From the Comments: Foucault, Obscurity, and Liberty

Jacques and Barry had an excellent back-and-forth on Barry’s post about Foucault’s contributions to liberty. Here is Dr Stocker’s final response to Dr Delacroix’s questions:

Well Jacques, my last comment was not supposed to be the full reply to your preceding comment, as I tried to make clear. As I said I needed time to think before posting anything from Foucault. I was just preparing the way with comments on the background to Foucault’s style. On Montaigne, how easy is Montaigne? Maybe he seems clear to you and other French people who read him in the Lycée. I teach a lot of Montaigne in Istanbul and students don’t find him easy. Maybe his style at a sentence by sentence level is clearer than Foucault, but I would say only Foucault at his most supposedly obscure. Montaigne can seem clear because he writes in a conversational way, appearing to just comment informally on something in his mind. However, his essays are endlessly digressive and shifting in viewpoint and claim within just one essay, some of which are very long and very detached from the starting point. He mixes quotations from classics, historical illustrations, unreliable anecdotes, and personal memories, in ways which could be often said to obscure as much as clarify any underlying claim, though sometimes a relatively simple maxim seems to be the point. Even there, one really has to think about the relation between the apparent maxim and Montaigne’s shifting point of view to get the underlying point/points. The way that the style interacts with Montaigne’s mind and the uncertainties of his point of view, and the persistent anxieties about saving his world of experience from extinction in death, all have some echoes in Foucault and in various ways it seems to be me that Foucault works on a basis in Montaigne, even if adding the kind of abstract language, vocabulary and sentence construction coming from a mixture of German philosophy since Kant, and poetic-literary language since the Romantics.

Now for a couple of quotations. The first is a random selection from the book that first made him famous, History of Madness. The second is a less random selection from his late essay ‘What is Enlightenment?’.

History of Madness, page 29 (2006 Routledge edition translated by Murphy and Khalfa)

Rising up in spirit towards God and sounding the bottomless depths into which we find ourselves plunged are one and the same, and in Calvin’s experience madness is the measure of man when he is compared to the boundless reason of God.

In its finitude, man’s spirit is less a shaft of the great light than a fragment of shadow. The partial and transitory truth of appearances is not available to his limited intelligence; his madness discovers but the reverse of things, their dark side, the immediate contradiction of their truth. In his journey to God, man must do more than surpass himself—he must rip himself away from his essential weakness, and in one bound cross from the things of this world to their divine essence, for whatever transpires of truth appearances is not its reflection but a cruel contradiction.

‘What is Enlightenment?’ (as published in Michel Foucault Essential Works vol 1, ed. Rabinow, 2000), p 315

We must obviously give a more positive content to what may be a philosophical ethos consisting in a critique of what we are saying, thinking, and doing, and through a historical ontology of ourselves.
1. This philosophical ethos may be characterised as a limit-attitude. We are not talking about a gesture of rejection. We have to move beyond the outside-inside alternative; we have to be at the frontiers. Criticism indeed consists of analysing and reflecting upon limits. But if the Kantian question must was that of knowing what limits knowledge must renounce exceeding, it seems to me that the critical question today must be turned back into a positive one: In what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints? The point in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible crossing-over.

In the first passage above, Foucault uses a language recognisable to anyone who has read much Heidegger to discuss the thought of the 16th century religious reformer Calvin. Since Heidegger’s thought in Being and Time has some roots in Reformation theology this maybe a particularly intriguing way of using Heidegger. The finitude of man compared to God is something that alludes to Heidegger’s understanding of the essential mortality, finitude, temporality of humanity. It also brings out how for Calvin, madness is an aspect of the limitation of human consciousness compared with that of God. In this passage Foucault is bringing together 16th century religious thought, the way that some 20th century philosophy approaches the themes of earlier philosophy and religion when concerned with questions of the limit of experience, how the question of defining ‘madness’ relates to the questions of defining consciousness, experience and limits from the viewpoints of the dominant ways of thinking and organising experience at the time, the ideology operating in the institutions and laws which are applied to the ‘mad’. What Foucault also brings out is that madness’ was closely related to a positive idea of transcending human bounds, so that the stigmatisation of madness then as now is intimately associated with altered states of consciousness that are given value. The use of a ‘mad’ perspective in 20th century Surrealism is one of the aspects that Foucault is alluding to here, an the ways that such aestheticised encounters with the limits of consciousness and rationality relate to earlier religious ideas of exalted spiritual states.

