Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 7 of 12)

04/19/202104/20/2021 Federico Sosa Valle Law, Liberty authoritarianism, crime, law enforcement, legal norms, liberal democracy, punishment, rule of law

Of course, for this hypothetical example to have an acceptable degree of relevance, a distinction must be made between highly probable consequences and merely contingent consequences. It is highly probable that a greater application of the norm will generate a change of behavior on the part of the public and that this will translate into fewer infractions. However, the fact that this lower number of infringements produces a relatively negative tax collection result is a matter of fact on which no nexus of necessity or probability can be predicated. An increase in the levels of regulatory application may result in an increase, in a reduction or neutral to the collection purposes, the final result depending on a multiplicity of circumstances. Notwithstanding this, the mere possibility of having a collection failure already represents a negative incentive for the government that is considering investing resources in increasing the degree of application of the regulations.

Another means of increasing the deterrent power of traffic regulations without incurring the costs of greater supervision of the streets and enforcement of fines is the expeditious solution of maintaining the level of regulatory enforcement but increasing the face value of the penalty. If with an application level of 1%, a fine of $1,000 – generates the same conditioning of conduct as a fine of $10, – with a 100% probability of application, then it is expected that the same fine will be increased to $80,000 obtain the same deterrent result as a fine of $1,000 – with 80% application. Thus, the government would obtain the same behavioral results of raising the level of regulatory enforcement without investing any additional resources, beyond the announcement of the new fines. Furthermore: if in fact the behavior modification were not so successful, since the level of infractions did not drop as expected, then the government would obtain a collection award, since they would mean an increase in its income from fines.

Thus, we see how, in terms of collection costs and benefits, faced with the dilemma between increasing the level of application of the rules or increasing the value of punishments (years in prison, fines or compensation in favor of third parties), incentives operate so that the governments decide for the latter type of solutions. Moreover, a low level of normative application generates the social unrest typical of any system of coexistence rules that does not work, which leads, in a kind of positive feedback mechanism, to a demand for an increase in the severity of the punishments. It is for this reason that, when there is evidence of a low level of regulatory compliance, governments find themselves in a trap, since the very dynamics of incentives induce them to increase the severity of sanctions instead of increasing the level of enforcement of the law.

However, although the behavioral effects of both models (low punishments with high application vs. high punishments with low application) could be quantitatively similar, they are not similar in terms of long-term social and political dynamics: societies with a High law enforcement tends to be democratic and liberal while low law enforcement societies tend to be opaque and authoritarian. The biggest trap that both governments and civil society can fall into is to attribute the consequences of low regulatory enforcement to cultural factors. Such a culturalist explanation definitively closes off any possibility of finding a reasonable solution and avoiding the trap of systematically increasing levels of authoritarianism.

This tendency to increase authoritarianism on the part of governments and societies manifests itself at various levels. One of them is the aforementioned increase in prohibitions and punishments. But another factor of authoritarianism is also represented by the wide margin of discretion that a low level of law enforcement grants to governments, since they are empowered to raise said levels of application at their own will.

To continue with the example with which the exhibition has been illustrated, although a fine for passing a red light of $80,000 that has an application of 1% is experienced by the population as a fine of $800 – with 100% application, nothing prevents the government from deciding to activate a mechanism for the control of infractions that raise the application to 50%, for putting a case, which means having fines of $40,000 in practice.

[Editor’s note: this is Part 7 in a 12-part essay; you can read Part 6 here or read the essay in its entirety here.]

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 6 of 12)

04/18/202104/18/2021 Federico Sosa Valle Law, Liberty authoritarianism, costs, crime, knowledge problem, law enforcement, legal norms, liberal democracy, punishment, rule of law

It could happen that a government feels very comfortable collecting a certain amount of money in traffic fines for crossing a red light. For example, the fine amounts to $1,000 – and the probability of application is 1%. In this way, drivers have little experience of having been fined despite the fact that they know better than the government itself that on numerous occasions “they crossed in the red.” Compliance with the traffic light becomes purely optional, left to the moral criteria of each driver and the immediate conditions of time, people and place that he perceives at the time of crossing (many or few pedestrians on the streets, cars crossing on the other side of the road). the street). If a fine of $1,000 is interpreted as a risk of $10, it is not necessary to have great reasons to decide whether or not to violate the norm. However, 1% of those who crossed with the red light did indeed receive a fine of $1,000, to be executed, let us suppose, by the public authorities on the occasion of renewing the driving license, under penalty of denying said renewal, some years after the violation occurred (with which, the present value of said fine at the time of the event would be even lower). With a minimum expenditure of resources, this particular government would achieve a substantial fundraising, since also the number of transgressors and fines in absolute terms would be much higher than under the circumstance of a greater application of the norm. However, the social purpose of the repressive system is not fulfilled: fines applied in this way do not have a dissuasive effect that contributes to ordering traffic and guarantees the safety and physical integrity of passers-by and drivers.

This is how this “hypothetical government” finds itself in the following trap: the low application of the norm causes that the regulation destined to order the traffic is not effective. In our example, it is common for cars to not respect the red traffic light and consequently accidents occur, resulting in the crossing of streets, both for pedestrians and drivers, dangerous and a source of large losses for individuals. But, at the same time, such an ineffective system to control traffic not only finances itself with fines, but also generates a surplus that represents a source of income for the government to cover other types of expenses. Of course, accidents and danger on the public highway are costs to be assumed by the government and society, with which such a de facto collection system is very likely to be highly inefficient, since it ultimately generates net losses or losses for the government or for society or for both.

However, if a ruler decided to invest resources to increase the degree of application of fines for violations of traffic regulations, it would be found that, in the short term, such a decision would lead to financial loss. Such would be the costs and consequences of increasing the level of application of the rules: if technological devices such as cameras were installed, with expert computer systems that processed the information properly, not only in terms of speed but also in terms of precision on the identity of the offending car, the fines would reach the owners of the vehicles a few days after the occurrence of the offense and the process of discharge and execution of the fine was relatively agile, the drivers, in a short time, would become much more scrupulous in the face of to a traffic light. With all security it could be said that accident rates would drop drastically, resulting in a direct benefit for society and direct and indirect benefits for the government. However, there is an element at the level of government incentives to take into account: obtaining a higher level of regulatory enforcement requires a greater investment of resources and, likewise, will likely result in a drop in the aggregate collection of fines, since it will be processed a greater number of fines for an offense actually committed, but this will generate a change in behavior on the part of the public that will reduce the number of infractions and, consequently, the number of fines in absolute terms.

[Editor’s note: this is Part 6 in a 12-part essay; you can read Part 5 here or read the essay in its entirety here.]

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 5 of 12)

04/17/202104/17/2021 Federico Sosa Valle Law, Liberty crime, freedom, law enforcement, legal norms, punishment, rule of law

Increase punishments or increase the application of the norm

As has already been pointed out on multiple occasions by various authors, when the utility maximizing agent makes the decision to transgress a norm or not to do so, the punishment provided by the norm is not represented (prison, fine, or indemnify a third party), but that multiplied by the probability of being effectively persecuted and convicted. As illustrated in the previous paragraph, a fine of $1,000 – whose probability of application is 80%, represents a risk equivalent to $800 – and the latter will have to be the magnitude to be taken into account by the agent. at the time of making your choice about complying with or transgressing the norm.

