My Arctic Journey, Part 7: Historical Manifestations and Structural Taxonomy of Constructive Realism.

Across my many books, I have dedicated my four-decade IR theoretical quest to a singular goal: rescuing International Relations from the sterile, structural fatalism of traditional neorealism. Traditional theorists trap us in Kenneth Waltzโ€™s three state-centric โ€œimagesโ€ (the individual, the state, and the international system). But my macro-theory, Constructive Realism, and its companion corollary, Fourth Image Theory, argue this Westphalian framework leaves a massive blind spot. By introducing my Fourth Image, I bring the pre-, sub-, trans-, and post-state tribal domains directly into grand strategy. I elevate indigenous polities and localized communities from passive footnotes to frontline geopolitical actors.

A New Taxonomy of World Order

To understand how my macro-theory operates, you have to look at the three subcomponents that serve as the building blocks of any political architecture:

  • The Organic: The foundations that evolve naturally over centuries, rooted in shared culture, bloodlines, language, geography, and distinct communal identity (like indigenous polities).
  • The Synthetic: The top-down administrative frameworks, treaties, and artificial borders constructed by political engineering or colonial mapmaking.
  • The Ethereal: The ideational, spiritual, religious, or ideological frameworks that exist in the minds and hearts of a group, giving them cohesive meaning and purpose.

Traditional neorealism focuses almost entirely on the mechanical interaction of purely Synthetic states. My framework, Constructive Realism, rejects this structural fatalism. I assert that human agency, strategic choice, and innovative governance can intentionally tame chaos. Order is not merely dictated from the top down; it is actively co-constructed from the bottom up when we balance these three subcomponents.

To see how my subcomponents manifest across time, it helps to view human history as an ongoing cycle of these three forces. When a political system brings them into perfect alignment, it achieves a durable state of order.

The Organic Polity (Foundations of Blood and Soil)

Organic polities are not engineered by lawyers or philosophers; they emerge naturally through shared kinship, language, deep ancestral memory, and ancestral geography.

  • Historical Example: The Iroquois Confederacy (Haudenosaunee). Long before European contact, five (later six) distinct indigenous nations bound themselves together through the Great Law of Peace. Their unity was rooted in organic kinship, shared clanship, and structural lineages that had evolved indigenously.
  • Modern Analogue: The Inuit Circumpolar Council. Spanning Alaska, Canada, Greenland, and Russia, the Inuit maintain an organic transnational polity based on shared survival strategies, culture, and deep historical connection to the Arctic ecosystem.

The Synthetic Polity (Foundations of Institutional Engineering)

Synthetic polities are artificial constructs, usually designed from the top down by statesmen, conquerors, or legal scholars. They use treaties, administrative lines, and bureaucratic institutions to forge a state out of disparate parts.

  • Historical Example: The Soviet Union (USSR). The USSR was a highly synthetic super-state. It mechanically welded together over a dozen distinct nationalities, linguistic groups, and historically antagonistic regions into a single, centralized administrative hull driven by institutional engineering. When the synthetic machinery failed in 1991, the state fractured back along more organic lines.
  • Alternative Example: Post-Colonial African States (e.g., Nigeria). Drawn with a ruler by European powers at the Berlin Conference of 1884, these borders synthetically enclosed hundreds of distinct ethnic groups (like the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo) into single administrative units.

The Ethereal Polity (Foundations of the Mind and Spirit)

Ethereal polities are bound together not by physical borders or shared DNA, but by an encompassing idea, a spiritual doctrine, or a transcendent ideology. They exist primarily in the hearts and minds of their believers, capable of crossing vast oceans and ignoring state lines.

  • Historical Example: The Early Islamic Caliphate (The Ummah). Under the early expansion of Islam, the Ummah functioned as a massive ethereal polity. It bound together disparate Arabic tribes, North African Berbers, and Persian populations under a singular spiritual and legal reality that transcended previous tribal and imperial boundaries.
  • Modern Analogue: The Borderless Digital Ideological Communes. Modern decentralized networks, crypto-states, or global ideological movements exist as entirely ethereal spaces where political affinity is decoupled from physical territory.

The Structural Spectrum: ESSLEs, POSLEs, and POSSEs

In my workโ€”most notably in articles and chapters like my “Tribe, State, and War: Balancing the Subcomponents of World Order,” Culture and Conflict Review, Vol 3, No. 3, November 1, 2009; “Chapter 5: The Tribal Foundation of Order” in my The Art of War in an Asymmetric World: Strategy for the Post-Cold War World (Continuum, 2012) and its excerpt “Rethinking the Subcomponents of World Order” in Small Wars Journal (August 15, 2012); and my “Decentralized Despotism and the Illusion of International Anarchy” (in Brandon Christensen (ed.), Liberty and Security in an Anarchical World Volume II, Palgrave Studies in Classical Liberalism, 2025, 191-223)โ€”I formalize how these entities interact using a precise structural spectrum:

  • ESSLEs (Ephemeral Synthetic State-Level Entities): These are brittle, top-down, artificially engineered states (like many post-colonial nations) that lack organic roots and are highly prone to collapse when stressed.
  • POSLEs (Persistent Organic State-Level Entities): These are cohesive nation-states where the synthetic state institutions perfectly match and reinforce an underlying organic, historical culture (such as Japan or Iceland).
  • POSSEs (Persistent Organic Sub-State Entities): These are the foundational, highly resilient tribal, sectarian, or indigenous units that survive beneath or between the cracks of synthetic state structures.

Why POSSEs Are Key to Enduring Order

Particularly when addressing the “State of Siege” in asymmetric and tribal warfare, the POSSE is the ultimate unit of resilient, enduring survival. A POSSE is what happens when a community successfully fuses the Organic, the Synthetic, and the Ethereal into a single self-defending unit. They are crucial to international stability for three reasons:

They Possess Infinite Defensive Resilience

Traditional states (ESSLEs) collapse when their synthetic capital city falls or their formal institutions are decapitated. A POSSE cannot be easily killed because its political entity is rooted in an organic kinship and an ethereal belief system. In asymmetric conflicts (like the decades-long resilience of regional tribal networks in Afghanistan or the resilient self-governance of Arctic indigenous corporations), these entities endure because their survival is tied to their identity, not an office building.

They Bridge the Westphalian Gaps

The international system is plagued by “ungoverned spaces” where synthetic states lack the power to project authority (e.g., remote frontiers, dense jungles, or icy tundras). POSSEs provide local, structural order in these blind spots. By acting as a sovereign and strategic entity from below, they police their own territories, manage local resources, and prevent total systemic anarchy.

They Create “Tribal-State Fusion”

My Constructive Realism emphasizes that enduring order happens from the bottom up, not the top down. The most stable geopolitical regions are those where the synthetic state stops trying to crush the organic substate, and instead forms a partnership with it.

When a major state integrates a POSSE into its grand strategyโ€”as Canada and the United States have increasingly done through modern Arctic land claims and indigenous co-management councilsโ€”it anchors its fragile synthetic institutions onto a deeply rooted, organic foundation. The result is an exceptionally durable, multi-layered model of peace.

Macro-Theoretical Considerations

Across my sweeping multi-volume bibliographyโ€”from my early Arctic security analyses like Breaking the Ice (2008) and On Thin Ice (2009), through my core theoretical quadrology The Realist Tradition in International Relations (2011, with its component volumes State of Hope, State of Fear, State of Awe, and State of Siege) and the separate State of Doom (on the nuclear order), to my focus on asymmetric threats in The Art of War in an Asymmetric World (2012, whose working title was State of Chaos) and State of Recovery (2013), and my recent Arctic Exceptionalism (2024)โ€”I have sought to foster a much-needed paradigm shift in IR theory.

To understand the absolute conclusion of my work is to see these concepts operating as a singular, unified engine:

  • Paradigm Shift (The 4th Image): My foundational contribution is proving that Waltzโ€™s three state-centric images are incomplete. By introducing the Fourth Image, I integrate the pre-, sub-, and trans-state tribal domains directly into grand strategy, elevating indigenous polities and localized communities from passive footnotes to frontline geopolitical actors.
  • Methodology (Constructive Realism): I reject the classic realist belief that structural anarchy condemns humanity to endless, tragic conflict. Instead, my books champion a “constructive” realism. I argue that human agency, strategic choice, and innovative governance can intentionally tame chaos, creating localized “zones of exception” and cooperative frameworks despite overarching systemic tensions.
  • The Alchemy of Order: By breaking political architecture down into Organic, Synthetic, and Ethereal components, I provide the analytical tools to see exactly where top-down states failโ€”and where bottom-up communities succeed.

The Ultimate Convergence: POSSEs as the Guardians of Order

The ultimate manifestation of my theories across all my works converges on the concept of the POSSE and its related structural variations.

As asymmetric conflict, climate-driven resource competition, and failing state structures push parts of the world into a perpetual “State of Siege,” traditional, purely synthetic states prove brittle. When a capital city falls or an artificial border fractures, chaos typically rushes in.

The POSSE is my solution to this vulnerability. It is a resilient, self-defending sociopolitical unit that achieves stability because it flawlessly fuses all three of my subcomponents:

  1. It is anchored by the unbreakable, centuries-old kinship of an Organic foundation (the Fourth Image).
  2. It is motivated and bound by a shared Ethereal or spiritual worldview.
  3. It adapts Synthetic legal structures (such as modern corporate-indigenous land claim agreements) to project real, localized Sovereign and Strategic power.

Related Entities and “Neotribal Fusion”

This structural model extends to a wider class of resilient entities, which I have documented across diverse geographies:

  • Neotribal Cooperatives: Found heavily in the North American Arctic, where entities like the Inuvialuit and Inuit regional corporations act as economic and political powerhouses, outlasting the policy shifts of southern federal governments.
  • Transnational Substate Polities: Communes and regional councils that cross arbitrary Westphalian lines (such as the Inuit Circumpolar Council or historical tribal confederacies like the Haudenosaunee), which maintain cohesive environmental and security governance where states lack presence.
  • Asymmetric Insurgent Matrices: The dark-side analogue to the POSSE, where non-state actors leverage organic local networks and ethereal ideologies to successfully resist and exhaust the military projections of traditional global superpowers.

POSSES: Resilient Engines of Survival

The international system is not an unchanging anarchic, homogenous arena of uniform states. Rather, it is a living, multi-layered, heterogenous landscape deeply rooted in human history. When top-down Synthetic states embrace, partner with, and integrate Persistent Organic Sub-State Entities instead of trying to assimilate or crush them, they anchor their fragile institutions onto humanityโ€™s deepest, most durable foundations. True, enduring world order is not enforced by a hegemon from above; it is sustained by the resilient, self-governing polities that hold the ground from below.

When purely synthetic, top-down states face asymmetric conflict, climate-driven resource competition, or institutional decay, they prove brittle. I categorize these fragile, artificially engineered regimes as ESSLEs (Ephemeral Synthetic State-Level Entities). When a capital city falls or an artificial border fractures, they collapse because they lack deep roots.

Conversely, POSLEs (Persistent Organic State-Level Entities) achieve long-term stability because their formal state institutions naturally align with enduring, cohesive, historical cultures. But when the state fails, or where its Westphalian authority cannot reach, the ultimate unit of resilient, enduring survival is what I term the POSSEโ€”the Persistent Organic Sub-State Entity.

A POSSEโ€”whether it manifests as an Arctic indigenous regional corporation, a transnational tribal council, or even a highly motivated asymmetric insurgent matrixโ€”survives the “State of Siege” because it successfully fuses all three of my subcomponents:

  1. It is anchored by the unbreakable, centuries-old kinship of an Organic foundation (the Fourth Image).
  2. It is bound and motivated by a shared, transcendent Ethereal worldview.
  3. It masterfully adapts Synthetic legal or strategic structures to project real, localized power.

When states embrace, partner with, and integrate Persistent Organic Sub-State Entities rather than trying to assimilate or crush them, they anchor their fragile, synthetic institutions onto humanityโ€™s deepest and most durable foundations.

My Arctic Journey, Part 6: Constructive Realism as a Bridge: Rethinking Western Order, from the Polar to the Global

My Fourth Image theory (as developed in my books on the Arctic, and later applied to my books on IR) and Constructive Realism theory converge to form a unified, bottom-up revision of traditional International Relations (IR) theory. Together, they break down the rigid, top-down fatalism of classical neorealism by restoring agency to substate actors and viewing the international system as something that can be actively reshaped rather than just endured. The alignment operates as a cohesive framework through a breakdown of its two core pillars and their synthesis into a single theory:

Component Parts

The 4th Image: The Tribal/Substate Domain

In his landmark 1959 book Man, the State, and War, Kenneth Waltz introduced three “images” (levels of analysis) to explain international conflict:

  1. The Individual (human nature and leaders)
  2. The State (domestic government structures)
  3. The International System (structural anarchy)

I argue that this Westphalian framework leaves a massive blind spot. To remedy this, I introduced the Fourth Image, which represents the pre-, sub-, trans-, and post-state tribal level. This domain captures indigenous polities, non-state communities, and insurgents. Instead of viewing these groups as passive victims of great-power politics, my work demonstrates that they are resilient, distinct structures capable of driving regional security (such as the “neotribal fusion” we see in Arctic governance).

Constructive Realism: Strategy as Order-Building

Traditional neorealism treats states like uniform billiard balls trapped in an anarchic system where structural fatalism dictates that war or zero-sum competition is inevitable.

My concept of Constructive Realism acts as a bridge between the hard material realities of realism and the ideational, identity-focused lens of constructivism. It rejects structural fatalism, asserting that human agency and strategic choice matter. Anarchy and chaos are not unalterable laws of nature; rather, they are environments where statesmen and local actors can intentionally construct alternative, cooperative, or highly resilient models of order and security.

Toward a Unified Theory: How the Fourth Image and Constructive Realism Align

When aligned, the Fourth Image and Constructive Realism provide the ontological space (the who and where) and the epistemological method (the how and why) for a modern, holistic theory of world politics.

Bottom-Up Order Construction

Instead of order being dictated purely top-down by hegemonic superpowers (the Third Image), my unified theory demonstrates how stability is co-constructed from the bottom up. In my work on the Arctic, for instance, the strategic agency of indigenous populations (the Fourth Image) combines with state-level policies to create “Arctic exceptionalism”โ€”a zone of peace constructed despite systemic geopolitical tensions.

A Framework for Asymmetric and Insurgent Warfare

In my four-volume The Realist Tradition in International Relations, I map constructive realism onto the worlds of classical, early modern, modern and contemporary asymmetrical conflict (with its proliferation of non- and sub-state combatants) Traditional realism struggles to explain how non-state actors and insurgents successfully frustrate major world powers. By deploying Constructive Realism from the classic Three Images to my salient but long-overlooked Fourth Image, cells of insurgents or localized tribal structures can be understood not as “lords of chaos,” but as rational, strategic actors intentionally constructing alternative, non-Western models of political order to challenge Westphalian primacy.

Bridging the Realist-Constructivist Divide

This synthesis completely redefines the concept of security dilemmas. In traditional realism, an anarchic system makes fear the primary driver of statecraft. My unified theory argues that because Fourth Image realities (local identities, tribal histories, and regional subsystems) heavily influence how state leaders perceive threats, security is fundamentally “constructed.”

My unified theory transforms realism from a tragic philosophy of passive endurance into an idealistic framework of active creation. It proves that world order is not merely a byproduct of great power distributions, but a dynamic, ongoing negotiation between state structures and the substate, tribal foundations of world order.

My taxonomy of Organic, Synthetic, and Ethereal subcomponents provides the foundational “building blocks” that make my unified theory work. If the Fourth Image establishes who matters and Constructive Realism describes how order is built, this taxonomy explicitly defines the materials used to build that order.

By deconstructing the state into these subcomponents, I show exactly where the Westphalian model cracks and how localized or ideological forces actively reshape international relations. This taxonomy fits perfectly with the Fourth Image and Constructive Realism, acting as the dynamic engine behind them.

Anchoring the Fourth Image (The Domain of the Organic)

Waltz’s traditional IR theory focuses almost entirely on the Syntheticโ€”the artificial, legally defined boundaries of Westphalian states interacting in a mechanical system.

My Fourth Image succeeds because it brings the Organic (tribes, indigenous nations) back to the center of security analysis. In places like the Arctic, order isn’t just maintained by synthetic state treaties; it survives because organic, indigenous communities (like the Inuit) exercise local governance. The Fourth Image is essentially my assertion that organic forces endure long after synthetic ones fracture.

The Mechanics of Constructive Realism

Constructive Realism is the art of building order out of chaos. I use this taxonomy to show that order-building is a constant, shifting chemistry experiment between the Organic, Synthetic, and Ethereal:

  • The Blueprint (Ethereal): An ideological or religious vision sparks a desire for order or rebellion.
  • The Material (Organic): Naturally cohesive tribal or cultural units provide the raw human capital and resilience.
  • The Structure (Synthetic): State builders use institutional engineering to create legal frameworks to house them.

When a state is purely Synthetic (like many post-colonial borders drawn in Africa or the Middle East) without an underlying Organic foundation or an Ethereal unifying myth, it risks collapse.

Constructive Realism is the process by which strategic actors try to synthesize these elements to create a stable polity. For instance, I note that the United States began as a highly Synthetic state bound by Ethereal ideals (enlightenment democracy), which eventually forged an Organic national identity over centuries.

Explaining Asymmetric “States of Siege”

In modern conflict, the clash is rarely Synthetic vs. Synthetic (State vs. State). It is usually a Synthetic State attempting to project power over a highly resilient Organic and Ethereal matrix (such as an indigenous tribe or a religiously motivated insurgency).

Traditional realism views a non-state actor as a minor nuisance. My unified theory, armed with this taxonomy, views them as a profound threat: they possess the raw defensive power of Organic cohesion paired with the asymmetric, uncompromisable motivation of the Ethereal.

A Unified View

In my IR theory, world order is a localized chemical reaction. The international system is not an anarchic arena of uniform states. It is a shifting landscape where Constructive Realism is used by actors across all four images to bind Ethereal ideas and Synthetic institutions onto humanityโ€™s deeply rooted, Organic (Fourth Image) foundations.

