Hansai, or the Cleansing Fire.

How the Center of Japan’s Christian Community Became the Unintended Target for America’s Second Atomic Strike.

Eighty-one years ago today, the course of military history and the geography of faith collided in a flash of light brighter than a thousand suns. When the second atomic bomb detonated over Japan at 11:02 a.m. on August 9, 1945, it did not hit its intended destination. 

It did not strike the sprawling military arsenals or the heart of the industrialized shipping yards that planners in Washington had meticulously mapped out.

Instead, through a sequence of tactical mis-steps, weather anomalies, and sheer mechanical friction, the plutonium weapon known as “Fat Man” detonated directly above the twin spires of Urakami cathedral.

In that single, catastrophic moment, the heart of Japan’s oldest, largest, and most resilient Christian community was instantly vaporized.

Through the lens of Hansai (or burnt offering), I have come to view the tragedy of Nagasaki not simply as a calculated geopolitical gambit, or a callous act of malice, but as something arguably more terrifying: a horrific, unintended accident of war. 

It was an event where the classic Clausewitzian concepts of fog and friction literally intercepted the purity of faith in an unimaginably cruel way. The destruction of Urakami was not a deliberate strike against an enduring religious minority, but a profound demonstration of how total war, once unleashed, inevitably escapes the boundaries of human control and intent.

To understand the sheer accidental nature of this horror, one must look closely at the tactical chaos of that morning. The primary target for the B-29 bomber Bockscar was not Nagasaki at all; it was Kokura, a city heavily fortified with steel works and munitions factories. 

When the twice-delayed bomber arrived over Kokura, the crew found the city obscured by a dense blanket of cloud and smoke—a literal “fog of war”—compounded by residual haze of a conventional firebombing raid on nearby Yahata the previous night.

For nearly an hour, the aircraft circled Kokura. Three separate bombing runs were aborted because visual targeting proved impossible, and strict orders forbade dropping the weapon blindly through radar. 

With fuel reserves dwindling to a critical threshold and Japanese anti-aircraft fire beginning to close in, the mission commander faced a stark choice: abort entirely and ditch the world’s most expensive weapon in the Pacific, or divert to the secondary target.

Nagasaki was that secondary target, but it too was heavily obscured by clouds when Bockscar arrived. The crew was on the verge of aborting their war-ending mission when, at the very last  minute, a fleeting break opened in the overcast sky. 

The bombardier, catching a hurried glimpse of the ground below through his targeting scope, thought he was above his target, and released the five-ton weapon.

But the drop was not precise. Missing its intended aim point by more than two miles, the bomb drifted north of the city, channeling down the natural amphitheater of the Urakami Valley and exploded 1,650 feet above the Urakami Cathedral, where parishioners had gathered that morning to celebrate the feast of the Assumption.

The historical irony of this trajectory is devastating. The Urakami Christians were the descendants of Japan’s “Hidden Christians” (Kakure Kirishitan), a community that had survived over two and a half centuries of brutal, systemic persecution under the Tokugawa Shogunate. For generations, they had practiced their faith in absolute secrecy, passing down prayers in corrupted Latin and Portuguese, defying crucifix-trampling tests (fumi-e), and enduring torture, exile, and execution.

When Japan finally reopened to the world in the late nineteenth century, these resilient believers emerged from the shadows. With their own hands, brick by painful brick, they constructed Urakami Cathedral, a magnificent red-brick structure that stood as the largest Christian church in East Asia. 

It was a monument to survival, a physical testament that their faith had outlasted the wrath of emperors and shoguns.

Yet, in a cruel twist of historical fate, this community—which had successfully resisted centuries of domestic tyranny—was obliterated in a microsecond by a weapon dropped by a western nation whose values and leadership were profoundly shaped by the Christian tradition.