On the other hand, this too must be contextualized within a given political regime. Modern and liberal democracies have as a guiding principle to extend as much as possible the spheres of autonomy of the will of individuals and this includes leaving open the possibility that a given subject freely chooses to transgress the norm in exchange for receiving the punishment provided by it – But no more than that. The restriction of freedoms for the sake of preventing the commission of crimes is only allowed in cases in which the compromised legal interests are of the highest value, such as life, personal liberty or public safety. Outside of these cases, the only mechanism to prevent citizens and inhabitants from taking certain actions resides in the incentive system that imposes dissuasive penalties and compensation, preserving a wide margin of decision on the part of those on whether to comply with the norm or assume the cost. of the consequent punishment for the case of his transgression.

Therefore, if governments want to increase discouragement towards a certain type of behavior, they can either increase the penalty or increase the degree of application of the rule. To continue with the previous example: either the amount of the fine is increased or the probability of being fined is increased. Of course, the second option entails additional or marginal costs: greater resources must be allocated to the supervision and execution of penalties, fines and compensation. For this reason, in certain cases, it is more efficient to maintain the same level of application of the rules and increase the penalties.

In general, society already takes for granted that the prosecution of homicides, ravages, and other serious crimes require an investment of resources for which there is a wide margin of consensus, so the decision to increase the penalties or increasing the degree of law enforcement will have to be done paying attention almost exclusively to the results to be obtained. However, for cases of minor transgressions, such as traffic fines or mere contractual breaches of insignificant figures, a “self-financing” component of the punitive system itself comes into play: the fines are expected to finance in full or at least largely the monitoring system deployed in order to enforce the standard. The problem is further complicated when governments see in the fines and justice fees charged in order to make use of the judicial system a collection instrument to defray the expenses incurred by other areas of the state. In the latter case, regulatory compliance may conflict with the collection purpose that is awarded to fines and fees. For this reason, it is inadvisable for governments to see these instruments as a source of resources for expenses unrelated to the punitive system of fines itself.

[Editor’s note: this is Part 5 in a 12-part essay; you can read Part 4 here or read the essay in its entirety here.]

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 4 of 12)

04/16/202104/16/2021 Federico Sosa Valle Law, Liberty costs, knowledge problem, law enforcement, legal theory, risks, values

Different degrees of law enforcement

Law enforcement systems range from ideal types of pure blind and automatic rule enforcement to pure discretion. The ideal of automatic law enforcement denies the reality of errors, the fragmentation of knowledge of special circumstances of time and place, and information costs. Meanwhile, complete discretion is the very negation of the law as abstract and general normative statements. However, defining both poles, the first factually unrealizable and the second contradictory in itself, allows us to identify the trend that characterizes the various legal systems given.

Likewise, information costs and discretion are variables that determine the degree of law enforcement. Both the criminal sanctions and the sentences to compensate damages depend to a large extent on questions of proof and evidence about the facts contained in the norm as a condition for the application of the legal solution envisaged. Likewise, the law itself imposes limits and criteria for collecting and assessing evidence, such as due process guarantees, which include the right not to testify against oneself and the inviolability of the person. Therefore, when a rule provides, for example, a fine of $1,000 – for the offender, the deterrent of said consequent depends on the degree of probability that the legal system will identify the infraction, the person responsible for the infraction and be able to prove said fact before the courts in a process supervised by the offender, who may present his defense and offer his own evidence.

Continuing with this example, if the probability of being fined is 80%, then the fine represented by the eventual offender is reduced to $ 800. Suppose then, that a driver needs to get to work on time so that the day is not deducted, which would mean a loss of $900. Then, the person in our example will maximize his choice if he violates any traffic rule, assuming the risk of losing $800 – in order to avoid the risk of losing $900. Of course, if it is discovered, your gross loss will be $1,000, but your net loss will have been reduced to $100, while if it is not discovered, your gross result will be $0, but your Net result will amount to $900, since thanks to his decision to assume the risk of being fined, he avoided losing the payment for the day of work. Therefore, given the incentive system given to the maximizing agent in our example, the most rational thing for him is to assume the risk of transgressing the norm.

This elementary example suggests several conclusions. The first one is that it should not be ruled out that society itself maximizes the utility of its resources by admitting a certain range of transgressions. However, these cases are not extra-systemic, but are justified or exempted from liability, as the case may be, within the legal system. Running a red light in order to urgently take a badly injured person to the hospital is a cause of justification. Doing it on a completely deserted street in order not to be late for work could be accepted as an acquittal. In these cases we are also faced with a certain degree of judicial discretion, in order to weigh the legal meaning of certain facts and circumstances as justifying or mitigating responsibility. But another issue related to this is to recognize that the agent himself has a higher level of information regarding his own circumstances than that of any other external observer, which allows him to make better decisions attentive to his level of immediacy with the facts. Finally, society itself also organizes itself spontaneously around a certain margin of extra-systemic regulatory breaches: in the example mentioned, society as a whole will maximize the utility of its resources if the offender arrives early at work, at the risk of paying a fee. penalty fee; while the traffic fines will have as their real destination those drivers who are not pressured by such an urgency, in which case it is more socially beneficial that they comply with the traffic regulations.

The latter brings us to another question, of singular relevance, which consists in defining the distinction between a liberal legal system and a police one. Legal systems that recognize the value of human dignity and are organized around a principle of autonomy of the will give each individual the power to decide whether to transgress certain norms at the price of assuming their consequences. Instead, police systems seek to prevent each individual from making such a decision, for the sake of certain collective values, such as security or mere compliance with the orders issued by the public powers. Of course, even in liberal legal systems, values such as the protection of human life and public safety entail certain mechanisms and norms for crime prevention, but always considering that these mean an injury to individual freedoms, not an absolute public authority.

Finally, although without definitively exhausting this debate, one characteristic of particular systemic relevance deserves to be mentioned, on which it will have to be discussed in greater depth: the relationship between the decision to increase the degree of application of the norm or to increase the threat of punishment, in order to achieve a certain degree of compliance by citizens.

[Editor’s note: this is Part 4 in a 12-part essay; you can read Part 3 here or read the essay in its entirety here.]

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 3 of 12)

04/15/202104/13/2021 Federico Sosa Valle Law, Liberty Austrian Economics, David Hume, F.A. Hayek, Homo Economicus, incentives, Swedish Economics

This reference to the distinction of values between the short and the long term also refers to the theory of capital and interest that Eugen v. Böhm-Bawerk and Austrian and Swedish economists who followed him in such developments, such as Ludwig v. Mises, Knut Wicksell, the already named Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig Lachmann, or the British economist John Hicks. Current economic science recognizes the element of time preference in the interest rate, but emphasizes the predominance of the value of money as its main component. In contrast to this, the Austrian and Swedish economists referred to had emphasized a characteristic of homo economicus that brought them closer to the behavioral presuppositions of David Hume: agents prefer the same good in the present than in the future, or, expressed in other terms, for an individual to agree to defer the use of a present good towards a future time, such abstention from consumption must be compensated by an increase in the future value of such good. Thus, if a person lends a certain sum of money and therefore incurs an opportunity cost by abstaining from its consumption, it is because he expects to receive compensatory interest on his waiting in the future. Of course, Böhm-Bawerk’s theory of interest received its timely evaluation by numerous economists, pointing out its weaknesses and subsequent developments by his disciples met with mixed luck – to the point that, for example, Friedrich Hayek declared that he had never undertaken the task of writing the second part of his work The Pure Theory of Capital attentive to the extreme complexity of the theory of interest that inspired him. However, re-expressing David Hume’s legal-political theory in terms of the Austrian and Swedish theory of capital represents an intellectual exercise with a significant heuristic function.