My Arctic Journey, Part 5: Arctic Exceptionalism: Cooperation in a Contested World (2024)

My Arctic Exceptionalism: Cooperation in a Contested World (2024) serves as a recent update to my earlier trilogy of Arctic literature (Breaking the Ice, On Thin Ice, and Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom). Writing in the wake of severe international disruptionsโ€”specifically the war in Ukraine and the resulting 2022โ€“2024 freeze/boycott of the Arctic Council by its seven Western member statesโ€”it tackles a pressing question: Can the historic peace and unique collaboration of the polar region survive an era of renewed Great Power competition and aggressive nationalism?

While many contemporary IR scholars fear that “Arctic Exceptionalism” (the idea that the Arctic is a unique zone of peace and international cooperation insulated from global conflict) is dead, I mount a robust defense of its survival. I re-contextualize the concept, grounding it not in idealistic optimism, but in structural realism and deep history.

1. Grounding Exceptionalism in Realism

A core theoretical evolution in this book is my merger of realism with cooperative governance. Traditionally, realism dictates that an anarchic world leads to zero-sum power struggles and inevitable conflict. However, I argue that the Arctic behaves differently because its geography is structurally hostile to the core pillars of war.

The region’s extreme environmental conditions, inhospitable climate, and massive logistical barriers naturally force states toward pragmatism. In the Arctic, the cost of unilateral conflict or unmanaged crisis is so high that cooperation is a structural necessity for survival. Therefore, I assert that Arctic exceptionalism is not a fragile, normative aspiration; it is an enduring, realist alignment of national interests.

2. The Roots of Consensus: A Millennia-Old Fault Line

To prove that Arctic cooperation is resilient enough to survive modern East-West tensions, I trace its roots far back before the 1996 formation of the Arctic Council. I argue that the foundations of the region’s commitment to consensus were built on two historical pillars:

  • The Tribe-State Fault Line: Centuries of collaborative land management, legal treaties, and modern land claims between sovereign states and Indigenous populations (My “Fourth Image” of IR theory).
  • The East-West Fault Line: The long-standing tradition of sub-state actors, scientists, and local stakeholders managing to cooperate across the Iron Curtain even during the height of the Cold War.

Because these governing, legislative, and constitutional frameworks are so deeply integrated into the domestic fabrics of the polar rim nations, they act as an anchor that prevents the regional order from entirely collapsing during international geopolitical storms.

3. Threat Inflation and “The Staged Great Game”

I take a highly critical look at the post-2022 militarization of Arctic policy and the rhetoric of a “New Cold War” at the top of the world. I accuse southern defense establishmentsโ€”including elements within the Pentagon and NATOโ€”of threat inflation. I provocatively suggest that much of the intensifying “Arctic Race” is a performative “Great Game” played out primarily in headlines and strategic documents.

Accordingly, this tension is frequently leveraged by rival states for domestic audiences to maximize defense budgets and justify infrastructure modernization (such as building new icebreakers or expanding northern bases), rather than reflecting a genuine, imminent breakdown of territorial sovereignty on the ground. The physical borders in the Arctic, I note, remain mutually respected.

4. The Expanding Arctic Council and External Pressures

The book also analyzes the structural pressures facing the Arctic Council as non-Arctic states seek a piece of the “Boom.” It evaluates how the Council has managed the rise of near-Arctic observers (most notably China).

It also details how the established Arctic states maintain the regional balance of power: by welcoming the technical and scientific expertise of observer nations into working groups, while strictly limiting their formal decision-making power. This structure preserves the core collaboration of the permanent members while neutralizing the potential for outside actors to destabilize the region’s governance.

5. Conclusion

Arctic Exceptionalism concludes that while the post-Cold War “Golden Age” of unhindered circumpolar cooperation has undoubtedly been tested and truncated by modern conflict, the fundamental structural architecture of the Arctic remains stable. The cooperation that defines the region is too deep, too legally institutionalized through Indigenous land claims, and too geographically determined to be easily destroyed by external geopolitical friction. Ultimately, cells of collaboration will continue to persist at the top of the world because, in a region defined by its punishing extremes, states simply cannot afford to face the ice alone.

My Arctic Journey, Part 4: Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom (2010)

Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom: The Geopolitics of Climate Change in the Arctic (2009) rounds out my three-part historical and theoretical exploration of the Arctic region by looking directly at the macro-level polarities of environmental crisis and economic opportunity. While my previous books explored how Indigenous land claims and governance altered internal state politics, this book acts as a geopolitical evaluation of the consequences of global warming, and in particular the polar thaw. It presents the “Big Thaw” as a structural double-edged swordโ€”analyzing both the ecological and cultural disruptions (the Doom) and the unprecedented strategic and commercial windows it flings open (the Boom).

1. The Core Dichotomy: Doom vs. Boom

I structure my argument around a tension between two competing narratives for the 21st-century Arctic:

The “Doom” Narrative

The book acknowledges the severe ecological anxiety defining early 21st-century climate science. The melting polar ice cap, thawing permafrost, and rapid coastal erosion represent existential threats to local infrastructure and Arctic biota (such as polar bears). For the region’s Indigenous inhabitants, “Doom” manifests as the disruption of traditional hunting routes, food insecurity, and the forced adaptation of a culture built entirely on ice and stable cold weather.

The “Boom” Narrative

True to my self-described stance as a “climate optimist,” I argue that the decline of summer sea ice is breaking a geophysical prison that has held the high latitudes isolated from the global economy for millennia. The “Boom” represents a massive geostrategic pivot. As the ice retreats, it exposes long-sought maritime shortcutsโ€”the Northwest Passage and Russia’s Northern Sea Routeโ€”and unlocks access to an estimated 22% of the world’s undiscovered, technically recoverable oil and natural gas trapped beneath the Arctic seabed.

2. Historical Re-conceptualization: From “Desert” to “New Mediterranean”

I challenge policymakers to shift how they visually and strategically conceptualize the top of the world. I track the Arctic through three major historical phases:

  • The Impenetrable Desert: Historically treated by southern capitals as an empty, frozen barrier that separated major world powers.
  • The Cold War Shield: A militarized buffer zone optimized for nuclear deterrence, dotted by radar networks like the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line.
  • The New Mediterranean: My preferred modern framework. I argue that climate change is transforming the Arctic Ocean into a busy, interconnected, navigable transit basin surrounded by littoral statesโ€”mimicking the classical Mediterranean Sea as a hub for global commerce, resource trade, and geopolitical interaction.

3. The “Cold Rush” and Great Power Sovereignty

A central focus of the book is the sudden race for sovereignty over the Arctic seafloor. It highlights key flashpoints from the late 2000sโ€”most notably Russia planting a titanium flag on the seabed at the North Pole in August 2007โ€”to illustrate how the circumpolar nations are rushing to map their continental shelves.

States are rushing to submit geological data to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to legally secure exclusive economic zones (EEZs) over oil and gas reserves. I note a hard strategic choice for the five main polar rim states (US, Canada, Russia, Denmark/Greenland, and Norway): they must choose between cooperative multilateral development or a tense, zero-sum military standoff.

4. Indigenous Peoples as the “New Saudi Royals” of the Polar World

Expanding on the themes of my previous works, I emphasize that Indigenous northerners are uniquely positioned to navigate this transformation. Because of the comprehensive land claims and co-management structures settled in decades prior, the Inuit and other Arctic tribes hold massive legal leverage and equity in regional resources.

I provocatively posit that if Indigenous corporations and regional governments successfully manage this influx of resource capital and industrial expansion, they could evolve into a northern equivalent of Saudi Arabia’s powerful royal familyโ€”economically formidable, highly autonomous, and essential partners to southern federal governments seeking to project national security.

5. Conclusion

I ultimately reject the commonly held, fatalistic view of climate change. Rather than viewing the melting Arctic strictly as an environmental tragedy to be cordoned off and preserved, Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom asserts that global warming makes the integration of the Arctic into the global economy inevitable.

The challenge of the 21st century is not stopping the thaw, but managing it through robust international law, sustainable resource stewardship, and an equal partnership between national defense architectures and the Indigenous communities who live on the front lines of the new frontier.

My Arctic Journey, Part 3: On Thin Ice (2009)

On Thin Ice: The Inuit, the State, and the Challenge of Arctic Sovereignty (2009) was conceived as part two of a three-part series on Arctic geopolitics, international relations (IR) theory, and Indigenous security studies, and directly follows Breaking the Ice. Published on the 50th anniversary of Kenneth Waltzโ€™s foundational neorealist text, Man, the State and War (1959), it applies Waltz’s conceptual architecture to evaluate the rapid, multi-layered transformation of the North American Arctic.

Written during a time of accelerating climate change and intensifying state interest in the region, it argues that the melting polar ice cap is opening up a rich new navigable “Mediterranean” basin. However, rather than viewing this solely as an environmental crisis or an inevitable theater for state-on-state conflict, I provide an analysis centered on the relationship between modern nation-states and the Indigenous Inuit populations. I argue that Arctic sovereignty cannot be successfully maintained or projected by central governments without a deeply collaborative, interdependent partnership with the regional tribal entities who have established “indigenous sovereignty.”

1. Theoretical Framework: Introducing My “Fourth Image”

The core theoretical contribution of On Thin Ice is my structural enhancement of Kenneth Waltzโ€™s traditional IR framework. Waltz famously posited three “images” or levels of analysis to explain the causes of conflict and international behavior:

  1. The First Image: The individual (human nature and leadership behavior).
  2. The Second Image: The internal structure of the state (domestic politics and governance systems).
  3. The Third Image: The international system (anarchy and the distribution of structural power).

I assert that traditional realist IR theory suffers from a structural blind spot when applied to frontier regions like the Arctic, where central state authority has historically been limited, highly virtual, or non-existent on the ground. To resolve this methodological gap, I propose a “Fourth Image”: the tribal or sub-state indigenous level of analysis.

In the Arctic context, the Fourth Image captures the enduring, non-state political reality of the Inuit. I argue that the contemporary Arctic cannot be understood strictly through the lens of interstate rivalry (Third Image) or Ottawa/Washington domestic policy (Second Image). Instead, Arctic security is shaped from the bottom up by a “systemless system” where tribal peoples retain intrinsic attributes of sovereignty, exercising considerable diplomatic and political agency.

2. Historical Context: From the Cold War to the “Big Thaw”

I structure this narrative by examining the historical shifts in the Arctic’s geopolitical importance.

Cold War Militarization

During the Cold War, the Arctic served as a crucial, frozen buffer zone between the United States and the Soviet Union. The military imperative to monitor the northern polar skies led to a massive expansion of defense infrastructure, exemplified by the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Lineโ€”a radar network stretching across the North American Arctic that I describe as an “Arctic Maginot Line.” During this period, state sovereignty was projected through top-down military mobilization, with the region viewed primarily as a passive geographic theater for nuclear deterrence.

The Post-Cold War Transition

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the Arctic entered a phase of political decompression. National security priorities shifted outward, allowing regional and domestic policy to reflect the political aspirations of the northern inhabitants. This decade saw the settlement of massive land claims and the devolution of governing authority, culminating in the creation of Nunavut in 1999. This transition allowed the Inuit to successfully bridge the gap between local community and national defense policies.

The “Cold Rush” of Climate Change

By 2009, accelerated global warming had fundamentally altered the region’s calculus. I describe myself as a “climate optimist” rather than an “environmental pessimist.” While recognizing the ecological instability caused by the melting ice cap, I argue that the “Big Thaw” represents the dawn of a new geostrategic pivot and economic powerhouse. The opening of legendary shipping routesโ€”specifically the Northwest Passage and the Northern Sea Routeโ€”combined with newly accessible subsea oil, gas, and mineral reserves, triggered a modern “Cold Rush” among the five main polar rim states: Russia, Canada, the United States, Denmark (via Greenland), and Norway.

3. The Synthesis of Tribe and State

The crux of my thesis is that the impending clash between modern states seeking to secure resource-rich frontiers and the indigenous peoples living there does not have to result in exploitation or conflict. Instead, On Thin Ice documents a sophisticated process of political integration, which I conceptualize as a synthesis of tribe and state.

Rather than resisting the modern state, Inuit organizations have utilized settled comprehensive land claims, modern treaties, and regional governance structures to embed themselves into the national fabric.

๎„“

DimensionTraditional State ApproachIntegrated Tribe-State Approach (Zellen’s Vision)
Sovereignty BaselineLegal titles, military presence, and international treaties.Joint sovereignty derived from continuous indigenous occupancy and local stewardship.
Security ParadigmHard defense, military border control, and missile defense systems.Broad human security, environmental protection, and localized civil defense.
Economic DevelopmentExternal corporate exploitation of raw natural resources.Regulated, co-managed development providing local equity and community stability.

I emphasize that for a nation like Canada, its legal and practical claim to Arctic sovereignty is profoundly dependent on its relationship with the Inuit. Because international law heavily weighs active occupancy and effective administration, the permanent presence of Inuit communitiesโ€”and their explicit alignment with the stateโ€”serves as the primary mechanism for validating federal claims over disputed waters like the Northwest Passage.

4. Reconceptualizing Arctic Security

A significant portion of the book is dedicated to redefining security through northern eyes. The Inuit have historically sought to expand the definition of national security beyond military defense to encompass human security, environmental defense, and cultural survival.

I highlight the extraordinary diplomatic and political skills demonstrated by Inuit leadership. Through transnational organizations like the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC), the Inuit have successfully projected their voice onto the global stage, participating directly in regional governance architectures like the Arctic Council. They have forced southern policymakers to recognize that environmental degradationโ€”such as the bioaccumulation of persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and the melting of sea iceโ€”constitutes an immediate security threat to human life in the North.

Furthermore, I note that the Inuit have actively contributed to national defense policies. In Canada, the Canadian Rangersโ€”a sub-component of the Canadian Armed Forces Reserves composed largely of Indigenous northernersโ€”provide a prime example of the Fourth Image collaborating with the Second Image. The Rangers serve as the “eyes and ears” of the military, combining traditional survival and tracking skills with state sovereignty exercises.

5. Risks of the New Frontier: The Shadow of “Inuit Fundamentalism”

While my outlook on the tribe-state synthesis is fundamentally cooperative, On Thin Ice issues a stark warning regarding the structural risks embedded in post-land-claims settlements.

It observes that the institutionalization of land claims has created a new class of indigenous political and corporate elites. Fueled by public funds and corporate joint ventures, these elites are highly integrated into southern capital and political systems. However, a significant portion of coastal and remote Arctic communities continue to suffer from severe social dislocation, systemic poverty, high living costs, and a lack of economic infrastructure.

I provocatively warn of the potential for an “Inuit backlash”or “Inuit fundamentalism.” If the gulf between the wealthy corporate indigenous elite and the impoverished, traditionally minded populace continues to widen, it could lead to intense internal political alienation. Such domestic instability would weaken the social cohesion required to maintain a united front against external geopolitical pressures, threatening the very sovereignty framework the state and tribe have worked to build.

6. Conclusion: Co-Authoring the Future of the North

Ultimately, On Thin Ice concludes that the long isolation of the Arctic has permanently come to an end. The twilight of the polar ice cap means the region can no longer be treated as an empty, frozen desert of interest only to military strategists and resource companies.

By introducing the “Fourth Image,” I provide a theoretical lens that elevates Indigenous populations from passive subjects of history to active, primary architects of international relations. For the Arctic rim states to survive and thrive on this new frontier, they must discard outdated colonial paradigms of absolute top-down sovereignty. The future of the polar basin must be co-authored by both the modern states asserting international title and the tribal peoples who have called the ice home for millennia.

My Arctic Journey, Part 2: Breaking the Ice (2008)

My 2008 book, Breaking the Ice: From Land Claims to Tribal Sovereignty in the Arctic, is a comprehensive study of indigenous rights, land claims, and governance in the Western Arctic and Alaska. Drawing from my decade of field research and residency in the region, it explores how native populations transformed from marginalized groups into powerful, central actors in Arctic governance.

The core themes and arguments of my book include:

1. The Shift to Tribal Sovereignty

I chronicle how the “age of land claims” evolved from basic real estate and economic disputes into a profound political movement. Rather than just winning back territory, indigenous peoplesโ€”such as the Inuit of Northern Canada and the Native populations of Alaskaโ€”successfully leveraged comprehensive land claim agreements (LCAs) to establish concrete structures of self-governance and tribal sovereignty.

2. The Clash of Modernism vs. Traditionalism

A major focus of the book is the tension native communities faced when integrating into modern, westernized legal and corporate frameworks.

  • The Conflict: For many Alaskan Natives, there was a deep sense of alienation when forced to adapt to corporate structures mandated by settlements like the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).
  • The Resolution: I argue that instead of losing their identity, these communities effectively used co-management systems, corporate development, and regional self-government to bridge the gap between ancient traditions (like subsistence hunting and fishing) and modern globalization.

3. Peaceful Negotiation as a Model

Unlike many global indigenous struggles that resulted in protracted violence or systemic legal deadlock, the Arctic transformations were achieved largely through peaceful, sophisticated political negotiation. I frame the Arctic experience as a highly successful model of how state governments and aboriginal populations can reach stable, dual-citizen governance models.

In Breaking the Ice, I introduce the concept of “sovereign duality” (often referred to interchangeably with hybrid sovereignty) to describe the unique, layered political landscape that has emerged in the Arctic. Rather than viewing sovereignty as an all-or-nothing, absolute power held exclusively by a central national government, I argue that the Arctic has pioneered a model where sovereignty is shared, cooperative, and distinctively split.

The core pillars of “sovereign duality” include:

1. ‘Dual’ Citizenship and Authority

Under this model, indigenous peoples in the Far North do not have to choose between being tribal citizens or state citizens; they are fully actualized as both. They maintain localized, independent tribal sovereignty over their ancestral lands and cultural practices, while simultaneously participating as active, influential citizens in the broader Westphalian (nation-state) political framework of Canada or the United States.

