INDIA: A case study in the demise of representative democracy

India of 1947 had battled decades of colonialism to embrace self-rule. Whatever divisions seeped through party ranks, coalesced – and how beautifully – to fight for the right the people to a democracy. Having a common enemy helped. Compounded by the ability of the political leaders of that time to weave magic through words, connecting the plights of the millions to the queen-ship of one propelled movements across the breadth of the Indian subcontinent. While much has been said of the academic prowess as well as the oratory skills of the Founders, it was their ability to connect across barriers of identity that ultimately pushed the wheel. How dearly they protected their freedom of speech, expression and press is perhaps telling of the importance they assigned to being connected with those they had chosen to represent. How is it then that a deeply flawed election system and disjointed lines of public communication yielded one of the biggest civil disobedience movements the world had ever seen?

In terms of representation and reach, India 2018 is better abled than India 1947. And yet, it fell upon the unelected shoulders of four men and one woman to correct a deeply violent, colonial and bigoted law. The right to sexual identity was granted by five cis heterosexual individuals; the ones in need of representation reduced to being mere petitioners. India celebrated breaking off one more shackle, the Judiciary reveled in being the harbinger of liberal values to the Indian legal system yet one more time and the Parliament, as always, stayed mum. It is not that either of the institutions have embraced staunch anti/pro liberal positions. The Indian judiciary has its share of misogynists much like the Parliament. Misogyny is not illegal. But what is illegal is the Parliament’s distance from her electorate. Even if one were to contend that a majority of India does not support homosexuality, the increasing momentum of the movement should have propelled an informed debate within and without the Parliament. Instead, the government chose to not object to the petitions filed in favor of decriminalizing homosexuality as if that is the extent of the responsibility they owe to the LGBTQ community of the country. The distance between a judicial decriminalization of homosexuality and one done through a legislative device is the distance between a populist democracy and a representative one. The counter-majoritarian difficulty seems almost trivial when democratic institutions lose their representative character.

The biggest reason behind the rising legitimacy of an essentially non-democratic institution as the Judiciary is not a power grab by the Supreme Court judges. Howsoever activist they might get, the requirement of giving a reasoned decision tempers their emotions. The Indian Parliament, on the other hand, has come to rely on this increasing politicization of the judiciary to avoid political battles that might require concessions from their mostly unreasoned manifestos. The result is a lack of deliberation that is disturbingly dismal for a democracy as huge as India. The requirements of representation have come to be restricted to a periodical holding of elections. Members of Parliament are neither Burkean agents nor Pateman’s representatives. They are a political class unto themselves working towards a steady demise of the largest democracy in the world.

A short note from New Delhi on the 2018 Eastern Economic Forum

Chinese President Xi Jinping recently attended the Eastern Economic Forum (EEF), hosted by the Russian city of Vladivostok, which was held on September 11th and 12th of 2018. President Xi (who became the first Chinese President to attend the EEF) met with Russian President Vladimir Putin for the third time in as many months. Significantly, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also attended the Forum, which was titled “The Russian Far East: Expanding the Range of Possibilities.”

Both Xi and Putin repeatedly referred to not just their close personal rapport (Chinese President Xi Jinping, while referring to their individual ties, stated that his and Putin’s ‘friendship was getting stronger all the time’), but also the deepening of economic and strategic ties between Russia and China, as well as the convergence on key global issues (neither side missed the opportunity to target the US for it’s inward looking economic policies).

China was also participating in military exercises, held in Siberia, which have been dubbed ‘Vostok 2018’ (Beijing clarified that these military exercises were not targeted at any third party). The military exercise (September 11-17, 2018) involves 300,000 troops, 1,000 planes, and a number of warships. China sent over 3,000 People’s Liberation Army personnel for the military exercises.

China-Russia Economic Times

A number of issues were discussed during the course of the Forum. Both sides agreed that there was a need to accelerate bilateral economic ties. Trade has witnessed a significant rise in recent years, while in 2017 it was estimated at over $80 billion. In 2018, bilateral trade could surpass $100 billion. Chinese investments in Russia have also been increasing. According to the Russia-China Investment Fund (RCIF; set up in 2012), 150 representatives from China and Russia have already identified 73 projects estimated at $100 billion. Also according to the RCIF, 7 projects estimated at well over $4 billion have already been undertaken.

Both sides also agreed to promote stronger synergies between the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

Given the fact that the Forum was held in Russia’s Far Eastern Region (RFE), the need to increase Chinese investment in the RFE was high on the agenda. President Xi stated that China has always been a key participant in development projects in the Eastern parts of Russia. China’s Shandong Hi-Speed Group is also likely to invest in highway projects in the RFE.