In “natural” terms, an individual will “spontaneously” fulfill a promise if he calculates that the present value of breaching it is less than the future loss of credit with respect to his creditor or the community with which he habitually – a term proper to the Humean empiricism – it interacts. This is consistent with Hume’s own theory of empathy, according to which each individual can understand how his neighbor would feel and judge a certain situation, better if he is someone known than a complete stranger. Thus, the tendency to cheat is less corroborated with those who have the expectation of interacting more than those in whom the interaction will occur in a single play – as illustrated by the best known game theory.

We can thus see how, in the absence of the incentives provided by the coercive powers on the part of the state, the natural tendency to keep promises is better corroborated among acquaintances, with continuous interaction over time, than with strangers with what will have to be done. interact only once. This is what led David Hume, likewise, to reject any theory of the social contract – since, by definition, in the supposed state of nature there would be no one to guarantee its fulfillment – and to consider that, in a primitive stage of the individual and society, the primordial political unit would have to be the family – in fact, the very etymological meaning of this term conveys a “micro-political” connotation.

It will be later Adam Smith who will extend the foundation of a human interaction order beyond the nearby nuclei through his concept of “Great Society,” in which unknown subjects are capable of spontaneously coordinating their respective activities through the signals transmitted by the system. of prices, which indicates the relative modifications in the terms of exchange of complementary and substitute goods, contemporary or deferred in time. However, neither did Adam Smith deny a fundamental function that some mechanism must fulfill in order to emerge and sustain such an extended cooperation order: the application of the norms of peaceful coexistence, which guarantee stability in the possession of goods, the transfer by consent of said possession and the fulfillment of the contracts entered into for the purpose of perfecting said transfers.

Consequently, the problems of law enforcement, which concern the degree of effective compliance with the legal norms that condition human conduct, must represent a major chapter of the political philosophy and theory that characterizes legal institutions and policies as true incentive systems.

[Editor’s note: this is Part 3 in a 12-part essay; you can read Part 2 here or read the essay in its entirety here.]

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 2 of 12)

04/14/202104/13/2021 Federico Sosa Valle Law, Liberty David Hume, F.A. Hayek, legal norms, virtue

Obviously, there is a whole question of information and transaction costs surrounding the game between empirical social norms and positive legal norms. The former are more agile and immediate, better adapted to the circumstances, but at the same time they are not enough to guarantee peace when the interests at stake gain social relevance. There are cases in which the legal system takes advantage of the immediacy of the empirical norms to give dynamism to the daily traffic and at the same time reserves the last word for a case of serious controversy: it is the referral made by the positive right to the validity of uses and customs. A typical example of this is commercial law.

Although in another frame of reference, but in the same vision, we can find in David Hume an antecedent of this distinction between empirical and positive norms. The Scottish philosopher called the first “natural virtues” and the second “artificial virtues,” and it was precisely justice that was among the latter. In turn, in the 20th century, Friedrich Hayek expressly collected his political philosophy in order to enunciate his concept of “spontaneous order”, which, among other characteristics, consisted of that diffuse zone in which the norms have not yet bifurcated between empirical and positive – and for which reason it is so elusive to categorize the first volume of Law, Legislation and Freedom, entitled “Norms and order,” either within social theory or within the theory of law.

The truth is that – something that Hayek did not have the opportunity to address – in that diffuse area in which it is difficult to distinguish a social norm with empirical compliance from another with recognition by the legal system – to use H. L. A. Hart’s own concepts – a determining factor for both types of norms, in addition to the violence that its non-compliance or its subsequent retaliation may involve, is the opportunism that acts as an incentive for the acting agents -with which here we return to the Humean distinction between natural and artificial virtues: stability in possession, the peaceful transfer of it and the fulfillment of promises are three virtues that make up the idea of justice but that, for its fulfillment, require from the agents a general vision of the social consequences compliance or non-compliance, or the incentive provided by government sanctions in anticipation of non-compliance.

Opportunism on the part of private agents consists in preferring a present good to deferring that good in order to obtain a greater good in the future. For example, breaking a promise in a pressing situation constitutes a present greater good for the defaulter. However, the generalization of such default by all debtors would destroy a credit system that would, in the future, go against the interests of the entire society as a whole, including the defaulter himself. However, for the debtor, the default means an obvious immediate advantage, which can only be counteracted by the threat of a social sanction – stop being seen and treated as a “good businessman” – and, if this does not reach to modify their behavior, due to the threat of a legal sanction, such as compensation for non-compliance or, if necessary and if this non-compliance had been deliberate and obtained through a ruse, imprisonment.

It is here where the superiority of representative democracy is manifested over direct democracy, and of mixed systems, which combine long-term and even life-long terms or “while their good conduct lasts.” In these cases, the rulers exercise the “opportunism” of enforcing the law, following the adage of Herman Melville regarding “private vices, public benefits” or Machiavellian realism: greater wealth and, consequently, higher taxes come from societies in those that are characterized by a high fulfillment of promises and contracts, since it goes without saying that, abstaining from a present good to achieve a greater good in the future, generates in the long term a greater volume of wealth than enjoying a good present at the cost of giving up future good. If a government had to be revalidated daily, its incentive to stay in office would be to make short-term benefits prevail. Likewise, it is not only enough with a political system with stability in office, but also with legal and political responsibilities around the demand to make the long term prevail over the short term.

In this distinction between legal responsibilities and political responsibilities of officials, the Humean distinction between artificial virtues (the legal responsibility for the poor performance of the position) and the natural virtues (the personal desire to continue in office, through re-election or by avoiding impeachment). The legal-political system is articulated through opposite incentives: individuals have a “natural” tendency to breach promises, which is counteracted by the incentive of the legal system that establishes forced fulfillment of contracts; while the political system is expected to align incentives in such a way that rulers have “the natural tendency” to enforce contracts. This natural tendency of the rulers does not come from any “natural” characteristic of the person of the ruler but from the incentives provided by the constitutional system.

[Editor’s note: this is Part 2 of a 12-part essay; you can read Part 1 here or the whole essay in its entirety here.]

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 1 of 12)

04/13/202104/13/2021 Federico Sosa Valle Law, Liberty legal norms, rule of law, rules, virtue

The topicality of the distinction between natural and artificial virtues

This essay aims to highlight that the low generalized application of positive legal norms in any legal system, by allowing greater discretion on the part of the public powers, leads to a gradual increase in the levels of authoritarianism, both on the part of governments and of society itself.

Here the concept of “positive legal norms” is used in order to establish a distinction with empirical social norms. The latter consist of factual rules, not enunciated by any specific authority, which are of common and spontaneous observance by the members of a given society and which have extremely diffuse enforcement bodies. The rules of courtesy, of what is known as “fair play,” the expected ethical conduct among the members of a certain group constituted in an unintentional way -such as a business community or a group of friends-, are typical cases of empirical social norms, of which everyone knows their content to a certain extent, although they are not always in a position to state it and transmit it clearly and precisely and that, in general, do not have a “disciplinary court” that applies sanctions; rather, these are usually administered by the group members themselves in a tacit and diffuse way, or they are still relegated to the own conscience of each individual.

