West Coast Hillbillies

A long time ago, after moving from San Francisco, I bought a beautiful Labrador puppy from a woman named Brigid Blodgett, in the hills above Santa Cruz California. (I think she won’t mind the free advertising in the unlikely case that she reads Notes On Liberty or my blog.) Her house was an older conventional California so-called “ranch house,” with low roofs and a sprawling house plan. The pup she had in mind for me was playing with his ten siblings in a concrete backyard when I arrived. There was one new litter, lying with Mom on some rags in the living room, and another in the kitchen, that I could see and smell. The lady, the breeder, told me there was yet another litter in the garage.

To get my new dog, I had not gone to just anybody since most dogs last longer than most cars. I had gathered recommendations in Santa Cruz (pop. 60,000) and its suburbs. Brigid Blodgett’s name kept coming up. Other things being more or less equal, (“et cetibus…” as they say in Latin) I believe in the predictive power of redundancy. I purchased the pup, “Max” (for the German sociologist Max Weber. My previous dog was “Lenin,” another story, obviously). He was a wonderful animal, big, sturdy, healthy, smart, and with a physique that turned heads. I never saw Ms Blodgett again. She asked me once by phone to enter Max in a show but I thought it would inflate his ego and I declined. Her name came up a couple of times when perfect strangers stopped me to ask if Max was one of “Brigid’s dogs.” Continue reading

Nightcap

  1. Male Violence Throughout History William Buckner, Quillette
  2. The Police Have No Obligation to Protect You Tho Bishop, Power & Market (Mises)
  3. Life in Syria Continues to Get Worse Krishnadev Calamur, the Atlantic
  4. The Architectural Sacking of Paris Claire Berlinski, City Journal

World War I: a pity

I will be dedicating many, if not most, of my columns at RealClearHistory to World War I over the next few months, mostly because it’s been 100 years since an armistice ended a war that was supposed to end all wars. Some of my thoughts will be heavy, but some, like this week’s, will be playful:

3. The Dervish state. This small state in the Horn of Africa was renowned throughout Europe and the Middle East for ably fending off challenges from Italians, the British, and the Ottomans during the roughly 25 years of its existence. The Dervish state openly resisted attempts at colonization during the Scramble for Africa and was recognized as a major ally by the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire. Being a small, independent state in the Horn of Africa, Dervish’s leaders played it smart and offered Ottoman and German troops assistance lightly, preferring instead to pay close attention to the realities of its allies’ war situation. When Istanbul and Berlin surrendered in 1918, no tears were shed by the Dervish. The state was conquered by the British Empire two years later, in 1920.

The piece is about some of the countries that played lesser roles in World War I. Please, read the whole thing. Any suggestions for next week’s column? (Bearing in mind that the theme is World War I.)

Nightcap

  1. Science fiction from China is epic AF Nick Richardson, London Review of Books
  2. What is the proper role of galactic government? Michelangelo Landgrave, NOL
  3. Science fiction & alternate realities in the Arab World Perwana Nazif, the Quietus
  4. Algorithmic wilderness: can techno-ecology heal our world? Henry Mance, Aeon

Nightcap

  1. Why French Federation Failed in Africa Tom Westland, Decompressing History
  2. Russia’s Centuries-Old Relationship with Kurds Pietro Shakarian, Origins
  3. Religious identity is once again trumping civic ties Ed West, Spectator
  4. The New Rise of Old Nationalism Mohsin Hamid, Guardian

Is Free-Riding for Union Negotiations a Myth?

As the US Supreme Court is considering the case of Janus v. AFSCME on mandatory deductions for the purposes of union negotiations, I think it is time to truly question the argument underlying mandatory deductions: free-riding. Normally, the argument is that union members fight hard to get advantageous conditions. After taking the risks associated with striking and expending resources to this end, non-members could simply get the job and the benefits associated with prior negotiations and not contribute to the “public good” of negotiation. This is an often-used argument.  I come from Quebec in Canada where closed shop unionism (i.e. you are forced to join the union to get the job) still exists and mandatory dues are more stringently enforced than in the United States. There, one of the most repeated defense of the closed shop system and of the mandatory dues is the free-riding argument. As such, the free-riding argument is an often-used communication line.

That is, in essence, the free-riding argument. While it appears axiomatically true, I do not believe that it is actually a relevant problem. However, before I proceed, let me state that I have a prior in favor of consent and I only sign off on “forcing” people when the case is clear and clean-cut (I am what you could call a radical “contractarian”).

