- A liberal case for seapower? Caverley & Mitchell, WOTR
- Catastrophism and cycles Chris Shaw, Libertarian Ideal
- The Left’s culture war rebranding Shant Mesrobian, AA
- The voice of the Anglo-Saxons NEO, nebraskaenergyobserver
benevolent hegemon
Nightcap
- Depicting extraterritoriality Mathew Hart (interview), JHIBlog
- America’s plot for world domination Robert Merry, TAC
- Beyond the !Kung (but no Wilmsen?) Manvir Singh, Aeon
- In high praise of Parler Eugene Volokh, Volokh Conspiracy
EU-China trade talks: More than just economics
The in-principle agreement between the EU and China over the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) is significant both from an economic and geopolitical standpoint.
The first round of talks for EU-China CAI began in January 2014 (it was only in 2016 that there was some agreement between both sides on the broad contents of the CAI). Ties between the EU and China too had witnessed a sharp deterioration in the aftermath of the covid-19 pandemic, and a number of EU member states, including Germany, Spain, and Italy, had tightened FDI regulations with an eye on preventing Chinese takeover of companies, especially in sensitive sectors like security.
In the month of September, while commenting on the possibility of the CAI, the European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen had stated: “China has to convince us that it’s worth having an investment agreement.”
Key contents of the agreement
The CAI will ensure a uniform arrangement for the whole of Europe with China. The key issues which will be addressed through the CAI include; resolution of disputes, greater transparency with regard to Chinese state subsidies, and curbs on China’s practice of asking foreign investors to share their technology in lieu for market access.
China has also agreed to address issues pertaining to sustainable development – such as environment and climate (China has agreed to implement the Paris Agreement on climate change). Beijing has also agreed to implement the International Labour Organisation (ILO) conventions.
According to an EU official, substantial commitments have been received from China on three issues: market access, level playing fields, and sustainable development. One of the strong backers of the CAI has been the German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
The deal will provide the EU greater access to China’s market. While the EU provides a significant amount of market access to China, the same can not be said of Beijing. Beijing is supposed to have made a firm commitment to the EU towards greater market access, especially in manufacturing (which makes up more than half of EU’s investment in China, including the automotive sector and basic materials).
Geopolitical implications
The deal has an important geopolitical dimension to it. While in the aftermath of the covid-19 pandemic, ties with the Western world, including the EU, had witnessed a downward spiral, this deal is important in terms of symbolism. Chinese media publications have hailed the finalization of this agreement, emphasizing the point that the EU has adopted an independent stance vis-à-vis China and not followed Washington’s line.
Gao Jian, a scholar at Shanghai International Studies University, states:
Deeper China-EU ties will decrease possibility that the US will be able to hijack Europe for its anti-China chariot. Hopefully, the completion of the China-EU BIT talks will sound an alarm bell to the US administration and send this message: cooperation is the only way out for China-US relations.
If one were to look at US reactions, it is not only officials in the Trump Administration (which has a little over two weeks in office) who have been skeptical, but those from the incoming Biden Administration as well. Matt Pottinger, Trump’s Deputy National Security Advisor, has stated:
Leaders in both U.S. political parties and across the U.S. government are perplexed and stunned that the EU is moving towards a new investment treaty right on the eve of a new U.S. administration.
One of Biden’s key thrusts has been on working with the EU, and his pick for NSA chief, Jack Sullivan, had said that the US would like to work with the EU on common concerns vis-à-vis China’s ‘economic practices.’ Many observers argue that the decision of the EU could drive a wedge between the EU and the US, and this was one of Beijing’s main aims. It has also been argued that trilateral economic cooperation between Japan, the EU, and the US vis-à-vis China could also be impacted by the CAI.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the EU has sent out a clear message: that it would like to chart its own course given that it has its own economic interests, and not necessarily toe the US line vis-à-vis Beijing. For China, it is important in terms of messaging, as is evident from the tone of the Chinese media who are trying to dub this as a snub by Brussels to Washington DC. While US President-elect Biden has sought joint cooperation with the EU, the EU and the US will need to be on the same page with regard to dealing with China.
