government regulation

Cognitive Blocks and Libertarianism

Brandon Christensen Economics , , , , , , , , , ,

Last year Brian Gothberg, who was lecturing at a summer seminar I attended in 2009, left the following comment in response to a post about media coverage and Austrian economics:

I think there’s a perceptual or cognitive block, that simply makes it hard for many people to see government activity in the foreground of the story, as an actor which actively and (often) arbitrarily changes outcomes. It reminds of the recent Brian Greene programs on cosmology on PBS. In one, he compares the treatment of space, through most of scientific history, as simply being the unadorned theater stage, upon which the truly interesting things actually happen. It’s only later that Einstein (using Riemann’s math) described space as having positive, unambiguous characteristics. After Einstein brought space itself into the foreground, you could make statements about particular things that space did do, and other particular things that space did not do.

Another example: at a gathering of friends with children, my wife and I were observing a small boy (3-ish) who kept biting the other children. When it came to tears, parents would come in and intervene, and scold him. Later, we watched the same parents — who were baffled at the boy’s biting — laugh and giggle as the father playfully bit his son. Apparently, nobody had ever brought the father’s behavior into the foreground, for their scrutiny, as a possible influence on the son’s problem. Sometimes, the obvious does stare people in the face. I think that the way we describe the role and actions of government, in the press and schools, goes a long way to explain this cognitive block. Libertarianism is nothing like common sense; not nearly.

I was reminded of this as I read the following 2008 piece by Roger Lowenstein in the New York Times, where he documents the regulatory regime that was built by the state in the years leading up to the Great Recession. Check this out: Continue reading →

The Volcker Rule

Warren Gibson Economics, Law, Politics , , , , , , , ,

Paul Volcker is a man of considerable stature, and not just because he’s six feet, seven inches tall. He gained a reputation for courage and plain talk as chairman of the Federal Reserve System under Presidents Carter and Reagan because he broke the back of the 1970s inflation. He did so by (mostly) sticking to a tight monetary policy even though that meant sky-high interest rates and sharp back-to-back recessions before the economy could enter its vigorous recovery. Now 84, he has enjoyed a comeback in recent years as an adviser to President Obama. His Volcker Rule, prohibiting proprietary trading by banks, was heralded as one way of preventing a repeat of the recent financial crisis, and it became part of the Dodd-Frank Act signed into law in July 2010.

Dodd-Frank’s full title, incidentally, is the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. Like most current legislation its name reflects hoped-for outcomes, not its actual provisions. Reading the act (the PDF is available here) is not for the faint of heart. There are 16 titles consisting of 1,601 sections for a total of 848 dense pages. Only a lawyer could love sentences like this:

Any nonbank financial company supervised by the Board that engages in proprietary trading or takes or retains any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsors a hedge fund or a private equity fund shall be subject, by rule, as provided in subsection (b)(2), to additional capital requirements for and additional quantitative limits with regards to such proprietary trading and taking or retaining any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsorship of a hedge fund or a private equity fund, except that permitted activities as described in subsection (d) shall not be subject to the additional capital and additional quantitative limits except as provided in subsection (d)(3), as if the nonbank financial company supervised by the Board were a banking entity.

Volcker initially outlined his proposal in a three-page memorandum. It came to life as Section 619 of Dodd-Frank, expanded to 11 dense pages. This section is supposed to prevent banks from buying and selling securities for their own accounts, in contrast to brokering customer trades. It also prohibits banks from holding interests in hedge funds or private equity funds or from sponsoring such funds. These prohibitions are supposed to lessen the need for future bailouts like those that were provided to financial institutions in 2008 and 2009. Continue reading →

Making Whistle-Blowing Pay

Warren Gibson Current Events, Economics, Law, Politics , , , , , , , , ,

The federal bureaucracies are hard at work churning out rules to implement the Dodd-Frank financial “reform” act. In May the Securities and Exchange Commission announced rules for its new whistleblower program, which rewards individuals who provide the agency with “high-quality tips that lead to successful enforcement acts.”