So, is free-riding a problem? The answer is in the negative (in my opinion) as the free-riding argument entails that unionism provides a public good. One of the main feature of a public good is an inability to exclude non-payers.  Think about the often-used example of lighthouses in public economics: the lighthouse provides a light that everyone can see and yet the owner of the lighthouse would have a very hard time to collect dues (although Ronald Coase in 1974 and Rosolino Candela and myself more recently have emitted doubts about the example).  However, why would a union be unable to exclude? After all, it is very easy to contractually “pre-exclude” non-payers. A non-member could obtain only 50% or 75% or 80% of the benefits negotiated of the union. Only upon joining would he be able to acquire the full benefits of the union.

As such, “excludability” is feasible. In fact, there are precedents that could serve as a framework for using this exclusion mechanism. Consider the example of “orphan clauses” which were very popular in my neck of the wood in the 1990s and early 2000s. Basically, these clauses “create differences in treatment, based solely on the hiring date, in some of the employment conditions of workers who perform the same tasks“. These existed for police forces, firefighters and other public sector workers.  Now, this was a political tool for placating older union members while controlling public spending. As such, it is not an example of exclusion for negotiation purposes. Nevertheless, such contracts could switch the “date of employment” for the “union status” in determining differences in treatment.

Another mechanism for exclusion is social ostracism. This may seem callous, but social ostracism is actually well rooted in evolutionary psychology. It also works really well in contexts of continuous dealings (see also this example by Avner Greif which has been the object of debates with Sheilagh Ogilvie and Jessica Goldberg)  Workplace relations between workers are continuous relations and shirkers can be ostracized easily.  The best example is the “water dispenser gossip” where co-workers will spread rumors about other workers and their behavior. All that is needed is an individual marginally inclined towards the union (who could even get special treatment from the union for being the ostracism-producer) who will generate the ostracism. As such, the free-riding argument has a solution in that second channel.

In fact, ostracism and contractual exclusion can be combined as they are in no way mutually exclusive. These two channels are the reason why I do not adhere to the “free-riding” argument as valid justification of compulsory payment for financing unions.

Nightcap

  1. Maggie Thatcher still owns the Left John Harris, New Statesman
  2. Stalinist Terror, Communist Prisons Patrick Kurp, Los Angeles Review of Books
  3. 1968 and the Irony of History Michael Mandelbaum, American Interest
  4. When Populism First Eclipsed the Liberal Elite Michael Massing, New York Review of Books

Underrated & overrated libertarian thinkers

Here is my take on Tyler Cowen’s views on libertarian thinkers who are either overrated or underrated in shaping the libertarian tradition. Please be aware that I think libertarianism and classical liberalism are two different strands of liberal thought, as argued in more detail in an earlier post here at NOL and in my latest book. Please also note that my judgement will be particularly informed by their views on international relations.

Overrated:

  1. Hans-Hermann Hoppe – completely esoteric ideas about international relations, especially his erroneous and ill-thought idea about private defence through private insurance companies.
  2. Deepak Lal – no complaints about his general work, but his praise for empires was deeply disturbing, even though he meant well. Liberalism and globalization do not need empires, no matter how civilized – in the Oakeshottian meaning – they are meant to be.
  3. Ron Paul – I admire Ron Paul in many ways, but his ideas for ‘a foreign Policy of freedom’ are not much better than Hoppe’s. ‘peace, commerce, and honest friendship’: nice Jeffersonian goals, bad underlying analysis, not least about human nature.

Underrated:

  1. Friedrich Hayek – a far more sophisticated thinker on international relations than he is ever given credit for.
  2. Adam Smith – nowadays erroneously equated with ‘trade leads to peace’ fairly tales. Yet any reader of the complete two volumes of the Wealth of Nations recognizes that the book is also a lot about war and foreign policy, as are his Lectures on Jurisprudence and even a bit in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Together these make for a full and sophisticated position on international affairs.
  3. David Hume – basically the same as Smith.
  4. Robert Jackson – ok, I am taking liberties here. I do not think Jackson would consider himself a classical liberal or libertarian. But his writings on international relations are important and often have a classical liberal leaning, especially The Global Covenant.

Nightcap

  1. Enlightenment and the Capitalist Crisis Chris Dillow, Stumbling & Mumbling
  2. The Wall is the Wall: Why Fortresses Fail Jack Anderson, War on the Rocks
  3. Topiary in the land of al-Qaeda Nicolas Pelham, 1843
  4. Why Ketchup in Mexico Tastes So Good Jeffrey Tucker, Daily Economy

SMP: Lessons From Inflation-targeting Regimes

Inflation targeting is probably the most widely-known policy adopted by central banks around the world. Under an inflation-targeting regime, the government (usually the central bank or treasury) announces an inflation target (usually with lower and upper limits). It is then up to the central bank to decide how to achieve the target. Seen in this light, inflation targeting is more of a constrained discretionary policy than a strict monetary rule.

