Bush/Clinton/Reagan type intervention as reactionary centrists would have you believe, but the nakedness of the extractive nationalist motivation does mark a difference that encourages even more brazenly cruel, more illegal, and more strategically incoherent and unpredictable interventionist warmongering.

Thirdly, and most obviously, I greatly overestimated his coherence on foreign policy. Whether it is him handicapping US influence in the Pacific by withdrawing from the TPP while implementing tariffs on Chinese goods to seem tough in the first term, which just gave China more leverage in the region. Or whether it’s his delusional flip-flopping on Russia and Ukraine based on who he talked to last, constantly this term. Or whether it’shis random provocation against Iran in 2019 by killing one of their generals. Or whether it’s his insane flip-flopping between Nuclear War talk and sychophancy with North Korea. Or the total randomness of his attacking Venezuela for more domestic than foreign policy reasons now. He is simply far more impulsive and deranged than I would have predicted in 2016. This part of that old article seems especially stale now:

After all, it doesn’t matter so much the character of public officials as the institutional incentives they face. But in matters of foreign policy problems of temperament and character do matter because the social situation between foreign leaders in diplomacy can often make a huge difference.

I did hedge that by allowing that Trump may be a uniquely unfit person so as to constitute a sui-generis case. But I should have been more emphatic about that: Trump really is a uniquely world-historically dangerous monster, and he has gotten more and more incoherent and impulsive over the years with his cognitive decline.

Finally, the biggest miss in my analysis of Trump’s foreign policy back then is that I put far too much emphasis on Trump’s focus on material goods, thinking he really just thought of geopolitics like a 12-year-old approaches a turn-based strategy game like Risk in just accruing more stuff. But in reality, his approach is far more disturbing and vile than even that. It is not simply about getting oil for US oil companies. In the case of Venezuela, oil execs do not seem so gun-ho. As one private equity investor told the Financial Times last week, “No one wants to go in there when a random fucking tweet can change the entire foreign policy of the country.” Indeed, the political risk is so big there Exonn’s CEO has called Venezuela “uninvestable” and Trump is trying to force oil companies to misallocate capital to Venezuela.

Narrow left-wing materialists’ critiques like mine misfire because they treat material resources as the main thing. It is not the oil per se that Trump wants, but what the oil represents. He is instead approaching international geo-politics like an 8-year-old driven by malignant narcissism: he wants symbols of nationalist masculine domination. Indeed, when asked why he wanted Greenland, Trump was quoted as saying:

Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success. I think that ownership gives you a thing that you can’t do, whether you’re talking about a lease or a treaty. Ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.

Indeed, the fact that Greenland looks big on a Mercator projection of the earth has as much to do with why Trump wants it as the oil. As Trump continues his authoritarian assaults on individual liberty domestically and pursues semiotic nationalist domination internationally, one can only vainly pray that something keeps his dark, demonic, twisted sadist fantasies in check without devolving into a true civilization-level threat.

In the Ruins of Public Reason, Part III: When the Barbarians Are at the Gates; Fascism, Bullshit, and the Paradox of Tolerance

Note: This is the third in a series of essays on public discourse. Here’s Part 1 and Part 2

Three years ago, I started this essay series on the collapse of public discourse. At the time, I was frustrated by how left-wing and progressive spaces had become cognitively rigid, hostile, and uncharitable to any and all challenges to their orthodoxy. I still stand by most everything I said in those essays. Once you have successfully identified that your interlocutors are genuinely engaging in good faith, you must drop the soldier mindset that you are combating a barbarian who is going to destroy society and adopt a scout mindset. For discourse to serve any useful epistemic or political function, interlocutors must accept and practice something like Habermas’ rules of discourse or Grice’s maxims of discourse, where everyone is allowed to question or introduce any idea to cooperatively arrive at an intersubjective truth. The project of that previous essay was to therapeutically remind myself and any readers to actually apply and practice those rules of discourse in good-faith communication.