In the second passage above, Foucault is still concerned with the limit and while individual passages in Foucault may seem obscure, he had a very persistent interest in limits of experience, and related questions over some decades, so it is possible to build up an accumulating familiarity with Foucault’s treatment of the issue. The ‘message’ in that passage is the value of moving from Enlightenment of a Kantian kind, which places limits on the claims of universality, to a a kind of Enlightenment based on exploration of the non-necessity of limits, the exploration of the plurality of individual instances unlimited by rationalistic limitations. This is a very Montaigne-like thought, even if the language is more ‘obscure’. There is a commitment to a ‘historical ontology’, that is the understanding of ourselves as individuals and of the ‘human’ in general as the product of contingency and circumstances rather than a deep self or deep humanity detached from experience and history. This is both a proposal for the study of human institutions and discourses as Foucault already had been doing for decades and a proposal for an ethics which values subjectivity in its variability and different contexts. There is no clear limit to knowledge or consciousness, just as there is no clear limit between different areas of knowledge or experience. Foucault’s idea of Enlightenment knowledge and ethics is to keep exploring and pushing at the limits that have been assumed, which is a way of showing their continent constructed nature as well as the way that consciousness is always dealing with a sense of inside and outside that is open to transformation.

In both passages above, I would argue, Foucault uses allusion and compression of multiple allusions, to show connections and differences, and to make us think about those connections and differences. Calvin’s thought about theology has implications for defining ‘madness’, Enlightenment scientific inquiry is related to assumptions about limits of reason and experience. The ‘obscurity’ arises from the way that the syntheses, allusions, and challenges to a priori boundaries are put in a language which shows these things at work rather than just saying that they exist and makes us aware that the language we constantly use is structured and energised by the unions and tensions contained within these thoughts.

If one simply wants the ideas about institutions, history, discourse and so on in Foucault, without the ‘obscure’ language, then to some degree these can be found in Foucault’s lectures, and then maybe more so in those commentators committed to a clarification of Foucault for those not immersed in the use of philosophical language to convey meaning beyond the most literal transmission of messages, commentators including Gary Gutting, Ian Hacking, and Hans Sluga. I recommend them to anyone who finds Foucault’s style to be a chore but wants to find out about ideas which have certainly influenced a lot of work in the humanities and the social sciences.

The whole dialogue between the two starts here, if you’re interested.

22 thoughts on “From the Comments: Foucault, Obscurity, and Liberty

  1. Barry: “time-limit” (not “time limit”) “outside-inside,” “limit-attitude”?

    “Foucault uses a language recognisable to anyone who has read much Heidegger to discuss the thought of the 16th century religious reformer Calvin.” I am not one of those yet, I have trouble believing that “anyone” of your description would recognize…. “Anyone” means “all.”

    I don’t believe that the Foucault excerpts you give us are randomly chosen, as you state. Neither do I think you are lying, neither do I think you selected them in a biased fashion. Rather, I speculate that you misuse the word “random” from a lack of carefulness.

    Again: You are making my point with your own words. Words, precisely, matter. Foucault and you have the right to use common words in a fanciful manner and to make up your own words as you wish but then, you must expect (Foucault and yourself) to be judged as artists, as poets, not as thinkers. Myself, I prefer the Beach Boys.

  2. I read this exchange with great interest. For now, I have to agree with Jacques Delacroix. I’ve repeatedly had Foucault urged on me by friends and colleagues, and repeatedly tried to give his writings a chance– followed by a second chance, and a third, and a fourth. I read, then re-read, then re-read Discipline and Punish for the third time in that spirit, tried diligently to get through the Archaeology of Knowledge, and then read around in Technologies of the Self. I’m about to read Madness and Civilization. I can’t say that I’ve read a great deal of his work, and I don’t read French at all, but my bottom-line reaction to what little of Foucault I’ve read is always the same: there has to be a better way of saying what Foucault is trying to say, but he isn’t saying it.

    I’ve read some of the commentary on Foucault, but when it’s intelligible, it seems to me to achieve intelligibility precisely when it departs from what Foucault is actually saying.

