- Driving alone, listening to talk radio Addison del Mastro, New Urbs
- My history of manual labor Tyler Cowen, MR
- My first year in the Covid lockdown Maria Farrell, Crooked Timber
- Biden finally called up Netanyahu Michael Koplow, Ottomans & Zionists
- The Strastnoy of Ayn Rand Roderick T. Long, Policy of Truth
- Brand India Ravinder Kaur, Aeon
Author: Brandon Christensen
Nightcap
- Depicting extraterritoriality Mathew Hart (interview), JHIBlog
- America’s plot for world domination Robert Merry, TAC
- Beyond the !Kung (but no Wilmsen?) Manvir Singh, Aeon
- In high praise of Parler Eugene Volokh, Volokh Conspiracy
Exit, federation, and scale (from the comments)
I think you make an interesting point, but allow me a bit of push back. The world government would set the rules of how federated entities would interact. This would be like standards and protocols. You are correct that a set of shared standards can allow for enhanced competition, of the good variety (what I call constructive competition). This would be a good thing.
However the same shared standards would lock in the world to one set of protocols, thus reducing the discovery via variation and selection of the shared institutions themselves.
Thus we would see more short range constructive competition between states, and less long term exploration of new and potentially better institutional standards.
This is from Rojelio. He is pushing back against my argument in favor of world government from a libertarian point of view. He’s right, of course. There’s two points I need to do a better job of clarifying when I advocate for world government from a libertarian point of view:
- I don’t think federating the entire world is a good idea. I think the piecemeal federation of political units is what libertarians ought to aim for. (I think the US interstate order is the best avenue for achieving this aim.) A healthy “world federation” would govern (say) 85% of the world’s population. This brings me to my second point I need to clarify.
- The importance of exit needs to be addressed and institutionalized in a proper federal order. This is difficult to do, but not impossible. My argument is to make exit difficult, but not too difficult. The difficulty of exit should be somewhere on the scale between a constitutional amendment (too difficult) in the US order and Brexit (too easy) in the Westphalian order.
The bottom line is that a more libertarian world will likely be composed of a large federal polity that protects the freedoms of the vast majority of its citizens better than most nation-states do today. The other 15% of the world would live under despotism (which will center around “cultural cores”), or under sparsely-populated democratic republics (i.e Australia), or within free-riding microstates that otherwise rely on the protection of the large federal unit.
If, say, England, Tamaulipas, and Duyên hải Nam Trung Bộ were to federate with the United States tomorrow, these polities would not be agitating for exit after 10 years of experimentation in self-governance. If, say, Texas or Vermont wanted to exit after 10 years of federation with those 3 polities, they would have to go through a process (via all of the legislative branches involved) to do so. A simple majority vote would be disastrous. It is unlikely, then, that Texas or Vermont would leave such a federation. Pure freedom would be unrealized, but billions of people would be much freer.
Nightcap
- We need to talk about the British Empire Sunder Katwala, CapX
- Nazi political economy Pseudoerasmus
- Liberty isn’t free Irfan Khawaja, Policy of Truth
- Institutional oceanography Chris Shaw, Libertarian Ideal
Afternoon Tea: Allegory of the Peace of Westphalia (1654)

This is by Jacob Jordaens, a Flemish painter, and it is not even one of his most famous paintings. Here’s Jordaens’ wiki page. The Peace of Westphalia ended the 30 Years War. The Habsburgs weren’t necessarily the bad guys. The Peace of Westphalia didn’t establish state sovereignty in a system of equal (in theory) nation-states within an interstate order. The Peace of Westphalia solved a religious constitutional question within the Holy Roman Empire and ended the war between the Dutch and the Spanish. The Westphalian state system that we speak of and live in today is not appropriately named. Here’s the best article (pdf) I’ve read on the Peace.
If we were to appropriately name the interstate order that we have today, it would be named the Napoleonic interstate system. Alas. It’s called the Westphalian system. The US, and a couple of other big states like China and Russia, have trouble fitting in to the “Westphalian” state system because they established their own regional state systems long before being wrangled into European imperial entanglements. It goes without saying that polities in Africa, Asia, and the Americas also had trouble fitting into the “Westphalian” state system.
What if one of the regional orders established by the US, Russia, or China were embraced as the new global order, instead of the “Westphalian” (really Napoleonic) system based on nation-state sovereignty? I don’t think this would be a bad thing, and in their own way, the US, China, and Russia have been trying to do this since the end of World War II.
Nightcap
- Who wants common sense? Robin Hanson, Overcoming Bias
- Theory versus common sense: the Dutch Notes On Liberty
- Scotland’s new blasphemy law Madeleine Kearns, L&L
- Academic corruption: government money Arnold Kling, askblog
Nightcap
- Fascinating piece on Ming China’s censorial system Branko Milanovic, globalinequality
- On the farmer’s protests Jeet Singh, Time
- Understanding the rise of socialism Brad Delong, Grasping Reality
- Understanding middlebrow Scott Sumner, Money Illusion
Nightcap
- The imperial sociology of “the tribe” in Afghanistan Nivi Manchanda, Millennium
- Life in the capital city of pre-modern Japan John Butler, Asian Review of Books
- The Irish free trade crisis of 1779 Joel Herman, Age of Revolutions
- Insiders and outsiders in 17th century philosophy Eric Schliesser, Philosophical Reviews
Nightcap
- Great piece on Latin American history Laurence Blair, BBC History
- The political economy of deep integration (pdf) Maggi & Ossa, NBER
- Democracy in the polycentric city (pdf) Loren King, Journal of Politics
- Here’s what I don’t say Christopher Craig, Threepenny Review
Nightcap
- The local touch of Soviet modernism Aliide Naylor, Jacobin
- The bad Muslim discount Kristin Yee, Asian Review of Books
- Ireland, America, and…national parks Melissa Buckheit, FIVES
- Can Japan bring the US back into the TPP? Daisuke Akimoto, Diplomat
Nightcap
- The Mises-(Karl) Polanyi debate (on imperialism) reconsidered Eric Schliesser, Digressions & Impressions
- Racism, entrepreneurship, and love Conor Friedersdorf, Atlantic
- The new power brokers? Index funds and the public interest Sahand Moarefy, American Affairs
- The quiet collapse of Scottish unionism Scott Hames, New Statesman
Nightcap
- Should everything be decentralized? Arnold Kling, Pairagraph
- Is Russia’s future non-Slavic? Eugene Chausovsky, Newlines
- Is America’s future non-European? Samuel Gregg, Law & Liberty
- The myth of Westernization Jon Davidann, Aeon
Nightcap
- Libertarianism is bankrupt Thomas Wells, 3 Quarks Daily
- Neoracism in America today John McWhorter, Persuasion
- Racism, elites, and the have-nots Joanna Williams, spiked!
- Monday morning quarterbacking Jason Brennan, 200-Proof Liberals
Nightcap
- Middle class: questioning the definitions Mary Lucia Darst, NOL
- On Romney’s child allowance proposal Scott Sumner, EconLog
- On the American constitutionalism, and nationalism Dennis Coyle, Modern Age
- Ottomanism, nationalism, and republicanism (IV) Barry Stocker, NOL
Nightcap
- The anti-colonial revolution Adom Getachew (interview), Tribune
- Testing balance-of-power theory in world history (pdf) Deudney, et al, EJIR
- Hayekian balance-of-power theory (pdf) Edwin van de Haar, TIR
- Globalization and peace: A Hayekian perspective (pdf) Adrián Ravier, LP