Credit Booms Gone Wrong

Recent research by economists Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor have confirmed the theory that economic booms are fueled by an excessive growth of credit. They have written a paper titled “Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles and Financial Crises, 1870–2008“, published by the National Bureau of Economic Research.

A major cause of the Great Depression was a credit boom, as analyzed by Barry Eichengreen and Kris Mitchener in their paper, “The Great Depression as a credit boom gone wrong” (BIS Working Paper No. 137). Eichengreen and Mitchener cite Henry George’s Progress and Poverty as providing an early theory of booms and busts based on land speculation. They also credit the Austrian school of economic thought, which in the works of Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises, had developed a theory of the business cycle in which credit booms play a central role. Henry George’s theory of the business cycle is complementary to the Austrian theory, as George identified the rise in land values as the key role in causing depressions.

An expansion of money and credit reduces interest rates and induces a greater production and purchase of long-duration capital goods and land. The most important investment and speculation affected is real estate. Much of investment consists of buildings and the durable goods that go into buildings as well as the infrastructure that services real estate. Much of the gains from an economic expansion go to higher land rent and land value, so speculators jump in to profit from leveraged speculation. This creates an unsustainable rise in land value that makes real estate too expensive for actual uses, so as interest rates and real estate costs rise, investment slows down and then declines. The subsequent fall in land values and investment reduces total output, generates unemployment, and then crashes the financial system.

We can ask whether this theory is consistent with historical evidence. One strand of evidence is the history of the real estate cycle, which has been investigated by the works of Homer Hoyt, Fred Harrison, and my own writings. Another strand is the history of credit booms, as shown by Schularick and Taylor, who assembled a large data set on money and credit for 12 developed economies 1870 to 2008. They show how credit expansions have been related to money expansions, and how financial innovations have greatly increased credit. Because economic booms are fueled by credit expansion, Schularick and Taylor note that credit booms can be used to forecast the coming downturn.

Followers of Henry George have focused on the real estate aspect of the boom and bust, while the Austrian school has focused on credit, interest rates, and capital goods. A complete explanation requires a synthesis of the theories of both schools, but these recent works on credit booms have not recognized the geo-Austrian synthesis. In order to eliminate the boom-bust cycle, both the real side (real estate) and the financial side (money and credit) need to be confronted.

Current Austrian-school economists such as Larry White and George Selgin have investigated the theory and history of free banking, the truly free-market policy of abolishing the central bank as well as restrictions on banking such as limiting branches and controlling interest rates. In pure free banking, there would be a base of real money such as gold or a fixed amount of government currency. Banks would issue their own private notes convertible into base money at a fixed rate. The convertibility and the competitive banking structure would provide a flexible supply of money along with price stability. The banks would associate to provide one another with loans when a bank faces a temporary need for more base money, or a lender of last resort.

Both the members of the Austrian school and the economists who have studied credit booms have not understood the need to prevent the land-value bubble by taxing most of the value of land. That would stop land speculation and eliminate the demand for credit by land buyers.

But the credit-bubble theorists have not understood that financial regulation and rules for central banks cannot solve the financial side of credit bubbles. Credit booms always go wrong. As the Austrians have pointed out, there is no scientific way to know the correct amount of money or the optimal rates of interest. Only the market can discover the rate of interest that balances savings and borrowing, and only the market can balance money supply with money demand.

Thus the remedy for the boom-bust cycle is both land value taxation and free banking. Land speculation would not be as bad without a credit boom, but will still take place as land values capture economic gains and land speculators suck credit away from productive uses. But also, a credit boom with land-value taxation will still result in excessive construction and the waste of resources in fixed capital goods, reducing the circulating capital need to generate output and employment, as Mason Gaffney has written about.

Economic bliss requires both the public collection of rent and a free market in money.

[Editor’s note: this essay first appeared on Dr. Foldvary’s blog, the Foldvarium, on April 4 2010]

Rare Earth Elements: Stockpile or Markets?

Quick, what do you know about lanthanum, praseodymium, neodymium, or dysprosium? If you said they are chemical elements, you are right: numbers 57, 59, 60, and 66, to be exact. They and their neighbors on the periodic table, collectively “rare earths,” were once mere curiosities tucked in between barium and tungsten. Now they’re having their day in the sun, thanks to new technology, as did uranium and plutonium when atomic energy was developed. The military may begin stockpiling them.