In the aftermath of the blast, survivors and theologians alike struggled to find meaning in a tragedy so starkly devoid of tactical logic. Among them was Dr. Takashi Nagai, a radiologist and Catholic convert who survived the explosion despite being grievously injured. Nagai popularized a deeply profound, if controversial, framework to process the trauma: the concept of Hansai, the spiritual burnt offering.

Nagai posited that the destruction of Urakami was not a punishment from God, nor was it a meaningless slaughter. Instead, he suggested that Urakami was chosen as a holy, spotless sacrifice to bring an end to the global slaughter of World War II. In his view, the cathedral and its faithful were consumed in a cleansing fire that finally quenched the flames of global conflict, prompting Japan’s immediate surrender.

While Nagai’s faith provided immense psychological comfort to a traumatized community, looking back through the cold clarity of military history reveals a parallel, secular truth. The “cleansing fire” that consumed Urakami was ignited by the messy mechanics of modern warfare. It was the ultimate casualty of tactical contingency and the persistent intrusion of chaos in even the best of military plans.

When we look back upon the records of the Manhattan Project and the deliberations of its Target Committee, it becomes clear that the destruction of the Christian valley was never a line item on America’s strategic ledger. The planners were looking at industrial outputs, harbor depths, and psychological shock value. They did not know that the city they designated as a secondary fallback contained the spiritual capital of Japanese Christianity, known as the Holy City of the East.

The bomb fell on Urakami because the wind blew a certain way over Kokura, because a fuel pump on Bockscar had malfunctioned at the start of the ill-fated Kokura mission, and because impenetrable cloud cover parted for a fraction of a second over a valley miles away from the intended target.

This realization does not diminish the horror; it amplifies it. It forces us to confront the reality that the most destructive weapons ever devised by human ingenuity are subject to the same unpredictable, chaotic forces as a stray bullet or a misplaced step on a muddy battlefield. The atomic bomb, for all its terrifying precision of physics, was deployed via a delivery system bound by human error and atmospheric whim.

The scorched, eyeless wooden head of the Urakami Madonna—recovered from the cathedral ruins by a young Japanese soldier from Hokkaido and eventually returned to the rebuilt church—remains a haunting visual metaphor for this intersection of faith and friction. Her face is blackened by the thermal radiation, her delicate features scarred by an atomic firestorm that she was never meant to witness.

To look back at Nagasaki through the framework of the Hansai is to recognize that total war inherently destabilizes our ability to control outcomes. When nations adopt strategies of total mobilization and absolute destruction, the line between a calculated tactical strike and a horrific accident completely dissolves. 

The Urakami Valley was not targeted for its faith, but it was destroyed because of our collective willingness to unleash forces where a shift in the wind can rewrite the spiritual history of a nation. As we look to the future, the ruins and rebirth of Urakami stand as a permanent warning. 

We must look past the sterile language of strategic deterrence and military necessity to see the human cost of tactical contingency. The destruction of the Holy City of the East was, in the end, a tragic accident, a manifestation of the terrifying truth that in the theater of total war, no one—not even the faithful, the innocent, or the hidden—is safe from the unpredictable trajectory of this most absolute of weapons, or the inescapable persistence of human fallibility.

A longer version of this article,  “Hansai, or the Cleansing Fire: How the Interplay of Fog, Friction, and Faith Resulted in the Unintended Atomic Annihilation of Nagasaki’s Christian Community – and Ended World War II 80 Years Ago,” previously appeared in Isonomia Quarterly 3:4 (Winter 2025).

Americanization in the wild

The death of a black man in Minneapolis, the largest city in the U.S. state of Minnesota, after a white police officer put pressure on his neck led to large-scale protests not only in the United States but also in cities around the world, including Osaka and Tokyo.
[…]
In Japan, discrimination based on differences in appearance and attributes occurs on various levels, including discrimination against black people, but what are the circumstances involved in this? Rather than treating this incident as something that happened in a faraway country and distancing ourselves from it, I would like people to think about it in relation to things that are familiar to them.