A positive legal norm, on the other hand, is sanctioned and promulgated by the public powers and has bodies for the application of its consequences before the verification of certain antecedents, which may consist of repressive sanctions or the establishment of certain creditor relations between individuals. The said consequences will be supported by the application also of the public powers or, expressed in other terms, the officials who exercise the public powers will not incur in any crime or contravention if they execute the dictation of a given sentence. Furthermore, they risk receiving a legal sanction if they abstain from enforcing the law without just cause of its own accord.

To illustrate what has just been expressed with some exemplary cases: If a private individual claims a certain sum of money from another – such as compensation for a breach of contract, or for damage caused to his property- he goes to court, the evidence is debated and the titles of the claim are examined and the court sentences condemning the defendant to a certain sum of money, if he does not pay it within the term stipulated in the sentence, then the claimant would be authorized to initiate the enforcement proceedings. As a consequence, an official with specific powers, summoned for this purpose, would be legally authorized to seize the debtor’s assets and sell them at auction in order to obtain the sum of money whose ownership corresponds to the creditor. Furthermore, the creditor has the power to order the official to activate the enforcement procedures, under the threat of incurring, likewise, legal consequences for the official himself in the event of a possible omissionate conduct.

On the other hand, if in a group of friends someone lies with the purpose of refraining from attending or inviting a certain member of the group to a given social gathering, the eventual discovery of the lie by the rest of the friends or the victim himself will not entail more than what is usually known as a “social sanction,” i.e., a change of concept about the person of the offender. In these cases expressing a negative opinion about the offender or “retaliating” with a similar attitude in turn would not have to carry any social sanction. Or perhaps yes, if the offender is offended by the interpretation given to his actions or considers the retaliation disproportionate or illegitimate. Logically, this can lead to an escalation of sanctions, but since this does not involve relevant interests for society nor does it generally lead to events of physical violence, everything remains at the level of the empirical social norms system.

Finally, if the interests involved gain social relevance -for example, retaliations involve events of physical violence-, positive legal norms begin to be activated that clearly demarcate the antecedents and responsibilities of each party and the compensation and sanctions to be determined and applied by part of an impartial tribunal. This is because, as is well known, one of the main tasks of the law is to “keep the peace.”

[Editor’s note: this is Part 1 in a 12-part series; the essay in its entirety can be found here.]

Efficient markets as normative systems

10/22/202010/22/2020 Federico Sosa Valle Philosophy abstract orders, complexity, efficient market hypothesis, Eugene Fama, F.A. Hayek, normative systems, spontaneous order

Recently, I came across this outstanding interview with Eugene Fama published by The Market / NZZ. Besides the main subject discussed -the inability of central banks to control inflation-, the interview is intertwined with gripping assertions about the limits of knowledge, such as the following ones:

Bubbles are things people see in hindsight. They don’t identify them in advance. Sure, you can look at the behavior of prices, and you may be able to identify cases where they are too high. But if you only look back and say: «Oh, stocks went down a lot, so that was a bubble», then that’s 20/20 hindsight. At the time, there was no evidence that there was a bubble.
I don’t say markets are completely efficient, but they’re efficient for most questions that I address. Models are never a 100 % true. If they were, we would call them reality, not models. But for almost all purposes, market efficiency is a very good approximation.
The real question is: How do you pick Warren Buffett? The way you pick him is after the fact, since he has done very well. Now, suppose I take 100,000 investors and say: Let’s let them run for 30 years and pick out the winner. Because you roll the dice so many times, even if none of them is a good or bad investor, many investors will do well and many will do poorly purely by chance. Statistically there is also going to be a big winner, but solely due to chance. In other words: There will be extremely good outcomes and extremely bad outcomes, but you just can’t tell who is successful because of luck and who because of skill.

This quotations resemble the distinction made by Friedrich Hayek between relative and absolute limits to explanation (The Sensory Order, 1952):

8.67. Apart from these practical limits to explanation, which we may hope continuously to push further back, there also exists, however, an absolute limit to what the human brain can ever accomplish by way of explanation -a limit which is determined by the nature of the instrument of explanation itself, and which is particularly relevant to any attempt to explain particular mental processes.
8.68. If our account of the process of explanation is correct, it would appear that any apparatus or organism which is to perform such operations must possess certain properties determined by the properties of the events which it is to explain. If explanation involves that kind of joint classification of many elements which we have described as “model-building”, the relation between the explaining agent and the explained object must satisfy such formal relations as must exist between any apparatus of classification and the individual objects which it classifies (Cf. 5.77-5.91).
5.90. The model building by such an apparatus of classification simplifies the task and extends the scope of successful adaptation in two ways: it selects some elements from a complex environment as relevant for the prediction of events which are important for the persistence of the structure, and it treats them as instances of classes of events. But while in this way a model building apparatus (and particularly one that can be constantly improved by learning) is of much greater efficiency than could be any more mechanical apparatus which contained, as it were, a few fixed models of typical situations, there will clearly still exist definite limits to the extent to which such a microcosm can contain an adequate reproduction of the significant factors of the macrocosm.
8.69. The proposition which we shall attempt to establish is that any apparatus of classification must possess a structure of a higher degree of complexity than is possessed by the objects which it classifies; and that, therefore, the capacity of any explaining agent must be limited to objects with a structure possessing a degree of complexity lower than its own. […]

Being confronted with an absolute limit to explanation does not mean that chaos lies outside those limits. Indeed, what we have beyond the scope of our models is a complex order -in this case, efficient markets. A kind of order whose “[…] existence need not manifest itself to our senses but may be based on purely abstract relations which we can only mentally reconstruct” (F. A. Hayek, “Law, Legislation, and Liberty”, Chapter II; 1973), and because of that its explanation finds not practical limits but absolute ones. For example, in this field, “passive investing” would be homologous to a law-abiding behaviour or to the moral saying “being honest is the best policy”. Of course, for such systems -economic, legal or moral- to evolve there have to be some “prices”, i.e.: people who trade in the short term or who perform innovative behaviours which establish a new legal precedent or a new habit.

But for this innovation to happen it is indispensable for the agents to count on a framework of stable regularities -usually called abstract or spontaneous orders- upon which they could draw their own “maps”, create new expectations, and coordinate their plans with other agents. That indicates that we have already spent enough ink writing about the economic way of looking at the law, and perhaps it is time to start pondering markets as complex normative systems.

In Defence of Economics Imperialism

05/16/202005/18/2020 Federico Sosa Valle Current Events, Economics crisis, economics, internationalism, Milton Friedman, neoliberalism, social science, universalism

Under the guise of the end of “Neoliberalism”, economics is losing its grip. Troubles had begun with the 2008 financial crisis. As people had once lost their faith in the Gold Standard, by 2008 the consensus upon the self-regulation of the markets slept away. Even some of the most notorious free-marketeers -like Alan Greenspan- became renegade from their lifelong beliefs.

The COVID-19 crisis seems to complete that process. However, it is not a process of the end of Neoliberalism, but of the end of what Gary Becker called the “economic way of thinking” -and this is truly bad news. The end of the imperialism of economics is, in some way, the end of rationality and universalism in political thinking.