However, at the time, I should have more richly emphasized something that has been quite obviously true for some time now: most interlocutors in the political realm have little to no interest in discourse. I wish more people had such an interest, and still stand by the project of trying to get more people, particularly in leftist and libertarian spaces, to realize that when they speak to each other, they are not dealing with barbarian threats. However, recent events have made it clear that the real problem is figuring out when an interlocutor is worthy of having the rules of discourse applied in exchanges with them. Here is an obviously non-exhaustive list of such events in recent times that make this clear: 

  1. The extent to which Trump himself, as well as his advisors and lawyers, engage in lazy, dishonest, and bad-faith rationalizations for naked, sadistic, unconstitutional executive power grabs.
  2. The takeover of the most politically influential social media by a fascist billionaire rent-seeker has resulted in a complete fragmentation and breakdown of the online public square
  3. The degree to which most on the right and many on the left indulge in insane conspiracy theories, which have eroded and destroyed the epistemic norms of society, for reasons of rational irrationality.
  4. Even the Supreme Court, the institution that ostensibly is most committed to publicly justifying and engaging in good-faith reasoning about laws, is now giving blatantly awful, authoritarian opinions so out of step with their ostensibly originalist and/or textualist legal hermeneutics and constitutionalist principles (not to mention the opinions of even conservative judges in lower courts). It certainly seems the justices are just as nakedly corrupt and intellectually bankrupt as rabble-rousing aspiring autocrats. Indeed, the court is in such a decrepit state of personalist capture by an aspiring fascist dictator that they aren’t even attempting to publicly justify ‘shadow docket’ rulings in his favor. One can only conclude conservative justices are engaging in bad-faith power-grabs for themselves, whether they intend to or not. Although this has always been true of statist monocentric courts to some extent, recent events have only further eroded the court’s pretenses to being a politically 

All these were obvious trends three years ago and have very predictably only gotten more severe.  You may quibble with the extent of my assessment of any individual example above. Regardless, all but the most committed of Trumpanzees can agree that there is a time and place to become a bit dialogically illiberal in times like these. Thus, it is time to address how one can be a dialogical liberal when the barbarians truly are at the gates. The tough question to address now is this: what should the dialogical liberal do when faced with a real barbarian, and how does she know she is dealing with a barbarian? 

This is an essay about how to remain a dialogical liberal when dialogical liberalism is being weaponized against you. This essay isn’t for the zealots or the trolls. It’s for those of us who believed, maybe still believe, that democracy depends on dialogue—but who are also haunted by the sense that this faith is being used against us.

Epistemically Exploitative Bullshit

I always intended to write an essay to correct the shortcomings of the original one. I regret that, for various personal reasons, I did not do so sooner. The sad truth is that a great many dialogical illiberals who are also substantively illiberal engage in esoteric communication (consciously or not). That is, their exoteric pretenses to civil, good-faith communication elide an esoteric will to domination. Sartre observed this phenomenon in the context of antisemitism, and he is worth quoting at length:

Never believe that anti‐Semites are completely unaware of the absurdity of their replies. They know that their remarks are frivolous, open to challenge. But they are amusing themselves, for it is their adversary who is obliged to use words responsibly, since he believes in words. The anti‐Semites have the right to play. They even like to play with discourse for, by giving ridiculous reasons, they discredit the seriousness of their interlocutors. They delight in acting in bad faith, since they seek not to persuade by sound argument but to intimidate and disconcert. If you press them too closely, they will abruptly fall silent, loftily indicating by some phrase that the time for argument is past. It is not that they are afraid of being convinced. They fear only to appear ridiculous or to prejudice by their embarrassment their hope of winning over some third person to their side.

If then, as we have been able to observe, the anti‐Semite is impervious to reason and to experience, it is not because his conviction is strong. Rather, his conviction is strong because he has chosen first of all to be impervious.

What Sartre says of antisemitism is true of illiberal authoritarians quite generally. Thomas Szanto has helpfully called this phenomenon “epistemically exploitative bullshit.” 

One feature of epistemically exploitative bullshit that Szanto highlights is that epistemically exploitative bullshit need not be intentional. Indeed, as Sartre implies in the quote above, the ‘bad faith’ of the epistemically exploitative bullshitter involves a sort of self-deception that he may not even be consciously aware of. Indeed, most authoritarians (especially in the Trump era) are not sufficiently self-aware or intelligent enough to consciously realize that they are deceiving others about their attitude towards truth by spouting bullshit. As Henry Frankfurt observed, bullshit is different from lying in that the liar is intentionally misrepresenting the truth, but the bullshitter has no real concern for truth in the first place. Thus, many bullshiters (especially those engaged in epistemically exploitative bullshit) believe their own bullshit, often to their detriment.