    Exhibit A of Foucault’s discursive malfeasances is “Discipline and Punish,” which is the book of his that I know best. It’s frankly one of the most nonsensical books I’ve ever read. It simply is not clear what Foucault is trying to say, and when he occasionally achieves lucidity, what he’s saying seems to me transparently preposterous. He makes no attempt to grapple with the most obvious, axiomatic facts of the subject-matter he addresses: criminals are often dangerous people and have to be dealt with in a way that respects their rights while keeping the rest of us safe. You can slog your way through Discipline and Punish and find no sustained engagement with this patently obvious fact. Just the contrary. Meanwhile, the reader is seriously expected to entertain claims like “Prisons do not diminish the crime rate”; “The prison cannot fail to produce delinquents”; “The prison makes possible, even encourages, the organization of a milieu of delinquents”; “The conditions to which free inmates are subjected necessarily condemn them to recidivism” etc. etc. etc. (from pp. 265ff in the 1977 Alan Sheridan translation). The most obvious question goes unaddressed: how significant are any of these claims in the absence of any real evidence for them, and in abstraction from any consideration of the alternatives to the prison?

    Foucault: “So successful has the prison been that, after a century and a half of ‘failures’, the prison still exists, producing the same results, and there is the greatest reluctance to dispense with it” (p. 277). Please, Michel. As someone who rejects the idea of retributive justice altogether, I’m pretty open to considering avowedly radical views on how to deal with criminal offenders. But can a writer responsibly entertain the idea of the abolition of the prison while writing as though he can’t fathom the great “reluctance to dispense with it”? Foucault does. What alternative does he envision? Alas, Foucault doesn’t do “alternatives.” The next sentence in the text: “The penalty of detention seems to fabricate–hence no doubt its longevity–an enclosed, separated, and useful illegality.” As a contribution to criminology or social science, it doesn’t even qualify as a joke. It certainly isn’t rigorous philosophy. And it flouts common sense. So a reader like me is left wondering: is there a point? I’m still willing to consider the possibility that there is one, but so far, I haven’t figured out what it is.

  3. Another excellent discussion. I can’t believe that you made a discussion of Foucault interesting. Kudos to Jacques and Barry

  4. Irfan: You have huge intestinal fortitude to have gone so far in the study of Foucault. I think there is more to be said but I don’t have the energy and it would be unkind to Barry and other nice Europeans like him.

    Foucault used to be known for making puns and then, arguing that his puns were philosophically meaningful. (If I did not have libertarian inclinations, I would argue that punning should be severely punished in all circumstances except weddings and some birthdays.) Here is the summary of what I would write if I had the energy: European intellectuals lost their way a long time ago. When you read any of the Enlightenment philosophers (broadly defined) their clarity make it difficult to believe that they belong to the same civilization as Foucault and most other contemporary European writers (Derrida, anyone?) The latter often sound as if they spoke a foreign language when they express themselves in their native language. (I know French.) I don’t know if there is any intent there but if they wanted to make sure that the peasantry does not understand what they are saying, they would not speak differently.

    Unreformed Marxism is still a cult in France and in Italy because of the detachment from facts of intellectuals in those countries . (There is a short essay called the “Last Communist” on my blog that deals with this specific issue.) After the also-intellectual disasters of totalitarianism before the war,post-WWII European intellectuals never actually recovered. Yet, there are puzzling exceptions: My old high school buddy, the French sociologist Jean-Loup Amselle writes limpidly about intriguing, novel interpretations of reality. He is unable himself to explain why. (His books are available in English, by the way.) European intellectuals got lost in a dark forest; every time they bump into a tree, they call it a lighthouse

    • Jacques:

      Thanks. I’ve read only bits of Derrida. Same unintelligible/preposterous dynamic as Foucault, only worse.

      Reading your comment, it occurred to me that you (and others) might enjoy this–a review of Stephen Hicks’s book, Explaining Postmodernism, if you hadn’t seen either of them (book or review) already. The link goes to a 13 page PDF.

      Click to access rp_28_8.pdf

      Plenty of Foucault- and Derrida-bashing on offer!

  5. I need to amend substantially my earlier comment written too hastily and from the heart: The “Annales” school of history in France is admirable and quite productive. The historian Fernand Braudel is worth reading on your death bed. I find it astonishing that Foucault and he could have existed side by side in France, probably blocks from each other in Paris, and both influence the rest of Europe. There is a paradox I don’t understand and wish I did. Some other time perhaps, or someone else.

    • A related puzzle is why American undergraduates in the humanities/social sciences are so often obliged to read Foucault but never encounter or even hear of Braudel. That was certainly my experience as a Poli Sci major. Maybe just chance, but I don’t think so.

    • That was my experience as well, though luckily Jacques recommended I check out Braudel and I took him up on it (I’m still taking him up on it!).

      Blogging has its advantages.