This is from a piece about Black Lives Matter in a Japanese-language magazine. The author is Shiori Kirigaya.

Americanization in the wild

In a complete reversal of its pre-pandemic policy, Tokyo’s Shibuya Ward wants partygoers to stay away from the area’s busiest neighborhood on Halloween night.

For thousands of people, celebrating Halloween in Shibuya, a popular shopping and entertainment district known for its vibrant youth culture, was an annual event to look forward to.

More here.

Some Monday Links

Shadows of the First World War loom over Germany’s ambiguous response to Russia (New Statesman)

The Wild West Outpost of Japan’s Isolationist Era (Narratively)

Vivid glimpses of life on an artificial island – called Dejima – in Nagasaki Bay. Dejima was a Dutch outpost and the sole trading route between an isolationist Japan and the rest of the world (meaning the Dutch, that had privileged access, and also the Chinese) from mid-17th to mid-19th century. The Elder Scrolls III: Morrowind and its oriental, chauvinist Dunmer, obviously drew inspiration from the era.

The West’s Struggle for Mental Health (WSJ)

Picked it form Marginal Revolution’s assorted links. Paywalled, but I somehow briefly skimmed it and sensed “post-Christian” world stuff, à la Jack Curtis.

Some Monday Links (extend, not pretend version)

The Strange Career of Paul Krugman (Tablet)

If anything, it warrants at least some praise for finally giving a date to an oft-cited, curiously undated essay by Krugman, Ricardo’s difficult idea.

Learning Sixteenth-Century Business Jargon (Lapham’s Quarterly)

Brainwashing has a grim history that we shouldn’t dismiss (Psyche)

Made in Japan – source

Another Case Against Science’s Objectivity Myth: Nepotism in Publishing (The Wire Science)

Who Controls the Narrative?: On David M. Higgins’s “Reverse Colonization: Science Fiction, Imperial Fantasy, and Alt-Victimhood” (LA Review of Books)

Hasui Kawase’s Beautiful Prints of Japanese Landscapes (Flashbak)

Nightcap

  1. Why is there no Rooseveltian school of foreign policy? Deudney & Ikenberry, Foreign Policy
  2. It’s time to drop the curtain on Japan’s colonial legacy Meindert Boersma, Lausan
  3. The ides of August (Afghanistan) Sarah Chayes (h/t Mark from Placerville)
  4. Rep. Barbara Lee on Afghanistan, 20 years later Abigail Tracy, Vanity Fair

State formation in Korea and Japan

State formation in Korea and Japan occurred a thousand years before it did in Europe, and it occurred for reasons of emulation and learning, not bellicist competition. Korea and Japan emerged as states between the 4th and 8th centuries CE and existed for centuries thereafter with centralized bureaucratic control defined over territory and administrative capacity to tax their populations, field large militaries, and provide extensive public goods. They created these institutions not to wage war or suppress revolt – the longevity of dynasties in these countries is evidence of both the peacefulness of their region and their internal stability. Rather, Korea and Japan developed state institutions through emulation and learning from China. State formation in historical East Asia occurred under a hegemonic system in which war was relatively rare, not under a balance of power system with regular existential threats. Why? We focus here on diffusion through a combination of emulation and learning: domestic elites copied Chinese civilization for reasons of prestige and domestic legitimacy.

This is good, and it comes out of the most interesting journal in international relations today, but it doesn’t quite do it for me. I think China’s imperialism was far looser than contemporary scholars imagine, especially as China spread territorially outside of its cultural hearth. I think China’s imperial sovereigns were more akin to Emperors in the Holy Roman Empire than, say, Louis XIV. I do think that Japan and Korea mimicked China, which is exactly why both countries had relatively decentralized political systems up until the 19th and 20th centuries.