However, the fact that epistemically exploitative bullshit is often unintentional, or at least not consciously intentional, creates a serious ineliminable epistemic problem for the dialogical liberal who seeks to combat it. It is quite difficult to publicly and demonstrably falsify the hypothesis that one’s interlocutor is engaging in epistemically exploitative bullshit. This often causes people who, in their heart of hearts, aspire to be epistemically virtuous dialogical liberals to misidentify their interlocutors as engaging in epistemically exploitative bullshit and contemptuously dismiss them. I, for one, have been guilty of this quite a bit in recent years, and I imagine any self-reflective reader will realize they have made this mistake as well. We will return to this epistemic difficulty in the next essay in this series.

To avoid this mistake, we must continually remind ourselves that the ascription of intention is sometimes a red herring. Epistemically exploitative bullshit is not just a problem because bullshitters intentionally weaponize it to destroy liberal democracies. It is a problem because of the social and (un)dialectical function that it plays in discourse rather than its psychological status as intentional or unintentional. 

It is also worth remembering at this point that it is not just fire-breathing fascists who engage in epistemically exploitative bullshit. Many non-self-aware, not consciously political, perhaps even liberal, political actors spout epistemically exploitative bullshit as well. Consider the phenomenon of property owners—both wealthy landlords and middle-class suburbanites—who appeal to “neighborhood character” and environmental concerns to weaponize government policy for the end of protecting the economic rents they receive in the form of property values. Consider the similar phenomenon of many market incumbents, from tech CEOs in AI to healthcare executives and professionals, to sports team owners, to industrial unions, to large media companies, who all weaponize various seemingly plausible (and sometimes substantively true) economic arguments to capture the state’s regulatory apparatus. Consider how sugar, tobacco, and petrochemical companies all weaponized junk science on, respectively, obesity, cigarettes, and climate change to undermine efforts to curtail their economic activity. Almost none of these people are fire-breathing fascists, and many may believe their ideological bullshit is true and tell themselves they are helping the world by advancing their arguments. 

The pervasive economic phenomenon of “bootleggers and Baptists” should remind us that an unintentional form of epistemically exploitative bullshit plays a crucial role in rent seeking all across the political spectrum. This form of bullshit is particularly hard to combat precisely because it is unintentional, but its lack of intentionality in no way lessens the harmful social and (un)dialectical functions it severe.

Despite those considerations, it is still worth distinguishing between consciously intentional forms of aggressive esotericism and more unintentional versions because they must be approached very differently. Unintentional bullshitters do not see themselves as dialogically illiberal. Therefore, responding to them with aggressive rhetorical flourishes that treat them contemptuously is very unlikely to be helpful. For this reason, the general (though defeasible) presumption that any given person spouting epistemically exploitative bullshit is not an enemy that I was trying to cultivate in the second part of this essay series still stands. In the next essay, I will address how we know when this presumption has been defeated. However, for now, let us turn our attention to the forms of epistemically exploitative bullshit common today on the right. We have now seen how epistemically exploitative bullshit can appear even in technocratic, liberal settings. But that phenomenon takes on a more virulent form when fused with authoritarian intent. This is what I call aggressive esotericism.

Aggressive Esotericism

The corrosiveness of these more ‘liberal’ and technocratic forms of epistemically exploitative bullshit discussed above, while serious, pales in comparison to more bombastically authoritarian forms of it. The truly authoritarian epistemically exploitative bullshiter aims at more than amassing wealth by capturing some limited area of state policy. While he also does that, the fascist aims at the more ambitious goal of dismantling democracy and seizing the entire apparatus of the state itself.

 Let us name this more dangerous form of epistemically exploitative bullshit. Let us call this aggressive esotericism and loosely define it as the phenomenon of authoritarians weaponizing the superficial trappings of democratic conversation to elide their will to dominate others. This makes the fascistic, aggressive esotericist all the more cruel, destructive, and corrosive of society’s epistemic and political institutions.

It is worth briefly commenting on my choice of the words “aggressive esotericism” for this. The word “esoteric” in the way I am using it has its roots in Straussian scholars who argue that many philosophers in the Western tradition historically did not literally mean what their discursive prose appears to say. Esoteric here does not mean “strange,” but something closer to “hidden,” in contrast to the exoteric, surface-level meaning of the text. We need not concern ourselves with the fascinating and controversial question of whether Straussians are right to esoterically read the history of Western philosophy as they do. Instead, I am applying the general idea of a distinction between the surface level and deeper meaning of a text, the sociological problem of interpreting both the words and the deeds of certain very authoritarian political actors. 