Good idea or not?

My first encounter with these elements was a project that developed high-tech shock absorbers to protect a replacement camera for the Hubble telescope during the camera’s rough ride to orbit. These devices, called M-Struts, pioneered the use of permanent magnets for shock mitigation. The only material our team found that would provide sufficient magnetic flux density (a measure of the strength of a magnetic field at a given point) was a rare earth alloy, NdFeB (neodymium-iron-boron). This material could only be procured from China.

M-Struts were a one-off project that had no discernible effect on the demand curve for neodymium. But now the demand curve is crowding up against the supply curve largely because of rare earth applications in “green” energy devices such as wind turbines (extra points if you knew that). Continue reading

Gold as Implicit Money

Economics encompasses two realities, the explicit and the implicit. The explicit is visible, obvious, recorded, and quoted. Explicit expenses are paid to others and recorded by accountants. The explicit is also called “nominal,” since that is what is named. For example, nominal interest is what a bank says it is paying, and the money it pays to depositors.

But there is also an implicit realm that is also real. Indeed, the implicit is more real than the explicit. What is explicit is often merely the superficial appearance. But things are often not what they appear to be. The reality beneath is implicit, not visible, not quoted, and not recorded, yet it is the true reality. Economists often use the adjective “economic” to designate the real thing in contrast to the explicit number or the accounting data.

An enterprise has explicit and implicit expenses. The explicit expenses are recorded by bookkeepers and accountants. The implicit expenses are non-recorded opportunity costs, such as what the owner of a business would have earned elsewhere, or what the assets of the firm would yield if sold and converted to bonds. The real cost of oil is not what the buyer pays but also includes the implicit costs of pollution damage not paid for by the customer.

Real interest is the nominal interest minus the inflation rate. Economic profit is accounting profit minus implicit expenses. Real GDP is nominal GDP (in current dollars) adjusted for inflation. Economists deflate prices and include implicit costs to get at the implicit reality. Continue reading

Gold and Money, II

Last [blog post], we examined some propositions about gold as money, drawing from theory and history. [In] this [blog post] we ask whether and how gold might once again serve a monetary function.

Money of any sort, commodity-based or not, derives its value in large part from what economists call a “network effect.” Like a fax machine, whose value depends largely on how many other people have fax machines, we value money because other people value it. We feel confident our money will buy us what we need tomorrow. A strong network effect means that something drastic has to happen before people will give up their familiar form of money.

Something drastic was happening when U.S. Rep. Ron Paul’s Gold Commission was set up in 1979. By the time the commission’s report was issued in 1980, inflation had reached alarming levels: The consumer price index was at 14 percent and rising. The prime rate was over 20 percent, and in 1980 silver exploded to $50 an ounce and gold surpassed $800 (about $2,300 in today’s dollars). Bestselling books urged people to buy gold, silver, diamonds, firearms, and rural hideouts.

We now know that inflation was peaking and that the silver price spike was a fluke caused by a failed attempt to corner the silver market. But none of this was apparent at the time, so it was reasonable to wonder whether our monetary system would survive. What did happen, of course, was that the new Fed chairman, Paul Volcker, stepped on the monetary brakes hard enough to break the back of inflation. Two back-to-back recessions resulted but were followed by a long period of recovery in which both inflation and interest rates dropped steadily. The Gold Commission was largely forgotten, though the U.S. Mint did get into the business of producing gold coins in a big way. Continue reading

Gold, Interest, and Land

Three seemingly unrelated variables are in fact deeply connected. Gold has been the most widely used money, and in a pure free market, gold would most likely come back as the real money. Free-market banking would mostly use money substitutes such as bank notes and bank deposits, but these could be exchanged for gold at a fixed rate. Free banking would combine price stability with money flexibility.

Interest is ultimately based on time preference, the tendency of most people to prefer present-day goods to future goods, due to our limited lifespan and the uncertainty of the future. In a free market, the rate of pure interest would be based on the interplay of savings and borrowing. Interest is not just income and payment, but has a vital job in the market economy. The job of the interest is to equilibrate or make equal the amounts of savings and borrowing. This also equalizes net savings (subtracting borrowing for consumption) and investment. Investment comes from savings, and the job of the interest rate is to make sure that net savings is invested. Continue reading

Gold and Money

Nothing seems to arouse passions—pro and con—quite like suggestions that gold should once again play a role in our money. “Only gold is money,” says one side. “It’s a barbarous relic,” says the other. Let’s turn down the heat a bit and look into some propositions about gold. That should lead us to some reasonable ideas about whether or how gold might return.

