- Watching a country make a fool of itself (Brexit) Jan Fleischhauer, der Spiegel
- Disarticulation goes north Branko Milanovic, globalinequality
- The Bosnians who speak medieval Spanish Susanna Zaraysky, BBC
- A depressing take on inequality Vincent Geloso, NOL
Author: Brandon Christensen
RCH: Grenada and the polarization of democratic society
I’ve been so busy enjoying Jacques’ series on immigration that I almost forgot to link to my latest over at RealClearHistory. A slice:
Grenada is a small island in the Caribbean about 100 miles to the north of Venezuela. The island gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1974 and held elections that year. In 1979, communists violently overthrew the democratically elected government of Grenada and installed a dictatorship. By 1983, infighting between communist factions produced yet another coup, and the leader of the first coup was murdered and replaced by a more hardline Marxist faction (the New Joint Endeavor for Welfare, Education, and Liberation, or New JEWEL, movement). Pleas from democrats inside Grenada were heard by Reagan and he ordered the invasion of Grenada, which was bolstered by troops from most of Grenada’s neighbors. Today, Oct. 25 is celebrated in Grenada as Thanksgiving Day, in honor of the United States coming to the defense of Grenada’s fledgling democracy.
Please, read the rest.
Nightcap
- Pagans against the Old Testament Pieter van der Horst, Aeon
- Isn’t every crime a hate crime? Charles Moore, Spectator
- How nation-states secure freedom Samuel Gregg, Law & Liberty
- Consent versus obedience: law and legitimacy Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth
Nightcap
- From the pussy hat to the liberty cap Marion Coutts, 1843
- Sweet waters grown salty Nathan Stone, Not Even Past
- A case for learning to read 17th century Dutch Julie van den Hout, JHIblog
- A danse macabre in Kermaria (Brittany) Kenan Malik, Pandaemonium
Nightcap
- There’s a long history of “grievance studies” in the US Chris Calton, Mises Wire
- The gap in preferences between men and women Alex Tabarrok, Marginal Revolution
- Asians are crazy and rich, but also generous Parag Khanna, Ozy
- Why it’s time to end factory farming Jacy Reese, Quillette
Nightcap
- When houses of prayer become places of shelter Bruce Clark, Erasmus
- Race, or the last colonial struggle in Latin America Jason McGraw, Age of Revolutions
- Free Trade, Unconditional and Unilateral Don Boudreaux, Cafe Hayek
- Remembering Peter Schramm Ken Masugi, Law & Liberty
From the Comments: How can we not consent to government if we obey it voluntarily?
Irfan Khawaja has a good argument on Yoram Hazony’s new book on nationalism, which is being thoroughly and thoughtfully dissected by Arnold Kling:
Does anyone understand the point that Kling and/or Hazony are making about the relation between legitimacy based on voluntary acceptance, and consent? On the one hand, the claim is that in a legitimate government, we obey the law “voluntarily”; on the other hand, the claim is that we do not consent to government. How can we not consent to government if we obey it voluntarily? Coming the other way around: how can we obey it voluntarily if we don’t consent to it? Even if Hazony wants to broaden consent beyond the Lockean account, that’s still a broadening of the conditions of consent, not a nullification of the role of consent. The combination of claims that Kling attributes to Hazony does not seem coherent.
Well?
As a reminder, this is not a philosophical argument. Well, it is but it isn’t. I suspect this is about Israel and Palestine as much as it is about logical rigor. Stay tuned, and don’t be shy about having your say!
RCH: The Crimean War was the 19th century’s most important
That’s what I argue in my weekend column for RealClearHistory, anyway. Here’s a peep:
5. Russia’s alienation from Europe, culturally. Russia had long been the odd man out in European affairs. Was Russia European? Asiatic? Russian? For most Russians, the Crimean War answered this question, as Christian Europe sided with Muslim Turks against it in a war Russia lost decisively. Russian efforts at integrating culturally with Europe began under Peter the Great in the 17th and 18th centuries, largely ended officially, though, of course, informally ideas still spread throughout the empire.
Please, read the rest.