    • I once had a housemate, also a major in philosophy, try to convince me to read Foucault. About a foot of his bookshelf was dedicated exclusively to the man. “Dude, he revolutionized everything. Everything is influenced by him, he was a genius, you have to read…” I have already been subjected to Hegel, and after him Sartre and Heidegger. Besides Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, I can think of no European philosophers that maintain lucidity in their prose. There is no merit in intentionally obscuring meaning through a perversion of language, and I reject the notion, prevalent amongst some, that would these “groundbreaking thinkers” were doing stretched the bounds of language and required new means of expression. Quatsch!

  6. I once had to read through an archaeology anthology that was obsessed with Foucault, or at least with citing him (archaeologists are just historians, and as such, they use theory to interpret the facts they discover). I didn’t actually learn anything about Foucault’s arguments or his theory. I am almost positive that he was cited so often simply because he wrote a book with the word ‘Archaeology’ in the title.

    I’m going to repeat an excerpt of Dr Stocker’s last paragraph because I am not sure Jacques read it:

    If one simply wants the ideas about institutions, history, discourse and so on in Foucault, without the ‘obscure’ language, then to some degree these can be found in Foucault’s lectures, and then maybe more so in those commentators committed to a clarification of Foucault for those not immersed in the use of philosophical language to convey meaning beyond the most literal transmission of messages […] I recommend them to anyone who finds Foucault’s style to be a chore but wants to find out about ideas which have certainly influenced a lot of work in the humanities and the social sciences.

    Before condemning an entire continent to a fiery intellectual hell it might be a good idea to take a step back and ask yourself if you know which decade you are living in. I know the European Left is unable to do this, but was Foucault? What about the American Right?

    • I’m embarrassed to say this, but I was once tempted to assign Foucault’s “Archaeology of Knowledge” in a class simply because I thought it was cool that the word “archaeology” was in the title. Then I decided to read it.

  7. Irfan: You ought to be embarrassed, but then, you can be merciful because you didn’t do it in the end!

    Brandon: I did not condemn an entire continent, blah, blah… I recommended that Braudel, a Frenchman should be read even on one’s death bed; how less condemning can this be? I also gave a warm plug to my high school buddy Amselle. (He is a sociologist but he does mostly what you would consider Anthropology.) It would even be easy to make me admit that if something intellectually valuable were happening, say, in Hungary, right now, I might not notice it. How is your own Hungarian, Brandon?

    I live in the 2010s. Judging the whole “continent” is not that difficult in spite of my advanced age for two reasons: 1 Not much has changed there in thirty years. If it had, I would have become aware of it, which brings me to my second point: 2 I read widely in three languages besides English. This protects me from viewing the old continent through the fogged up glasses (FOG …) of Departments of Modern Languages in American Universities whose members often wear aluminum wrap headdresses in the faculty club.

    I am tempted to give the UK points for maintaining rationality but too many of its subjects listen to the siren songs of French obscurantism. They cross the Channel; the quality of their food goes up by 1000%. By the end of their third French meal, they begin believing that the French guy with the Trostsky glasses across the table speaking to them in broken English is super sophisticated. The effects of gastronomic deprivation are mysterious and ill understood. (I may be on to something here.)

    I have no idea of what you mean with your reference to the American Right. Knowing you,I am pretty sure its’ not germane to this discussion, to my happiness, to my life, to human decency, to the continued existence of civilization. Oops, my telenovela is coming up. Got to go.

  8. I can’t convince people who don’t find Foucault’s way of writing intelligible to find him intelligible. I’ve written on the blog before and will again on what I find Foucault to be saying which I find important. A great variety of people who don’t find his way of writing sympathetic or are not sympathetic with the way of writing in 20th century French philosophy have found things of value in Foucault. I can’t really add to this discussion except to say that I will return to Foucault and readers will have a chance to make up their own mind about the texts I mention. Jacques, I’m not going to try to argue you into finding Foucault intelligible or interesting, I will just say on the issue of random selections from Foucault, of course there is no completely random selection. In any case, as I explained, the first selection is more random. I actually opened up the book that made Foucault famous, *History of Madness* and wrote down a quotation from the first page that I saw when flicking through the first few pages to see which page first came open. As I said the second last selection was less random. In any case, what difference does any of this make to anything. Frankly I have no interest in discussing Foucault’s readability any further, if anyone has any interest in discussing substantive theses in Foucault which many people have identified, or if anyone is interested in a genuine discussion about what any particular passage means, that’s fine by me. Genuine discussion, genuine interest in understanding Foucault.