Propositions About Gold

Gold has intrinsic value. Actually, nothing has intrinsic value. The value of any good or service resides in the minds of individuals contemplating the benefits they might derive from it. What gold does have is some rather remarkable physical properties that make it very likely that people will continue to value it highly: luster, corrosion resistance, divisibility, malleability, high thermal and electrical conductivity, and a high degree of scarcity. All the gold ever mined would only fill one large swimming pool, and most of that gold is still recoverable.

Only gold is money. Although gold was once used as money, that is no longer the case. Money is whatever is generally accepted as a medium of exchange in a particular historical setting. Right now, government-issued fiat money, unbacked by any commodity, is the only kind of money we find anywhere in the world, with some possible obscure exceptions.

Perhaps people who say this mean that gold is the only form of money that can ensure stability. That’s what future Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan thought in 1967, when he wrote “Gold and Economic Freedom” for Ayn Rand’s newsletter. “In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation,” he said. When later asked by U.S. Rep. Ron Paul whether he stood by that article, Greenspan said he did. But he weaseled out by saying a return to gold was unnecessary because central banks had learned to produce the same results gold would produce. Continue reading

“How China Became Capitalist”

That’s the title to this short piece by Nobel laureate Ronald Coase and his co-author Ning Wang published by the Cato Institute. Among the gems:

The presence of two reforms was a defining feature of China’s economic transition. The failure to separate the two is a main source of confusion in understanding China’s reform. The Chinese government has understandably promulgated a state-centered account of reform, projecting itself as an omniscient designer and instigator of reform. The fact that the Chinese Communist Party has survived market reform, still monopolizes political power, and remains active in the economy has helped to sell the statist account of reform. But it was marginal revolutions that brought entrepreneurship and market forces back to China during the first decade of reform when the Chinese government was busy saving the state sector.

Do read the whole thing. The Cato Institute ranks third on my list list of trustworthy think tanks. Hoover and Brookings are two that I think produce university-caliber research. Cato ranks far below Hoover and Brookings in my estimation, but it occupies a lonely third place, as none of the other think tanks out there are even close to Cato’s stature, either.

You can check out Cato’s website here.

Who Owns the Fed?

Have you heard? The Federal Reserve System raked in profits of $79.3 billion last year, almost triple what runner-up ExxonMobil made. The Fed’s business model is a snap—just print money—and unlike poor beleaguered Exxon, the Fed has no competition to worry about. This means a gigantic windfall for the big banks because, although they don’t like to admit it, they actually own the Fed.

Or not. These are all half-truths and distortions, all too easy to find on the Internet. Bloggers like to begin with the discovery that commercial banks hold shares of Fed stock and those shares pay an annual dividend. A further discovery that the Fed makes big profits is all it takes to send some of them off on a conspiracy tangent. Because shareholders in a profit-seeking corporation are its owners, so it must be with the Fed, they think. Profiteering, world-government schemes, and who knows what else, must surely follow. As I will show, these half-baked ideas are distractions from the serious issues that surround the Federal Reserve System.

Yes, commercial banks hold shares of stock in their local Federal Reserve branch, but these shares do not confer ownership in any meaningful sense. Ownership is defined as the legal and moral right to use and dispose of some asset. Ownership can be conditional or temporary, as when you lease an apartment and acquire the right to occupy it for a limited time, but not to run a business in it or do major renovations. Your purchase of shares of stock in a public corporation gives you rights to vote in shareholder elections, receive any dividends declared, and sell your shares—but that’s about all. You may not walk into the corporate offices and start giving orders; on the other hand, you may not be held liable for any misdeeds of corporate officers or employees. If you acquire shares in a nonpublic company like Facebook, you accept additional restrictions on when and to whom you may sell your shares.

Member banks receive a fixed 6 percent annual dividend on their Fed stock and enjoy limited voting rights. But there the resemblance to ordinary shares ends. The banks are obliged to acquire shares when they become members of the Fed, and they may not sell their shares or pledge them as collateral. An initial issue of stock was seen as a good way to capitalize the Fed when it began, but there has been no need for additional capital and those shares are no longer significant.