Nightcap
- Hiroshima in the digital age Spencer Cohen, Los Angeles Review of Books
- The remaining goodness of America Tian Atlas Xu, New Rambler Review
- Utah’s exceptionalism Natalie Gochnour, American Affairs
- Do we send the goo? Betül Kaçar, Aeon
Nightcap
- Trump and the liberal international order (pdf) Doug Stokes, IA
- Goodbye — sort of — to Germany? Victor Davis Hanson, National Review
- The failure of global liberal hegemony David Gordon, The Austrian
- Liberty displaced Daniel McCarthy, Modern Age
Nightcap
- The United States needs a new foreign policy (federation not considered) William Burns, Atlantic
- The elusiveness of a liberal world order (federation not considered) Patrick Porter, War on the Rocks
- How autocrats use sovereignty in the Westphalian system Lisa Gaufman, Duck of Minerva
- A reflection on information and complex social orders Federico Sosa Valle, NOL
Nightcap
- Are the liberal internationalists wrong? Peter Henne, Duck of Minerva
- Order and the wealth of nations Arnold Kling, Econlib
- How libertarians plan to profit from Covid-19 Quinn Slobodian, Guardian
- Teaching my daughter to read in self-isolation Ryu Spaeth, New Republic
Nightcap
- Between Scylla and Charybdis Mark Helprin, National Review
- Protest and pandemic at sea Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth
- Scottish nationalism and free banking George Selgin, Alt-M
- What to do about China Samuel Gregg, Law & Liberty
Nightcap
- The long Ethiopian century James Barnett, American Interest
- Indian sovereignty and King William’s War Jenny Pulsipher, New England Quarterly
- The Lippman Gap David Hendrickson, IR and All That
- How Coptic Christianity is finding refuge in America Casey Chalk, American Conservative
Nightcap
- Coming of age in the CIA Susan Blumberg-Kason, ARB
- Here’s what’s wrong with US foreign policy Peter Henne, Duck of Minerva
- Towards a better globalization Reuven Brenner, American Affairs
- An argument against Richard Dawkins Rupert Shortt, TLS
RCH: MacArthur’s rule over Japan
That’s the subject of my latest over at RealClearHistory. An excerpt:
The relative graciousness of the American occupation of Japan led to the most peaceful and prosperous era in Japanese history. MacArthur’s governing strategy for a conquered people was so successful that it was aped by Washington in 2001 and 2003 when the United States invaded and occupied Afghanistan and Iraq. What went wrong? You could write a dissertation trying to answer that question, but the most straightforward answer is that Iraq and Afghanistan were not conquered. The governments of Kabul and Baghdad never officially surrendered to Washington, and they never really had the capacity to wage war the way that Japan was able to wage war on the United States.
As always, I appreciate the clicks…
Eye Candy: Each (American) state’s biggest export trading partner
Those tariffs will work wonders for the economy, I’m sure…
Nightcap
- Scenes from a Police Detention Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth
- The Weight of Words Jacob T Levy, Niskanen
- Trump’s Making the Liberal World Order Stronger Christopher Preble, National Interest
- Brexiters’ blind spot Chris Dillow, Stumbling and Mumbling
From the Comments: Naval Power and Trade
This is an extremely interesting point, the worth of fighting pirates and guerre de course seems difficult but is completely worth the effort. Strangely, just before reading this post, I finished the book To Rule The Waves by Arthur Herman, which asserts that the rise of large-scale trade went hand in hand with the growth of British naval strength, and points very specifically to the 18th and 19th centuries. On page 402, he asserts that it was only naval protection that enabled British trade to grow considerably during the Napoleonic wars (over 11,000 British merchants were captured by the French from 1793-1815 and far more would have been but for the British blockades and convoy protection). How much can one measure the cost-to-yield of maintaining peaceful trade against such depredation?
Herman also argues that Naval research and technology drove the development of far better seagoing technologies without which large-scale merchant ventures would have had far lower yield (perhaps the most famous example is the Longitude Prize) and the demand for iron and ship production was a major driver of the early Industrial Revolution. While I think that both of these arguments are very vulnerable to crowding out arguments, it seems to me that there were nuanced interconnections between technology, trade, and naval power that each had positive feedback into the others. It seems to me that by examining the very large investment made by the British East India Company in their merchant marine in this very period gives a parallel in which private interests made similar investments in protection of sea trade routes, showing its probable positive return on investment.