2. The Merging of Two Worlds

Sovereign duality bridges the gap between two traditionally clashing systems:

  • The State Framework: Modern, Westernized legal systems, globalized corporate structures, and national security interests.
  • The Indigenous Framework: Traditional tribal structures, historical autonomy, and an economy rooted in subsistence (hunting, fishing, and deep interconnectedness with the land).

Through comprehensive land claim agreements (LCAs), these two frameworks form a hybrid system. For example, instead of relying on standard government regulation, the Arctic utilizes co-management boards where state officials and indigenous leaders hold (largely) equal authority to manage wildlife, resources, and environmental protection.

3. Integration Through Collaboration, Not Conquest

I highlight that this dual sovereignty was not born out of military conquest or systemic assimilation, but through sophisticated, peaceful political negotiation. The state essentially consolidated its own Arctic borders and sovereign claims by empowering and embedding indigenous self-governance into its constitutional fabric. Sovereign duality rejects the classic idea that a country has one single, absolute ruler. Instead, it creates a post-modern, “layered” sovereign reality where indigenous nations and federal states co-exist and co-rule, proving that local tribal security and national sovereignty can strengthen one another rather than compete.

As climate change thins the Arctic ice and draws global economic and military interest to the region, I argue that indigenous peoples are no longer passive bystanders. Through their hard-won land claims, they have secured a permanent seat at the table to collaboratively manage both environmental preservation and sustainable economic development in the Far North. Tribal polities like regional and municipal government levels may be constitutionally subordinated to the national government level, but they are locally and regionally predominant and are thus political elites and sovereign partners in collaborative governance, and thus neither marginalized or excluded.

Breaking the Ice highlights a few key differences in how “sovereign duality” took shape on either side of the US-Canada border. While both regions used comprehensive land claims to empower indigenous communities, they used notably different legal, economic, and structural vehicles to get there.

The core differences it identifies include:

1. Salient Vehicle of Sovereignty: Corporations vs. Public Government

The biggest distinction is how power is structured and held.

  • Alaska (Corporate Model): Under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) of 1971, land and monetary compensation were transferred to regional and village for-profit corporations owned by Alaska Native shareholders. This initially caused a sense of “alienation” as traditional tribal cultures were forced to adapt to Western corporate governance, though it ultimately became a powerful mechanism for economic self-sufficiency and regional development.
  • Canada (Public Government Model): When Canada negotiated modern land treaties across the Arctic, it built upon and revised the Alaskan model. Instead of relying primarily on corporate structures, Canada integrated structures of Aboriginal self-governance and co-management directly into the treaty structure. A prime example is Nunavut, where a vast territorial government was established (via secession from the NWT) under a public government structure heavily dominated by the Inuit majority.

2. Tribal Resurgence vs. Structural Planning

Because of how the two systems were set up, the path back toward local autonomy looks different:

  • In Alaska, the purely corporate setup of ANCSA originally omitted explicit tribal governing powers. This oversight triggered a powerful resurgence in tribalism as Alaskan Natives fought to reclaim local political and judicial control outside of their corporate boards, ultimately resulting in co-management and subsistence protections in 1980 with ANILCA, and 1993 with federal tribal recognition.
  • In Canada, co-management, self-government, and land claims were increasingly tied together from the start of the modern treaty era. The treaties granted the Inuit title to roughly one-tenth of their traditional land base alongside formal, state-recognized governing authority and co-management boards.

3. Co-Management Integration

While both regions eventually developed co-management systems to handle environmental and wildlife resources, I point out that Canadaโ€™s later treaties integrated these boards more seamlessly into the constitutional fabric of the state. These boards served as a direct bridge between traditional subsistence living and modern federal oversight, whereas Alaska Native communities had to fight harder to protect their subsistence rights against competing state and federal jurisdictions.

I view Alaska as an economic and corporate trailblazer that had to actively fight for political tribal recognition, while Canada took those lessons and created a model where co-management (and, increasingly political self-governance and territorial control) were woven into the land claims from day one.

My Arctic Journey, Part 1: A Northern Perspective on World Politics and IR Theory

Two decades ago, the first of what has evolved into a full bakerโ€™s dozen of my published books went under contract, marking a shift from my prolific writing of articles and book chapters to much longer-winded and more in-depth and nuanced format for theoretical reflection. While I started out my life of scholarship as an IR Theorist, it was my field-based works on Arctic geopolitics, international relations and multilevel governance that came to press first, and which in turn deeply influenced my approach to IR Theory (as discussed previously in โ€œMy Realist Journey.โ€) Below, I will explore the chapter of my life of scholarship that emerged from my Arctic journey, away from the groupthink of Cold War-era IR Theory, as informed and inspired by the Arctic as a distinct and alternative model for world politics and IR Theory.

In this retrospective journey through my books on Arctic international relations and multilevel governance, “My Arctic Journey,” I extract and develop a comprehensive macro-theory of international relations (IR) and geopolitical order based on my decades of research in and on the Arctic. Across my oeuvre of published books and articles, I present a shift away from top-down, state-centric and (IMHO) overly fatalistic Westphalianisn toward a bottom-up model of collaborative sovereignty and stability. My work in IR Theory discussed above (“My Realist Journey”) bridges the gap between raw, material realism and identity-driven constructivism through Constructive Realism, which informs my understanding of Arctic IR and multilevel governance, rooted in the durability and salience of tribal polities in world politics, yielding what I call Fourth Image Theory, an innovative framework that explains, describes and predicts how sub-state actors ultimately anchor global politics.  

The literature and core concepts I have developed follow an interconnected trajectory across my oeuvre of published works:

  • Breaking the Ice (2008): In this book, I establish the historical and theoretical foundation of my work, examining how indigenous populations in Alaska and Northern Canada transitioned from marginalized groups into central actors in Arctic governance. I introduce the concept of sovereign duality (or hybrid sovereignty) to show how comprehensive land claim agreements (LCAs) allowed native communities to balance ancient traditional frameworks with modern Westernized corporate and public government systems without losing their cultural identity.  
  • On Thin Ice (2009): Transitioning directly to international relations theory, I use this work to introduce my “Fourth Image”โ€”the tribal or sub-state indigenous level of analysisโ€”to correct a structural blind spot in Kenneth Waltzโ€™s traditional three-image framework. Using the rapid geopolitical changes of the polar thaw, I illustrate the successful synthesis of tribe and state, highlighting how a nation’s Arctic sovereignty relies heavily on continuous indigenous occupancy and co-management systems. I also issue a warning regarding the potential for “Inuit fundamentalism” if socioeconomic gaps widen between indigenous corporate elites and remote local communities.  
  • Arctic Doom, Arctic Boom (2009/2010): Here, I shift to a macro-level evaluation of the geopolitical impacts of climate change, presenting the melting ice cap as a structural double-edged sword. I contrast the “Doom” of ecological and cultural disruptions with the “Boom” of newly exposed maritime routes and oil reserves, framing the thawing Arctic Ocean as a “New Mediterranean” transit basin where resource-rich indigenous corporations have the leverage to become the new “Saudi Royals” of the polar world.  
  • Arctic Exceptionalism: Cooperation in a Contested World (2024): In this recent update, written in the wake of the post-2022 freeze of the Arctic Council, I mount a robust, realist defense of the Arctic as an enduring zone of peace. I argue that the region’s hostile environment makes unilateral conflict logistically prohibitive, naturally forcing states toward cooperation. I also critique southern defense establishments for “threat inflation” and for executing a performative “staged Great Game”.  
  • Additionally, across a prolific mix of theoretical essays, such as โ€œTribe, State, and War: Balancing the Subcomponents of World Order,โ€ book chapters, and multi-volume book series (such as my States of Mind project in addition to my books on the Arctic), I formalize my theory of Constructive Realism as well as Fourth Image Theory. From these, I deconstruct world order into a taxonomy with three key pillars: the Organic (natural cultural/kinship foundations), the Synthetic (artificial administrative frameworks), and the Ethereal (ideational or spiritual doctrines).  

Upon this structural foundation, I define the various entities that emerge when these components interact, contrasting brittle, artificially engineered regimes (ESSLEs, or Ephemeral Synthetic State-Level Entities) with cohesive, historically aligned nation-states (POSLEs). Ultimately, my work culminates in the concept of Persistent Organic Sub-State Entities (POSSEs, or Persistent Organic State-Level Entities)โ€”a highly resilient, self-defending unit (such as an Arctic indigenous corporation or a localized tribal matrix) that fuses all three subcomponents to survive a “State of Siege” and anchor fragile national institutions from the ground up.

My Realist Journey, Part 5: Our State of Recovery.

Volume 7 of the States of Mind project: State of Recovery.

In my 2013 book (paperback in 2014), State of Recovery: The Quest to Restore American Security After 9/11, I present a retrospective reflection of the decade following the September 11 attacks, exploring how aย  sustained wave of technological innovation was deployed to restore homeland security and overcome our collective โ€œstate of despair.โ€

State of Recovery serves as a direct sequel to my 2012 book, The Art of War in an Asymmetric World: Strategy for the Post-Cold War Era, originally known as State of Chaos. While The Art of War in an Asymmetric World focuses on how the collapse of the Cold War order birthed a fragmented world driven by tribal and asymmetric insurgencies, State of Recovery serves as the tactical and architectural response to that chaos.

It positions โ€œrecoveryโ€ not as a return to the pre-9/11 status quo, but as a technological and doctrinal evolution to restore Western homeland security against decentralized threats. The Art of War in an Asymmetric World argued that modernization and globalization have pushed non-Western, indigenous, and radical groups to weaponize asymmetrical warfare and tribal structures to destabilize the nation-state.

State of Recovery serves as the logical and sequential next step: How does a major state power heal from a massive asymmetric shock and reconstruct its security framework? Rather than focusing strictly on foreign battlefields, this book analyzes the decade-long domestic and technological mobilization within the United States to insulate and defend the homeland.

It documents how American defense shifted inward, investing heavily in innovation like biometric scanners, remote border sensors, and autonomous drone capabilities to build a preventative shield. State of Recovery was originally conceptualized as the final volume of the States of Mind series and the sequel to the updated post-Cold War volume I added to the original three-volume Visions of Order treatise after 9/11. It tracks the intellectual transition of strategic thinkers from the state of total vulnerability examined in The Art of War in an Asymmetric World (originally titled State of Chaos) back to a state of managed stability:

  • Expanding the Battlefield Away from the Homeland: It illustrates that a core tenet of the American recovery strategy was ensuring that future kinetic engagements would take place far from the homeland. It examines operational efforts like Operation Iraqi Freedom and counter-proliferation efforts in North Korea and Iran to show how the U.S. attempted to control asymmetric volatility abroad.
  • Bridging Fields: While The Art of War in an Asymmetric World focused heavily on counterinsurgency and international relations theory, State of Recovery bridges these concepts with homeland security, domestic intelligence, cyberwarfare, and the private tech sector.

Ultimately, my transition from The Art of War in an Asymmetric World to State of Recovery demonstrates my belief that surviving modern conflict requires shifting away from old Westphalian military symmetry toward a dynamic, agile, and technologically fortified state of constant resilience. The core themes and arguments of State of Recovery include:

A Technology-Driven โ€œRecoveryโ€

I argue that the primary way the United States filled the security vacuum left by the 9/11 attacks was through an unprecedented surge in technology spending and innovation. I chronicle how thousands of tech professionals, scientists, and policy experts collaborated to build entirely new defensive and offensive layers. Key examples include:

  • Defensive: The erection of new border defenses utilizing remote sensors and biometric scanners.
  • Offensive: The rapid deployment of autonomous air warfare capabilities, most notably the drone program.

Pushing the Battlefront Outward

A central pillar of Americaโ€™s post-9/11 strategy was the conscious effort to ensure that future military engagements would take place far from the American homeland. I analyze major geopolitical shifts and interventions through this lens, examining: Operation Iraqi Freedom; the rise of Iran as a nuclear threat and North Korea’s accelerated missile program; and the development of a global ballistic missile shield designed to thwart emerging threats from the (overly conflated and much exaggerated) โ€œAxis of Evilโ€ before they could reach U.S. soil.

โ€œEngineeringโ€ Security over Cyberwarfare

Unlike many contemporary security texts that focus purely on cyber warfare, State of Recovery focuses on the physical and structural engineering of homeland security. It looks at how the integration of tech across multiple disciplines created a new, algorithmic type of security.

Individual and Social Networks

Borrowing from international relations theory, I analyze the GWOT conflict from the level of the individual and the social networks in which they are embedded. I explore not only how the U.S. government leveraged network technologies to combat terrorism, but also how asymmetric, militant Islamist adversaries (like al-Qaeda) adapted and used those exact same digital and technological tools to wage war against a superpower.

State of Recovery is first and foremost a comprehensive retrospective on how the United States leveraged technological innovation to rebuild its national security apparatus in the decade following the September 11 attacks. Rather than focusing strictly on the politics of the War on Terror, it analyzes the intersection of public policy, private enterprise, and emerging technologies that transformed Americaโ€™s defensive and offensive capabilities:

Technology to the Rescue: It argues that the sheer shock of 9/11 left a deep psychological and systemic vacuum in America. To pull the country out of this โ€œstate of despair,โ€ policy makers turned heavily to technologists. The resulting massive influx of public and private capital triggered a decade of rapid innovation. 

An Algorithmic Age of Defense: The book chronicles the shift toward automated, digital, and data-driven defense systems. It outlines how modern security became reliant on things like biometrics, advanced information-sharing networks, and automated infrastructure protection. 

Border and Frontier Security: A significant portion of the monograph breaks down how America secured its borders. It details the deployment of remote sensors, biometric scanners, and less-lethal border solutions designed to balance security with functional infrastructure. It evaluates three distinct โ€œfrontsโ€: Maritime Front: securing seaports against illicit cargo or weapons of mass destruction; Southern Front: reducing border violence and high-volume illegal immigration; and Northern Front: managing the vast, open border with Canada through integrated surveillance.

Geopolitics and External Threats: Beyond non-state actors like al-Qaeda, I contextualize how these technologies were deployed against conventional state threats during the early 2010sโ€”specifically analyzing America’s response to Iran’s emerging nuclear ambitions, North Korea’s missile acceleration, and the conceptual deployment of a ballistic missile shield. 

The Asymmetric Battlefield: The book examines how both the U.S. and militant Islamist groups adapted to the digital age. I note that the internet evolved into a literal theater of war, forcing the U.S. to focus heavily on information security and tracking how terrorist entities went โ€œvirtualโ€ to recruit and coordinate. Northern Front: Managing the vast, historically open border with Canada through integrated surveillance.

Geopolitics and External Threats: Beyond non-state actors like al-Qaeda, I contextualize how these technologies were deployed against conventional state threats during the early 2010sโ€”specifically analyzing America’s response to Iran’s emerging nuclear ambitions, North Korea’s missile acceleration, and the conceptual deployment of a ballistic missile shield. 

Conclusion

I conclude that while the combination of innovative technology and aggressive foreign policy succeeded in preventing another mass-casualty attack on the U.S. homeland for over a decade, it created a highly complex, fragmented world. Security is no longer static; it is an ongoing, evolving struggle where both states and non-state actors are trapped in a continuous loop of technological adaptation.

Ultimately, State of Recovery presents an historical mosaic of the thousands of unsung engineering and policy professionals who fundamentally redesigned how America protects itself, moving the battlefield far from the homeland while embedding security into the everyday digital fabric of the country.

It also lays the foundation for the post-GWOT era of frequent but exceedingly limited wars fought from the skies without boots on the ground, initiated during the Obama administration and in many wars perfected during the second Trump administration, which has come to experience near-constant ultra-limited warfare culminating in strategic and economic partnerships with former rivals, transforming the world order into a global business arena where war is not a continuation of policy by other means but the continuation of business by other means before defaulting to a more transactional and less kinetic relationship.

It is amidst such a climate of perpetual peace (albeit with brief armed conflicts to rebalance regional orders to better meet American interests) that we celebrate our historic 250th anniversary of Americaโ€™s momentous 1776 Declaration of Independence.

Looking back 2,500 years as I have done in my States of Mind project helps to contextualize the American experience, and our experiment forging a new republic from the American wilderness, integrating the Western pillars of the realist order into separate but largely equal branches of government, so that the people, the state and the armed forces stand united against all enemies of Western value. Itโ€™s thus not naรฏve to imagine not only another 250 years of American liberty, but a full 2,500 more years of Western orderโ€”an order defended by American values and power.

My Realist Journey, Part 4: Navigating the State of Chaos.

Volume 6 of the States of Mind project: State of Chaos (published as The Art of War in an Asymmetric World).

Volume 4 of my treatise on Constructive Realism, State of Siege, spawned not just one sequel (as volume 3, State of Awe did with State of Doom), but two sequels: the first of which wasThe Art of War in an Asymmetric World: Strategy for the Post-Cold War Era (originally known as State of Chaos), which examined how the international security landscape transformed following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It chronicled how the end of predictable, bipolar Cold War dynamics did not lead to a utopian โ€œEnd of History,โ€ but rather unleashed a wave of global chaos and entropy. This volume bridges the fields of counterinsurgency (COIN), cyberwarfare, counterterrorism, and international relations theory through several core pillars:

1. Rebellion Against Modernity and Globalization

I position modern asymmetric conflictsโ€”ranging from the 1994 Zapatista uprising in Mexico to Al Qaedaโ€™s global jihadโ€”not as isolated incidents, but as unified reactions against globalization, Western dominance, and forced modernization. Stripped of the stabilizing structures of the Cold War, marginalized populations and radical movements rebelled against state-centric, Western-imposed structures.

2. The Adaptation of American Power

A significant portion of the text analyzes how the United States military and intelligence communities had to radically rewrite their strategic doctrines. Designed to fight massive, conventional nation-states, the U.S. had to pivot during the Global War on Terror (GWOT) to counter decentralized networks, fluid insurgencies, and technological threats like cyberwarfare. I evaluate the theoretical and operational contributions of GWOT-era  military strategists (such as Stanley McRaven and David Ronfeldt) who helped shape these new approaches.