Each branch has a board of directors with six members elected by local member banks and three appointed by the central board of governors. However, board members are not all bankers. Moreover, under a rule recently enacted by Congress, only nonbankers may serve on committees that select Fed bank presidents. This new rule is one way in which the ground has been shifting under the Fed recently; more about this below.

In the beginning the Fed was quite decentralized. A dollar bill in my wallet is imprinted “Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,” a remnant of the formerly dispersed power. The headquarters operation was initially a modest one, operating out of an office in the Treasury Department, but it now has its own imposing building, greatly expanded powers, and a correspondingly larger staff. With so much power now centralized, the branches engage mainly in monitoring local conditions and passing recommendations up to the board of governors. They have also become known for differing interests and points of view. The St. Louis Fed, for example, has an excellent collection of data available to the public. The Cleveland Fed is known for innovative research.

The Fed is a nonprofit institution, but that designation means only that profits are not its primary mission. The Red Cross is also a nonprofit, and like the Fed, it does earn a profit during any year in which gross income exceeds expenses. From an accounting point of view, such profits are essentially the same as those earned by firms in competitive markets, but not from an economic point of view. Competitive profits serve the vital function of directing scarce capital resources to the most urgent unmet demands of consumers. The Fed’s profits serve no such function.

Its income consists primarily of interest earned on its securities portfolio. Until recently the portfolio was made up almost entirely of Treasury securities. It has expanded greatly since 2008 to include mortgage-backed securities, loans to such pillars of the financial system as Harley-Davidson, and other assets including direct real-estate holdings. It incurs operating expenses of the usual sort: salaries, buildings, supplies, and more.

Remember that $79.3 billion profit? The 2010 figure, far higher than the $47.4 billion recorded for 2009, did not benefit the Fed’s managers or member bank shareholders because the money was remitted to the Treasury. That’s the law. It happens every year. If any private firm earned that much in a year it would be headline news and a boon to stockholders. For the Fed this is just an interesting statistic.

Who Calls the Tune?

The answer to the question “Who owns the Fed?” is that it’s the wrong question. Instead, we should ask: Who calls the Fed’s tune? That’s not such an easy question, yet it’s the only way to reach an understanding of why the Fed acts as it does and why it has done so much economic damage.

First and foremost, the Fed was created by Congress and can be modified or abolished by Congress. Clearly Congress is the Fed’s most important constituent.

The U.S. president also holds substantial sway over the Fed. He appoints the seven-member board of governors subject to Senate confirmation. The powerful Open Market Committee, which makes monetary policy decisions, consists of those seven plus the president of the New York Fed and four seats that are rotated among the 11 regional presidents.

But even though it exercises ultimate control, Congress has given the Fed a degree of independence that no other federal agency enjoys. Although its profits are swept back to the Treasury, the Fed enjoys a sweet deal that is unavailable to ordinary Federal agencies, which must plead with Congress for an annual appropriation. The Fed spends whatever it wants on operations, constrained only by the necessity to keep up appearances—not to look like fat-cat bankers. Its profit is whatever remains after all expenses have been paid, and, in contrast to ordinary corporate accounting, after dividends have been paid.

The Fed’s vaunted independence is a good thing, the thinking goes, because we don’t want the stewards of our money to be caught up in the swirl of day-to-day politics. But independence trades off against accountability. After all, in a democracy the bureaucracies are supposed to be accountable to Congress. The purse strings are the primary means of accountability among the other agencies, but there are no such strings tying Congress to the Fed.

Such control as commercial banks exert is not so much a function of their nominal stockholdings as it is of their connections through the network of good ol’ boys that weaves through government and “private” financial institutions. The Fed surely looks out for the interests of major private institutions, especially big banks, insurance companies, and securities firms. It does not want big-bank failures or a stock-market crash. It must be cognizant of foreigners who hold $3 trillion in U.S. Treasury debt and are keenly aware of the Fed’s actions and pronouncements.

