Nightcap

  1. A great primer on Derrida’s “deconstruction” David Gunkel, MIT Press Review
  2. Is feudalism going to make a comeback? Adam Wakeling, Quillette
  3. Yet another reason why libertarians should embrace federation as a foreign policy War on the Rocks
  4. Hunter-gatherers in outer space Nick Nielsen, The View from Oregon

Nightcap

  1. Collecting the dreams of imperial subjects Erik Linstrum, Aeon
  2. On NATO’s open door policy Emma Ashford, War on the Rocks
  3. Stalin’s Danish mystery Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, History Today
  4. Taleb’s distinction between “complicated” and “complex” Mark Cancellieri, askblog (comments)

Nightcap

  1. Giving the Devil his due (in praise of Trump) Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth
  2. Turkey (a NATO ally) launches Syrian offensive Amberin Zaman, Al-Monitor
  3. The case for Amy Klobuchar in 2020 David Leonhardt, New York Times
  4. The only gaijin in the village Kris Kosaka, Japan Times

Nightcap

  1. In defense of Democratic war socialism Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth
  2. China brought NATO closer together Ringsmose & Rynning, WOTR
  3. In praise of trade frictions Chris Dillow, Stumbling & Mumbling
  4. “We are in Soviet times again” Tara Burton, City Journal

Nightcap

  1. Qassem Soleimani and deterrence Michael Koplow, Ottomans & Zionists
  2. A grim history of civilian planes shot down Ron DePasquale, NYT
  3. NATO expansion into the Middle East? Caitlin Oprysko, Politico
  4. Imperialism in medieval Java (sea power?) WJ Sastrawan, New Mandala

Entangling alliances, Donald Trump, and a new libertarian alternative

Some say that Donald Trump’s transactionalism in the realm of geopolitics has gotten out of hand. Tridivesh has actually been saying this for awhile now. Jacques is not pleased with the president’s decision to withdraw American troops from Syria. Of the other Notewriters, only Andre has spoken up for Trump’s withdrawal from Syria.

There are libertarians and leftists who have applauded Trump’s move, but for the most part people are dissatisfied with the way the president of the United States conducts foreign policy. There’s no logic. There’s no strategy. And the incentives don’t quite line up, either: is Trump out for the republic or himself?

This is unfair. Trump’s transactionalism comes with more press, but Obama and the guy before him were transactionalist presidents, too. Just think about Syria to begin with. Getting involved in the butchery there had no logic to it and actually went against the strategy of Obama’s “Pivot to Asia.” Still, Obama mired the republic in another brutal regional scuffle. GWB did the same thing in Iraq, too. Osama bin Laden was hiding out in Afghanistan, so Bush invaded Iraq, a country that had nothing to do with 9/11. Makes sense, right?

Maybe we’re looking at this all wrong. Maybe we should be looking at the incentives and trade-offs available to the executive branch of the American government instead of single individuals.

My contribution to reassessing American foreign policy is to look at the role that formal alliances play in chaining down the executive branch in the American system. Libertarians loathe both alliances and the executive branch, but what if one is useful for off-setting the other? Which one would you rather have? (Trade-offs are more realistic than utopias, my fellow libertarians.)

There are two general types of alliances in the world: formal and informal. Alliances have been with us since the dawn of time, too. Think of the alliances our Stone Age ancestors made, one individual at a time. Elected politicians make alliances and call them political parties. Dictators make alliances and call them bargains. You get the picture. The United States has traditionally made use of informal alliances, so Trump’s abandonment of the Kurds in Syria is really a continuation of American foreign policy and not an aberration as some hawks claim.

In fact, prior to World War II, the United States had signed just one official alliance with another polity: the Treaty of Alliance with France that lasted from 1778-80. So from the start of the Revolutionary War (which was really a secession from the British Empire rather than an actual revolution) in 1776 to America’s entrance into World War II in late 1941, the United States had joined only one alliance, and it was a short-lived alliance that would make or break the existence of the republic. (During World War I, the United States was an “affiliated partner” rather than an official ally.)

This doesn’t mean that the United States was isolationist, or non-interventionist, during this time frame. In fact, it highlights well the fact that the United States has a long history of entering into alliances of convenience, and a short history of building and then leading stable coalitions of military partners around the world. Alliances have shaped the destiny of the republic since its founding. And, more importantly, these alliances of convenience have their intellectual roots in George Washington’s foreign policy. Washington’s foreign policy even has its own name: the Washington Doctrine of Unstable Alliances. According to Washington and other elites of the founding era, the United States should freely enter into, and exit, alliances as necessary (Jefferson was a big fan of this Doctrine, too). This stands in stark contrast to the idea that the United States only soiled its virginal unilateralism once, when it was in dire peril and needed a helping hand from France to fend off an evil empire.

Washingtonian alliances throughout American history

Aside from fighting alongside the Oneida and Tuscarora during its secession from the British Empire, the United States forged alliances with Sweden, in 1801 to fight the Barbary states, and with the Choctaw, Cherokee, and some of the Creek during the ill-fated War of 1812. In fact, one of the reasons the United States got pummeled in the War of 1812 was the lack of Native allies relative to the British, who had secured alliances with at least 10 Native American polities.

The American push westward saw a plethora of shifting alliances with Native peoples, all of which tilted in eventual favor of the United States (and to the detriment of their allies).

The American foray into imperialism in the late 19th century saw alliances with several factions in Cuba and the Philippines that were more interested in extirpating Spain than thinking through an alliance with an expansion-minded United States.