3. The โ€œFourth Imageโ€: The Tribal Foundations of Order

Expanding on Ken Waltzโ€™s classic โ€œthree imagesโ€ of international relations analysis (the individual, the state, and the international system),  I introduce a Fourth Image: the tribal level. I provocatively argue that in the remote, indigenous, or poorly governed spaces where asymmetric modern wars are actually fought, state-imposed centralized control fundamentally fails.

Instead, I suggest that stable, long-term peace can only be achieved by understanding, cooperating with, and restoring traditional, bottom-up tribal order. In short: my framework shows that modern asymmetric warfare is a clash between globalizing state forces and localized tribal identities, requiring a complete rethink of classical strategic theory for a fragmented world. Rather than entering a harmonious, stable democratic era, the post-Cold War landscape unleashed fractured, non-state elements that defied classical nation-state containment.

Global Disorder: The Post-Cold War Era (Part 1)

The Collapse of Bi-Polar Stability and the Illusion of the Peace Dividend

I introduce my central thesis by challenging the prevailing neoliberal optimism of the early 1990s. The fall of the Berlin Wall prompted western theorists to predict an era dominated by market economies and democratic peace theory. I systematically dismantle this premise, demonstrating that the bipolar confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, despite its terrifying nuclear risks, acted as a powerful stabilizing mechanism. This architecture effectively suppressed localized ethnic, tribal, and religious rivalries.

The removal of this overarching systemic pressure did not lead to international integration. Instead, it triggered a massive, systemic phenomenon that I describe as global entropyโ€”a rapid descent into decentralized chaos, fragmentation, and structural decay within weak or artificial nation-states.

Global Entropy and Systemic Decay

In this section, I draw a sharp contrast between classical war and the security challenges of the modern era. While classical interstate competition was defined by institutional order, predictability, and formal declarations, post-Cold War entropy is characterized by its fluidity and lack of structural boundaries. I explore how the vacuum left by superpower retrenchment allowed pre-modern identities to reassert themselves. Entire regions, particularly across the Global South and the post-Soviet periphery, experienced a regression from state-level governance back to sub-state allegiances. I detail this structural decay not as an accidental byproduct of history, but as a predictable consequence of removing systemic equilibrium. The post-Cold War era is therefore defined not by international law, but by a chaotic scramble for localized survival and autonomy.

Rebellion Against Modernity, Globalization, and Western Hegemony

A core pillar of my framework is the ideological reinterpretation of asymmetric warfare. Rather than viewing modern insurgencies, radical groups, and trans-state networks merely as criminal syndicates or isolated terrorist cells, I re-conceptualize them as a unified, deep-seated rebellion against modernity and globalization.

Globalization, driven heavily by Western economic models and digital connectivity, has consistently threatened traditional, localized ways of life. I explore how asymmetric actors leverage asymmetric methods to fight back against what they perceive as an intrusive, homogenizing, and imperialistic Western framework. This resistance manifests across a wide spectrum, from the neo-Zapatista movement (EZLN) in Chiapas, Mexico, which directly opposed global trade pacts like NAFTA, to the rise of radical jihadist networks seeking to overturn Western political influence in the Middle East.

Asymmetrical Conflict and the Information Age (Part 2)

Netwar, Cyberwarfare, and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)

Turning my focus to the technological landscape, I analyze how the Information Age fundamentally disrupted the traditional distribution of power. During the Cold War, cutting-edge military technology required the immense industrial and financial backing of a superpower. The digital revolution completely inverted this dynamic by democratizing the tools of mass communication, intelligence gathering, and precision disruption.

I examine the concept of Netwarโ€”a term popularized by Rand Corporation theorists David Ronfeldt and John Arquilla. Netwar describes conflicts waged by decentralized, network-centric actors who lack a formal hierarchy, clear command structure, or geographical center of gravity:

AttributeConventional WarfareInformation-Age Netwar
Organizational StructureStrict military hierarchyDecentralized, flat network cells
Primary Center of GravityCapital cities, industrial hubs, formal militariesShared ideological narrative, digital nodes
Operational SpeedLinear, dependent on supply chainsRapid, swarm-based, digitally synchronized
Resource RequirementsImmense industrial capital and state revenueLow-cost, commercial-off-the-shelf technology

The Democratization of Force and Non-State Multipliers

I explore the strategic implications of this technological inversion, noting that the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) inadvertently handed asymmetric adversaries devastating force-multipliers. A non-state group no longer needs an air force or an industrial base to project power across borders.

Through cyber operations, open-source intelligence collection, and low-cost digital orchestration, a tiny cell can disrupt critical infrastructure, manipulate international media cycles, and compromise the information infrastructure of a heavily armed nation-state. This digitization of conflict strips traditional powers of their conventional advantages. In the digital arena, mass and heavy armor are easily bypassed by agility, anonymity, and distributed networks.

Case Studies of Early Asymmetric Digital Actors

To ground these information-age theories, I provide detailed historical case studies:

  • The Zapatista Uprising (1994): I highlight the EZLN as one of the earliest pioneers of modern netwar. Recognizing they could not defeat the conventional Mexican military in a direct engagement, the Zapatistas utilized early internet networks, listservs, and international solidarity groups to wage a highly effective informational campaign. They successfully constrained the Mexican government’s military response through global public pressure.
  • The Evolutionary Trajectory of Al Qaeda: I next document how Al Qaeda transitioned from a localized, sanctuary-dependent organization in Afghanistan into a highly adaptive, globally distributed digital franchise. By using web forums and media manipulation, they decoupled their operations from physical geography, allowing their ideology to survive and replicate even after losing their primary territorial safe havens.

The Global War on Terror (GWOT) (Part 3)

The Strategic Shock of September 11 and Policy Misalignments

I position the September 11 attacks as the definitive, tragic confirmation of my thesis on global entropy and asymmetric threat vectors. The destruction of the World Trade Center demonstrated how a non-state actor, using minimal financial resources and commercial infrastructure, could inflict a catastrophic strategic shock on the world’s sole remaining superpower.

However, I critiques the initial Western response. I argue that the United States and its allies suffered from deep-seated institutional inertia, attempting to view and fight the early Global War on Terror through a conventional, state-centric lens. This led to a profound strategic misalignment: attempting to use heavy, industrial-era military machines to capture fluid, phantom networks.

The Doctrine of Counterinsurgency (COIN) and Operational Adaptation

As conventional interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan devolved into complex, protracted multi-sided insurgencies, the Western military apparatus was forced to undergo a radical intellectual evolution. I chart this transformation by focusing heavily on the revival and rewriting of Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, spearheaded by figures like General David Petraeus and reflected in the release of Field Manual (FM) 3-24.

This pivot required moving away from conventional โ€œkineticโ€ operations (killing or capturing enemies) toward population-centric warfare. I detail how the military had to transform its soldiers into nation-builders, diplomats, and cultural anthropologists. Success was no longer measured by terrain seized, but by the degree of security, economic viability, and political legitimacy provided to the local population.

The Evolution of Special Operations Forces (SOF)

Alongside population-centric COIN, I explores the massive expansion and structural elevation of Special Operations Forces (SOF) within the global security framework. I specifically highlight the theoretical and operational insights of strategists like Admiral Stanley McRaven.

McRavenโ€™s theories on relative superiorityโ€”achieved by a small, highly integrated force using element of surprise, speed, and precision purposeโ€”became the bedrock of modern counterterrorism. I describe how SOF units adapted to combat network-centric enemies by building their own highly integrated, inter-agency networks. This organizational evolution allowed them to shrink the time between intelligence acquisition and operational execution, creating a highly lethal tool designed to match the agility of asymmetric adversaries.

The Art of War in an Asymmetric World (Part 4)

Synthesizing Classical and Modern Strategic Theory

In this section, I deliver my primary theoretical contribution by placing modern asymmetric realities in direct conversation with classical strategic thought. I bridge the historical gap between timeless principles of conflict and the chaotic features of the 20th and 21st centuries.

I systematically revisit the foundational works of classical strategic thinkers, filtering their enduring insights through the lens of modern decentralized, non-state conflicts:

  • Carl von Clausewitz: I re-evaluate Clausewitz’s core concept of the remarkable trinityโ€”the dynamic balance between the government (reason), the military (chance and strategy), and the people (passion and primal violence). In an asymmetric world where the state is no longer the sole actor, this trinity becomes fragmented. The โ€œgovernmentโ€ may be an amorphous tribal council, and the โ€œmilitaryโ€ a fluid network of insurgent cells. I argue that Clausewitz’s emphasis on the political nature of war remains true, but warns that when the political entity lacks clear borders, finding its strategic center of gravity becomes exceptionally difficult.
  • Antoine-Henri Jomini: Jomini’s classical focus on geometric lines of operation, concentrated mass, and territorial control is heavily challenged by me. In asymmetric netwar, there are no front lines, defined flanks, or conventional territories to capture. I argue that over-reliance on Jominian geometric principles misleads modern commanders, as the modern battlespace is human, cognitive, and digital rather than physical.
  • Sun Tzu: I suggest that Sun Tzuโ€™s The Art of War is far more applicable to asymmetric environments than Western industrial-era theories. Sun Tzuโ€™s emphasis on deception, winning without fighting through psychological subversion, avoiding strength, and attacking weakness directly mirrors the operational art of the asymmetric warrior.

The Asymmetric Paradox: When Vulnerability Becomes Strength

I introduce a counterintuitive concept known as the asymmetric paradox. In conventional warfare, a lack of heavy armor, secure logistics bases, and centralized command hierarchies is considered a fatal vulnerability. However, in asymmetric conflicts, this absolute lack of infrastructure becomes a profound strategic strength.

Because an asymmetric adversary has no permanent military bases to target, no cities to hold hostage, and no formal economy to sanction, they offer zero conventional targets to a state military. Their extreme material weakness forces them to remain fluid, hidden, and deeply embedded within the civilian population. This structure leaves conventional states with immense firepower but no clear targets against which to deploy it.

The Tribal Foundations of Order (Part 5)

Extending Realist Theory: The Application of the โ€œFourth Imageโ€

The climax of my strategic analysis occurs with his critique and extension of structural realism. In international relations theory, Kenneth Waltzโ€™s landmark framework established three images (or levels of analysis) to explain the causes of conflict and the nature of world politics:

  1. The First Image: The Individual (human nature, psychology of leaders).
  2. The Second Image: The State (domestic political and economic structures, democracy vs. authoritarianism).
  3. The Third Image: The International System (anarchy, distribution of material power among nation-states).

I assert that this three-tiered framework suffers from a glaring, Eurocentric, state-biased blind spot. In the remote, fractured, and underdeveloped regions where modern asymmetric wars are actually fought, the state is an alien, artificial concept imposed by colonial history.

To correct this deficiency, I introduce the Fourth Image: the tribal level of analysis.

The Fourth Image focuses on sub-state kinship networks, clan allegiances, and traditional, localized structures of authority that have existed long before the Westphalian state system.

The Primacy of Indigenous and Tribal Sovereignty

I assert that when modern states attempt to stabilize an asymmetric battlespace by building centralized state institutions from the top down, they are fighting against the natural grain of local society. Whether in the Hindu Kush of Afghanistan, the valleys of Waziristan, or the vast expanses of the Arctic and the Amazon, local populations look to traditional kinship structures for security, justice, and resource allocation.

Top-down state-building is frequently viewed by local populations as a hostile, foreign occupation. I argue that true, durable social order in these environments cannot be achieved by imposing Western administrative institutions. Instead, it must be carefully negotiated, built, and secured from the bottom up, utilizing the organic legitimacy of traditional tribal authority.

Policy Implications for Grand Strategy and Stabilization

In the concluding chapters, I deliver a pragmatic warning to Western policymakers and military strategists. If international stabilizing efforts continue to ignore the Fourth Image, they are destined to experience perpetual strategic failure.

Grand strategy must adapt to treat tribal and indigenous structures not as obstacles to modernization, but as foundational partners in creating sustainable regional security. I call for a paradigm shift: an evolution toward an organic, decentralized approach to global order that respects, integrates, and cooperates with the tribal realities of the post-Cold War world.

My Realist Journey, Part 3: Strategy After Hiroshima (State of Doom).

As I updated and expanded my States of Mind seriesย in the 2000s and 2010s, I found the need for a fourth, then a fifth, then a sixth, and finally a seventh volume to complete my treatise. What became volume 5 was an outgrowth of volume 3 (State of Awe), drilling in on the nuclear age which had culminated in volume three my with discussion of order in the age of total war.

While this was indeed, a single era as war industrialized and later nuclearized, achieving absoluteness in its destructiveness, I felt both the need and the desire to explore the nuance of the nuclear age, in part in homage to Waltz whose neorealism, like Brodieโ€™s deterrence theory, sought to tame the terror of the nuclear age (and did for a little while).

Both can be thought of as nuclear realists, but as I wrote, I came to find the literature on neorealism rather light and lacking in substance, while the literature on nuclear strategy was refreshingly complex and nuanced and provided the true foundation of the nuclear order (a dangerously brittle one that collapsed like a house of cards under the unforeseen massing of Gandhian people power in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.)

My 600-page dissertation, Bernard Brodie and the Bomb: At the Birth of the Bipolar Worldย (published in book form in 2011 by Continuum (now Bloomsbury) as the much shortened (by 300 pages!) State of Doom: Bernard Brodie, the Bomb, and the Birth of the Bipolar World), stands as a definitive professional biography and philosophical investigation of one of the 20th centuryโ€™s most vital strategic minds. It explores how Bernard Brodie (1910โ€“1978) earned his reputation as โ€œAmericaโ€™s Clausewitzโ€ or the โ€œClausewitz of the Nuclear Age.โ€ย 

By tracing Brodieโ€™s intellectual journey from his pre-World War II writings on naval engineering to his foundational texts on atomic deterrence and his late-career work translating Carl von Clausewitz’s classic On War, it reveals the existential dilemma of the modern era: How can a state utilize military force for political objectives when the weapons at its disposal threaten total planetary destruction? Brodie answered these questions, which were left unanswered, uncomfortably so, by Waltzโ€™s neorealism (which left all the heavy lifting to the imagined โ€œsystem,โ€ as if a cult or new religion structured upon Godโ€™s grace and infinite wisdom.)

Introduction: The Strategic Crucible of the Bipolar World

I frame his exploration around the transition from a multipolar global system to the rigid, highly tense bipolar structure of the Cold War. In this landscape, the United States and the Soviet Union faced an unprecedented security environment defined by the โ€œbalance of terror.โ€ At the center of this transformation was Bernard Brodie. As one of the first civilian defense intellectuals to bridge the gap between academia and military policyโ€”most notably through his long tenure at the RAND Corporationโ€”Brodie fundamentally redefined the purpose of military force.

My core thesis is that Brodie’s intellectual life was a lifelong project to reconcile classic military theory with technological shifts.ย When the splitting of the atom yielded the absolute weapon, traditional concepts of victory, total mobilization, and kinetic warfare were shattered. Throughout his career, Brodie fought to bring politics back into command of military strategy, preventing the machine of war from triggering a global apocalypse.

Before the Bomb: Sea Power and Technological Determinism

Before becoming the premier architect of nuclear strategy, Brodie was a scholar of naval history and sea power.ย  I emphasize that understanding Brodieโ€™s early work is essential, as it established his analytical framework for evaluating how technological paradigm shifts alter strategic realities.

Sea Power in the Machine Ageย (1941)

Brodieโ€™s first major academic contribution analyzed the profound transition of naval warfare during the industrial revolution. He tracked four great technological revolutions that fundamentally altered naval architecture and strategy:

  1. The transition from sail to steam propulsion.
  2. The replacement of wooden hulls with iron and steel armor plating.
  3. The evolution from solid shot to explosive shells and rifled ordnance.
  4. The introduction of submarine warfare and the torpedo.

Brodie observed that military establishments are historically slow to grasp the true strategic implications of new inventions. Tacticians often attempt to force revolutionary technologies into outdated operational doctrines. I highlight this as Brodie’s first encounter with technological determinismโ€”the idea that technology drives changes in human history and warfare, requiring an equal revolution in strategic thought to prevent catastrophe.

A Laymanโ€™s Guide to Naval Strategyย (1942)

Published right after the attack on Pearl Harbor, this book established Brodie as a clear-eyed strategic communicator. It arrived at a moment when many critics believed the airplane had rendered the surface fleet obsolete.

Brodie took a nuanced, balanced view. He argued that while air power changed the tactics of naval engagement, it did not change the fundamental strategic purpose of sea power: the control of maritime lines of communication. This early insight previewed his nuclear-era philosophyโ€”technological leaps change the meansย and costs of warfare, but they do not automatically erase basic geopolitical realities.

The Absolute Weapon: The Invention of Nuclear Deterrence

The atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 completely upended Brodieโ€™s strategic worldview. Within months of these events, Brodie edited and co-authored a foundational text, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Orderย (1946). It was in this work that modern nuclear deterrence theory was born.

The Inversion of Military Utility

I analyze this iconic quote to illustrate how profoundly Brodie broke from traditional military tradition. For centuries, military strategy focused on securing victory through the destruction of the enemy’s armed forces.

Brodie recognized that the atomic bomb rendered total war obsolete as an instrument of statecraft. Because an atomic exchange could destroy entire civilizations in a matter of hours, a war fought with such weapons could yield no rational political benefit. Therefore, the militaryโ€™s primary job shifted from war-fightingย to war-averting.

The Pillars of Early Deterrence Theory

In The Absolute Weapon, Brodie laid out the core principles that would govern U.S. and Soviet interactions for the next four decades:

  • The Futility of Defense:ย Brodie argued that there was no foreseeable, reliable defense against an atomic attack.ย Even if a defensive system intercepted 90% of incoming bombers, the remaining 10% would still deliver unacceptable, civilizational ruin.
  • The Primacy of Retaliation:ย Since defense was impossible, security could only be achieved through the guaranteed threat of overwhelming retaliation. A potential aggressor must understand that attacking would trigger their own destruction.
  • The Irrelevance of Superiority:ย Once a state possesses enough nuclear weapons to destroy its opponent’s society, acquiring thousands more offers little strategic advantage. Nuclear utility hits a point of saturation.

Preserving Order in the Age of Apocalyptic War

As the 1940s turned into the 1950s, the strategic landscape grew vastly more complex and dangerous. I detail how Brodieโ€™s early, clean models of deterrence were severely tested by fast-moving historical developments.