These incentives have little to do with the Fed’s official dual mandate: stable prices and high employment. That mandate was established by the Employment Act of 1946 and the Humphrey-Hawkins act of 1978. These were times when no one questioned the Keynesian idea that inflation and unemployment always trade off against each other (the Phillips curve) and that monetary and fiscal policy must steer a course between two extremes. If the proponents of the mandate could see the relatively stable prices of recent years coupled with high unemployment, they would call for major Fed “easing.” If they then found out how much easing we have already had and the consequent monstrous increases in debt, they would surely be speechless.

Swift Changes

Some congressmen are calling for reassessing the dual mandate. This is just one way in which things are changing fast for the Fed. This once-staid institution is under increasing attack and is finding it necessary to defend itself, as when Chairman Ben Bernanke came out of his cloister to appear on 60 Minutes, a decision he may regret given the reaction to his astonishing claim that further “quantitative easing” will not increase the money supply.

New rooms are being added to the Fed mansion even as the sand shifts under it. Congress has given it extensive new powers unrelated to monetary policy, most notably a new consumer protection agency. The idea is that the Fed’s independence will ward off regulatory capture, something that always seems to happen to ordinary regulatory agencies. We shall see.

Rep. Ron Paul is the Fed’s most prominent critic. Last year his bill to require an audit of the Fed garnered a great many cosigners in the House. He reintroduced it at the start of the 2011 session, this time with his son Rand Paul on hand in the Senate to file the same bill there.

But in some ways the Fed is already quite transparent. Its website has extensive reports, updated regularly and more detailed than any releases from commercial banks or private corporations. And while deliberations of the powerful Open Market Committee are secret, detailed minutes are now made available shortly after each meeting.

In other ways it is quite secretive. For example, the Fed refused to disclose the names of banks that got loans during April and May 2008, denying Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed by Bloomberg and Fox News. Responding to lawsuits, the Fed did not claim it was a private institution and therefore exempt. Instead it cited potential harm to the banks that had borrowed, but the court sensibly ruled against a “test that permits an agency to deny disclosure because the agency thinks it best to do so. . . .” The information was released.

“End the Fed” has become a rallying cry for Ron Paul and his supporters. His little book by that name will not earn any academic awards, but as a mass-market polemic it does a good job of making his case without conspiracy theories or private-ownership sideshows. There is, however, room for honest debate about fractional-reserve banking, which he opposes.

About the Fed, though, Ron Paul is right. Whatever good intentions its managers may have, the Fed, like all central banks, exists ultimately as an enabler of ever bigger government. My colleague Jeffrey Rogers Hummel may be right when he says the Fed is becoming the central planner of the U.S. economy. But when we argue for replacing the Fed with market institutions, we must take the time and effort to get our facts straight and to expose the complex network of special interests that supports the Fed. Wrongheaded and simplistic arguments only hinder the cause.

[Editor’s note: this essay first appeared in the Freeman on April 21 2011] 

Government Programs, Coffee and Bread

I have been vexed for years by a simple problem: How to explain to young people who were not taught anything of substance at school why free markets are desirable. You would expect this to not be much of a problem is this overall still capitalist country. When, I try, most of the time, I end up making their eyes glaze over although I am captivating speaker overflowing with charisma.

The difficulty is that the concept of market is counter-intuitive. In everybody’s personal experience, good things generally happen because someone makes them happen: Mom, Dad, the boss, God. The “invisible hand” of the free market is just that, invisible. To understand our economy takes an effort of imagination.

Lack of understanding of markets opens up people, especially young people, to the direct, unsophisticated emotional appeal of government intervention. In many minds again, especially in the young’s, government solves problems and when it does not, problems go unsolved. There is a good reason for this misapprehension of reality: The many good things that the market does, it does undramatically, almost imperceptibly. Its achievement tend to be taken for granted. By contrast, government interventions are nearly always thunderous, even and especially, if they turn out to be completely ineffective.

Below is a micro-essay question that illustrates this phenomenon. (No grade and no reward except the pleasure of discovery.) Continue reading

What’s Up with Inflation?

Inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been almost nonexistent for several years, though it started creeping higher in the first half of 2011. Yet many prices have been rising at double-digit percentage rates. Are official figures trustworthy? And what of expectations? There is a great deal of buzz right now about inflation but also talk of renewed stagnation with the Fed’s QE2 program having ended in June. Could renewed stagnation trigger enough deflation to counter inflation? Or might we get the worst of both worlds—stagflation—as in the 1970s?