The demise of economics in politics, in fact, had begun just some months before the 2007-2008 Crisis: when Tony Blair stepped down from Downing Street. Or even before: when George W. Bush, trying to avoid losing his re-election as his father had done in 1992, crushed the superavit inherited from Bill Clinton’s administration and created twin deficits. But Bush’s misfortunes were at least generated by an ill-understanding of economics. We are in danger of the near future being ruled by a not-understanding of economics at all. That is why we should not renounce the use of the economic way of thinking.

The key is not to leave the task only to the economists. Philosophers, lawyers, sociologists, historians, and all sorts of social scientists should get involved. Milton Friedman was the scapegoat of the Left, but the 1980’s and 1990’s came after decades of works of thinkers of all nationalities and sorts, like Karl Popper, Robert Nozick, Friedrich Hayek, Bruno Leoni, Max Weber, Raymond Aron, T. S. Ashton, Gary Becker, Robert Mundell, James M. Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Anthony Downs and many more.

A Reflection on Information and Complex Social Orders

04/10/202004/10/2020 Federico Sosa Valle Current Events, Liberty civil law, common law, coronavirus, democracy, information, pandemics, public health, public policy, rule of law, social orders, technology

In the year 2020, occidental democracies face a time of lock-downs, social distancing, and a sort of central planning based on epidemiological models fueled by testing methodologies. An almost uniform consensus on the policy of “flattening the curve and raising the line” spread worldwide, both in the realms of politics and science. Since the said public policy is not for free, but nevertheless it is out of discussion, the majority of the efforts are focused on gathering data concerning the rate of infection and fatalities and on achieving accurate and fast methods of early detection of the disease (COVID-19). The more the data is collected, the more efficient the policy of “flattening the curve” will be, i.e.: minimizing the economical costs. Technology -in a broad sense- seems to be the key ingredient of every successful policy.

Nevertheless, since the countries that undertook the said task are democracies -and they were urged to do so because they are democracies-, there is a lot more than data provided by technology to take into account. Science and technology could reach a conclusive study about infection and fatality rates, but the outcomes of the societal discussions about the value of life and the right of every individual to decide upon the way of conducting their own plans of life will always remain inconclusive. Those discussions are not only philosophical and, fundamentally, are not only to be conducted in the terms of an academic research, since the values at stake entitle every human being to have their own say and, at the same time, are so deeply rooted in the upbringing of the individuals that seldom they might be successfully articulated -and surely that is why such questions are of philosophical interest.

In the race to determine the political agenda, technology plays with a significant advantage over philosophy: in times of emergency, conclusive assertions -despite proving right or wrong afterwards- enable political leaders with a sense of determination that any philosophy can hardly achieve. It is true that philosophical considerations mark the legitimate limits of science and its uses, but the predictable models and plausible scenarios depicted by the technology might lift the barriers of what had been considered at the time as politically illegitimate, i.e.: to describe a given situation as a state of exception.

However, there is still a dominion in which philosophical considerations might have high expectations of winning the competition against technology: the making of the abstract criteria to judge the fulfillment of the due procedures to be followed by the authorities given the account of the data gathered by the technology. Such philosophical considerations on which base authorities should personally account for their decisions, despite having been discussed by academics and writers, have being treated for centuries in particular legal procedures that crystallized the standards of conduct of the Civil Law (the diligence of a good father of a family, or of a good businessman, etc) or Common Law concepts (the reasonable person, the ordinary prudent man of business) or more recent -in terms of the evolution of the law- formulae, such as the Hand’s rule.

Such legal standards, concepts or formulae do not oblige the political authorities in their public sphere, but they perform as an incentive to be taken into account by the agent who is invested with the public authority; since he, eventually, will be personally accountable for his decisions. Moreover, those legal parameters to judge the personal responsibility of the agent in charge of the political authority are a true guarantee for the public servants, more reliable than the changing public opinion measurements to be provided by the technology.

Notwithstanding the Realist assertion about the division between law and politics might earn certain relevance in times of turmoil, individual rights and legal procedures should endure in the long run, in order to work as a benchmark to judge the personal performance of the political agents.

Such times of political and social upheaval are useful to test political theories and doctrines as well. Certain strains of Political Liberalism -particularly Classical Liberalism- have been largely criticized for -supposedly- trying to replace the political with the law. However, the law is there to remind the political agents that the state is an abstraction run by individuals who are expected to be personally accountable for their decisions. In this case, the true function of the law, although conceding that it should remain outside of the political sphere, is to provide the correct incentives for the political agents, who are not mere abstractions -and so, maximize their own plans- to take their own decisions. If technological devices might be the key instruments for public policy, the rule of law is its inescapable framework -or at least so it is, of course, for every democracy.

Discovery Processes

11/25/201911/25/2019 Federico Sosa Valle Economics, Philosophy competition, cosmopolitanism, entrepreneurship, F.A. Hayek, incentives, innovation, James Jay Carafano

A good friend of mine encouraged me to read this note published by James Jay Carafano, Vice President of The Heritage Foundation.

Despite being as compelling as it is well intentioned, the article misses to mention one of the main arguments for free markets: what once Friedrich Hayek described as “the competition as a discovery process.”

Indeed, the concept is insinuated in Carafano’s piece of writing: “He decided to make a splash in the sports car market by jumping into the race car racket. Initially, he planned to do it by buying the world’s premier race car manufacturer, Ferrari. But that plan fell flat. So Ford moved to Plan B: to field his own, all-American team.”

Businessmen, like any other kind of people, are rational: initially, they try to maximize their profits by avoiding competition. They are not heroes and nobody can ask them to be so. People, businessmen included, respond to incentives.

When there is not any other choice than competition, then innovation, ingenuity, and creativity arise. Not because of a change in the mind of certain businessmen, but for new innovative entrepreneurs outperform the non competitive ones.

The free market capitalist system James Jay Carafano praises is mostly an institutional arrangement named -once again- by Hayek as “competitive order.” Nevertheless, the most interesting question for our times is not about the virtues of the said free market capitalist system -which seem to be out of discussion- but whether competition under the rule of law deserves to have a Kantian “Cosmopolitan Purpose.”

There is no such thing as a sunk cost fallacy

09/23/201909/23/2019 Federico Sosa Valle Economics, Philosophy Barry Weingast, catallaxy, constitutionalism, costs, Douglass North, F.A. Hayek, James Buchanan, John Joseph Wallis, Jon Elster, sunk costs fallacy, Vernon Smith

The advocates of the sunk cost fallacy state that, since an agent ponders in his decisions marginal costs against marginal incomes, any consideration upon sunk costs would be irrational. Notwithstanding, as soon as we accept the arguments of the said sunk cost fallacy and try to put its recommendations into practice, we discover that we have just become an easy prey of a more severe kind of irrationality: the one that concerns with intransitive preferences.

Jon Elster exemplifies the sunk cost fallacy with the case of a huge snowfall that pours onto the city the very same day we were planning to attend a theatre play whose tickets we had bought the previous days and are not refundable. Elster points out that, since our attendance to the play will not bring the money we had paid for the tickets back, there is no reason to make the decision on whether or not to attend the play on the basis of the sunk costs of the tickets. The correct reasoning should take into account only the cost of enduring the heavy snowfall in order to reach to the theatre where the play would be performed. Nevertheless, the same Jon Elster makes the disclaimer that a zealous observance of avoiding the sunk cost fallacy could lead to make choices following non transitive preferences.