The Loss of the American Monopoly (1949)

When the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in August 1949, the United States lost its nuclear monopoly much faster than Washington political elites had predicted. This shift created a symmetric balance of terror, giving rise to the truly bipolar world.

Brodie had to adapt his theories to a world where bothย sides could instantly retaliate. This eliminated any lingering illusions that the atomic bomb could be used as an offensive tool of diplomatic coercion without risking domestic annihilation.

The Thermonuclear Revolution

The strategic equation changed again with the development of the Hydrogen Bomb (the thermonuclear weapon), first tested by the United States in 1952 and the Soviet Union in 1953.

While the atomic bomb measured its yield in kilotons (thousands of tons of TNT equivalent), the thermonuclear bomb measured its yield in megatons (millions of tons of TNT). Fission bombs were city-killers; fusion bombs were region-killers, capable of poisoning massive geographic areas with lethal radioactive fallout.

I point out that while some defense intellectuals, like those in the Air Force, viewed the H-bomb as just a larger explosive tool for strategic air power, Brodie saw it as a qualitative leap into absolute absurdity. The H-bomb removed any remaining doubt about his 1946 thesis: total war with thermonuclear weapons was absolute suicide.

Rethinking the Unthinkable: Escalation and Limited War

With total war off the table as a rational choice, Brodie turned his focus to preventing brushfire conflicts from escalating into all-out thermonuclear exchanges. My analysis of this period highlights Brodie’s tenure at the RAND Corporation, where he interacted and frequently sparred with other giants of nuclear strategy, such as Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, and Henry Kissinger.

The Problem of Massive Retaliation

During the Eisenhower administration, U.S. defense policy relied heavily on the doctrine of Massive Retaliation. This policy declared that the U.S. would respond to any communist aggression globallyโ€”even local, conventional incursionsโ€”using overwhelming nuclear forces at times and places of its own choosing.

Brodie emerged as a sharp critic of Massive Retaliation. He argued that the threat lacked credibility in an era of nuclear parity. If the Soviet Union launched a localized conventional attack in Europe or Asia, would an American president truly risk the destruction of New York and Washington to defend a distant border?

Brodie asserted that a non-credible threat fails to deter.ย If the enemy exposes the bluff, the U.S. would face a terrible choice: launch a suicidal nuclear war or suffer an embarrassing geopolitical retreat.

The Architecture of Limited War

To solve this credibility gap, Brodie helped develop the theory of Limited War, which he detailed in his 1959 masterpiece, Strategy in the Missile Age.

Brodie argued that to make deterrence function at lower levels of conflict, the United States had to develop the capability and political will to fight limited wars using restricted means and targeting limited objectives.

  • Limitation of Means:ย Intentionally holding back maximum military powerโ€”such as avoiding the use of tactical nuclear weaponsโ€”to signaling a desire to avoid total war.
  • Limitation of Objectives:ย Fighting not for the unconditional surrender of the enemy or the total overthrow of their regime, but for specific geopolitical corrections (e.g., restoring a pre-war border).

I highlight the deep irony Brodie wrestled with: to prevent an absolute war, a superpower must become proficient at fighting restrained, sometimes frustratingly inconclusive limited wars.

A Clausewitz for America: Reuniting War and Politics

The final chapters of my book dive into the philosophical culmination of Brodieโ€™s career: his deep engagement with the writings of Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz:

The Clausewitzian Renaissance

In the late 1960s and 1970s, disillusioned by the strategic failures of the Vietnam War, Brodie dedicated himself to a deep reassessment of classical strategic philosophy. He collaborated with historian Peter Paret to produce the landmark 1976 Princeton University Press translation of Clausewitzโ€™s On War, providing an extensive commentary that contextualized the Prussian master for the nuclear age.

Brodie discovered that Clausewitz provided the perfect philosophical toolkit to fight the technocratic, math-heavy trends that had taken over American defense planning. Strategists like Robert McNamara had tried to turn war into a bureaucratic exercise of systems analysis, body counts, and raw cost-benefit equations. Brodie used Clausewitz to remind the world that war is inherently an unpredictable, messy, human phenomenon driven by emotion, chance, and politics.

Reconciling the Famous Dictum

The core of Clausewitzian theory rests on the famous dictum: โ€œWar is the continuation of politics by other means.โ€ย This means that military violence must always serve as a tool for a specific political objective, and the political goal must entirely dictate the scale of military effort.

I carefully map out how Brodie solved the paradox of applying this 19th-century rule to the thermonuclear era:

  • The Separation Point:ย In an all-out nuclear war, the sheer scale of destruction breaks the connection between violence and statecraft. Because no political goal can justify the total annihilation of one’s own society, total thermonuclear war cannot be a continuation of politics. It is simply madness.
  • The Solution:ย Therefore, the only way to keep war Clausewitzian in the modern era is through nuclear deterrenceย and strict limitation. Deterrence uses the threatย of force to achieve the political objective of stability and peace.ย When kinetic conflict does break out, it must be kept strictly limited so that the costs of fighting never outgrow the political value of the goal.

By aligning deterrence with Clausewitz, Brodie elevated it from a temporary military fix to a permanent, morally grounded framework for preserving global order.

The Lingering Legacy of the (Brief) Bipolar Peace

In my analysis, it becomes clear that Bernard Brodieโ€™s contributions were central to preventing the Cold War from turning hot.ย The stable bipolar order was not an accidental byproduct of technology; it was a constructed intellectual architecture designed by thinkers who walked the world back from the brink of doom.

Brodie’s evolution reflects the journey of an era:

  • Technology and War:ย He began by studying how technology changes the machinery of warย (Sea Power in the Machine Age, and Guide to Naval Strategy).
  • The Bomb and Obsolescence of Total War:ย He recognized when technology had made total war obsoleteย (The Absolute Weapon).
  • Escalation:ย He built the operational guardrails of escalation management (Strategy in the Missile Age and Escalation and the Nuclear Option).
  • He grounded the entire system in the timeless truth that military power must always serve political ends (โ€œGuide to Reading On Warโ€œ and War and Politics).

I conclude that while the modern international system has continued its shift away from the bipolarity of the Cold War into a complex, multipolar landscape featuring asymmetric threats and nuclear proliferation, Brodie’s insights remain essential. The challenge of the 21st century mirrors that of 1946: ensuring that human political wisdom stays in control of our terrifying capacity for technological destruction.

My Realist Journey, Part 2: Our Enduring Realist Tradition; 2500+ Years of Constructive Realism.

In my four-volume The Realist Tradition in International Relations: The Foundations of Western Order, I unpack 2,500+ years of strategic history.ย To me, โ€œconstructive realismโ€ is not a tragic acceptance of endless war, but a tool of heroic idealismโ€”a systematic, philosophical effort by key thinkers across millennia to use power, strategy, and statecraft to actively craft order out of chaos.

My framework is fundamentally the conceptualization, explication and defense of Constructive Realism.ย By focusing on these states of mind, I attempt to revive the first Waltzian image (the psychological, human, and sub-state level of analysis). I argue that international order is not just an accident of systemic architecture, but a conscious, evolving philosophical product constructed by human actors responding to the changing nature of violence. I structure my exploration chronologically through four distinct eras, using an historic roster of foundational thinkers, military leaders, and strategists to illustrate this concept.

Volume 1: The Classical Foundations (State of Hope)

In the ancient world, where systemic chaos reigned supreme, thinkers laid down the cognitive and linguistic tools needed to conceptualize international order.

  • Thucydides:ย The ancient Greek historian who chronicled the Peloponnesian War.ย Iย  treat him not as a pessimist who famously declared that โ€œthe strong do what they can,โ€ but as a constructive pioneer who first mapped out the objective mechanics of the security dilemma, allowing future societies to consciously design balances of power.
  • Socrates & Plato:ย I highlight the philosophical pivot toward defining justice, structural stability, and the idea of the โ€œPhilosopher King.โ€ย Platoย  epitomizes the constructive realist effort to intellectualize governance, arguing that true political order requires aligning supreme power with supreme wisdom.
  • Aristotle:ย The father of empirical political science. I also view Aristotle as a pioneering constructive realist who analyzed the anatomy of various state constitutions to determine how practical, balanced, and stable governance could survive internal and external shocks.

Volume 2: The Rise of the Modern State (State of Fear)

Confronting the brutal collapses of regional orders, early-modern theorists sought to build an unshakeable sovereign foundation to protect humanity from its own destructive nature.

  • Niccolรฒ Machiavelli:ย The Florentine diplomat famous for The Prince. I look past the caricature of Machiavellian ruthlessness to reframe him as a visionary of sovereign creation. Machiavelliโ€™s dream was the journey from a fractured prince’s rule to a stable, enduring republic capable of defending its people through civic virtue and martial readiness.
  • Thomas Hobbes:ย Dubbed by me as the โ€œUltimate Constructive Realist.โ€ Hobbes famously described life in the anarchic state of nature as โ€œnasty, brutish, and shortโ€ (somewhat like life on the โ€œIslandโ€ during the final season of Lost).ย I note that Hobbes’ response was a masterpiece of constructive statecraft: inventing the Leviathanย (the modern state), which trades total individual freedom for collective security under a centralized authority.
  • Frederick the Great:ย The Prussian king who embodied the transition from theory to practice. I chronicle Frederickโ€™s journey from writing his idealistic critique of Machiavelli (Anti-Machiavel) to ruling as a pragmatic โ€œPhilosopher Kingโ€ who used a highly disciplined military apparatus to stabilize Central European geopolitics.
  • Napoleon Bonaparte:ย The ultimate catalyst of total war. I view Napoleon’s legacy as the structural shockwave that forced the European continent to graduate from limited Westphalian warfare into industrialized, nationalized conflict, testing the limits of state-built order. Theorists of modern war, Carl.von Clausewitz and Antoine-Henri Jomini serve as the intellectual bridge at the end of Volume 2, dueling over how to impose order onto the chaotic explosion of the Napoleonic Wars.
  • Antoine-Henri Jomini:ย The Swiss officer and military theorist who sought to reduce the chaotic genius of Napoleon into a reliable, scientific manual. I frame Jomini as an early champion of a highly structured, geometric approach to strategy. To Jomini, war could be mastered through immutable principlesโ€”lines of operation, concentration of force, and geometric symmetry. He modernizes constructive realism by codifying these precise rules, so that states could make warfare a predictable, manageable instrument of national policy.
  • Carl von Clausewitz:ย The Prussian general and philosopher of war whose masterwork, On War, serves as the ultimate counterweight to Jomini. Rather than trying to iron out chaos with geometry, Clausewitz embraced it. He introduced concepts like โ€œfrictionโ€ (the unexpected things that go wrong in war) and the โ€œfog of war.โ€ I position Clausewitz as a cornerstone of modern constructive realism because he fundamentally reconnects violence back to human order, famously declaring that โ€œwar is the continuation of politics by other means.โ€ By subordinating raw military destruction to rational political objectives, Clausewitz provided the conceptual guardrails to prevent war from consuming civilization in the age of total war.

Volume 3: The Nuclear Era and Neorealism (State of Awe)

The advent of the atomic bomb forced 20th-century strategic minds to completely redefine the relationship between state survival and total destruction.

  • Bernard Brodie:ย Known as โ€œAmerica’s Clausewitz,โ€ Brodie was one of the first to grasp the reality of the nuclear age. Iย  examine how Brodie brilliantly adapted classical military theory to the absolute weapon, asserting that the primary purpose of the military had fundamentally changed: it was no longer to winย wars, but to avertย them through deterrence. (My chapter on Brodie in State of Awe later evolved into a separate volume entirely in my States of Mind treatise, becoming State of Doom.)
  • Herman Kahn:ย The legendary (and provocative) nuclear strategist who wrote On Thermonuclear War. I note Kahn took a โ€œJominianโ€ (highly calculated, geometric, and systematic) approach to strategic thinking. By boldly โ€œthinking about the unthinkable,โ€ Kahn constructively mapped out scenarios to ensure that even if deterrence failed, escalation could be controlled and civilization could survive (albeit with much denial on the lingering consequences of nuclear fallout and radiation).
  • Kenneth Waltz:ย The father of structural realism (neorealism), a critique of which began my own realist journey as I sought to reinvigorate the First Image (the individual), and de-emphasize the Third (system level). I focus on Waltz and his peers as the โ€œwizards of automation.โ€ Waltz shifted the lens away from human psychology to system architecture, illustrating how the bipolar structure of the Cold War created an equilibrium that mechanically preserved global stability (until it didnโ€™t!)

Volume 4: The Age of Peoples’ War & Insurgency (State of Siege)

In the contemporary era, the traditional state’s monopoly on violence is challenged by asymmetric, decentralized, and non-Western movements. I highlight that these architects of upheaval are often visionaries constructing alternative political models and sovereign structures.

  • Sun Tzu:ย The ancient Chinese strategist whose philosophy anchors modern asymmetric conflict. I utilize Sun Tzu to show how strategic order can be achieved by prioritizing deception, subversion, and psychological manipulation over costly, direct state-on-state clashes.
  • Mao Zedong:ย The architect of modern insurgent warfare. I analyze Mao’s theory of โ€œPeople’s War,โ€ framing him as a constructive theorist who successfully weaponized marginalized, agrarian populations to overthrow an established political order and forge an alternative state model.
  • Mahatma Gandhi:ย Pioneering theorist of โ€œPeople Power.โ€ย I explain how Gandhiโ€™s nonviolent resistance (and Gene Sharpโ€™s structural/theoretical interpretation of Gandhi) framework for civilian-based defense are highly strategic, calculated exercises of power designed to dismantle oppressive regimes without the traditional tools of kinetic war.
  • Osama bin Laden:ย The infamous mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks. I analyze bin Laden through a dark realist lensโ€”not as a nefarious, chaos-inducing terrorist, but as a sub-state strategic actor attempting to challenge the global Westphalian model and build an alternative transnational, faith-based political order through militant jihadism.

My Realist Journey: Looking Back Upon 2,500 Years of Realist Theory as America Turns 250

Part 1: An American State of Mind

Itโ€™s amazing how fast 250 years can go by!

Celebrating Americaโ€™s 250th anniversary since its momentous Declaration of Independence certainly makes a quarter millennium feel like the blink of an eye. Especially after the triumph of people power brought President Trump back into office in a sweeping indictment of the deep state and its subversion of American values and constitutional principles.

Ultimately, the American experience has been an experiment in achieving a realist vision of the world, and crafting a modern republic built upon the same balanced โ€œtrinity of powerโ€ (a liberating alignment of the people, the state and the armed forces) that has empowered the Western order since the days of Socrates, Plato and Xenophon.

But to fully grok the universal significance of the American experiment, we must look back not just 250 years, but much farther โ€” to the start of the Western experiment 2,500 years ago!

And it just so happens that I have penned just such a retrospective analysis, originally (before the Cold War ended) called Visions of Order, a three-volume work (Volume 1: State of Hope; Volume 2: State of Fear; and Volume 3: State of Awe); and later, States of Mind, an expanded four-volume work with the added volume, State of Siege, which soon again expanded to include a fifth, sixth and seventh volume, State of Chaos, State of Doom and State of Recovery. 

My original three-volume treatise (Visions of Order) concluded, in State of Awe, with the bipolar Cold War peace, and was penned in the mid-to-late 1980s, coming to completion just as Cold War ended, collapsing the seemingly millennial era of bipolarity (like all such millennial dreams of everlasting order), and with the swiftness of that collapse, unmasking neorealism and most other Cold War IR theories (with notable exceptions like Regime Theory) as brittle ideological dogmas masquerading as theories.

Visions of Order was going to be my dissertation, a rebuttal of Ken Waltzโ€™s neorealism written under Waltzโ€™s apoplectic supervision (he hated it, but at the same time, loved it, but mostly hated it!) His other students were unwilling to stand up to him, and he loved a good debate (as Scott Sagan came to appreciate with their post- Cold War debate on nuclear proliferation). But when the Cold War ended, imploding the now obsolete field of Soviet and East European Studies, and unmasking a whole generation of IR theorists as delusional navel-gazers and Waltzian butt-kissers, I proposed a new subfield in Circumpolar Studies to replace the now-obsolete field of Soviet and East European Studies (itself a fiction of Russian imperialist fantasy), but was laughed at by the pompous defenders of obsolete subfields.

Rather than kick a dead horse, I hopped on my 250cc Honda Rebel motorbike and road up the Alaska Highway to Whitehorse, and from their up the Klondike Highway to Dawson, and from there up the Dempster Highway to Inuvik on the Mackenzie River Delta near the Beaufort Sea Coast, where over the next decade I penned another three-volume treatise on the foundations of international relations, based upon my observations and experiences in the Western Arctic (and which is discussed in the companion to this retrospective theoretical memoir, โ€œMy Arctic Journey.โ€)

Two decades later, as the dust and debris of 9/11 was settling, I pulled out my handwritten draft of my completed, three-volume Visions of Order on spiral bound notebooks, and hired a wonderful typist on Craigslist to digitize the manuscript for me for the Internet era, with the idea of adding new volumes to bring what I was now calling States of Mind up to date (as both tribute to, and defiant mockery of, the nonsensical, and overly ideological, Constructivist school that has colonized the hive mind of academia after neorealism became obsolete with the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall to people power.)

As my updated expanded treatise approached completion, I decided it was time to publish it. Waltz was still alive, and still beating the dead horse of neorealism, even arguing in The New York Times that an Iranian bomb would be good for world peace. Though too late to become a dissertation under his supervision, he did enthusiastically agree to serve as an external reader, but unfortunately passed away before the public defense, owing to an overly eager junior faculty member insisting on yet another revision to bring the work current with the literature, since I wrote the first draft just before the end of the Cold War, resulting in a year delay that we simply did not have as Waltzโ€™s precarious health deteriorated.

With Waltz no longer with us, I refocused my attention on State of Awe, in tribute to Waltz, and wrote the expanded State of Doom which further evolved into a strategic biography of Bernard Brodie, a contemporary of Waltzโ€™s who did for deterrence and strategic theory what Waltz did for IR theory: wedded it to the existential nuclear challenge of the post-Hiroshima world.