Recent years have witnessed an increasing Chinese economic presence in Khabarovsk, which is the second largest city in the Eastern Region and 800 kilometres from Vladivostok. It may also be pertinent to point out that a large number of Russians have been uncomfortable with the growing Chinese economic clout, as well as immigrants. In 2010, the Chinese population in the Russian Far East was estimated at less than 30,000, though according to some estimates the population is much higher.

Protectionism

Both Russia and China warned against growing economic protectionism. Xi stated that he was all for greater international cooperation, and even lashed out at the growing tendency towards protectionism. Xi’s views were echoed by Putin, who stated that ‘the world and global economy are coming up against new forms of protectionism today with different kinds of barriers which are increasing.’

Putin made the point that protectionism was a threat, especially to Asia-Pacific (significantly, the current Trump administration has been using the term ‘Indo-Pacific,’ much to the chagrin of the Chinese).

What was also significant was that Xi came down heavily on ‘unilateralism’ at a time when China itself is being accused of ‘expansionist tendencies’ and promoting ‘Debt Trap Diplomacy.’ What was even more interesting was a reference to ‘UN Charter.’

The message emanating from the forum was clear: that the economic as well as strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing is likely to strengthen, and both will try to develop an alternative narrative to that currently emerging from Washington.

Significance of meeting: Why India would be watching

New Delhi would be observing the Forum and meetings between Putin and Xi, since it’s own relations between Russia and China are of vital importance. While Russia is important in the security context, economic ties with Beijing are important for New Delhi.

New Delhi attaches immense significance to ties with Moscow

There are many in analysts in New Delhi who argue that India should be cautious in strengthening strategic ties with the US, given that this could cause friction in New Delhi’s relations with Moscow (Russia’s improved defense ties with Pakistan are often cited as a consequence of New Delhi moving too close to Washington DC). There are others who argue that New Delhi’s ties with Moscow are robust and time-tested, and will not be impacted by close ties with Washington DC. Russian President Vladimir Putin will be visiting India in October 2018 (for the 19th annual India-Russia Summit), while Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj, during her Moscow visit, met with Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov. Both of them jointly chaired the 23rd India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, Technical, and Cultural Cooperation (IRIGC-TEC) meeting. A number of issues, including the need to boost bilateral trade and enhance people-to-people contact, were discussed. Significantly, this was Swaraj’s third visit to Russia in 11 months and she stated that India accorded ‘high priority’ to ties with Russia.

The fact that Swaraj’s visit to Russia took place after a successful 2+2 dialogue with the US, where a number of important defense agreements including COMCASA were signed, shows that New Delhi realizes the importance of ties with Russia. India is likely to sign a deal with Russia for the procurement of the S-400 air defence system, even though the USA has not given India any assurances with regard to a waiver from CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act) if India purchases defence equipment from Russia. During the visit, India is also likely to go ahead with an agreement with Russia for four frigates for the Indian Navy. While two of these will be manufactured in Kaliningrad, two will be manufactured in Goa.

New Delhi-Beijing ties

The issue of trade tariffs, which was highlighted by Putin and Xi, has also not gone unnoticed by New Delhi. One of the reasons (apart from the desire for peace and tranquility on borders) why India has been pro-actively reaching out to China is a convergence on economic issues. In fact, days after the 2+2 Summit, US President Trump, while referring to India and China, stated that the US has been providing subsidies to India and China for far too long and can not afford to do so any longer.

In terms of investments, there has not been much progress so far due to political disputes, but there is scope for greater economic cooperation between both countries through enhanced connectivity. New Delhi, on its part, should be open to projects like BCIM Corridor (Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar). The recent proposal out of Beijing to start a railway line from Kunming to Kolkata may not seem possible in the short run, but in the long run it is definitely worth examining, and would give a boost to economies of India’s Eastern and North Eastern states. Interestingly, on September 9th, 2018, Myanmar signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with China for agreeing to establish the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC). New Delhi should see this connectivity project as an opportunity rather than an obstacle.

Conclusion

New Delhi, while enhancing strategic cooperation with Washington, needs to keep in mind that there is a plethora of economic as well as other issues of global importance where New Delhi can find common ground with Beijing and Moscow. India bilaterally shares robust economic ties with China, and a strategic relationship with Russia. All three countries are also working closely in BRICS as well as SCO. New Delhi also needs to keep in mind that while strategic ties with Washington are important, Trump’s unpredictability will compel New Delhi to keep all its options open and think in a nuanced manner. While historically New Delhi shares close ties with Moscow, the logic of geography can not be ignored in the context of India-China ties.

Eye Candy: the states in India’s federation

NOL India's states
Click here to zoom

Stay tuned for more on India from a sub-state perspective. I’m going to find the GDP (PPP) per capitas of these states. I’m going to find their population densities. I’m going to find their literacy rates and their life expectancy rates. I’m going to find out much more about India over the coming 12 to 16 months.