I am glad to see that you have recognized that naval production was almost always based on relative strengths of navies. The huge decomissioning trends of the mid-19th century in Britain was exceeded by that of their enemies/rivals (the Dutch had been weak since the late 1600s, the French were exhausted completely, and the Spanish and Portuguese were on a long decline worsened by French occupation). However, there is one major aspect to consider in examining naval strength longitudinally: complete revolution in ship technology. Steam, iron plating, and amazing advances in artillery picked up hugely after 1815, and the British navy in the Crimean War would have been unrecognizable to Nelson. I am not sure how this would affect your analysis, because navies became simultaneously more expensive and more effective, and GDP was exploding fast enough to support such high-tech advances without bankrupting the Brits. I am sure this is not an original problem, but I am interested in seeing how historical economists can control for such changes.
Good luck on this paper, it seems like an extremely useful examination with a lot of interesting complications and a fundamentally important commentary on the balance between maintaining law and allowing market determination of resource distribution.
This is from my fellow Notewriter Kevin on another fellow Notewriter’s (Vincent) recent post about shipping and imperial navies.
From the Comments: The Contribution of American Allies to Pax Americana
Dr Stocker answers my concerns about free-riding and rent seeking with this gem:
Good points Brandon. On the rent seeking, I think you are broadly correct, but I would offer two qualifications. European nations/the EU often foot a lot of the bill/take on associated civilian tasks where America has taken military action, so that the US is not subsidising the defence and security needs of Europe quite as much as it might seem. So for example, in the Yugoslav breakup led to US military operations and a comparatively passive role for Europe, but a lot of the afterwork was taken on by Europe and there is no point in military intervention without work on building civil society to create long term security and stability. Going back a bit further to the first Gulf War/expulsion of Saddam from Kuwait, Germany and Japan did pay a lot towards the cost in return for not participating. Despite [this] they got a lot of abuse in the US Congress from politicians who don’t appear to understand that their non-intervention in the Gulf owed a lot to constitutions and attitudes which the US encouraged/imposed during post-World War II occupation. Recently, though European govts have been cautious in what they say in public about the Ukraine crisis and containing Putin, there is a growth in military spending and co-operation done in fairly quiet ways largely with the aim of deterring Putin from adventurism in the Baltic states. Just one example, Germany has recently taken 100 Leopard II tanks out of retirement and work is underway for the Leopard III. Moving to the Pacific, Japan is enhancing its military and weakening constitutional restrictions on the deployment of the military (imposed by the US in the post-war Constitution) in reaction to Chinese assertiveness.
While I think it is broadly correct that the US has been paying for a military burden which should be born by Europe and Japan, the situation is not as extreme as it often assumed in the US and as far as I can see is moving in a more balanced direction. In general while it is true that the US has a very impressive military machine with some impressive technology and officers, I think some Americans are a bit over confident about this. A lot of Americans, at least amongst those who take an interest in military kit, appear very convinced that the Abrams 2 is the best tank anywhere, I would suggest that in military capacity, for cost, the Leopard II is probably better (it certainly does much better in export markets) and even in absolute terms ignoring cost, the French Leclerc (which is extremely expensive) has a good claim to be the best tank around, and the Korean K2 is another strong but very expensive candidate. The Abrams is expensive, heavy, difficult to transport and difficult to keep in sufficient fuel, though it can certainly do a very good job. A lot of Americans appear to be incapable of thinking of France as anything other than a surrender monkey joke in military terms, which is really very far from the reality, as can be seen by the very strong role that France is now taking in northwest Africa against violent Islamist fundamentalists. The US military may well be able to have the same military capacity for lower cost if it moves away from the Abrams II model of a tank that is expensive to run and transport as well as build.
So broadly a correct point Brandon, but I think the situation is a bit better than is often understood in America and is moving in the right direction as Japan and Europe are getting used to the idea of taking responsibility for dealing with new threats from China, Putinist Russia and the hydra of Islamist fundamentalists.
A very good point, and an even better angle with which to view the world.
My only quibble is that the right direction American allies are moving can easily be changed without a more fundamental shift in institutional arrangements between us. Some sort of federal or confederal arrangement would go a long way toward addressing this issue, and would further deepen the economic and cultural ties between constitutional democracies.
Or am I just looking for problems where there are none, in order for my arguments to gain ground?
Notes On Liberty 