We can’t get anywhere with these questions until we agree on the meaning of inflation. At one time the word referred to an increase in the money supply. Over time it came to mean a general increase in prices, an unfortunate turn of events not just because we lost the nice metaphor of an inflating balloon, but also because the shift in meaning tended to obscure the relationship between the two phenomena. Some free-market authors hold out for the old definition, but I suggest this is wasted effort. In my classes I use the phrases “price inflation” and “money inflation” to keep the distinction alive without getting too sidetracked by semantics.

In 1970 Milton Friedman said, “[Price] inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” This is not entirely true but understandable because he was writing at a time when the causal relationship had nearly been forgotten. We can have price inflation without money inflation when there is a supply shock. An overthrow of the Saudi government, for example, might well disrupt the flow of oil from that country. A surging oil price, because it is so important to our economy, would likely pull up the price level with it. In this situation the monetary authorities can help things by doing exactly nothing—letting higher energy prices do the work of encouraging marginal users to cut back. Supply shocks, as such one-time events are called, do not of themselves generate sustained price increases and are therefore not classified as inflation by some economists. Continue reading

Boombustology: A Review

These days commentators near and far are announcing booms and bubbles in Treasury securities, gold, China – perhaps even a bubbles. Vikram Mansharamani is in the China camp, but his arguments stand out from the others. If you can get past the title of his book – Boombustology – you will be rewarded with a thorough, well-documented, yet mercifully brief and readable exposition of a theory of booms and busts applied to past events and China’s future.

Most macroeconomists see the boom-bust cycle as an unsolved problem. Like physicists in search of a Grand Unified Theory, they long for a model that accounts for all the major aspects of the business cycle. Perhaps they are hampered by looking through the wrong end of a telescope. Mansharamani uses not just one but five “lenses” to examine the subject. In addition to micro- and macroeconomics, they include psychology, politics, and biology. He is not the first economist to invade these fields. Rather his accomplishment lies in assembling ideas from each of those areas, applying them to past boom-bust cycles, and putting his ideas on the line by issuing a brave prediction of a forthcoming Chinese economic train wreck.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory

The author’s macro lens includes Austrian business cycle theory. That theory says inflation of the money supply causes a drop in interest rates, which is misinterpreted as an increased aggregate preference for saving over consumption, leading to investments in more roundabout means of production. When it becomes clear that there has been no such preference shift, these undertakings are seen to be at least partial mistakes, requiring write-offs and retrenchment – a bust. The boom is the problem, not the bust, which is the market’s attempt to realign itself to the realities of time preference. Austrian business cycle theory has great merit but leaves some things unexplained.

Mansharamani’s micro lens includes the concept of reflexivity. Market participants don’t just observe prices but also influence them. Reflexive dynamics occasionally give rise to instabilities in which rising prices lead to increased demand.  A simpler term would be a “bandwagon effect.” I recall an office party in 1980 where one of the secretaries asked about buying gold – precisely at the peak, as it turned out. All she knew about gold was that it was way up and therefore must be going higher. I should have realized that when you see financially unsophisticated people like her climbing on a bandwagon, you can be pretty sure there’s no one left to sell to and nowhere for prices to go but down, which is where gold and silver prices went in 1980, and in a big hurry.

From psychology Dr. M. borrows ideas and data about cognitive biases. For example, subjects asked to guess some bland statistic, like the number of African countries that belong to the UN, are influenced by the spin of a wheel of fortune: When the wheel lands on a high number, they guess higher. He translates this and a dozen other cognitive biases into irrational market behavior that can foster booms and busts.

He introduces his biology lens with an analogy to the spread of an infectious disease. When the prevalence of a disease reaches a high level, the infection rate necessarily slows and the disease begins to wane, just like the 1980 gold market.  But it is devilishly difficult to “inoculate” oneself against infectious ideas. Individual investors who can do so have a decent chance to beat the market averages over time, I believe. (Those who would pursue these ideas in greater depth would do well to find James Dines’s quirky and expensive but worthwhile book, Mass Psychology.) Continue reading

Inside Insider Trading

Insider trading is something we hear a lot about these days. To most people, the practice smells of foul play, and federal law restricts it. But the inside story of insider trading is something very different, as we shall see. The alleged ill effects on shareholders in particular and on the economy in general are mostly illusory, and in fact insider trading produces benefits that are little understood.