In the meantime, here are all of NOL‘s posts from Tridivesh, a resident of New Delhi. And here are all of NOL‘s posts from Shree, a resident of New York.

RCH: 10 rivalries that shaped world history

My weekend column for RealClearHistory, in case you missed it, was fun to write. An excerpt:

4. The Mughals versus the Persians (1600s -1739). The Mughal Empire, an Indian polity that ruled over much of the subcontinent, fought three wars against two Persian dynasties (Safavids and Afsharids) and lost all of them. Much of the fighting was done around the city of Kandahar, in what is now Afghanistan. Kandahar was for a long time an important fortress for empires and dynasties that lorded over both Persia and India. While the Mughals had their pride stung by the losses, they could at least find solace in the fact their realm was the most economically successful on the planet at the time. India and Iran have long been weary regional rivals and sometime allies, but geographic distance and terrain have made outright wars between the two civilizations rare and limited. The rivalry between Iran and India has been a cultural one rather than a military one.

Read the rest (if you haven’t already!).

China and the liberal vision of the Indo-Pacific

Mike Pompeo’s recent speech (titled ‘America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision’) at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum hosted by the US Chamber of Commerce in Washington, DC, has been carefully observed across Asia. Beijing has understandably paid close special attention to it. Pompeo emphasized the need for greater connectivity within the Indo-Pacific, while also highlighting the role which the US was likely to play (including financial investments to the tune of $113 million in areas like infrastructure, energy, and digital economy). The US Secretary of State, while stating that this vision was not targeted at anyone, did make references to China’s hegemonic tendencies, as well as the lacunae of Chinese connectivity projects (especially the economic dimension).

The Chinese reaction to Pompeo’s speech was interesting. Senior Chinese government officials were initially dismissive of the speech, saying that such ideas have been spoken in the past, but produced no tangible results.

A response article in the Global Times is significant here. Titled ‘Indo-Pacific strategy more a geopolitical military alliance’ and published in the communist state’s premier English-language mouthpiece, what emerges clearly from this article is that Beijing is not taking the ‘Indo-Pacific vision’ lightly, and neither does it rule out the possibility of collaboration. The article is unequivocal, though, in expressing its skepticism with regard to the geopolitical aspect of the Indo-Pacific vision. Argues the article:

[…] the geopolitical connotation of the strategy may lead to regional tensions and conflicts and thus put countries in the region on alert.

The piece is optimistic with regard to the geo-economic dimension, saying that American investment would be beneficial and would promote economic growth and prosperity. What must be noted is that while the US vision for an ‘Indo-Pacific’ has been put forward as a counter to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of China, the article also spoke about the possible complementarities between the US vision for an ‘Indo-Pacific’ and China’s version of BRI. While Pompeo had spoken about a crucial role for US private companies in his speech, the article clearly bats in favor of cooperation between the Indian, Japanese, Chinese, and US governments, rather than just private companies. This is interesting, given the fact that China had gone to the extent of dubbing the Indo-Pacific vision as “the foam on the sea […] that gets attention but will soon dissipate.”

While there is absolutely no doubt that there is immense scope for synergies between the Indo-Pacific vision and BRI, especially in the economic sphere, China’s recent openness towards the Indo-Pacific vision needs to be viewed in the following context.

First, the growing resentment against the economic implications of some BRI projects. In South Asia, Sri Lanka is a classical example of China’s debt trap diplomacy, where Beijing provides loans at high interest rates (China has taken over the strategic Hambantota Project, since Sri Lanka has been unable to pay Beijing the whopping $13 billion). Even in the ASEAN grouping, countries are beginning to question the feasibility of BRI projects. Malaysia, which shares close economic ties with Beijing, is reviewing certain Chinese projects (this was one of the first steps undertaken by Mahathir Mohammad after taking over the reigns as Prime Minister of Malaysia).

Secondly, the Indo-Pacific vision has long been dubbed as a mere ‘expression’ that lacks gravitas in the economic context (and even now $113 million is not sufficient). Developments over recent months, including the recent speech by Pompeo, indicate that the American Department of State seems to be keen to dispel this notion that the Indo-Pacific narrative is bereft of substance. Here it would be pertinent to point out that Pompeo’s speech was followed by an Asia visit to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The US needs to walk the course and, apart from investing, it needs to think of involving more countries, including Taiwan and more South Asian countries like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in the Indo-Pacific partnership.

The Indo-Pacific also speaks in favor of democracy as well as greater integration, but countries are becoming more inward-looking, and their stands on democracy and human rights are more ambiguous than in the past. Japan is trying to change its attitude towards immigration, and is at the forefront of promoting integration and connectivity within the Indo-Pacific. Neither the US, nor India, Japan, or Australia have criticized China for its human rights violations against the Uighur minority in Xinjiang province.