States of Mind further evolved into what ultimately became a seven-volume treatise and I ended up dividing the work in two to ensure the entire work could be published. Praeger Security International agreed to publish the original Visions of Order with the addition of the post-9/11 State of Siege, while Continuum Books agreed to publish State of Doom, State of Chaos, and State of Recovery.

Thus, in 2011, my four-volume, twenty-five century chronicle of realism across the ages (The Realist Tradition in International Relations: The Foundations of Western Order) came to pressโ€”the first part of my seven-volume States of Mind project. In it, I present a sweeping and provocative (if I do say so myself!) reinterpretation of realist theory.

Challenging the systems-centric neorealist tradition of structural realism as articulated by Waltzโ€”one of the two most stubborn mentors Iโ€™ve ever had, the other being Gene Sharp, another realist thinker of Waltzโ€™s generation who was as unyielding on strategic nonviolence as Waltz was on systemic structureโ€”I frame the evolution of realist thought through the eyes of two-and-a-half millennia of individual realist thinkers and their respective quests to tame the chaos of their times, from the era of city-states and classical empires to global nuclear superpowers, yielding an evolving but strikingly consistent philosophical and theoretical tradition.

I conclude that the foundations of world order are built upon these evolving โ€œstates of mindโ€ that correspond to distinct historical eras and their respective technologies, strategies and paradigms of warfare. I organized this framework into four distinct โ€œstates of mind,โ€ each examined in its own volume, capturing how political leaders, philosophers, and strategists responded to, and yearned to transcend, the chaos of their times.

Volume 1: State of Hope: Order in the Age of Classical War

  • The Era: Classical Antiquity (tracing back to Thucydides and ancient Greece).
  • The Concept: This state of mind emerges from a baseline of supreme geopolitical chaos. It is a โ€œstate of hopeโ€ because it represents humanity’s earliest philosophical efforts to conceptualize, predict, and ultimately tame international anarchy. Rather than accepting perpetual vulnerability, classical realism sought the intellectual foundations necessary to construct a predictable, sustainable balance of power out of raw conflict.

Volume 2: State of Fear: Order in the Age of Limited War

  • The Era: The early-modern period through the Enlightenment (and the rise of the Westphalian states system).
  • The Concept: Driven by a collective psychological dread of endless religious and civil bloodbaths (such as the Thirty Years’ War), this state of mind prioritized survival and stability above all else. This collective โ€œfearโ€ directly catalyzed the birth of the modern sovereign nation-state. By monopolizing violence and establishing strict borders, states constrained the scope of conflict, transitioning the world into an era of structured, โ€œlimitedโ€ warfare governed by clear diplomatic rules.

Volume 3: State of Awe: Order in the Age of Total War

  • The Era: The 20th century through the Cold War (both World Wars and the nuclear age).
  • The Concept: The rise of absolute industrialized warfare and the advent of the atomic bomb shifted humanity into a state of psychological โ€œaweโ€โ€”a paralyzing realization of our capacity for total self-destruction. Realist strategy during this period evolved to manage unprecedented systemic danger. It gave rise to the philosophy of nuclear deterrence and strategic stability, where order was paradoxically maintained through the terrifying equilibrium of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).

Volume 4: State of Siege: Order in the Age of Insurgency

  • The Era: The post-Cold War and post-9/11 contemporary world.
  • The Concept: This modern state of mind reflects the fragmentation of the traditional nation-state’s monopoly on security. As globalized networks, tribal factions, and asymmetric actors rose up against Western modernization, states found themselves in a perpetual โ€œstate of siegeโ€ from within and below. This era shifts the realist focus away from massive, state-on-state clashes toward navigating non-state insurgencies, counter-terrorism, and localized border friction.

“Must Liberalism be Atomistic?” by Jacob Rodriguez

During his inauguration ceremony, the newly elected mayor of New York City Zohran Mamdani pledged to run the city as he had run his campaign, as a committed socialist. He stirred much discussion during his speech when he claimed that โ€œWe will replace the frigidity of rugged individualism with the warmth of collectivism.โ€ A variety of public thinkers and politicians commented on this statement, taking it as a moment to reflect on what they perceived as a referendum on uniquely American ideals.


[Click here to read the entire essay]


Jacob Rodriguez is a PhD candidate in political science at Baylor University. Email him at jacob_rodriguez12@baylor.edu.

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Economics and the Mirror of Nature

Editorial Note: This is an old and longform essay I wrote on the philosophy of economics and economic methodology originally for a history of economic thought class as a sophomore undergraduate at Hillsdale College back in April of 2015. I am uploading it here mostly for posterity as a historical interest in my own intellectual development and for any curious onlookers interested in what interpretive economic social theory could look like–at least at a high, sketchy and not detailed level.

It is worth noting that there is an obvious thing I should have done differently: it really should have treated the “ecological rationality” of figures like Vernon Smith and the later FA Hayek as a fourth alternative paradigm to the sort of rationality practiced by neoclassicals, the interpretive rationality practiced by some Austrians and the Bounded Rationality practiced by behavioral economists. This ecological notion of rationality which makes room for neoclassical-style constructivist theories of rationality–so long as they are understood as maps and not the terrain–is something I am more sympathetic towards these days alongside the intepretive, hermeneutic sort of rationality argued for in this essay.

I still think it gets a lot of the genealogical and psychological diagnosis of what historically has gone wrong in economic questions about rationality as developed by neoclassical, behavioral, and Misesean Austrian economics by relying too much on an unquestioned epistemic foundationalism , but I think normative pragmatists like Robert Brandom offer us a more constructively and ecologically critical way forward than I was aware of when I penned this paper.

The essay is presented here largely as it was originally written, with only minimal editing. Its sophomoric sketchiness, grand but unrealized ambitions, and rough edges are intact.

Economics and the Mirror of Nature: Richard Rortyโ€™s Hermeneutics as an Approach to the Historical Study of Rationality in Relation to Economic Theory and Method

The conception of man as a โ€œrational actorโ€ is one of the key foundations of modern economic thinking. However, what exactly economists mean by โ€œrationalityโ€ in the technical sense has historically been a fairly sticky issue that has evolved as economic theory has evolved. In some ways, rationality is tied up with epistemological problems in economic methodology. In other ways, it has been tied to value theory, expectations theory, and a host of other issues that seem like pure theoretical theory than meta-economic questions of method. However, a historical treatment of how economists have come to understand rationality deserves sensitivity to how economists have understood internal problems to economics itself and the relationship to the nature of the economic science.

FA Hayek (1952) lays out the potential for a progressive research program in the history of thought in the social sciences in his work Counterrevolution of Science. For Hayek, โ€œscientism,โ€ viewing the research program of the social sciences as essentially the same as the natural sciences, is prevalent the intellectual discourse about the social sciences. Hayek objects to โ€œthe objectivism of the scientistic approachโ€ insofar as it treats the data of the social sciences as fundamentally the same as the data of the physical sciences, objective, measurable phenomena. For Hayek, this leads to โ€œrationalist constructivismโ€ in approach to solving the problems of society. Examples of โ€œrationalist constructivismโ€ include most primarily August Comteโ€™s approach to social engineering and sociology and socialist attempts to design economies.

In a similar vein, Richard Rortyโ€™s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980) objects to what he calls the โ€œPlatonic Kantianโ€ approach to philosophy. For Rorty, the โ€œimage of the mind as a great mirror, containing various representationsโ€”some accurate, some notโ€”and being capable of being studied by pure, nonempirical methodsโ€ (12) has lead philosophy astray into a series of non-constructive topics such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of language in which philosophers tried to โ€œgroundโ€ all of knowledge in a way that every rational being could agree.

This paper proposes that FA Hayekโ€™s program of โ€œrational constructivismโ€ should be viewed as a complementary approach to Richard Rortyโ€™s program in the history of philosophy as laid out in the Mirror of Nature. Following the tradition of Lavoie (1990), this paper argues that a hermeneutical exegesis of economics as a whole, not simply one or the other tradition, might help bring the various โ€œschoolsโ€ of economics into better dialogue with each other. The first part lays out a partial history of one subject, utility theory, in which economics has attempted to objectify itself into the realm of natural science drawing heavily off of Zouboulakisโ€™ Varieties of Economic Rationality (2013). The second part argues that Rortyโ€™s hermeneutical approach can explain the historical narrative in a Hayekian way. A concluding section reflects on areas needed for further research.

Part 1: Our Utilitarian Essence
One of the fundamental assumptions, especially of the English school during the marginal revolution, in the formation of the economics science as we know it today was presupposing a fairly simple psychology of utilitarianism drawing from Bentham. However, this idea of utility theory as foundational to economics was eventually replaced by Paretoโ€™s ordinal approach to utility theory. The title of this section draws from the title of the first section of Rortyโ€™s Mirror of NatureL โ€œOur Glassy Essence,โ€ which reflects on how the image of โ€œthe mind as mirrorโ€ came into existence. This section lays out how utility came to be viewed as โ€œessentialโ€ to the meaning of economics

Rationality as Utility Maximization: Jevons and the English Marginal Revolution
When economists say โ€œrationality,โ€ they have always intended it as a term of art. Thus phrases such as โ€œrational action,โ€ โ€œrational actor,โ€ and โ€œrationalityโ€ in the technical economic sense have never really meant what is thought by these phrases in the everyday sense. In the everyday sense, what is typically meant by โ€œrationalโ€ is that one is holding a belief based on reasonable evidence. However, for early economists rationality has always been tied up with some sense of individualized self-interest.

The most primitive version of rationality as an economic term of art was found in the work of classical political economist and utilitarian philosopher Jerome Bentham. For the early nineteenth century economists, to be rational was to maximize utility in the Benthamite sense; to maximize pleasure and minimize pain in a very broad sense. Thus early economic ideas of a rationally self-interested actor were intimately related to utility. An example of this idea of rationality as pursuit of utility is the work of William Jevons. Though Jevons never used the term โ€œrationality,โ€ it is clear in his work that the concept today called โ€œrationalityโ€ is very central to Jevonโ€™s work. Jevons adopted a very strong conception of rationality in line with homo economicus.

In order to understand how Jevons conceived of economics, it is important to understand its place in his broader context of economic thought on economic method. In his Theory of Political Economy (1871/2013),Jevons claimed that โ€œEconomics, if it is to be a science at all, must be a mathematical scienceโ€ (434). This is largely because Jevons had a strong commitment to making economics analogous to physics. As he wrote in the first edition of TPE (1871/2013):

The theory of economy, thus treated, presents a close analogy to the science of Statistical Mechanics, and the Laws of Exchange are found to resemble the Laws of Equilibrium of a lever as determined by the principle of virtual velocities. (cited in Zouboulakis 2013,  26).

Unlike physics, however, Jevons claimed economics was โ€œpeculiarโ€ because โ€œits ultimate laws are known to us first by intuition, or at any rate they are furnished to us ready made by other mental or physical sciencesโ€ (cited in  Zouboulakis 2013, 30).

As Zouboulakis (2013) notes, a very strong conception of rationality Jevons insisted upon almost axiomatically was necessary to give economics this extreme level of mathematical and scientific rigor. In order to make rationality such a strong concept, Jevons would rely upon a Benthamite utilitarian theory with a heavily scientific flavor. He argued the idea that people maximize pleasure and avoid pain is an โ€œobvious psychological lawโ€ on which โ€œwe can proceed to reason deductively with great confidenceโ€ (cited in Zouboulakis 2013, 30-31). For Jevons (1871/2013), โ€œpleasure and pain bare undoubtedly the ultimate objects of the Calculus of Economicsโ€ (440). Utility, therefore, is the the central object of Jevonโ€™s economic inquiry. Jevons, quoting Bentham, defines as โ€œthat property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happinessโ€ (1871/2013, 438). Jevons maintains a concept of โ€œtotal utilityโ€ (440) that may be โ€œestimated in magnitudesโ€ (435). This idea of rationality is, to quote Herbert Simon (1978) โ€œomniscient,โ€ meaning is there is little to no concept of uncertainty, limited information, or psychological error taken into account in how people pursue rational self-interest, it is simply a law of psychology that people always seek to maximize utility, a law that is central for his understanding of economics as a science.

Jevons was not alone in his strong conception of understanding of rationality as a maximization principle. Zouboulakis (2013) argues that Cournot, Walras, and Marshall, all shared a similar conception of rationality to Jevons (35). In fact, Walras (Zouboulakis 2013) in line with Jevons adopted a strong conception of economics as another sort of mathematical physics. Edgeworth (1881/2013), though he doubted that Jevons was entirely correct on to what extent total utility was quantifiable still generally adopted the utilitarian outlook Jevons had assumed, as well as the mathematical outlook as he extensively compared it to physics (504-505).

To summarize, the concept of rationality as formulated by Jevons consists of the following four unique theoretical features:

  1. Defined as a maximization of total cardinal utility
  2. United with a psychological hypothesis
  3. Irrefutable, obviously true about human nature
  4. Assumes omniscience

It is dependent on another methodological feature: that economics is to be viewed mathematically and analogous to physics on some important level. It is important to note, however, that the early neoclassical economists were not wholly homogeneous in their outlook of economics as a science. Alfred Marshall argued that โ€œeconomics cannot be compared with the exact physical sciences: for it deals with the ever changing and subtle forces of human natureโ€ (qtd. in McKenzie 2009). Though Marshallโ€™s conception of rationality was still largely in line with Jevons, his softer methodological positions would allow for a softening of rationality as a concept after the marginal revolution.

Rationality asInstrumentalism: Paretoโ€™s Departure from Utility Theory
In addition to the concept of economics as a completely mathematical science, other assumptions that led to Jevonโ€™s omniscient conception of rationality would be threatened. After the marginal revolution, primary cornerstones of how Jevons conceived of rationality, cardinal utility as a quantifiable concept, would be rejected by the economics profession. The key insight from Jevonโ€™s subjective utility theory was his marginal analysis, his insight from the theory of exchange that consumers seek to equilibrate the ratios between the marginal utilities (what Jevons calls the โ€œdegree of utilityโ€) of goods.

Though Jevonโ€™s conception of total utility โ€œconstituted the metaphysical foundation of utilitarian economics, neither [its] measurement nor even their existence was central to their methodsโ€ (Read 2004). At the dawn of the twentieth century, Pareto had brought about the ordinal revolution. Any reference to โ€œcardinal utility,โ€ that is utility as a measurable concept, was completely removed. Instead, for Pareto, any measurable cardinal utility was replaced by ordinal utilityโ€”utility as a relative comparison of some basket of goods (cited in Read 2004).

With the change in utility followed a change, in the conception of rationality. Since one of the key theoretical implications of Jevonโ€™s rationality thought was disproven, economists could greatly weaken what they meant by rationality. First, Pareto distanced rationality from being any sort of an axiomatic psychological claim. He did this by adopting a more positivist, experimental approach to economics, he declared โ€œI am a believer in the efficiency of experimental methods. For me there exist no valuable demonstrations except those that are based on factsโ€ (cited in Zouboulakis 2013, 37). However, given his rejection of cardinal utility, the hypothesis that rational actors can maximize utility becomes meaningless and untestable since it is unclear what they are maximizing (Zouboulkis 2013, 38). As Pareto said, โ€œLet us suppose that we have a schedule of all possible choices indicating the order of preference. Once this schedule is available, homo ล“conimicus can leave the sceneโ€ (cited in Zouboulakis 2013, 38).

Instead, Pareto focuses only on the โ€œfactsโ€ which he asserts are โ€œthe sales of certain goods and certain pricesโ€ (cited in Zouboulakis 2013, 38). In other words, Pareto is only concerned with the impact of rational choice theory in a market setting, not with the psychology behind those facts. For Pareto, then, โ€œrationality is simply a choice of efficient means for serving any independently given objective,โ€ Zouboulakis (2013) calls Paretoโ€™s an โ€œinstrumentalโ€ conception of rationality (38).

For Pareto, contra Jevons, the extent to which rationality was wholly applicable to all of humanity was extremely limited. In his later works, he made a strong distinction between โ€œlogicalโ€ and โ€œnon-logical actions.โ€ As Zaboulkis (2013, 39-41) puts it, logical actions are those in which the โ€œsubjective aim of the actor is reasonably connected with the actionโ€™s objective goal,โ€ whereas everything else are things that man do not have control other such as psychological factors that an economist takes as given. This greatly limits the extent of human action that economics studies from Jevonโ€™s attempts to universalize utilitarian psychological hypotheses.

To summarize, Paretoโ€™s conception of rationality has the following theoretical features:

  1. Non-psychological
  2. Given within a means-ends framework (Instrumental)
  3. Non-universal, non-omniscient

Rationality as Purposeful Action: Misesโ€™ Austrian Tautology

While Pareto had developed a fairly weak conception of rationality in contrast to Jevons, a separate tradition in the Austrian school of economists had developed a similar, though different, conception of rationality. This latter type of rationality is the conception primarily taken up by Ludwig von Mises and Carl Menger. In order to understand the Austrians, it is important to understand the historical context it was born out of in contrast to Pareto. Pareto was primarily influenced by Anglophonic and Francophonic marginalists, and had inherited from that tradition a strong conception of rationality wedded to cardinal utility that he had to soften with ordinal utility. In contrast, Mises had inherited the marginal utility theories of Menger (which included no reference to โ€œtotal utilityโ€ as a cardinal concept to begin with), and had participated in the climate of the Methodenstreit which had placed heavy emphasis on theoretical methodology. Because of this, Misesโ€™ idea of rationality bears resemblance to Pareto in important ways, however differs because of Misesโ€™ and Paretoโ€™s differing methods.

For Mises, to say that man is a rational actor is a tautological truth, he claims that โ€œ[h]uman action is necessarily rationalโ€ (1949/1998 18-19).[1] Though this sounds like a universalist claim found in Jevons, it is fundamentally different. For Mises to be a rational actor is not a psychological hypothesis, it simply means that man acts, or that he โ€œthe employment of means for the attainment of endsโ€ (13). To be rational is simply to act purposefully, not to choose anything that an economist would normatively say one should chose such as maximization of cardinal utility.