The minimum amount of recovered funds that can earn a reward is $1 million, but the sky’s the limit on the upside. The whistleblower gets to keep 10 to 30 percent of the amount collected, including fines, interest, and disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. We’re talking about big game here, with awards conceivably topping $100 million.

Eric Havian, an attorney with a law firm that represents whistleblowers, noted in an interview with the San Francisco Chronicle’s Kathleen Pender that the securities laws cover a “huge category of bad conduct,” such as illegal insider trading, cooking the books, market manipulation, stock option back-dating, false or misleading disclosures, and the deceptive sales of securities. Almost anything potentially can be illegal, and these vaguely defined offenses leave much room for government mischief. As for insider trading, this is a practice that does little harm and may actually provide benefits to small investors. (See my January/February 2011 Freeman article, “Inside Insider Trading.”)

If corporations felt they needed limits on insider trading or other conduct to attract shareholders, they could write prohibitions into their bylaws so that violations, if not settled internally, could be remedied under civil law. Continue reading →

Shoot the Shorts

Warren Gibson Economics, Law , , , , ,

European bank stocks have dropped sharply in recent days, presumably because they hold large amounts of shaky debt issued by the governments of Greece, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy.  Several European governments have found someone to blame for their financial problems, and their target is that perennial favorite, speculators. And not just any old speculators, but the darkest of that shady lot, short sellers. Short sales of major European bank stocks are banned for a period of time so that traders can’t spread false rumors and trigger a downward spiral in these stocks.

(To sell short means to sell borrowed stock in the hope that the price will decline.  If the stock does fall, sellers buy the shares cheaply, return them to their original owner, and pocket the cash difference.  If the shares rise instead, short sellers have to pay a high price and suffer a loss.  When a number of short sellers cover their positions out of  fear of rising prices, it’s called a short-covering rally.)

What a dreary and stupid move the Europeans have made. They might have learned from the ban instituted in 2008 by U.S. authorities, which accomplished nothing.

Real Fears

There is good reason to fear for the European banks – the problems with European sovereign debt are evident.  Rumors are hardly necessary when the banks’ exposure is well known.  And if false negative rumors justify intervention, what about false positive rumors? Why not ban purchases of stocks when the all-knowing regulators determine they were boosted by bullish rumors? Continue reading →

Bank Deregulation: Friend or Foe?

Warren Gibson Economics, History, Law , , , , ,

Banking has changed a lot during my lifetime—for the better. The changes are partly due to technology (ATMs, online access), but also to deregulation that subjected banks to a lot more competition. What were the major deregulatory moves and how might they have contributed to the recent crisis? Before addressing those questions, a little personal history.

I got interested in money and banking at a very young age. My mother often took me along on shopping trips, explaining what money was, why we needed it in stores, and how my father got it for us. Trips to the bank were a special treat. The Cleveland Trust branch near us was an imposing affair, with a limestone façade, high ceilings, and tellers ensconced behind ornate barred windows. The architecture was intended to instill confidence, but to me it was just a magic place.

Later, my sixth-grade class operated a student branch of another bank, the Society for Savings. Twice a month our classroom was rearranged like a bank branch. Tellers (all boys, as I recall) would accept student deposits of a dime, a quarter, or sometimes a whole dollar. Assistant tellers (girls) would write the amount of the deposit in the student’s passbook, while the boys handled the cash. After closing we tallied the deposits and packed the loot—perhaps $50—into a canvas bag, and a privileged student would trundle it off to the principal’s office under the watchful eyes of two “guards.” What great lessons we learned: thrift, honesty, attention to detail!

By the time I was 14 I was earning good money shoveling snow, raking leaves, and mowing lawns. I had become something of a saving fanatic. I soon found out that the local savings and loan (S&L) offered higher interest than commercial banks, so I opened an account there. Savings passbooks seem quaint in hindsight, but mine was a treasured possession, a tangible reminder of my growing nest egg. Continue reading →