Continue reading at SMP.

Political Science survey (take it!)

I received the following email from a graduate student at SUNY-Stony Brook:

A team of researchers from Stony Brook University have asked us to help them study the role that emotion plays in politics. I have completed the survey myself, and it only took me a few minutes to finish. The survey is completely anonymous.

Click the link below to begin the survey:

https://stonybrookuniversity.co1.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_bDvaFRlp0rmqYBf* * *

If you choose to post it, please let me know, and please discourage your readers from discussing the content of the survey by disabling the comment section on the post.  It could bias my results if people go into it with specific expectations about the study.
Thanks so much for your consideration!

Best Regards,
Brandon Marshall
Stony Brook University
Department of Political Science

Note: This study has been approved by Stony Brook University’s Institutional Review Board protecting research involving human subjects.


The link is legit, though it took me about 10 minutes to complete it. On top of that, it wasn’t as cool as the ideology quizzes I link to, or the surveys Michelangelo occasionally conducts. The political scientists are trying to find out why Democrats and Republicans don’t like each other, so don’t expect any nuance or to learn anything new.

All the same, take the survey. Because science!

Nightcap

  1. It’s not gerrymandering if it benefits Democrats Aaron Bycoffe, FiveThirtyEight
  2. Just because you’re paranoid doesn’t mean they aren’t out to get you Rod Dreher, the American Conservative
  3. Planting trees beneath Turkish bombs in Syria Matt Broomfield, New Statesman
  4. In the long run we are all dead Charles Goodhart, Inference

Nightcap

  1. Victor Hugo’s surreal, forgotten art Andrew Hussey, 1843
  2. Was Roosevelt’s “Europe First” Policy A Mistake? Salvatore Babones, Asian Review of Books
  3. Your God is Our God Elliot Kaufman, Claremont Review of Books
  4. The Seduction of the Gun Matt Lewis, Los Angeles Review of Books

Nightcap

  1. Catholic Debate Over Kidnapping A Jewish Boy Korey Maas, the Federalist
  2. God’s Own Music Ian Bostridge, New York Review of Books
  3. Church property cases and “neutral principles” Samuel Bray, Volokh Conspiracy
  4. What to Do About the Money Frank McGough, Origins

On Antitrust, the Sherman Act and Accepted Wisdom

I am generally skeptical of “accepted wisdom” on many policy debates. People involved in policy-making are generally politicians who carefully craft justifications (i.e. cover stories) where self-interest and common good cannot be disentangled easily.  These justifications can easily become “accepted wisdom” even if incorrect. I am not saying that “accepted wisdom” is without value or that it is always wrong, but more often than not it is accepted at face value without question.

My favorite example is “antitrust”.  In the United States, the Sherman Act (the antitrust bill) was first introduced in 1889 (passed in 1890). The justification often given is that it was meant to promote competition as proposed by economists. However, as often pointed out, the bill was passed well before the topic of competition in economics had been unified into a theoretical body.  It was also rooted in protectionist motives. Moreover, the bill was passed after the industries most affected saw prices fall faster than the overall price level and output increase faster than the overall output level (see here here here here and here). Combined, these elements should give pause to anyone willing to cite the “accepted wisdom”.

More recently, economist Patrick Newman provided further reason for caution in an article in Public Choice. Interweaving political history and the biographical details about senator John Sherman (he of the Sherman Act), Newman tells a fascinating story about the self-interested reasons behind the introduction of the act.

In 1888, John Sherman failed to obtain the Republican presidential nomination – a failure which he blamed on the governor of Michigan, Russell Alger. Out of malice and a desire of vengeance, Sherman defended his proposal by citing Alger as the ringmaster of one of the “trusts”. Alger, himself a presidential hopeful for the 1892 cycle, was politically crippled by the attack (even if it appears that it was untrue). Obviously, this was not the sole reason for the Act (Newman highlights the nature of the Republican coalition which would have demanded such an act). However, once Alger was fatally wounded, Sherman appears to have lost interest in the Act and left others to push it through.

As such, the passage of the bill was partly motivated by political self-interest (thus illustrating the key point of behavioral symmetry that underlies public choice theory). Entangled in the “accepted wisdom” is a wicked tale of revenge between politicians. At such sight, it is hard not to be cautions with regards to “accepted wisdom”.