Nightcap
- Are China’s provincial boundaries misaligned? Pei Zhi Chia, Science Trends
- How costly would a no deal Brexit really be? Aarti Shankar, CapX
- Why a Nexit would be good for the Netherlands Chhay Lin Lim, NOL
- Where the West went wrong Shikha Dalmia, the Week
Nightcap
- U.S. environmentalism is a success story Patrick Allitt, Liberty Forum
- Don’t blame Karl Marx for “Cultural Marxism” Brian Doherty, Reason
- Texas and the white-washing of the American Revolution Michael Oberg, Age of Revolutions
- How would we recognize an alien if we saw one? Samuel Levin, Aeon
Nightcap
- Isolated in Africa, Chinese workers get religion en masse Yuan & Huang, Global Times
- Explaining Hazony’s nationalism Arnold Kling, askblog
- A prison journalist doing work — from the inside Daniel Gross, Literary Hub
- Character-based voting and the policy of truth Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth
RCH: America and Russia use to be friends
It’s true, and it’s the subject of my latest Tuesday column over at RealClearHistory. Check it out:
The two future superpower rivals had more in common than mere future greatness, though. Both were expanding rapidly, gobbling up huge swaths of territory at the expense of isolated polities like the Khiva Khanate and the Sioux confederacy, and hapless autocracies like Mexico and the Ottoman Empire. Russia and the United States also shared common foes – France and the U.K. – due mostly to the fact that American and Russian expansion was beginning to step on French and British toes. Both empires – one democratic, the other autocratic – also had looming labor crises that overshadowed everything they did in international affairs: slavery and serfdom.
Yes, I’m writing about the widely-ignored Crimean War. Please, read the rest, and don’t forget to tune in Friday for ten cool facts about the Crimean War!
Nightcap
- One thousand years of labor: the evolution of work Gabriel Winant, the Nation
- Why didn’t ancient Rome industrialize? Mark Koyama, NOL
- Productions, and the threshold of industrialization Nick Nielsen, The View from Oregon
- Rationalization of production and changes in the nature of work Jacques Delacroix, NOL
Nightcap
- Marx and the morality of capitalism Virgil Storr, Liberty Matters
- Adam Smith’s two economies Chris Dillow, Stumbling & Mumbling
- 2002 essay on Columbus and the New World Charles Mann, the Atlantic
- Polish plans for an American military base, pros and cons Michael Kofman, War on the Rocks
NATO, Kendrick Lamar, and the answer to free riding
Edwin’s post giving one cheer to NATO brings up the old rift between European and American libertarians on foreign policy and military alliances. As usual, it’s excellent and thought-provoking. Here’s what he got out of me:
International relations splits the classical liberal/libertarian movement for a few reasons. First, consensus-building on both sides of the pond is different, and this contributes strongly to the divide over foreign policy. American libertarians lean isolationist because it aligns closer to the American left and libertarians are desperate to have some sort of common ground with American leftists. In Europe, leftists are much less liberal than American leftists (they’re socialists and communists, whereas in the States leftists are more like Millian liberals), and therefore European libertarians try to find different common ground with leftist factions. Exporting the Revolution just doesn’t do it for Europe’s libertarians.
Edwin (and Barry) have done a good job convincing me that trans-Atlantic military ties are worth the effort. But we’re still stuck at a point where the US pays too much and the Europeans do too little. Trans-Atlantic ties are deep militarily, culturally, and economically. Tariff rates between the United States and Western Europe are miniscule, and the massive military exercise put on by NATO’s heavyweights highlights well the intricate defense connections between both sides of the pond. Night clubs in Paris, London, Warsaw, and Los Angeles all play the same Kendrick Lamar songs, too.
Politically, though, the Western world is not connected enough. Sure, there are plenty of international organizations that bureaucrats on both sides of the pond are able to work in, but bureaucracy is only one aspect of getting more politically intertwined with each other (and it’s a damn poor method, too).
In 1966 economists Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser wrote an article for the RAND Corporation showing that there were two ways to make NATO a more equitable military alliance: 1) greater unification or 2) sharing costs on a percentage basis. The article, titled “An Economic Theory of Alliances,” has been influential. Yet almost all of the focus since it was published over 50 years ago has been on door number 2, sharing costs on a percentage basis. Thus, you have Obama and Trump bemoaning the inability of Europe’s NATO members to meet their percentage threshold that had been agreed upon with a handshake at some sort of bureaucratic summit. You have Bush II and Clinton gently reminding Europe’s NATO members of the need to contribute more to defense spending. You have Nixon and Carter prodding Europe’s NATO members to meet an agreed-upon 3-4 percent threshold. For half a century policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have tried to make NATO more equitable by sharing costs on a percentage basis, and it has never panned out. Ever. Sure, there have been some exceptions in some years, but that’s not okay.
What has largely been lost in the Olson & Zeckhauser article is the “greater unification” approach, probably because this is the much tougher path to take towards equitable relations. The two economists spell out what they mean by “greater unification”: replacing the alliance with a union, or federation. I’m all for this option. It would make things much more equitable and, if the Europeans simply joined the American federation, it would give hundreds of millions of people more individual freedom thanks to the compound republic the Americans have built. Edwin, along with most other European libertarians/classical liberals, acknowledges that Europe is free-riding, but are Europe’s liberals willing to cede some aspects of their country’s sovereignty in order to make the alliance more equitable? Are they ready to vote alongside Americans for an executive? Are they ready to send Senators and Representatives to Washington? Or are they just pandering to their American libertarian friends, and telling them what they want to hear so they’ll shut the hell up about being ripped off?