However, theorizing about law enforcement takes on vital importance when it comes to considering whether a low level of law enforcement denatures the Rule of Law in such a way that it implies, de facto, a change of regime. That is, when it happens that, under the shell of a constitutional system, an increasingly authoritarian system begins to develop, which successively curtails freedoms and deteriorates the viability of individual life plans, denigrating the dignity of people, through the file to weaken the application of the legal norms destined to protect said rights, guarantees, and freedoms.
For this reason, a liberal political regime requires a substantive content that involves the express recognition of individual freedoms and rights, but also requires in a vital way the respect and enforcement of those procedures that make their effective exercise possible. This is, through a high degree of law enforcement, previously inspired by those political principles typical of liberal democracies.
When we are in the presence of a constitutional system that is designed to guarantee the existence of a government limited by the law itself and to protect the freedoms and rights of individuals, a low level of application of legal norms implies a true denaturalization of such a regime. political and a de facto transition to an authoritarian system of government. As has been pointed out, given that the low law enforcement imposes high opportunity costs on those who spontaneously choose to comply with the law and places them at a severe disadvantage compared to their competitors, the reduced law enforcement works as an incentive to generate low regulatory compliance by the population. In turn, assigning such low regulatory compliance by citizens to cultural or ethnic characteristics works as a pseudo-sociological foundation to increase punishments and continue the aforementioned de facto transition towards an authoritarian or totalitarian system.
A similar mechanism had been noted at the time by Friedrich Hayek in his well-known book The Road to Serfdom, although he did not focus so much on the low law enforcement as on the pretexts and excuses used to justify such a transition towards an authoritarian system. Generally, in a mistaken way, the “road to serfdom” is characterized as a process of increasing state interventions, but such assertion does not constitute the core of either the aforementioned book or about what should be understood by a road of servitude. As Hayek stated on that occasion, we are not faced with a political process of this type when governments intend to carry out a plan of social and economic transformation in accordance with a model of society whose characteristics are rarely stated expressly and which is placed above the procedures and constitutional safeguards designed to legally limit the power of governments and defend the rights and guarantees of individuals. Thus, the system of constitutional safeguards is seen as too onerous an obstacle for the transformation process set in motion and, consequently, it begins to be de facto repealed through a low level of regulatory application and the gradual replacement of a political decision-making system. based on rules by another of decisions taken based on the opportunity, merit and convenience related to the aforementioned model of society to which it is aspired to achieve.
Both in the case of the path of servitude, as of a smooth and flat deterioration of the levels of law enforcement, we find ourselves in the presence of a transition of political regime: from the Rule of Law towards an increasingly authoritarian system: the government of the pure will of men, free from legal and constitutional ties. In both cases, the validity of the notion of individual freedom as the absence of arbitrary coercion is under serious threat.
As it will have to be repeated every time it is necessary to do so, it does not depend on cultural, historical or ethnic traits. Such processes of political regime change respond to an incentive system that perverts the functional dynamics of the Rule of Law. In the case under study here, the low application of legal norms.
But to describe with a greater degree of precision what the aforementioned process of de facto change of the political regime, from liberal democracy and the Rule of Law to authoritarian or totalitarian systems consists of, it is necessary to delve into the distinction between decisions based on rules and those that are They are motivated by reasons of opportunity, merit or convenience, that is, in the exercise of discretionary power.
As previously admitted in this writing, every government official, whether he belongs to the administration or is a judicial magistrate, enjoys a certain margin of discretion in the exercise of his functions and within the framework of competences that the Constitution and the laws give him. grant. Thus, a judge can say the right for a specific case that is subject to his jurisdiction within a range of alternative solutions that the law and judicial precedents impose on him. Thus, we are not faced with a mechanical law enforcement -which is reminiscent of the modern aspiration of “mechanization of thought” – but rather in a judgment of the adequacy of the rules to the specific case that the courts carry out taking into account the special circumstances of people, time, and place that the law, being expressed in abstract and general terms, cannot foresee. However, such adaptation of the law to the specific case should not in any way distort the meaning, scope and purpose of the law. Something similar occurs with administration officials, who enjoy certain powers granted by law and who have a margin of discretion to operate within it, which is subject to control by other hierarchical state bodies, superior or judicial.
Likewise, there are situations in which both judges and public officials deviate exceptionally from the abstract and general guidelines of the laws without them configuring any illicit, that is, exceptions that are within the legal system itself. Thus, we find ourselves in the judicial sphere with judgments that are based on notions of justice and equity and in the administration sphere with discretionary powers expressly granted to officials by law.