If we change our mind every day, discarding previous decisions and assuming a new direction just because a new opportunity has arisen, we risk to end up in the ruin. Transitive preferences tend to assure the agent of a certain profit and non transitive ones exposes him to losses. In evolutionary games simulations, agents who act according to transitive preferences outshine agents who do not. It seems, then, that the rational agents walks on the edge of the razor, between sunk cost fallacies and non transitive preferences.

That is why there is not such a thing as a sunk cost fallacy. The rational agent, to be such, must ponder a whole plan against an alternative plan in a whole as well, which in some cases, both of them last several periods of time. It is true that in the “very short term” all past costs are sunk and that it only matters the opportunity costs, but most decisions are made in the short term, which lasts more than just a moment. Otherwise, the very concept of transitive preferences would lack any meaning.

Of course certain costs are sunk: if the flux of earnings that a good of capital produces just covers the variable costs of putting it to work (for example, a truck whose earnings just pay for the gas and the salary of the driver), the more rational choice is to use it until it becomes full obsolete and do not replace it with a brand new unit.

But the sunk cost fallacy does not provide a criterion to distinguish sunk costs from just mere costs of a single plan. What a rational agent with transitive preferences discards in his considerations will be named sunk costs, and what he does not, will not. A pure tautology.

Even the snowfall case does not explain satisfactorily the said fallacy: when the agent bought the tickets, their cost were inferior to the income of watching the play, but a heavy snowfall adds not a marginal cost but increases the marginal cost of the plan composed by the cost of the tickets plus the cost of enduring the snowfall.

Notwithstanding, the sunk cost fallacy derives into a philosophical puzzle: what is the subject? How are relations between time and being and between being and becoming. It seems that our permanence as rational agents depends mostly upon not to put into practice the opportunistic approach of the sunk cost fallacy ad libidum.

Moreover, the matter has a political strand: constitutional constraints demand from the authorities to take into account the weight of certain principles in their decisions and those principles could be disregarded if the decisions are purely made on the basis of expediency. If it is the same authority the one who decides whether certain constitutional principle should be followed or not, then all the citizens would be left exposed to arbitrariness.

The considerations about the length of the period a plan should last, the responsibility upon the consequences of our past choices, and the weight of the constitutional principles on the legitimacy of political decisions, become rational if they are not pondered by an isolated agent but in the framework of the interplay among several agents.

This framework of human interaction upon which the agent’s choices take place had been characterised by Friedrich A.Hayek as a spontaneous, or abstract or extended order. He proposed to leave the term “economics” to the explanation of the choices made by an isolated agent and to establish the science of “catallaxy” as the study of the complex phenomena involved in the said structure of interactions. In the same line, James M.Buchanan labelled the interplay of individual agents as “symbiosis” and proposed to redefine the task of the political economy to its study. More recently, in 2009, Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, in Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, coined the term “open access orders” to analyse the same set of events. To this stream of thought, it also belongs Vernon L. Smith’s own account of the concept of ecological rationality.

Catallaxy, Symbiosis, Complex Phenomena, and Open Access Order or Ecological Rationality are some of the aspects of what Karl Popper once called “critical rationalism” and supersedes old problems such as those of the instrumental or subjective reason. An authentic “toolbox,” ready to be used.

Institutions, Machines, and Complex Orders (Part 9); Conclusion: legal-political institutions and systems

06/25/201906/16/2019 Federico Sosa Valle Culture, Law complex orders, coordination problem, Douglass North, incentives, institutions, modernity, spontaneous order

Institutions, whether formal or informal, consist of limitations on behaviour that allow structuring an order of human interaction (North, D.C., 1991). Such institutions endow decisions with their agents of transitivity and, consequently, with rationality and predictability. That is to say, an institution allows to conform expectations on a range of events dependent on individual decisions that will happen and, above all, on another range of events that will not happen or, if they do happen, they will generate an obligation to repair (either to a private individual through a pecuniary indemnity or to society through a criminal sanction).

For these reasons it is interesting to compare institutions with algorithms: a set of automatic procedures -and therefore devoid of arbitrariness on the part of any of the agents- that, according to the data provided by the environment, yield a range of possible results. In a modern political legal system (equality before the law, division of powers, political responsibility of high officials, principle of closure, etc.), such results show at the individual level a certain range of prohibited actions (the aforementioned principle of closure, everything that is not prohibited is allowed). At the individual level, an institution as an algorithm will allow us to predict what an individual will not do, but not what he will concretely do outside of that range of prohibited actions. At the governmental level, the opposite occurs: institutions allow us to anticipate what judicial decisions will be, which in turn will have to review laws and decrees that violate the rights and guarantees of individuals.

However, while institutions can function as algorithms, providing predictability to individual decisions and policies, they cannot function in a vacuum, but they need to be integrated into a legal and political system. This is so that it is impossible to enunciate them if it is not within the parameters configured by such systems. If institutions are algorithms, legal and political systems are abstract machines that select and integrate such institutions. It is the institutions integrated into a legal and political system that constitute a framework of incentives for human action.

Such institutions evolve following a natural selection pattern, when the legal-political system allows to act a negative feedback system mainly articulated by judicial decisions and precedents that readjust their meaning and content for the resolution of concrete controversies based on principles emanating from the legal system itself. Of course, each system represents the materialization of a set of values. Those of modernity, for example, are based, among others, on the dignity of the human person, which translates into the right to individual autonomy.

An ethic of political responsibility that defends such values can be carried forward by rescuing an abstract system of dispute resolution between individuals that refrains from designing society from a central command. In many cases, such an ethic of responsibility must face ideological political programs that are presented under the guise of an ethics of principles.

Such antagonism is asymmetric, since the central design of society presents its followers with a concrete model and the promise that everything works. Although, this only leads, in practice, to an increasing number of decisions based on expediency. Thus, the opposite of the predictability and absence of arbitrariness of a system of spontaneous coordination of individual plans.

[Editor’s note: You can find Part 8 here, and the full essay can be read in its entirety here.]

Institutions, Machines, and Complex Orders (Part 8): Inequality before the law, de facto

06/24/201906/16/2019 Federico Sosa Valle Culture, Law complex orders, coordination problem, F.A. Hayek, François Furet, ideology, incentives, inequality, institutions, Kenneth Minogue, public policy, rationalization, spontaneous order

François Furet, in the preliminary essay that serves as an introduction to The Past of an Illusion, entitled “The Equalitarian Passion,” highlights that in the Ancient Regime inequality was legally consecrated, while after the French Revolution, inequality persists surreptitiously, of contraband, thus cementing a feeling of vindication in the face of illegitimate inequality. Something similar happens in a system of regulations that, with the intention of serving the common good, re-establishes, de facto, a system of monopolies and oligopolies.

It is paradoxical that a political legal system made up mostly of general and abstract rules finds an unintended consequence of an increase in general well-being, while a regimented system based on a specific goal of social justice and growth finds itself as an involuntary stagnant consequence and with high rates of inequality. However, attentive given that no one can be judged morally for their involuntary results and instead for their intentions, it is commonly interpreted that the success of societies organized around abstract and general principles cannot be adjudicated to such principles, as it is also considered active policies that deliberately seek the common good cannot be reviewed by virtue of their poor results, but in any case what deserves to be discussed are the means to reach such objectives.