It is important to note that unlike Jevons, the Austrian school adopted from the outset that rational actors are not omniscient. As Menger argued in his first statement of subjective value theory:

Even individuals whose economic activity is conducted rationally, and who therefore certainly endeavor to recognize the true importance of satisfactions in order to gain an accurate foundation for their economic activity, are subject to error. Error is inseparable from all human knowledge. (148)1

Likewise, Mises devoted a whole chapter of his magnum opus (1949/1998) to the concept of uncertainty (105-118).

It may be seen that there is a certain overlap between Misesโ€™ idea of rationality and Paretoโ€™s. Both have significantly weaker ideas of rationality than is implied by the utilitarians, and both distinguish economic rationality very carefully from psychology. For Mises, this means defining action as rational and defining its opposite โ€œnot irrational behavior, but a reactive response to stimuliโ€ (1949/1998, 20). For Pareto, this means distinguishing between logical action and non-logical action and applying economic rationality only to the former.

However, there are important differences between Pareto and Mises: namely, Mises universalizes rationality as applied to all human action, Pareto does not. This is primarily due to differences in what is meant by โ€œaction,โ€ Mises tautologically defines all action as rational, whereas Pareto simply makes action an instrument that is applied to a means-end framework. Thus, for Mises rationality defines the means-ends framework, for Pareto it is a tool that helps men pursue ends. The reason for this difference lies in their different views on economic methodology. Recall that Pareto is only concerned with facts that can be experimentally derived. However, Mises includes tautologies as an important part of his economic method which he calls โ€œmethodological a priorismโ€ (1949/1998). Mises claims โ€œtautologiesโ€ are helpful in providing โ€œcognitionโ€ and โ€œcomprehension of living and changing realityโ€ (38). Whereas Pareto would have scoffed at Mises idea of rationality as useless, for Mises it was a helpful a priori assumption for economic analysis, or in his terms โ€œpraxeological reasoning.โ€

To summarize, Misesโ€™ weaker idea of rationality is marked by the following three qualities and assumes an a priorist methodological background:

  1. Rationality defines a means-end framework (is tautological)
  2. Is universal by a non-omniscient definition
  3. Non-psychological

The extent to which Misesโ€™ idea of theory can be thought of as โ€œfoundationalโ€ to the rest of his social science is disputable. Clearly, Mises thought his theory was absolutely foundational, however that need not be the โ€œfoundationโ€ of the rest of his economics. Zoboukalis seems to oversimplify in claiming that thereโ€™s a fundamental difference between Weberโ€™s conception of an โ€œideal typeโ€ of rationality as universal and Misesโ€™ conception of rationality as to some extent tautological. Boettke and Leeson (2006) claim that Mises rejected the analytic/synthetic distinction, thereby placing him in a more complex position than simple Kantian epistemology. However, Boettke, Lavoie, and Storr (2001) claim that Misesโ€™ distinction between theory and history was โ€œarbitraryโ€ and use the philosophy of John Dewey to argue against it.

Rationality: How Lionel Robbins Misunderstood Mises, How Hayek Challenged Mises

The extent to which there is a universal โ€œAustrianโ€ conception of rationality is also disputable. Zaboukalis understands this in comparing the rationality of FA Hayek to Mises. Zaboukalis argues that Robbins presented Misesโ€™ concept of rationality as โ€œconsistencyโ€ for a normative ideal in his work The Nature and Significance of Economic Science. This is supportable when Robbins (1932/2005 140) says:

There is nothing in its generalisations which necessarily implies reflective deliberation in ultimate valuation. It relies upon no assumption that individuals act rationally. But it does depend for its practical raison d’etre upon the assumption that it is desirable that they should do so. It does assume that, within the bounds of necessity, it is desirable to choose ends which can be achieved harmoniously.

Misesโ€™ welfare economics clearly do not include all the presumptions that consistent action is โ€œnormativeโ€ that Robbinsโ€™ neoclassical misinterpretation of Mises presupposes. Mises explicitly says in Human Action that manโ€™s preferences are situated in time and therefore are inconsistent over time. Mises places emphasis on manโ€™s preferences as situated in time and uncertainty, Robbins makes the preferences sound as if they are independent of time and uncertainty in every sense.

Rizzo (2013) puts emphasis on how Mises postulated the meaning of economics to be primary. This passage is worth quoting at length:

First, we must distinguish between the meaning of behavior and criteria for the rationality of behavior. Abstract criteria of rationality cannot be applied without first understanding what individuals mean by what they do. Getting the meaning wrong may result in inaccurately labeling the behavior as irrational.

In Zoboukalisโ€™ presentation, this lead Samuelson (1938) to present his revealed theory of preferences, which included the assumption of invariance, in Economica. Samuelson seems to have misunderstood Robbinโ€™s misunderstanding of Mises on an even deeper level. In 1937 which Zoboukalis presents as โ€œthe year of uncertainty,โ€ there were several challenges to Mises, one of which included Hayekโ€™s challenge to Mises in Economics and Knowledge (cited in Zoboukalis, 1938). Kirzner (2001 81-89) argues that Hayek misunderstood what Mises thought about rationality. Mises did not take invariance through time to be normative, he took it to be positive at a particular instance.

Economics without Constancy in Utility: Preference Theory, Behavioral Economics as Paradigms aiming to be โ€œSuccessor Subjectsโ€

In response to the challenges to invariance raised by Hayek, Friedman and Samuelson, Zoubakalis argues, made a defense of the normative criterion of rationality, which became standard in the โ€œneoclassical synthesis.โ€ This was primarily the โ€œas-ifโ€ methodology of Friedman which Austrians find so objectionable. In the research program of this paper, Lavoieโ€™s (1980) hermeneutical way of dealing with the problem of pure methodological instrumentalism will be an issue. Lavoie argues for a way of doing economics without epistemic foundationalism, drawing directly off Rorty. The extent to which there is a balance established between what Lavoie sees as the crude epistemic foundationalism of Freidmanโ€™s positivist approach and the possibly foundationalist a priori approach of Mises will be perhaps the main focus of further research in this program. However, unlike Lavoie, the Hermeneutics will be more likely drawn directly from Rorty than Gadamer.

After Freidman, the invention of behavioral economics in Kahneman and Tverskey challenged several of the positive assumptions of neoclassical theory. Kahneman (2012) describes the Chicago schoolโ€™s views on the matter in relation to the behavioral economic one as follows:

The only test of rationality is not whether a personโ€™s beliefs and preferences are reasonable, but whether they are internally consistent. A rational person can believe in ghosts so long as all her other beliefs are consistent with the existence of ghosts. A rational person can prefer being hated or being loved, so long as his preferences are consistent. Rationality is logical coherence, reasonable or not. Econs are rational by this definition but there is overwhelming evidence that humans cannot be.

In modern neo-classical economics, which has incorporated Kahnemanโ€™s theories of loss aversion and hyperbolic discounting as mathematically as possible, this is an oversimplification. However, there is reason to believe that the rigid formalism of modern Chicago economics may or may not be consistent with the best means of developing a research program, however useful it might be in many contexts.

Recent scholarship on the relationship between behavioral economics and neoclassical theory has tried to figure out how to get past utility without invariance through time. This issue suggests there is no such thing as โ€œtrue preferencesโ€ as Pareto, Samuelson, and Friedman implicitly assumed. Stigler (1977), in violation of typical Chicago school method posited a way of assuming there were โ€œtrue preferencesโ€ by making appeal to the possibility that our preferences are developed into some preferences everyone could agree on in time. For example, one who tastes wine initially might not know what they are doing; however, with time, they become a wine connoisseur, and in general wine connoisseur agree on their preferences. Drawing of Stigler, Robb (2009) draws of Nietzscheโ€™s psychology to further support Stiglerโ€™s theories. Heckman (2009), in a comment on Robbโ€™s paper responded in typical neoclassical fashion, claiming the psychological theories of Neitzsche can be made endogenous in the neoclassical model with some mathematical tweaks. Robb made some amazingly insightful comments in response:

However, I am not prepared to take the easy way out and fully accept (R1) as Nietzschean Economics. Sticking with Occamโ€™s razor, I would propose, as an alternative to (R1), that our engagement with time is twofold and a portion of it lies outside of pleasure maximization. While lacking the precision of fully specified models, the WTP approach gives specific predictions that are useful in practical problems in economics. Nietzsche, along with Heraclites, Kierkegaard, Hegel and Bergson, was the philosopher of becoming โ€“ whether I have expressed the point with any useful clarity at all, he should have a great deal to teach us.

I should acknowledge that Nietzschean Economics has a personal objective beyond explaining various phenomena in economic life. I wanted to arrive at a โ€œframework for modeling intertemporal choice that is more closely aligned with our immediate experience.โ€ A formative event for me was a yearlong spell of unemployment in 2001 after leaving a job managing the global derivatives and securities business of Japanโ€™s largest bank. I was looking forward to inputting some ti, ei, Xi and realizing U(Z). But when my unexamined faith in U(Z) was put to the test, it did not turn out like I expected. Without obstacles to overcome, I discovered that the day is long. I got back to work. I believe my experience is not uncommon.

Rizzo (2012), meanwhile, draws on three ways Austrians in general have tried to reconcile the balance between psychology and economics. Rizzo draws off of Wittgensteinโ€™s philosophy of language, Schutzโ€™s phenomenological sociology, and Hayekโ€™s gestalt psychology in The Sensory Order.

What is striking about Robbโ€™s โ€œNietzschean economicsโ€ and Rizzoโ€™s work on Austrian economics is they are two economists from two very different schools doing the same exact thing Rorty attempted to do with epistemology in the 70s. Much as there was an aversion to psychology in economics throughout the early formulations of utility theory, in philosophy there was an eversion to implementing psychology into epistemology because epistemology conceived of itself as the epistemic foundation on which all of philosophical knowledge stood. Likewise, economists have been reluctant to let any psychology into their utility theories at all. Rorty proposed a form of โ€œbehavioral epistemologyโ€ modeled after the work of William James, however Rorty proposed that โ€œbehavioral epistemologyโ€ should not be thought of as foundational to the philosophical project as a whole. โ€œBehavioral economicsโ€ has, from a neo-pragmatist perspective, committed the sin Rorty avoided in trying to be the new foundation of preference theory and choice theory.

Just as Rorty was skeptical extensively in Philosophy and the Mirror of Natureโ€ about โ€œsuccessor subjectsโ€ such as philosophy of mind and language attempting to be substitutes for Kantian epistemology as the foundation of all of philosophical, economists should be skeptical of possible โ€œsuccessor subjectsโ€ to Jevons-style utility theory in economics. Pareto once famously described his war against the English School as a war against โ€œ(t)hose who have a hankering for metaphysicsโ€ (McLure 199 312). Preference theory, behavioral experiments, and even Neitzschean psychology in Robbโ€™s formulation could be viewed as merely โ€œsuccessor subjectsโ€ to Jevonโ€™s ordinal utility theory. Just as Rorty claimed philosophers clung to โ€œour glassy essenceโ€ in Kantian epistemology by postulating a whole bunch of โ€œsuccessor subjectsโ€ to epistemology, economists may need to be careful in clinging to โ€œour utilitarian essenceโ€ in trying to relegate the โ€œfoundationโ€ of the social sciences to other realms.

Part II: Utility Theory to Hermeneutics

It is striking that many of the philosophers that the economists who are trying to figure out where to go in the neoclassical and Austrian traditions are appealing to the same philosophers Rorty did. Lavoie (1990) appealed to Heiddeger and Gadamer under Rortyโ€™s influence to rid economics of its foundationalism in the way I described. Boettke is appealing to Quine and Dewey, two pragmatists to understand Misesโ€™ apriori assumption of rationality over human action. Rizzo is appealing to Wittgenstein, one of Rortyโ€™s โ€œheroesโ€ of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature for his philosophy of language. Robb is appealing to Neitzsche, another one of Rortyโ€™s major influences. Rorty is in some sense what got Lavoie going in the Hermaneutic research program to begin with. Perhaps, a return more specifically to the manner in which Rorty presented hermeneutics is what is necessary for economists to approach the question of rationality at this point, this section aims to more narrowly analyze Rortyโ€™s hermeneutics, a concluding section suggests general lessons from the history of rationality out of a Rortian Hermeneutic research program in the subject of economic rationality.

Kuhn, Rorty, and Incommensurability

In chapter seven of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty appeals most fully to Thomas Kuhnโ€™s philosophy of science. Kuhnโ€™s philosophy of science includes the idea of โ€œparadigmsโ€ in research, that is basic fundamental assumptions that go into a scientistโ€™s work. Khun then carefully distinguishes between โ€œcommensurable paradigms,โ€ those fundamental assumptions that can work together, and โ€œincommensurable paradigms,โ€ those fundamental assumptions that cannot. If there are two incommensurable paradigms at once, there will be a โ€œparadigm shift.โ€ The most famous and widely cited example is the shift from Newtonian physics to Quantum Mechanics in physics.

Rorty posits the new place of philosophy should be to โ€œedify,โ€ to be therapeutic in some sense on the personal level of the philosopher. To some extent, that idea of an โ€œedifying philosophyโ€ seems to be going on in the back of Robbโ€™s mind in his response to Heckman on Nietzsche. But not only is philosophy to edify, it is also possible to use philosophy as hermeneutics to commensurate seemingly incommensurable paradigms. It may be the case that this is the direction economics in which must go.

In Vernon Smithโ€™s Nobel Prize lecture (2002), he laid out a way in which paradigms could be thought to relate to each other in this question of rationality in economics. Smith distinguishes between โ€œconstructivist rationality,โ€ drawing off Hayekโ€™s program mentioned at the outset of this paper in The Counterrevolution of Science, and โ€œecological rationality.โ€ โ€œConstructivist rationality,โ€ to Smith, is rationality stems from Cartesian rationalism (506) and โ€œprovisionally assumes or โ€˜requiresโ€™ agents to possess complete payoff and other informationโ€”far more than could ever be given to one mind.โ€ Ecological rationality, on the other hand, is rationality that is identified with Hayek and the Scottish enlightenment. It is a โ€œconcept of rational order, as an undersigned ecological system that emerges out of cultural and biological evolutionary processโ€ (508).


Vernon Smith thought that the research paradigms between the two are somehow commensurable. Though this is likely the case, most economists researching the literature in the behavioral and neoclassical traditions seem to disagree. Most of the economists in the hermeneutic tradition researching the issue seem to have Lakatosโ€™ philosophy of science more prominent in their minds than Kuhnโ€™s (Cachanosky 2013). Perhaps, for the moment, economics is in a place that is closer to Kuhnโ€™s philosophy of science than Lakatos, and we need to assume that the paradigms between โ€œecological rationalityโ€ and โ€œconstructivist rationalityโ€ are incommensurable in some sense, though agree with Vernon Smith that they need not be. Further research in the Rortian hermeneutic tradition may help commensurate those paradigms.

Conclusion: Open-Mindedness in Rational Economic Discourse

Often, debate over rationality gets extremely heated thanks to its connection at times to politics and the nature of capitalism. For an example, in Nudge Thaler and Sunstein primarily place blame for the financial crisis on behavioral factors (2009 255-260). New Keynsians might respond to this by yelling at the top of their lungs that theyโ€™re ignoring aggregate demand, Austrians might respond by yelling at the top of their lungs that theyโ€™re ignoring the interest rate and business cycle theory. But perhaps a combination of the three, a pluralism, is necessary for the explanation. The problem with economic debates is too often when it gets associated with the political spheres, the arguments get personally provocative and nasty. This is how incommensurable paradigms occur, and that is likely what has occurred with the debate about rationality. Thaler and Sunstein are probably oversimplifying the complex myriad of institutional factors that went into causing the recession, but yelling that your business cycle theory explains it is not the right solution.

Zouboulakis ends Verities of Economic Rationality by proclaiming โ€œWhat is Rational after all?โ€ Rorty would say something like, โ€˜Rationality is not a human faculty, itโ€™s a social virtue.โ€™ In order to maintain open-minded discussion and approach a point when there can be normal discourse in the economics profession, perhaps this is the answer that is needed. Perhaps all the actors in a market economy are the โ€œrationalโ€ ones in Rortyโ€™s use of the term, and economists are not.

References:

Allen, R.G.D., and J.R. Hicks. 1934. โ€œA Reconsideration of the Theory of Value.โ€ Economica 1(1) (Feb. 1934): 52-76.

Arrow, Kenneth J. 1959. โ€œRational Choice Functions and Orderings.โ€ Economica 24(102) (May): 121-27.

Boettke, Peter and Peter Leeson. 2006 “Was Mises Right?” Review of Social Economy 64(2). (June): 247-265.

Boettke, Peter J., Don Lavoie, and Virgil Henry Storr. 2004. โ€œThe Subjectivist Methodology of Austrian Economics and Deweyโ€™s Theory of Inquiry.โ€ Pp. 327โ€“56 in Dewey, Pragmatism, and Economic Methodology, ed. Elias
L. Khalil. London: Routledge.

Edgeworth, Francis. โ€œMathematical Physics.โ€ 2013. In The History of Economic Thought: A Reader edited by Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels. New York, NY: Routledge. (Originally published 1881).

Hammond, Peter J. 1997. โ€œRationality in Economics.โ€ Unpublished. http://web.stanford.edu/~hammond/ratEcon.pdf.

Hayek, Friedrich. 1952. The Counterrevolution in Science. Indianapolis, Indiana: The Free Press.

Jevons, William S. โ€œThe Theory of Political Economy.โ€ 2013. In The History of Economic Thought: A Reader edited by Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels. New York, NY: Routledge. (Originally published in 1871).

Kahneman, Daniel. 2003. โ€œMaps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics.โ€ American Economic Review 93 (December): 1449-75.

Lavoie, Donald. 190. “Economics and Hermeneutics.” In Economics and Hermeneutics ed. by Don Lavoie. Abidingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge.

โ€”. 2011. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

McKenzie, Robert B. 2009. โ€œRationality in Economic thought: From Thomas Robert Malthus to Alfred Marshall and Philip Wicksteed.โ€ In Predictably Rational, edited by Robert McKenzie. Berlin Heidelberg: Springer. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-01586-1_4?LI=true.

