1. Sovereignty and the modern treaty process (pdf) Paul Nadasdy, CSSH
  2. How states wrest territory from their adversaries (pdf) Dan Altman, ISQ
  3. Farage’s dangerous appeal Chris Dillow, Stumbling & Mumbling
  4. Decomposing the nation-state (pdf) Murray Rothbard, JLS

From the Comments: How can we not consent to government if we obey it voluntarily?

Irfan Khawaja has a good argument on Yoram Hazony’s new book on nationalism, which is being thoroughly and thoughtfully dissected by Arnold Kling:

Does anyone understand the point that Kling and/or Hazony are making about the relation between legitimacy based on voluntary acceptance, and consent? On the one hand, the claim is that in a legitimate government, we obey the law “voluntarily”; on the other hand, the claim is that we do not consent to government. How can we not consent to government if we obey it voluntarily? Coming the other way around: how can we obey it voluntarily if we don’t consent to it? Even if Hazony wants to broaden consent beyond the Lockean account, that’s still a broadening of the conditions of consent, not a nullification of the role of consent. The combination of claims that Kling attributes to Hazony does not seem coherent.


As a reminder, this is not a philosophical argument. Well, it is but it isn’t. I suspect this is about Israel and Palestine as much as it is about logical rigor. Stay tuned, and don’t be shy about having your say!