Once this point is reached, we discard any political program that does not have a purpose of reform or transformation based on a specific objective and in which the political discussion is about society models and the means to achieve in the practice of the realization of such models, the table is served for the ideologization of political discourse. Kenneth Minogue had rescued the original concept of “ideology” -before the Marxist who points to a set of values of the ruling class at the service of the perpetuation of his power-, which dealt with the set of claims with scientific pretension that, through a redemptorist program, he proposed a series of concrete transformations of society. This word and notion comes from the ideologues of the French Revolution, which mostly fulfilled a pedagogical function.

Since the ideology of politics is installed, any doctrine that arises from its discourse in terms of defending a system of coexistence articulated around abstract and general norms and lacking a specific purpose of designing the society according to a certain model. In the political arena, therefore, there are political programs that seek to impose a certain model of society, articulated around a series of assertions with alleged scientific validity. Whatever the model of society under discussion, by the mere fact of proposing such political programs the transformation of society in function of those, the legal norms expressed in abstract and general terms that make up both the individual guarantees and the private right run the serious risk of being considered as an obstacle and an irrational hindrance of the past that prevents the realization of such models of society. This is the process that Friedrich A. Hayek had described in The Road to Serfdom.

The paradox is that a legal – political system composed mostly of abstract (that is, lacking a concrete purpose) and general (that is, the same for all citizens regardless of their status) rules allows to coordinate in a more efficient way the resources of those that a society has, through a better coordination of individual plans, about whose content we know nothing and whose final configuration is impossible to predict, that is, a complex social order. On the other hand, the abolition or gradual weakening of such a system of coordination in the allocation of resources and its replacement by a system of planning or centralized control of the economy and society based on a specific model generates an economic breakdown that only serves of excuse to redouble centralization in the administration of resources. At one point, neither the model of society nor the need to have a central planning to reach it, nor even that there is such a model or such a central planning of society, is only discussed, but it is indeed discussed which are the most appropriate means to “improve” said model.

That said, it is worth making a terminological clarification: what Hayek called in The Road to Serfdom “socialism” and then in Law, Legislation and Liberty “constructivism,” can be assimilated to a large extent to what Kenneth Minogue called “ideology” (although in truth, it must be recognized that Minogue, at the time, accused Hayek of being an ideological author). But, as Hayek himself clarifies in his prologue to the 1974 edition of The Road to Serfdom, the socialism to which he alluded in 1944 was not income redistribution programs, but the centralized planning of the economy and society . Similarly, Hayek’s critique of the notion of social justice concerns precisely those programs of political reform that seek to establish, through centralized planning, a designed social order. Another issue is the positivization of values through abstract and general rules. A negative income tax – as proposed by Milton Friedman at the time – can be implemented through abstract and general norms, as well as patterns of redistribution inspired by John Rawls’ theory of justice. The problem is not redistribution, but the replacement of a spontaneous social organization system with a centralized planning system.

At the heart of the dispute between the prevalence of a spontaneous social order versus its replacement by a system of centralized planning of society is a divergence around the concept of the abstract. The supporters of the centralized planning of society are convinced that, through the measuring elements provided by science, the wealth of social events can be selected in aggregates that allow forming an abstract model of society, which In turn, it allows planning its reform according to the ideal model of society in whose transformation the political program that gives it reason to be to the politician’s own activity and that justifies his ethics of responsibility.

Of course, statistical tools, which are constantly developing (Hayek himself was a professor of statistics, and from The Road to Serfdom to today appeared the desktop computer and the science of Big Data, for example), allow a better allocation of public resources in the implementation of government programs. It is very useful for the rationalization of the government administration to know how much the population is going to vaccinate, the poverty and indigence statistics in order to determine, for example, subsidies to the demand, or the needs of schooling at its various levels. However, if there is consensus on the need for a vaccination program, or on the importance of subsidizing access to certain goods or the importance of schooling the population, it is because the members of that society already have a set of principles about what is considered good or bad, desirable or undesirable, necessary or superfluous. Such abstract notions do not arise from the abstraction of social events in statistical aggregates, but, on the contrary, these abstract concepts allow to form the groupings by virtue of which the social reality will have to be interpreted.

Such principles are born, develop and evolve according to the game of continuous human interaction. As described above, they consist of uses and customs that individuals incorporate in the course of exchanges and that prove with the passage of time to provide a better performance to the members of the community that follow them. Accounting standards, public behaviour guidelines, compliance with the word pledged, good faith, are examples of such practices that are extended throughout the population by incorporating such standards into the habits of its members. It was what Max Weber at the time conceptualized as the emergence of “rational capitalism.” These principles are not immutable, but on the contrary they adapt to the circumstances. However, they also enjoy certain permanence in time that allows them to serve as a structure or parameter for rational decision-making, since such a structure of values prohibits a certain range of decisions, which makes its transitivity possible.

This system of discovery and spontaneous evolution of the abstract values according to which reality is perceived and its respective organized elements can assume various configurations and has its own process of immanent criticism. The egalitarian guidelines that we can characterize as typical of modern society, in which every human being has the right to have equal consideration and respect, were extended over less efficient structures such as those of the caste and estates societies, in which the restrictions of competition and the unpredictable exercise of political authority generate stagnation (what Acemoglu and Robinson call “extractive economic and political institutions,” as opposed to “inclusive”). For its part, the peaceful resolution of disputes through the right of judges allows readjusting the set of expectations with which each member of society usually makes its decisions.

Such a system of discovery of abstract values with which each individual can count on to coordinate their respective life plans and their corresponding immanent criticism through the judicial system is also susceptible of receiving a critical analysis by a reasoned examination regarding it and as a result of this, a new political legal order or partial reform of the existing one may arise through the legislative promulgation or even of a constituent assembly. A spontaneous order may have as its origin the enactment ex nihilo of it by a legislator, but among its defining characteristics is the note that it should not necessarily be so. Another of its defining characteristics is that the consequences of a political legal order, still created by the will of a legislator or constituent, cannot be foreseen in its entirety. Moreover, the future evolution of this order cannot be foreseen in its totality and detail. Such degree of uncertainty does not come from the deficiency or insufficiency of the elements of measurement that have for object to know the reality, but in the levels of complexity to which such order can arrive in their more abstract planes.

However, these degrees of complexity decrease drastically in the daily experience of the subjects that interact with each other, seeking to coordinate or compete in their respective individual plans, since each one of them knows what expectations to have regarding the actions of the rest of the subjects (the more “inclusive” the institutions are, the lower the degree of uncertainty). For the case in which two spheres of autonomy collide, the controversy will be resolved by a court that will have to say the content of the law for the specific case submitted to its decision. From this result, they will have to configure a set of expectations with which agents will know that they can count or not.

In contrast to this, at the level of the legislator and the political authority, such levels of certainty leave room for increasing degrees of complexity. Although there are many administrative decisions that can be taken with a high degree of probability of being successful following the procedures of administrative law and the general principles of law – what Max Weber described as a process of rationalization in political decision-making , the certain thing is that it arrives at a point in which the legal reasoning arrives at a limit – what in his moment Carl Schmitt characterized like an instance in which the right dies and leaves its place to the policy. This is where the political authority is faced with the need to dispense with the rationalizing element of law and articulate its decision-making process based on another type of “anchoring”: a philosophical doctrine, a conception of life, a political doctrine, a reason of state or an ideology.