If I may first indulge in a little personal history: I was once a corporate insider. Two friends and I started an engineering services firm in 1982, and we set it up as a corporation. The paperwork required to register the corporation was minimal, but the law allowed us to offer shares only to specially qualified individuals, in addition to ourselves and our employees. Actually this rule wasn’t binding on us. We didn’t want to be answerable to strangers so the only “outsiders” we sold to were a couple of relatives, whom we later bought out.

Most Silicon Valley firms like ours aim to “go public” at some point—that is, sell shares to the general public to raise additional capital and reward early investors. We had no such ambition. We did not want to jump through all the hoops required in an initial public offering, nor did we want the continuing hassle of running a public corporation. (Since that time hassles have been multiplied by Sarbanes-Oxley.) However, we might have benefited from something short of a full public offering, where we would have offered shares to a wider but still limited set of shareholders.

Yet SEC rules allow only a very restricted offering or a full public offering, and nothing in between.

What if we had gone public? The law would have restricted our ability to trade our own shares for reasons roughly as follows: Insider trading would violate our fiduciary responsibility to our shareholders. As managers of a public corporation we would have placed ourselves under a board of directors answerable to shareholders. Our job would be to watch out for shareholder interests, not subordinate them to our own private gain.

There is some truth in these arguments. Shareholders can never be totally sure that management is looking out for their interests. Corporate regulations and employment contracts can do a lot to minimize these “agency problems,” as they are called, but perfection is not possible. Purchasers of shares should be aware of the risks they take and act accordingly. But none of this justifies insider-trading restrictions. Continue reading

The Long and Short of Short Selling

Short selling is a little-understood, much-maligned tactic by which traders can profit from their belief that a company’s stock is overvalued.

Following the financial problems of the last two years, short selling has come under fire, with new or revived regulations proposed to curb the practice. It is unpatriotic, destructive, and destabilizing, say the critics. Such complaints are nothing new. President Hoover blamed short sellers for the continuing market declines of 1931 and 1932, threatening regulation or even outright prohibition. “Individuals who use the facilities of the [stock] Exchange for such purposes are not contributing to the recovery of the United States,” he grumbled.

Defenders say short sellers add liquidity to markets. When short sellers are present, buyers encounter a more liquid market because they face a larger pool of sellers than they would otherwise. More sellers—more liquidity—means more predictable prices and smoother price changes. Shorts can put a damper on runaway enthusiasm, and when they are right, they can hasten the demise of failed businesses.

The mechanics of short selling are simple. You borrow stock and sell it, hoping its market price will decline so you can repay your loan with stock that you buy cheaply. In the meantime, you are said to be “short” that stock, the opposite of the situation of someone who owns the shares and is “long.” For widely traded stocks, brokers can easily find shares to borrow, either from their own inventory or from customers who have agreed to make their shares available. For thinly traded stocks it may be difficult or impossible to find shares to borrow. The short seller must pay the lender the amount of any dividends that the stock pays while he is short. And most brokers require cash on deposit to cover the obligation to buy the stock later on. Continue reading

RIP James Buchanan

Nobel laureate and classical liberal economist James Buchanan has died at the grand old age of 93. I have been slowly working my way through his book The Calculus of Consent for a while now, and his other works are on my “to do” list once I graduate in June. He was one of the co-founders of public choice theory, a rather common sense approach to economics that has long been derided by authoritarians on the Left.

EconLib has a succinct biography of him here.

This short piece by Buchanan in the Independent Review has influenced my own way of approaching writing and arguing.

I’ll post more thoughts from around the web as they appear throughout the day.

Liberty has lost a true champion today.

Government’s War on Sharing

There is a fuzzy border between trading and sharing. Suppose Adam gathers apples and Eve gathers oranges. The each want some of the other, so they can either trade some of the fruits, or they can share them. The result is the same: they each eat some of both.

Sharing implies that one gives the other some of the goods, and the other gives some to you, but reciprocal sharing is about the same as trading, perhaps though with a psychological difference.

Now comes the income tax to turn the beautiful act of sharing into a taxable commercial transaction. To the government, barter is just as much income as selling for cash. If you trade an apple for an orange, it has the same economic effect as selling the apple for cash, and then using the cash to buy the orange from your trading partner. The person trading his apple is subject to the same tax as the one selling for cash.  Continue reading