Contemporary scholarship has a soft spot for pre-modern (before 1500 AD) non-Western state systems, so you get stuff like this. Again, this is a great article, and you should read it right now, but I don’t buy it. I don’t think Japan and Korea were states that existed for centuries “with centralized bureaucratic control defined over territory and administrative capacity to tax their populations, field large militaries, and provide extensive public goods.” That’s too rich for my blood. There were cultural hearths and polities in Japan and Korea that tried to mimic China, but sovereignty was still far too fractal until the Europeans arrived with their formal imperialism. See this piece for an example of why I’m skeptical of the author’s claims.

Nightcap

  1. In defense of Cortez and the Conquest of the Aztecs Daniel Rey, Spectator
  2. Race and empire in Meiji Japan (1868-1912) Ayelet Zohar, A-PJ
  3. The political legacy of World War I John Moser, Cato Unbound
  4. How working from home will spur creativity Nick Bilton, Vanity Fair

Nightcap

  1. Imperial Japan and Soviet communism Peter Gordon, ARB
  2. Why the West must stop bashing China Phil Mullan, spiked!
  3. No blueprint for utopia Kieran Setiya, LARB
  4. A Kirkian look at Houellebecq James Person, Modern Age

Post-pandemic trends in post-Brexit British foreign policy: Asia or the Atlantic?

Introduction

In January 2020, the UK had given a go-ahead to Chinese telecom giant Huawei to participate in its 5G network – with restrictions and conditions. The Trump administration conveyed its displeasure to the Boris Johnson administration. Not just the US President, but senior officials of the US administration are supposed to have said that this decision would impact economic and security relations between the UK and the US.

In the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic, ties between the UK and China have steadily deteriorated. As a result of increasing strains with Beijing, and the imposition of strong US sanctions against Huawei, London began to rethink its approach towards Huawei’s role in its 5G network.

First, it was decided that Huawei’s participation would be reduced to zero by 2023. In May, Britain had also proposed a multilateral grouping of 10 countries, D10 (G7+ India, South Korea and Australia), which could work collectively for reducing dependence upon Chinese technologies.

UK-China ties after the imposition of the National Security Law in Hong Kong

London further hardened its stance vis-à-vis China after the imposition of the National Security Law in Hong Kong, which, according to the UK, is a violation of the ‘one country two systems’ arrangement safeguarded by the ‘Basic law’ of Hong Kong and the Sino-British joint declaration signed in 1985. According to the Boris Johnson administration, the National Security Law will impinge upon not just the autonomy of Hong Kong but freedoms and rights of the residents of the former British colony, guaranteed by the 1985 declaration (these rights were to remain in place for a period of fifty years from 1997 – the year in which British left Hong Kong and handed over sovereignty to China).

Decision regarding Huawei

On July 14, 2020, on the recommendation of National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC), the Boris Johnson administration decided that Huawei will be removed from the 5G network by 2027. It was also decided that the purchase of 5G kits from Huawei will not be allowed after the end of December 2020.

China reacted strongly to the UK’s recent announcement, while it was welcomed by US President Donald Trump. China stated that the UK’s decision will exacerbate tensions, while the US President stated that the Johnson administration took this decision as a result of pressure from Washington. A top official in Boris Johnson’s administration stated that this decision was not driven by US pressure. Said the British Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab:

But I think that decision was made not because the US said it was a good decision but because the leadership in the UK concluded the right thing to do was to make that decision for the people of the UK.

Interestingly, some media reports suggest that British officials have stated that the recent ban on Huawei was imposed with a view to placate Trump, and the UK could revise its decision, if the mercurial US President is voted out in November 2020.

UK-Japan relations

Britain has already begun to look for alternatives to Huawei for developing its 5G network. On July 16, 2020, just two days after the decision was taken to remove the Chinese telecom giant altogether by 2027, British officials are supposed to have met with their Japanese counterparts and sought assistance for developing Britain’s 5G network. Two companies which were discussed as possible alternatives to Huawei were NEC Corp and Fujitsu Limited.