Menger, Carl. 1976. Principles of Economics. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute. http://mises.org/sites/default/files/Principles%20of%20Economics_5.pdf. (Originally Published in 1871.)

Mises, Ludwig. 1998. Human Action. Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute. (Originally published in 1949).

โ€”. 2013. Epistemological Problems in Economics. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/2427. (Originally published in 1933).

Read, Daniel. 2004. โ€œUtility theory from Jeremy Bentham to Daniel Kahneman.โ€ LSE Department of Operational Research Working Paper LSEOR 04-64.

Rizzo, Mario. 2012. โ€œThe Problem of Rationality: Behavioral Economics Meets Austrian Economics.โ€ Unpublished. http://econ.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/28036/BEHAVIORAL_ECONOMICS.pdf.

Robb, Richard. 2009. โ€œNietzsche and the Economics of Becoming.โ€ Capitalism and Society. 4(3) (January). < http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2209313>

Robbins, Lionel. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science.

Rorty, Richard. 1979. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Samuelson, Peter. 1938. โ€œA Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour.โ€ Economica, New Series, 5(17) (February): 61-71.

Thaler, Richard and Cass Sunstein. 2009. Nudge. Penguin Books.

Simon, Herbert A. 1972. โ€œTheories of Bounded Rationality.โ€ In Decision and Organization edited by C.B. McGuire and Roy Radner. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing. http://mx.nthu.edu.tw/~cshwang/teaching-economics/econ5005/Papers/Simon-H=Theoriesof%20Bounded%20Rationality.pdf.

โ€”. 1978. โ€œRational Decision-Making in Business Organizations.โ€ Paper Presented at Nobel Prize Memorial Lecture Pittsburg, PA.

Zouboulakis, Michel. 2013. The Varieties of Economic Rationality. New York, NY: Routledge.


[1] Though Misesโ€™ 1949 work Human Action is cited here, it is important to note that he had laid out very similar positions much earlier (1933/2013).

In the Ruins of Public Reason, Part III: When the Barbarians Are at the Gates; Fascism, Bullshit, and the Paradox of Tolerance

Note: This is the third in a series of essays on public discourse. Hereโ€™s Part 1 and Part 2

Three years ago, I started this essay series on the collapse of public discourse. At the time, I was frustrated by how left-wing and progressive spaces had become cognitively rigid, hostile, and uncharitable to any and all challenges to their orthodoxy. I still stand by most everything I said in those essays. Once you have successfully identified that your interlocutors are genuinely engaging in good faith, you must drop the soldier mindset that you are combating a barbarian who is going to destroy society and adopt a scout mindset. For discourse to serve any useful epistemic or political function, interlocutors must accept and practice something like Habermasโ€™ rules of discourse or Griceโ€™s maxims of discourse, where everyone is allowed to question or introduce any idea to cooperatively arrive at an intersubjective truth. The project of that previous essay was to therapeutically remind myself and any readers to actually apply and practice those rules of discourse in good-faith communication.

However, at the time, I should have more richly emphasized something that has been quite obviously true for some time now: most interlocutors in the political realm have little to no interest in discourse. I wish more people had such an interest, and still stand by the project of trying to get more people, particularly in leftist and libertarian spaces, to realize that when they speak to each other, they are not dealing with barbarian threats. However, recent events have made it clear that the real problem is figuring out when an interlocutor is worthy of having the rules of discourse applied in exchanges with them. Here is an obviously non-exhaustive list of such events in recent times that make this clear: 

  1. The extent to which Trump himself, as well as his advisors and lawyers, engage in lazy, dishonest, and bad-faith rationalizations for naked, sadistic, unconstitutional executive power grabs.
  2. The takeover of the most politically influential social media by a fascist billionaire rent-seeker has resulted in a complete fragmentation and breakdown of the online public square
  3. The degree to which most on the right and many on the left indulge in insane conspiracy theories, which have eroded and destroyed the epistemic norms of society, for reasons of rational irrationality.
  4. Even the Supreme Court, the institution that ostensibly is most committed to publicly justifying and engaging in good-faith reasoning about laws, is now giving blatantly awful, authoritarian opinions so out of step with their ostensibly originalist and/or textualist legal hermeneutics and constitutionalist principles (not to mention the opinions of even conservative judges in lower courts). It certainly seems the justices are just as nakedly corrupt and intellectually bankrupt as rabble-rousing aspiring autocrats. Indeed, the court is in such a decrepit state of personalist capture by an aspiring fascist dictator that they arenโ€™t even attempting to publicly justify โ€˜shadow docketโ€™ rulings in his favor. One can only conclude conservative justices are engaging in bad-faith power-grabs for themselves, whether they intend to or not. Although this has always been true of statist monocentric courts to some extent, recent events have only further eroded the courtโ€™s pretenses to being a politically 

All these were obvious trends three years ago and have very predictably only gotten more severe.  You may quibble with the extent of my assessment of any individual example above. Regardless, all but the most committed of Trumpanzees can agree that there is a time and place to become a bit dialogically illiberal in times like these. Thus, it is time to address how one can be a dialogical liberal when the barbarians truly are at the gates. The tough question to address now is this: what should the dialogical liberal do when faced with a real barbarian, and how does she know she is dealing with a barbarian? 

This is an essay about how to remain a dialogical liberal when dialogical liberalism is being weaponized against you. This essay isnโ€™t for the zealots or the trolls. Itโ€™s for those of us who believed, maybe still believe, that democracy depends on dialogueโ€”but who are also haunted by the sense that this faith is being used against us.

Epistemically Exploitative Bullshit

I always intended to write an essay to correct the shortcomings of the original one. I regret that, for various personal reasons, I did not do so sooner. The sad truth is that a great many dialogical illiberals who are also substantively illiberal engage in esoteric communication (consciously or not). That is, their exoteric pretenses to civil, good-faith communication elide an esoteric will to domination. Sartre observed this phenomenon in the context of antisemitism, and he is worth quoting at length:

Never believe that antiโ€Semites are completely unaware of the absurdity of their replies. They know that their remarks are frivolous, open to challenge. But they are amusing themselves, for it is their adversary who is obliged to use words responsibly, since he believes in words. The antiโ€Semites have the right to play. They even like to play with discourse for, by giving ridiculous reasons, they discredit the seriousness of their interlocutors. They delight in acting in bad faith, since they seek not to persuade by sound argument but to intimidate and disconcert. If you press them too closely, they will abruptly fall silent, loftily indicating by some phrase that the time for argument is past. It is not that they are afraid of being convinced. They fear only to appear ridiculous or to prejudice by their embarrassment their hope of winning over some third person to their side.

If then, as we have been able to observe, the antiโ€Semite is impervious to reason and to experience, it is not because his conviction is strong. Rather, his conviction is strong because he has chosen first of all to be impervious.

What Sartre says of antisemitism is true of illiberal authoritarians quite generally. Thomas Szanto has helpfully called this phenomenon โ€œepistemically exploitative bullshit.โ€ 

One feature of epistemically exploitative bullshit that Szanto highlights is that epistemically exploitative bullshit need not be intentional. Indeed, as Sartre implies in the quote above, the โ€˜bad faithโ€™ of the epistemically exploitative bullshitter involves a sort of self-deception that he may not even be consciously aware of. Indeed, most authoritarians (especially in the Trump era) are not sufficiently self-aware or intelligent enough to consciously realize that they are deceiving others about their attitude towards truth by spouting bullshit. As Henry Frankfurt observed, bullshit is different from lying in that the liar is intentionally misrepresenting the truth, but the bullshitter has no real concern for truth in the first place. Thus, many bullshiters (especially those engaged in epistemically exploitative bullshit) believe their own bullshit, often to their detriment.

However, the fact that epistemically exploitative bullshit is often unintentional, or at least not consciously intentional, creates a serious ineliminable epistemic problem for the dialogical liberal who seeks to combat it. It is quite difficult to publicly and demonstrably falsify the hypothesis that oneโ€™s interlocutor is engaging in epistemically exploitative bullshit. This often causes people who, in their heart of hearts, aspire to be epistemically virtuous dialogical liberals to misidentify their interlocutors as engaging in epistemically exploitative bullshit and contemptuously dismiss them. I, for one, have been guilty of this quite a bit in recent years, and I imagine any self-reflective reader will realize they have made this mistake as well. We will return to this epistemic difficulty in the next essay in this series.

To avoid this mistake, we must continually remind ourselves that the ascription of intention is sometimes a red herring. Epistemically exploitative bullshit is not just a problem because bullshitters intentionally weaponize it to destroy liberal democracies. It is a problem because of the social and (un)dialectical function that it plays in discourse rather than its psychological status as intentional or unintentional. 

It is also worth remembering at this point that it is not just fire-breathing fascists who engage in epistemically exploitative bullshit. Many non-self-aware, not consciously political, perhaps even liberal, political actors spout epistemically exploitative bullshit as well. Consider the phenomenon of property ownersโ€”both wealthy landlords and middle-class suburbanitesโ€”who appeal to โ€œneighborhood characterโ€ and environmental concerns to weaponize government policy for the end of protecting the economic rents they receive in the form of property values. Consider the similar phenomenon of many market incumbents, from tech CEOs in AI to healthcare executives and professionals, to sports team owners, to industrial unions, to large media companies, who all weaponize various seemingly plausible (and sometimes substantively true) economic arguments to capture the stateโ€™s regulatory apparatus. Consider how sugar, tobacco, and petrochemical companies all weaponized junk science on, respectively, obesity, cigarettes, and climate change to undermine efforts to curtail their economic activity. Almost none of these people are fire-breathing fascists, and many may believe their ideological bullshit is true and tell themselves they are helping the world by advancing their arguments. 

The pervasive economic phenomenon of โ€œbootleggers and Baptistsโ€ should remind us that an unintentional form of epistemically exploitative bullshit plays a crucial role in rent seeking all across the political spectrum. This form of bullshit is particularly hard to combat precisely because it is unintentional, but its lack of intentionality in no way lessens the harmful social and (un)dialectical functions it severe.

Despite those considerations, it is still worth distinguishing between consciously intentional forms of aggressive esotericism and more unintentional versions because they must be approached very differently. Unintentional bullshitters do not see themselves as dialogically illiberal. Therefore, responding to them with aggressive rhetorical flourishes that treat them contemptuously is very unlikely to be helpful. For this reason, the general (though defeasible) presumption that any given person spouting epistemically exploitative bullshit is not an enemy that I was trying to cultivate in the second part of this essay series still stands. In the next essay, I will address how we know when this presumption has been defeated. However, for now, let us turn our attention to the forms of epistemically exploitative bullshit common today on the right. We have now seen how epistemically exploitative bullshit can appear even in technocratic, liberal settings. But that phenomenon takes on a more virulent form when fused with authoritarian intent. This is what I call aggressive esotericism.

Aggressive Esotericism

The corrosiveness of these more โ€˜liberalโ€™ and technocratic forms of epistemically exploitative bullshit discussed above, while serious, pales in comparison to more bombastically authoritarian forms of it. The truly authoritarian epistemically exploitative bullshiter aims at more than amassing wealth by capturing some limited area of state policy. While he also does that, the fascist aims at the more ambitious goal of dismantling democracy and seizing the entire apparatus of the state itself.

 Let us name this more dangerous form of epistemically exploitative bullshit. Let us call this aggressive esotericism and loosely define it as the phenomenon of authoritarians weaponizing the superficial trappings of democratic conversation to elide their will to dominate others. This makes the fascistic, aggressive esotericist all the more cruel, destructive, and corrosive of societyโ€™s epistemic and political institutions.

It is worth briefly commenting on my choice of the words โ€œaggressive esotericismโ€ for this. The word โ€œesotericโ€ in the way I am using it has its roots in Straussian scholars who argue that many philosophers in the Western tradition historically did not literally mean what their discursive prose appears to say. Esoteric here does not mean โ€œstrange,โ€ but something closer to โ€œhidden,โ€ in contrast to the exoteric, surface-level meaning of the text. We need not concern ourselves with the fascinating and controversial question of whether Straussians are right to esoterically read the history of Western philosophy as they do. Instead, I am applying the general idea of a distinction between the surface level and deeper meaning of a text, the sociological problem of interpreting both the words and the deeds of certain very authoritarian political actors. 

I choose the word โ€œaggressiveโ€ to contrast with what Arthur Melzer calls โ€œprotective,โ€ โ€œpedagogical,โ€ or โ€œdefensiveโ€ esotericism. In Philosophy Between the Lines Melzer argues that historically, philosophers often hid a deeper layer of meaning in their great texts. In the ancient world, Melzer argues, this was in part because they feared theoretical philosophical ideas could disintegrate social order (hence the โ€œprotective esotericismโ€), wanted their young students to learn how to come to philosophical truths themselves (hence the โ€œpedagogical esotericismโ€), or else wanted to protect themselves from authorities for โ€˜corrupting the youthโ€™  (as Socrates was accused) with their heterodox ideas. 

As the modern world emerged during the Enlightenment, Melzer argues esotericism continued as philosophers such as John Locke wrote hidden messages not just for defensive reasons but to help foster liberating moral progress in society, as they had a far less pessimistic view about the role of theoretical philosophy in public life (hence their โ€œpolitical esotericismโ€). Whether Melzer is correct in his reading of the history of Western political thought need not concern us now. My claim is that many authoritarians (both right-wing Fascists and left-wing authoritarian Communists) invert this liberal Enlightenment political esotericism by engagingโ€”both in words and in deeds, both consciously and subconsciously, and both intentionally and unintentionallyโ€”in aggressive esotericism. Hiding their esoteric will to domination behind a superficial faรงade of โ€˜rationalโ€™ argumentation.

Aggressive esotericism is a subset of the epistemically exploitative bullshit. While aggressive esotericism may be more often intentional than more technocratic forms of epistemically exploitative bullshit, it is not always so. You might realize this when you reflect on heated debates you may have had during Thanksgiving dinners with your committed Trumpist family members. Nonetheless, this lack of intention doesnโ€™t cover up the fact that their wanton wallowing in motivated reasoning, rational ignorance, and rational irrationality has the selfish effect of empowering members of their ingroup over members of their outgroup. This directly parallels how the lack of self-awareness of the technocratic rentseeker ameliorates the dispersed economic costs on society.

Aggressive Esotericism and the Paradox of Tolerance

Even if one suspects one is encountering a true fascist, one should still have the defeasible presumption that they are a good-faith interlocutor. Nonetheless, fascists perniciously abuse this meta-discursive norm. This effect has been well-known since Popper labelled it the paradox of tolerance.  

The paradox of tolerance has long been abused by dialogical illiberals on both the left and the right to undermine the ideas of free speech and toleration in an open society, legal and social norms like academic freedom and free speech, and to generally weaken the presumption of good faith we have been discussing. This, however, was far from Popperโ€™s intention. It is worth revisiting Popperโ€™s discussion of the Paradox of Tolerance in The Open Society and Its Enemies:

Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant will be destroyed, and tolerance with them. In this formulation, I do not imply, for instance, that we should always suppress the utterance of intolerant philosophies; as long as we can counter them by rational argument and keep them in check by public opinion, suppression would certainly be most unwise. But we should claim the right even to suppress them, for it may easily turn out that they are not prepared to meet us on the level of rational argument, but begin by denouncing all argument; they may forbid their followers to listen to anything as deceptive as rational argument, and teach them to answer arguments by the use of their fists. We should therefore claim, in the name of tolerance, the right not to tolerate the intolerant. We should claim that any movement preaching intolerance places itself outside the law, and we should consider incitement to intolerance and persecution as criminal, exactly as we should consider incitement to murder, or to kidnapping, or as we should consider incitement to the revival of the slave trade.

His point here is not so much to sanction State censorship of fascist ideas. Instead, his point is that there are limits to what should be tolerated. To translate this to our language earlier in the essay, he is just making the banal point that our presumption of good-faith discourse is, in fact, defeasible. The โ€œright to tolerate the intolerantโ€ need not manifest as legal restrictions on speech or the abandonment of norms like academic freedom. This is often a bad idea, given that state and administrative censorship creates a sort of Streisand effect that fascists can exploit by whining, โ€œHelp, help, Iโ€™m being repressed.โ€ If you gun down the fascist messenger, you guarantee that he will be made into a saint. Further, censorship will just create a backlash as those who are not yet fully-committed Machiavellian fascists become tribally polarized against the ideas of liberal democracy. Even if Popper himself might not have been as resistant to state power as I am, there are good reasons not to use state power.

Instead, our โ€œright to tolerate the intolerantโ€ could be realized by fostering a strong, stigmergically evolved social stigma against fascist views. Rather than censorship, this stigma should be exercised by legally tolerating the fascists who spout their aggressively esoteric bullshit even while we strongly rebuke them. Cultivating this stigma includes not just strongly rebuking the epistemically exploitative bullshit โ€˜argumentsโ€™ fascists make, but exercising oneโ€™s own right to free speech and free association, reporting/exposing/boycotting those, and sentimental education with those the fascists are trying to target. Sometimes, it must include defensive violence against fascists when their epistemically exploitative bullshit manifests not just in words, but acts of aggression against their enemies. 

The paradox of tolerance, as Popper saw, is not a rejection of good-faith dialogue but a recognition of its vulnerability. The fascistsโ€™ most devastating move is not to shout down discourse but to simulate it: to adopt its procedural trappings while emptying it of sincerity. What I call aggressive esotericism names this phenomenon. It is the strategic abuse of our meta-discursive presumption of good faith.

Therefore, one must be very careful to guard against mission creep in pursuing this stigmergic process of cultivating stigma in defense of toleration. As Nietzsche warned, we must be guarded against the danger that we become the monsters against whom we are fighting. I hope to discuss later in this essay series how many on the left have become such monsters. For now, let us just observe that this sort of non-state-based intolerant defense of toleration does not conceptually conflict with the defeasible presumption of good faith.

In the next part of this series, I turn to the harder question: when and how can a dialogical liberal justifiably conclude that an interlocutor is no longer operating in good faith?