I choose the word “aggressive” to contrast with what Arthur Melzer calls “protective,” “pedagogical,” or “defensive” esotericism. In Philosophy Between the Lines Melzer argues that historically, philosophers often hid a deeper layer of meaning in their great texts. In the ancient world, Melzer argues, this was in part because they feared theoretical philosophical ideas could disintegrate social order (hence the “protective esotericism”), wanted their young students to learn how to come to philosophical truths themselves (hence the “pedagogical esotericism”), or else wanted to protect themselves from authorities for ‘corrupting the youth’  (as Socrates was accused) with their heterodox ideas. 

As the modern world emerged during the Enlightenment, Melzer argues esotericism continued as philosophers such as John Locke wrote hidden messages not just for defensive reasons but to help foster liberating moral progress in society, as they had a far less pessimistic view about the role of theoretical philosophy in public life (hence their “political esotericism”). Whether Melzer is correct in his reading of the history of Western political thought need not concern us now. My claim is that many authoritarians (both right-wing Fascists and left-wing authoritarian Communists) invert this liberal Enlightenment political esotericism by engaging—both in words and in deeds, both consciously and subconsciously, and both intentionally and unintentionally—in aggressive esotericism. Hiding their esoteric will to domination behind a superficial façade of ‘rational’ argumentation.

Aggressive esotericism is a subset of the epistemically exploitative bullshit. While aggressive esotericism may be more often intentional than more technocratic forms of epistemically exploitative bullshit, it is not always so. You might realize this when you reflect on heated debates you may have had during Thanksgiving dinners with your committed Trumpist family members. Nonetheless, this lack of intention doesn’t cover up the fact that their wanton wallowing in motivated reasoning, rational ignorance, and rational irrationality has the selfish effect of empowering members of their ingroup over members of their outgroup. This directly parallels how the lack of self-awareness of the technocratic rentseeker ameliorates the dispersed economic costs on society.

Aggressive Esotericism and the Paradox of Tolerance

Even if one suspects one is encountering a true fascist, one should still have the defeasible presumption that they are a good-faith interlocutor. Nonetheless, fascists perniciously abuse this meta-discursive norm. This effect has been well-known since Popper labelled it the paradox of tolerance.  

The paradox of tolerance has long been abused by dialogical illiberals on both the left and the right to undermine the ideas of free speech and toleration in an open society, legal and social norms like academic freedom and free speech, and to generally weaken the presumption of good faith we have been discussing. This, however, was far from Popper’s intention. It is worth revisiting Popper’s discussion of the Paradox of Tolerance in The Open Society and Its Enemies:

Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we should claim the right even to suppress them, for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to anything as deceptive as rational argument, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, exactly as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or as we should consider incitement to the revival of the slave trade.

His point here is not so much to sanction State censorship of fascist ideas. Instead, his point is that there are limits to what should be tolerated. To translate this to our language earlier in the essay, he is just making the banal point that our presumption of good-faith discourse is, in fact, defeasible. The “right to tolerate the intolerant” need not manifest as legal restrictions on speech or the abandonment of norms like academic freedom. This is often a bad idea, given that state and administrative censorship creates a sort of Streisand effect that fascists can exploit by whining, “Help, help, I’m being repressed.” If you gun down the fascist messenger, you guarantee that he will be made into a saint. Further, censorship will just create a backlash as those who are not yet fully-committed Machiavellian fascists become tribally polarized against the ideas of liberal democracy. Even if Popper himself might not have been as resistant to state power as I am, there are good reasons not to use state power.

Instead, our “right to tolerate the intolerant” could be realized by fostering a strong, stigmergically evolved social stigma against fascist views. Rather than censorship, this stigma should be exercised by legally tolerating the fascists who spout their aggressively esoteric bullshit even while we strongly rebuke them. Cultivating this stigma includes not just strongly rebuking the epistemically exploitative bullshit ‘arguments’ fascists make, but exercising one’s own right to free speech and free association, reporting/exposing/boycotting those, and sentimental education with those the fascists are trying to target. Sometimes, it must include defensive violence against fascists when their epistemically exploitative bullshit manifests not just in words, but acts of aggression against their enemies. 

The paradox of tolerance, as Popper saw, is not a rejection of good-faith dialogue but a recognition of its vulnerability. The fascists’ most devastating move is not to shout down discourse but to simulate it: to adopt its procedural trappings while emptying it of sincerity. What I call aggressive esotericism names this phenomenon. It is the strategic abuse of our meta-discursive presumption of good faith.