It would be pertinent to point out that in recent months Britain has been aiming to strengthen trade ties with Japan, and is also looking to secure a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Japan. Both countries have also been at the forefront of pitching for diversifying global supply chains.

Conclusion

While it remains to be seen whether Britain and Japan can work together for developing the former’s 5G network, the London-Tokyo relationship has witnessed an upswing in the aftermath of Covid-19. Both countries have already begun to take steps for reducing economic reliance on China. It would be interesting to see if Britain sticks to its announcement of removing Huawei from its 5G network by 2027, in case Donald Trump loses in 2020. While Britain is seeking to strengthen ties with countries wary of China’s increasing economic dominance, the former would not likely to be perceived as a mere appendage of Washington.

Nightcap

  1. The genealogies of migration Danijela Majstorović, Disorder of Things
  2. States versus societies Michael Koplow, Ottomans & Zionists
  3. Free expression and evolving standards Ryan Muldoon, RCLs
  4. Engakuji and the Winds of War Peter Miller, Views

The Real Meaning of Christmas

…Jesus Christ matters a great deal for this atheist. For Christians, Easter, the Resurrection, is the big date. For us it’s Christmas. When someone wishes me “Good Holidays” in my simplistically minded libprog town, I respond with a cheery, “Merry Christmas.” I don’t do it just to be churlish (though I wouldn’t put this beyond me). No, I mean it.

What happened in Bethlehem is that God became a human, completely, with a conventional birth and all, and a regular upbringing.* This is not another small unimportant religious tale. In time, it’s a world-changing myth.

When God is man, we are only one step removed from Man becoming God. In the long run, it’s the beginning of the end of our collective submission to an often savage Bronze Age divinity. It took about 1500 years but it did happen and only in the parts of the world that had been Christian (plus, maybe, in Japan. Why in Japan? Beats me!).


* By the way, the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception is not what many people think it is. I keep hearing the mistake on the radio. (It takes an atheist to help with Christian theology, N.S.!)

Iran-US tensions: Why Tokyo and New Delhi should arbitrate (But will they?)

After the drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities

Iran’s ties with the rest of the world, especially Washington, have witnessed some interesting developments in recent weeks. While there was a possibility of a thaw between Washington and Tehran after the G7 Summit (held in August 2019 at Biarritz, France) with both sides making the right noises.

Tensions between both countries have risen yet again after two oil facilities, Abqaiq and Khurais, of Saudi Aramco (a Saudi state-run company) were attacked by drones and missiles on September 14, 2019. The Houthis of Yemen have claimed responsibility for the attack, though the Saudis and the US blamed Iran. US President Donald Trump warned of retaliatory action against Iran (the US also sent troops to the Gulf to prevent further escalation), while US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo described the attack as an ‘act of war’.

Iranian reactions to US statements

If one were to look at Iranian reactions to US statements, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in an interview on September 19, stated that if the US or Saudi Arabia launched a military attack on Iran, in retaliation for the strikes on the Saudi oil facilities, he did not rule out an ‘all out war’. Zarif did say that Iran wanted to avoid conflict and was willing to engage with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

On September 22, the anniversary of Iraq’s invasion of Iran, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani warned against the presence of foreign troops in the Gulf, saying that this would lead only to more apprehensions and insecurities. The Iranian President also stated that Tehran had extended its hand of friendship towards countries in the region for maintenance of security in the Gulf, as well as the Strait of Hormuz. On the same day, Zarif made a much more measured statement, arguing that Tehran wanted to make September 22 a day of peace not war. Referring to Saddam Hussein’s invasion in 1980, he stated that this act, which received support of global powers, has been one of the reasons for turmoil in the region. Hours before Rouhani’s speech, Zarif, in an interview with the American media company CNN, stated that Iran was ready for a re-negotiated deal, provided Donald Trump lifted economic sanctions. The Foreign Minister made a telling remark:

We continue to leave the door open for diplomacy. In the meantime, our campaign for economic pressure will continue.

