- Toward an a priori theory of international relations (pdf) Mark Cravelli, JLS
- A fourth way out of the dilemma facing libertarianism (pdf) Laurent Dobuzinskis, C+T
- Taobao, federalism, and the emergence of law, Chinese-style (pdf) Liu & Weingast, MLR
- A road not taken: the foreign policy vision of Robert A. Taft (pdf) Michael Hayes, TIR
As an economist who has been drawn into teaching several International Relations courses I’m bit of an interloper in debates on the methodology/philosophy of science underlying IR. That said, I’m struck, but not surprisingly so, by the way Mark Cravelli’s arguments mirror similar debates in economics as I have noted through both my teaching and research. It’s no coincidence that he cites an economist, Richard Hoppe to help define his a prioristic methodology. I can think of a few other economists who have similarly defined the philosophy of economics, albeit from differing ideological pespectives (E.K. Hunt-Marxism; Paul Davidson Post Keynesian Fundamentalism and Nell and Hollis Post Keynesian/Neo Ricardian). If our behavioral axioms are truly known “a priori” and by introspection and are self evident, one must wonder why the axiomatic foundations of theories vary so dramatically? I would argue-and might do so more rigorously on some occasion-that what is being described are not really “axioms” so much as very general kinds of statements about the nature of reality of a sort we are not actually born with, but which we take as given. I can take them as given with varying degrees of confidence. But the problem remains-how can we know these are in fact the most essential aspects of human experience? It’s one thing to say that I have to have a starting point for theorizing as we obviously do. But when we examine these, they are actually inductive generalizations. I’m also bothered by the way in which a priorists (of any stripe) take the cheap shots of pointing out that many general statements at some point might incur paradoxes of the sort “this sentence is a lie”. For example, the sentence, metaphysics is meaningless is only a paradox if by “metaphysics” one means any general statement about properties of the world. If I say that metaphysical statements are meaningless if when translated into practical implications they are non sensical, there is no paradox (which is what I think most people mean when they criticize metaphysics). I don’t think anyone has ever said there’s no such thing as ontology. To say that would be a paradoxical statement. So, before I start repeating myself I’ll just some with my main point: what Mark Cravelli claims as given by introspection is not known by introspection but rather hypothesized on the basis of reflection about our general experience. I will add that a further flaw of this article is its cheap shot at induction which has been addressed by multiple figures.
Is the email you use on here a good one to reach you at?
I have a question for you…
I think so. I assume it’s the yahoo account. Anyway, it’s no great secret. Either cspoirot@yahoo.com or cpoirot@shawnee.edu
Cool. Just shot you an email at your yahoo account.
“A Road Not Taken: The foreign policy vision of Robert A. Taft”: Taft was right; so was Jesus Christ. Both are gone. Has humanity changed behavior in either’s direction?
Taft and Jesus? I dunno Jack, you’re going to have to explain yourself on this one!