In 1832 the United States entered into a Washingtonian alliance with the Dutch in order to crush some Barbary-esque states along the Sumatran coast. The alliance led to the eventual, brutal conquest of Aceh by the Dutch and a long-lasting mutual friendship between the Americans and the Dutch.

From 1886-94 the United States and its ally in the South Pacific, the Mata’afa clan of Samoa, fought Germany and its Samoan allies for control over the Samoan islands. The Boxer Rebellion in China saw the United States ally with six European states (including Austria-Hungary) and Japan, and affiliate with three more European states and several Qing dynasty governors who refused to follow their emperor’s orders.

NATO’s continued importance

Clearly, the United States has followed its first president’s foreign policy doctrine for centuries. Washington warned that his doctrine was not to be an eternal guideline, though. Indeed, the most-cited case study of the Washington Doctrine of Unstable Alliances is not the American experience in the 19th century, but the Nazi-Soviet one of the 20th, when the Germans turned on the Soviets as soon as it became expedient to do so.

The establishment of NATO has forced the United States to become reciprocal in its alliances with other countries. The republic can no longer take, take, and take some more without giving something in return. This situation of mutually beneficial exchange has tempered not only the United States but everybody else in the world, too (especially in the industrialized part of the world; the part with the deadliest weapons). Free riding will most likely continue to be a problem within NATO. The United States will continue to pay more than its share to keep the alliance afloat. And that’s perfectly okay considering most of the alternatives: imperialism (far more expensive than free riding allies), ethnic cleansing, or oscillating blocs of states looking out for their own interests in a power vacuum, like the situation Europe found itself in during the bloody 20th century.

The forgotten alternative

Unstable alliances lead to an unstable world. The rise of NATO has been a boon to the world, despite its costs. If libertarians want to be taken seriously in the realm of foreign affairs, they would do well to shake off the Rothbardian shackles of isolationism/non-interventionism and embrace Madisonian federalism with a Christensenian twist. The 13 North American colonies that broke away from the British Empire were sovereign states when they banded together. The 29 members of NATO are sovereign states, too, and there’s no reason to believe that Madison’s federal blueprint can’t band them together as well.

If libertarians are comfortable embracing non-interventionism as a foreign policy doctrine, even though it has never been tried and even though it’s based on a shoddy interpretation of history, there’s no reason why they can’t instead embrace federation as their go-to alternative. Federation at least has history on its side, and it’s also got the obscure appeal that libertarians so love to ooze at public gatherings. Will 2020 be the year that libertarians shift from non-interventionism to federation?

Nightcap

  1. Fear and loathing at the NATO summit? Curt Mills, American Conservative
  2. The Russians are in Libya now, too Frederic Wherey, Foreign Policy
  3. Is the 21st century really about US-China? Will Staton, Areo
  4. The opioids have been nothing but good to us Steven Landsburg, Big Questions

Nightcap

  1. If the United States leaves NATO: a thought experiment Economist
  2. The cries of populism have always been hollow Bryan Caplan, EconLog
  3. A new two-party system in the democratic West John Quiggin, Crooked Timber
  4. The student takeover at Cornell, 50 years on Tony Fels, Quillette

Nightcap

  1. An anticipatory elegy Walter A. McDougall, Law & Liberty
  2. Colonial lives of legality Alvina Hoffmann, Disorder of Things
  3. The limits of interdisciplinarity Nick Nielsen, Grand Strategy Annex
  4. Should we federalize the social sciences? Michelangelo Landgrave, NOL

Nightcap

  1. The year the singularity was cancelled Scott Alexander, Slate Star Codex
  2. The nature of sex Andrew Sullivan, Interesting Times
  3. We should firmly shut the open door William Ruger, Law & Liberty
  4. What’s different about the Sri Lanka attacks? Krishnadev Calamur, Atlantic

Nightcap

  1. Japan’s robust challenge to China’s BRI Tobias Harris, War on the Rocks
  2. NATO needs to re-purpose itself…or die David Goldman, Law & Liberty
  3. Macron has learned how to fight Julia Amalia Heyer, Der Spiegel
  4. Ottawa calls on NATO for help in the Arctic Regina Leader-Post

Nightcap

  1. Teach your children well Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth
  2. A quiet NATO success story Azita Raji, War on the Rocks
  3. Whack-a-mole and Westphalian sovereignty Nick Nielsen, Grand Strategy Annex
  4. Why moving sucks Firoozeh Dumas, New York Times

Nightcap

  1. Israeli election season has been dominated by Bibi Michael Koplow, Ottomans & Zionists
  2. The Trump Era should make libertarians of us all David French, National Review
  3. Start planning NATOs 100th birthday Josef Joffe, American Interest
  4. Were European cities responsible for liberalism? Johnson & Koyama, Cato Unbound

Nightcap

  1. NATO at 70: ten of history’s most important alliances Brandon Christensen, RealClearHistory
  2. Rethinking American efforts to boost partner militaries Jason Fritz, War on the Rocks
  3. Brexit is getting worse Tom Harris, CapX
  4. On the eve of the Great Psychedelic Debate Matthew Blackwell, Quillette

Nightcap

  1. Against dogma Henry Hardy, Footnotes to Plato
  2. How “collective self-defense” leads to more war Bryce Farabaugh, Niskanen Center
  3. English language and American solipsism Branko Milanovic, globalinequality
  4. Towards a new internationalism David Hendrickson, the Nation