Rouhani had expressed his openness towards meeting Trump on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Hours before his speech, one of his spokespersons stated that Tehran was willing to give commitments with regard to not expanding its nuclear program, provided the US lifted sanctions. During his speech, Rouhani made it clear that while he was willing to engage with the US, he would not do so under any sort of pressure, and Tehran would only engage with Washington if the US-imposed economic sanctions are removed. Rouhani dubbed these sanctions as economic terrorism.

Statement (and remarks) issued by France, the UK, and Germany with regard to the attack on Saudi’s oil facilities

What was significant, however, was the statement issued on September 23 by the UK, Germany, and France that Tehran was responsible for the attack on the oil facilities run by Aramco. The three countries, which have been firmly backing greater engagement with Iran, and have been so far critical of Trump’s approach, in a statement held that Iran was responsible for the attacks, and that these could lead to greater conflict in the region. The statement issued by the three countries did make the point that these countries supported the Iran and P5+1 nuclear agreement/JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), asking Tehran to comply with the deal and adhere to the commitments.

Significantly, British PM Boris Johnson spoke in favor of Trump renegotiating the JCPOA, while French President Emmanuel Macron stated, in a conversation with reporters, that he was not ‘married to the JCPOA’. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, while speaking in favor of talks between Tehran and Washington, stated that Tehran’s conditionality of sanctions being lifted before talks take place was unrealistic.

Why France’s statement was especially surprising

Statements made by Macron came as a surprise, given that he has played a pivotal role in keeping the JCPOA intact and differed with Trump’s approach towards Tehran. Apart from fervently supporting the JCPOA, the UK, Germany, and France had also set up a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) to circumvent sanctions from Iran. This move had been criticized by senior officials of the Trump Administration, including Mike Pence, John Bolton, and Pompeo.

Macron also attempted to organize a meeting between Zarif and G7 Ministers on the sidelines of the G7 Summit held at Biarritz (the French President did meet Zarif, with G7 leaders giving him a go ahead to negotiate with Iran). A statement made by Trump, where he stated that he was willing to meet with Rouhani and described Iran as a country of great potential, raised hopes of possible engagement with Iran. Trump in his usual style did put forward conditionalities, and did state that he was not party to a joint statement by G7 on Iran.

It would be pertinent to point out that Macron even attempted a meeting between Rouhani and Trump on the sidelines of the UNGA meeting, though this did not work out. The French President did meet with the Iranian President on the sidelines of the UNGA. A tweet by the Iranian representative to the UN stated that apart from bilateral relations, Macron and Rouhani discussed ways in which the JCPOA could be saved.

Trump’s approach towards Iran: Back to square one?

The removal of John Bolton, a known Iran hawk, as National Security Adviser also raised hopes with regard to US engagement with Iran. In fact, Bolton’s approach vis-à-vis Iran was cited as one of the main reasons for growing differences between Bolton and Trump.

The attacks on the oil facilities have made Trump more aggressive

The attack on Saudi facilities however acted as a spoiler, and has given Trump the opportunity to act aggressively and put more pressure on France, Germany, and the UK to adopt a tough stance vis-à-vis Iran. Washington has already imposed sanctions on Iran’s Central Bank, and while Iran has warned of retaliations in case there is any sort of military action, US cyber attacks on Iran can not be ruled out. At the UNGA, Trump attacked Iran by saying it is a security threat to ‘peace-loving nations’. The US President also said that there was no chance of lifting sanctions as long as Tehran’s ‘menacing’ behavior continued.

With the UK, Germany, and France also backing US claims with regard to Iran being responsible for the attacks on Saudi oil facilities, Trump has become further emboldened.