Here it would also be important to state that there is scope for China to be part of the Indo-Pacific, but it needs to look at certain projects beyond the rubric of the BRI. A perfect instance is the Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar (BCIM) Corridor, which India was willing to join, but China now considers this project as a part of BRI.

In conclusion, Beijing can not be excluded from the ‘Indo-Pacific’ narrative, but it cannot expect to be part of the same, on its own terms. It is also important for countries like the United States and India to speak up more forcefully on key issues pertaining to freedom of speech and diversity (and ensure that these remain robust in their own respective countries), given that one of the objectives of the Indo-Pacific vision is a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.

Nightcap

  1. Violent Conflict and Political Development Over the Long Run: China Versus Europe Dincecco & Wang, Annual Review of Political Science
  2. Why was the 20th century not a “Chinese Century”? Brad DeLong, Grasping Reality
  3. Law and border Jacob Levy, Niskanen
  4. The story of Indian magic John Butler, Asian Review of Books

Courts as Modern Civic Churches?

India is in the middle of an anachronistic power tussle. Watching The Tudors right when the Indian Supreme Court is hearing submissions in the Sabrimala case placed before me an interesting hypothesis – the King v Church tug of war is replicating itself, albeit democratically, in the controversy surrounding the Essential Practices Test.

First introduced in the Shirur Mutt case (1954 AIR 282), the doctrine provides for a test that would make state interference justified under a Constitution that gives to her citizens (Article 25), the freedom to practice and profess their religion, and to religious denominations (Article 26), the right to manage affairs and administer properties, both being subject to restrictions on public order, morality, and health. Essentially, the test gives the Court the power to determine what constitutes “essential to the practice of the religion” and holds that everything non-essential is subject to legislative action by the State.

A number of scholars (Gautam Bhatia, Shreya Atrey) have commented on the un/desirability of the consequences of such a test. The clearest of them all comes from Jacobsohn who characterizes the test as an attempt to internally reform the religion by allowing the judges to “re-characterize the religion in a more progressive light”.

What has given these objections much weight is the support Justice Chandrachud has lent to the skepticism of judicial discretion bestowed by the doctrine. He questions the ecclesiastical function of the court and proposes to use constitutional morality as the one stop test for determining the constitutionality of a religious practice, instead of going the long way of finding the non-essential elements that may be subjected to progressive restraints. This adherence to the constitutional word is consistent with the treatment of the constitution as the new-age charter of a civic religion, a notion oft repeated and celebrated in India.

King Henry VIII’s ostensible zeal for reform came out of his hatred for papal supremacy. Divine rights of the Kings placed the King directly under God, and God alone. He would then become the supreme mortal in terms of matters relating to governance and spirituality. The Indian courts do not wish to claim any such supremacy over spiritual matters (yet). What they seek to do is social reform – a venerable objective behind the framing of the Indian constitution. In that, they seek to be not just interpreters and guardians of the constitution, but active participants of change in realizing the aims of the constitution.

But one must question this insistence that in religion, like with the legislation, there is an umbra and a penumbra and that the latter is so hierarchy placed that it may be interfered upon, whereas the umbra is so essential that it may not be touched. What is religion but not faith? And what is faith but not a collection of beliefs organically coalesced to create charters that may look different for each generation? Is it not possible that a religion undergo change so as to value a tenet A over B within a span of decades? Is it also not possible that A and B exist simultaneously without harming the essentiality of each other, howsoever inconsistent they might seem to an educated rational mind? Since when has religion been the epitome of moral consistency?

Much can be said on the justifiability of this aspiration. Much more can be said of the legitimacy of the court’s position on such matters. Democratically speaking, ridding a society of its ills is more likely to give positive results if it comes from a joined political action rather than from a bench of judges who, in all their wisdom, are not privy to a large section of the society. Of course, the Indian supreme court has “grounded itself” (a phrased used by Dr. Rajeev Dhavan) and has acquired the kind of legitimacy that demands respectful obedience from its supporters. And this has been primarily because of the non-traditional use of judicial description for activism against a falling parliament often mired in political games to care much about the legal and policy lacunae deserving attention.

Sabrimala is an especially thorny issue, not just because the judges must conclusively decide the path the judiciary wishes to take with respect to social reform but also because they can either be the ecclesiastical court and inform the citizens of the immorality (grounded in the constitution, no doubt but then looking at the vastness of the Indian constitution, it can probably accommodate all moral philosophers barring Peter Singer) of their actions or they can let arguably unethical practices live, giving individual liberty the space that separation of church and state demands.