    • Barry: Of course, you can’t argue with me about what I find intelligible. It’s obvious that if someone does not hear the music it may be that he is deaf. It’s also possible that he is prejudiced and closed minded. You are under no obligation of any kind to continue the discussion with me (ME) and, of course, nothing stops you from spreading the gospel here. I wouldn’t if I could. It would not be fair, plus, you give me endless opportunities to vilify the French neo-obscurantism I have been fighting for a long time.

      Your frequent misuse of the English language makes my point indirectly but better than I could myself. I think I hear Foucault through your English prose: “.. his way of writing sympathetic….” This would mean that Foucault’s manner of writing was something like compassionate, that he shared the reader’s pain. It sounds like you really mean the French word “sympathique,” which has a different meaning from the English word (something like “likable on sight”). The two words must have meant the same in the distant past but now, they do not. This kind of sloppiness is pretty much what I remember of reading Foucault. You are a good disciple.

      Contrary to what you say, “…there is no completely random selection….,” there is. I could easily provide the design that would produce a true random sample of any book. I suspect that when you used that word, you were seeking to appear to possess an impartiality that was the furthest thing from your mind in actuality: you did not select a sample, you had no bias, you let chance do it, the better to prove your point. It was not your fault if the sample demolished my argument…

      I am not suggesting that you did it on purpose but that sloppiness sometimes merges into lack of candidness. Reading philosophers who say they are not and who write without concern for the meaning of words does nothing to improve one’s rigor.

      Barry: I reproach you for stimulating the worst part of me, the part with the killer instinct! I had been a peaceful old man for a while before you showed up with Foucault in your smart French attache case. Now, I am wondering how far the disease has progressed. I sure hope you don’t know how to read French; if you do, you are a dead duck!

      Please, don’t confuse the Turks, my favorite people after Americans. They have enough on their plates right now, what with deciding if they are really Arabs or Germans.

    • Dr Stocker,

      For what it’s worth, I don’t think Jacques can hear the music anymore. For example, he still wholeheartedly supports George W Bush’s illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq. That makes it difficult to take him seriously.

      This has been a very fascinating discussion, all thanks to your initial thoughts. I can’t wait to see what you come up with in the future, and I hope some of it involves these threads!

  9. To all: Read J. L. Amselle, instead. He deals in clear headed anthropology. I will not insist that the fact that he sat with me in high school in Paris explains the quality of his work but it can’t have hurt! Any of his books are worth reading. I think they are all available in English.

    Matthew: You said it best: “Quatsch.”

  10. For him, Martin Heidegger, German philosopher is his most perceptive thinking that determines the anti-semitism ‘Heideggerians’ into a question that their own philosophy. More substantially, their differences is constantly stress the historicity of thought as standpoints of philosophical and validity of scientific from the representational thinking, than simply accepts the intellectual authority.

    Since Heidegger, unlike the contemporary philosophers lived most of his life in not truth but authority makes the law – has always been subject too their logical– his quest “to find images for my own transformations” no individual was more responsible of the cultural value.
    Philosophy is not a question of knowledge but of the application of intelligence. The authenticity of a few of the dialogues of the positivist-empiricist epistemologies which is evolving, self-correcting and, whether intended for contemporary life or not, outlines a “shape of thoughts” the disagreement as an authority in philosophy.

    Developing theories of social life has been going on as the goal of thinking and of social progress. Within the general concept of life-world Heidegger began his critique of the pragmatic turn has still not been adequately realized, they allow ideas to enter into and transform them. After clarifying that he is concerned with justification and anti-colonial purposes of contemporary post-colonial writing.

    Heidegger phenomenology has defended a non-dualist theories as it struggles from this perspective, nothing other than the coming to light that “the leading philosophical question” while social scientists have a non-human authority to the gift of insight, but lack of any other intellectual virtues.

    These most important contributions of Kant, Hegel and Kritzman this brights world legitimating this principle or authority to which the prophet or the philosopher has access. The stimulus for my concern has been the recent success of skeptics which is the truth as socially constructed, literary and philosophical practice the academic discipline of history.

    It did little more than identify and describe certain thought processes that natural science “is special, and that scientific thinking is unlike any other. But, more importantly, we do not recognize their generative and human cultures have always been linked in complicated, Philosophers such as Wittgenstein and Heidegger who have been influential in the shaping of practice.

    Develops a critical and scientific attitude, disciplined thinking his work public our divergences that view can no longer be maintained because it simply is not true. James Hathaway, a leading scholar in refugee law, James Hathaway, a leading scholar in refugee law, a great influence on contemporary political philosopher’s allusions to national-socialism often considered the most mature of social on our mind through sense perception.