Role of countries like Japan and India

While the reactions of European countries and the UK are important, one country, which has been very cautious in its reaction, has been Japan. Japan’s Defence Minister Toro Kono, in fact, stated that ‘We are not aware of any information that points to Iran’.

Japan has close economic ties with Iran. Earlier, Shinzo Abe had made efforts to intervene between Iran and the US. Abe, who visited Iran in June 2019, met with Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stating that it was a major step toward peace. The Japanese PM had also sought the release of US citizens detained by Iran.

Interestingly, Brian Hook, US Special Envoy to Iran, while alluding to Japan, China, and other Asian countries, stated that countries must not shy away from unequivocally acknowledging that Iran was responsible for the September 14th attack on Saudi oil facilities. Hook gave the example of the UK, France, and Germany. He also sought Asian participation, especially Japan and South Korea, in Washington’s maritime initiative to protect oil shipments through the Strait of Hormuz.

It would be important to point out that Japan, which has close economic ties with Iran, has already started looking at other sources of oil given the situation in the Middle East.

It is not just Japan. Even India would not like escalation of conflict with Iran, though so far it has stayed out. While New Delhi is looking to various sources for its oil needs (during Modi’s recent visit, one of the issues high on the agenda was closer energy ties with the US), the Chabahar Port, in which New Delhi has invested, is of strategic importance. Some recent statements from the Iranian side suggest a growing impatience with New Delhi, not merely due to toeing the US line with regard to the importation of oil from Iran (India had stopped buying oil from Iran, after the US removed the temporary waiver which it had given), but also slow progress on the Chabahar Port.

During the G7 Summit, Macron had urged the US to allow India to import oil from Iran, while Modi, during his meeting with Trump, also is supposed to have raised the Iran issue. While India has not made any statement with regard to the attack on Saudi oil facilities, Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale visited Iran days after the attack (a number of issues, such as the progress of the Chabahar Port, and issues pertaining to trilateral connectivity between India, Afghanistan, and Iran, were discussed). The Indian PM also met with the Iranian President on the sidelines of the UNGA. Both of them are supposed to have discussed issues of bilateral and regional importance.

Conclusion

It is time that countries which have close ties with the US and robust economic engagement with Iran find common ground, rather than speaking in different voices. While at the G7 meeting, there was an opportunity for the same, but this was short lived. This is essential, not just for economic and strategic purposes, but also to ensure that Iran does not become totally dependent upon China. Beijing’s recent commitments of investing over $400 billion in Iran are a clear indicator of the point that, as a result of economic isolation, Tehran is left with limited options, and is tilting towards Beijing.

China has not just made important commitments in oil and infrastructure projects, but Beijing will also be stationing its troops to protect it’s investments in the oil sector. It is not just European countries (Germany, France and the UK) but countries like Japan and India, which should be wary of the growing proximity between Tehran and Beijing. New Delhi and Tokyo would be advised to work in tandem, to get both Washington and Iran to moderate their stance. While this is no mean task, given Trump’s unpredictability it is absolutely imperative.

RCH: MacArthur’s rule over Japan

That’s the subject of my latest over at RealClearHistory. An excerpt:

The relative graciousness of the American occupation of Japan led to the most peaceful and prosperous era in Japanese history. MacArthur’s governing strategy for a conquered people was so successful that it was aped by Washington in 2001 and 2003 when the United States invaded and occupied Afghanistan and Iraq. What went wrong? You could write a dissertation trying to answer that question, but the most straightforward answer is that Iraq and Afghanistan were not conquered. The governments of Kabul and Baghdad never officially surrendered to Washington, and they never really had the capacity to wage war the way that Japan was able to wage war on the United States.

As always, I appreciate the clicks…

Nightcap

  1. Making sense of Japan’s new immigration policy Emese Schwarcz, Diplomat
  2. Deportations with benefits Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth
  3. Democracy as an information system Henry Farrell, Crooked Timber
  4. Against debate Chris Dillow, Stumbling & Mumbling