Therefore, one must be very careful to guard against mission creep in pursuing this stigmergic process of cultivating stigma in defense of toleration. As Nietzsche warned, we must be guarded against the danger that we become the monsters against whom we are fighting. I hope to discuss later in this essay series how many on the left have become such monsters. For now, let us just observe that this sort of non-state-based intolerant defense of toleration does not conceptually conflict with the defeasible presumption of good faith.

In the next part of this series, I turn to the harder question: when and how can a dialogical liberal justifiably conclude that an interlocutor is no longer operating in good faith?

Piece of music

A new bill, currently under public consultation, is poised to introduce quotas, yes, for music:

Greek-Language Music Quota Bill Sparks Controversy (BalkanInsight)

In its proposed form, the bill tinkers with the music lists aired in common areas (lobbies, elevators, corridors etc) of various premises (hotels, traveling facilities, casinos and shopping malls). The programs should consist of a minimum of 45% of either Greek-language songs, or instrumental versions of said songs. The quota leaves out cafes, restaurants and such (thus slinking away from a direct breach of private economic liberty, as interventions like anti-smoking laws in some cases were found as too heavy-handed). The bill also incentivises radio stations to scale up, so to say, the play-time of this kind of songs, by allocating them more advertising time (another thing that is also strictly regulated, obviously), if they comply to some percentage. Finally, there are some provisions regarding soundtracks in Greek movie productions.

There is an international angle in this protectionist instrument (pun intended). Wiki reveals that a handful of countries apply some form or another of music quotas, with France the most prominent among them. The Greek minister also mentioned Australia and Canada in an interview.

The bill aims to protect local music legacy and invigorate modern production, as part of the competent Ministry’s constitutional mandate. But there are some discords, apart from the always funny administrative percentages (and the paraphernalia needed to track who plays what and for how much). What is deemed as eligible Greek music, in the bill’s proverbial ears, misses a tone or two: Foreign-language songs and prototype instrumental compositions, by Greek artists, do not qualify. For example, Greek band VoIC (their latest album’s cover above, source) mix rock with (mostly Greek) folk music, but fall short of the criteria. And given some minister remarks on “Englishisation”, this will be a point of contention.

Bonus tracks:

Cover of a Greek (and Greek-language too!) song, “Misirlou”
Some Russian folk music (especially no34 is excellent) from an indie game (a most fortunate use of local traditional sound)

Americanization in the wild

The death of a black man in Minneapolis, the largest city in the U.S. state of Minnesota, after a white police officer put pressure on his neck led to large-scale protests not only in the United States but also in cities around the world, including Osaka and Tokyo.
[…]
In Japan, discrimination based on differences in appearance and attributes occurs on various levels, including discrimination against black people, but what are the circumstances involved in this? Rather than treating this incident as something that happened in a faraway country and distancing ourselves from it, I would like people to think about it in relation to things that are familiar to them.

This is from a piece about Black Lives Matter in a Japanese-language magazine. The author is Shiori Kirigaya.

Americanization in the wild

In 1990, actor Michael J. Fox played one of his signature roles. As Marty McFly in “Back to the Future III” he traveled to the year 1885, right in the middle of the Wild West. There he showed up in a pink and blue shirt with red embroidery, pearl buttons and pastel yellow fringes.
[…]
The cowboy style has taken over pop culture once again, and it’s bigger, more colorful and more glittery than it has been in a long time. In keeping with the hit film of the year, “Barbie”, fans not only went to the cinema in pink, but also with cowboy hats on their heads here and there. Barbie and Ken also get new clothes after their arrival in the real world.
[…]
As is often the case, only one outshines them all: Beyoncé. She also leaves the competition behind when it comes to cowboy couture. To announce her current “Renaissance” tour, the Texan posed in the spring with a cowboy hat that has countless mirror plates like a disco ball.

This is from FAZ, a daily newspaper in Frankfurt, which is arguably the financial capital of the European Union and authoritatively the financial capital of Germany. The daily is considered to be right-of-center, an equivalent to the Wall Street Journal.

Notice how the author treats American celebrities: as if they’re already well-known and well-established. She’s not putting a qualifier like “the American actress” in her sentences.

Notice, too, how the author treats the cowboy style. No need for an introduction. The German public is well-aware of what this looks like.

No need to clarify that Texas is a state within the American federal union, either…