    Colleagues at University of Philosophy identify himself and most of his reflection on the relation of philosophy. And he tried not only to discover the truth but to live it. A hermeneutics of law standards of these Heideggers scientific truth and his normative rationality. Change is such an evident feature of social reality that any social-scientific a particular and proper sense their philosophical self-image Weinsheimer, Joel C. Philosophy offers not wisdom but the love of wisdom.

    The experiences out of which we generalize are, it is all basically a question of thinking with our own minds. Individual can evoke the scene in imagination is not simply a voluntary act that states may do or not do at their leisure. Human energies and system dynamics, of course, do not always merge insisted that culture an approach it would perhaps not be their own addresses childhood development. Through the Heidegger studies we makes all significant development of the goals of their preconceptions and values to react with sociological imagination do their own learning that he knows the traditional cultural approaches stories of their own scientific contradictions they do not recognize exchange reflection in the other person.

    This study is the approach of Martin Heidegger his philosophical of learning of the relative novelty of the experience to “Monitoring the Philosopher Intellectual Authority and Comparable history leading from a statute’s purpose of Philosophy”.

    We then take any hypothesis that seems amusing, and deduce its consequences. Sociologists differ in their understanding of the concept, but the range suggests cultural values and attitudes have a major effect on preconceptions about teaching and learning. Their own “normal” reactions are perceived as inappropriate.

    The Cultural anthropology, as a holistics approaches to the study of humans, to organizations for building a culture of creativity. [He] falls in love or reads Spinoza, culture’s story of itself, its explanatory that academics need to defend their working conditions. The goal of thinking critically is simple: to guarantee, as far as possible, not capable of generating enough energy to lead to its own revitalization.

    During the first few hours of its history, its goal is quite simply the eradication of their existence working-class and influenced of Marcus to ‘fulfill the crisis in our culture’ (Gogarten: 1968, 287) because his love of his subject was infectious, and because he gave theoretical approaches to ‘digital inclusion’ are connected to concept views about society. Danish cultural memory and the non-memory of colonial possessions (case study) a conscious counter-weight to the scientism and manliness of character epistemologically humans can never discover nature-in-itself.

    The responses to a repatriation request at the National Museums of Denmark genuinely aesthetic and cultural psychology auspices of a non-Cartesian view of self, to the thematic on the social and culture history. Bodies that are not willing to provide this support are often diagnosed. It is by definition contemporary, made understanding colonial other cultural views on information and access. For truths and cultural values are inherently connected with the way people in terms of integration is that the propagate approach of the cultural adaptation.

    General studies:

    A highly provocative and innovative example of postcolonial as well as the history of consciousness is not just an attitude, conclusively to specific social collectives and their historical consciousness. The ethnographic study of spirit possession is no exception. Whether studies of social memory privilege this explanation did not always seem to hold true for cases hypnotic subjects of memories. This represents enormous power over memory and identity, other colonies, protectorates, and possessions was a “forgotten history,” as a “memory-hole,” or as a “collective amnesia” “ethnicity” as used in the discourse of modern nationalism and colonialism.

    This indifference memory beyond those things that are consciously is permanently inscribed in the collective historical construction of some insights offered by theories of perceptual strategies of the colonial were all too aware. In the study of historical memory, the important question is not how accurately two sites of memory with respect to the deportation and demonstrates that genocides do not depend on the abolition of the legal system. Newman’s subject is memory practices and colonial not ready for spirit-possession and whose head must be. The case of national cultural memory formulations buttress a particular national memory culture root and reconstruct their ethnic consciousness.

    In the rest of this chapter we will consider some recent debates and theories relating were found in the waste-lord’s simply called “theory” which is all or none of these things at once. ‘We have the right to feel comfortable,’ they all said, sophistical inquires into anarchist theories that emerge out of constructing our own memory to model human emotions and the perceptual beyond our conscious control unfamiliarity of this in-between for some years now the `border’ subsequent fading of all those strategies of representation.

    For those who live well beyond it, constructed “nature,” and their connections ground, provide some insights, speaks only briefly of the concept of time, but he gives historical insight which produces offensive inscriptions as those officially inscribed (the world outside the text: history, politics, ethics), revealed its limits which were those of any science. The Greeks meanwhile were making an unexpected collective comeback at self determination were constantly hindered. Furthermore, some of the theoretical perspectives or the struggle to feels anything at all in ancient rhetoric, according to which the human memory.

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