Those who oppose the extension of political power over the autonomous institutions and processes of society maintain that such philosophies, reasons of state, or ideologies are mere masks of pure political will left to their free will. However, at least in principle, they can serve as limitations or at least elements of political responsibility of the ruler in a democracy. There are numerous cases in which a democratically elected governor receives criticism from public opinion regarding a supposed lack of consequence with his political doctrine, a double discourse, or the configuration of a consistent but mistaken ideology. Even so, except for the cases of impeachment and the impossibility of re-election, the tools to control the political reasons of the rulers and their consequences are rather scarce.

However, a distinction can be made between a simple political doctrine and an ideologized political doctrine – or, in Minogue’s terms, quite simply an ideology. A political doctrine can sustain a series of diffuse principles that do not exhaust a totalizing vision of reality. For example, German Christian Democracy can be defined equally by rejection of the extreme left, as the extreme right, a market freedom regulated by the State in order to preserve competition from the actions of monopolies (the “competitive order” of Ordo-Liberalism) and the moderate defence of certain values prevalent in society through the non-interference of the government in its autonomous processes, that is, a clear division between society and State. However, no one can define in detail an ideology of German Christian Democracy.

In many circumstances, this “de-ideologization” is interpreted as “pragmatism” or “opportunism.” However, there is also room for opportunism in the interpretation of a political ideology by the public power that invokes it as a reason of state. The great problem that “ideologies” or ideological visions of politics do present is that, by offering a totalizing and scientific version of reality, they can be used as tools to discredit the legal system.

It is true that a legal system could be replaced by another in its entirety through a legislative reform – in the case of private law, a new civil code, for example – or a constitutional reform. But once reformed or replaced by the new, unless a tyranny has been instituted, it becomes the new legal order that will limit the political power. The problem arises when there is a phenomenon that can be named as the “road to serfdom”: the continuous, permanent and incremental discrediting, erosion, violation and exception to the current legal order.

When such a process is presented, freedom understood as the absence of arbitrary coercion is in decline, since, by invoking a reason of state or a state of exception, the expectations with which individuals counted to form their plans of life are frustrated in a way impossible to foresee. As a result, the political legal order becomes perceived as arbitrary and its obligation to obey it put in doubt.

Another consequence of the phenomenon known as the “road to serfdom” is that the system of immanent criticism of positive law affected by the application of this by judges in the face of concrete controversies is eroded. As already mentioned, attentive to the open texture of legal language, the judicial system allows for marginal readjustments on the content of the law that represent a true process of evolution, in the sense of adaptation to changes in the environment. In turn, this readjustment introduces new expectations in the agents, which generates a change in reality and opens the way for a new interpretation change through the open texture of the letter of the law, in a real feedback process negative that gives stability and predictability to the system.

On the contrary, the state of emergency and emergency legislation, as well as legislative and judicial activism, which seek to modify the content of the law not to solve the internal contradictions generated by its open texture, but to transform it according to concepts alien to the law. Right, they erode such a negative feedback system of expectations and, far from achieving the modernization of the law, what they obtain is their obsolescence, their discredit, and their disobedience. See that in countries with a greater authoritarian tradition, the adherence to standards by the population is significantly lower than in countries where emergency legislation and the state of emergency was limited to cases of war.

[Editor’s note: here is Part 7, and here is the essay in its entirety.]

Institutions, Machines, and Complex Orders (Part 7): The open texture of the words of the law

06/23/201906/16/2019 Federico Sosa Valle Culture, Law Carl Schmitt, complex orders, constitutionalism, F.A. Hayek, government regulation, incentives, institutions, isonomy, language, norms, public policy, rule of law

However, the law itself has its own endogenous system of production of rules, which operates on the abstract plane of the configuration of the structure of the relationships between its terms, and whose dynamics depends on the negative feedback process implied by the judicial work itself to clarify the words of the law for each specific case to be decided. Both in codified law systems and in customary law systems, the current positive law is clearly defined. The legal systems in which previous judgments oblige judges are even more rigid than codified systems, since in the latter it is enough for the legislature to enact a new code for the positive law to change. On the contrary, the judges must make a hermeneutical effort to modify the doctrine consecrated in a judicial precedent without this constituting an arbitrary ruling.

However, both in coded and customary legal systems, the law, which is always enunciated in express statements, carries with it the phenomenon of the open texture of language. These are not the cases of ambiguity, vagueness, or obscurity of the letter of the law. These latter cases can be solved by the doctrine, composed of scientific works that investigate the debates between the members of the legislative power at the moment of sanctioning the norm whose text carries such problems, or resorting to the normative antecedents of which the current law took its vocabulary.

However, vagueness, obscurity, and ambiguity in the words of the law configure linguistic problems with legal relevance, but not legal ones in themselves. What really matters to study are the cases of open texture of the language of the law, since it is through these cases that the law evolves.

In cases of open texture of language, the anomaly occurs in the universe of events to which the language refers. An obvious example: a constitution written in the 19th century can establish that the President is the Commander-in-Chief of land and sea forces. It would not be necessary to reform its text to incorporate the air force – or even weapons built to act outside Earth’s orbit.

However, the dynamics of legal traffic are mostly made up of less obvious cases in which the open texture of language forces judges to establish the words of the law for the specific case, resorting to a hermeneutic interpretation of the law for which “common sense” is not enough. In customary law these hard cases are those that generate a new precedent that often define what is inside and what is outside the “good legal sense.” The authors disagree among themselves on how to characterize this aspect of judicial work. However, the remarkable thing is that these “difficult cases” generated by the phenomenon of the open texture of the language are what make the law respond autonomously to changes in the conditions of the environment that the same right has as a regular task.

Indeed, Friedrich Hayek states in Law, Legislation and Liberty an attempt to separate law and politics based on the evolution of law according to a process of natural selection of norms. While it expressly recognizes that a legal system can be sanctioned in its entirety by the legislator, it also highlights the ability of legal systems to make an immanent critique of themselves, through the judicial system.

Although Hayek does not analyse the phenomenon of the open texture of language in his work, it does characterize law as a structure of norms that continually readjust to changes in circumstances following a negative feedback process, through successive judicial decisions. In Hayek’s own words, what establishes a legal order is a set of expectations about the behaviour of congeners that will be considered or not according to law. For example, if a party fails to meet its contractual obligations, it can expect the other party to refuse to comply with them and that, if sued, the latter will be supported by the courts. This expectation also works as an incentive to fulfil contracts and reduce litigation.

On the other hand, another feature of legal systems -particularly modern ones- that Hayek highlights is the definition of a range of expectations that will be systematically thwarted. This is what determines a structure for human action and implies the consecration of the principle of closure: everything that is not expressly prohibited is allowed. This allows individuals to form their life plans with the expectation that they will be fulfilled and with the ability to anticipate the behaviour of their peers, since they will be under the same incentive structure. The latter leads to a third characteristic of modern legal systems, which allows them to function as self-regulated systems: the principle of isonomy or of the same law for all. The incentive structure determined by the range of expectations that will be systematically frustrated, in a system that results from the same application for each individual, allows the definition of individual spheres of autonomy, within which each individual has free discretion, but when entering into collision with each other, each one will be able to infer what expectations they can have regarding a possible judicial ruling.

The reverse of this system is the “Administrative State,” by Carl Schmitt, in which only that which is expressly authorized by a decision based on expediency, and the status system of the Ancient Regime, is permitted, that each group had a private legal system or privilege-strictly speaking, our current modern system of rights consists in the extension to all human beings of the liberties or privileges that the nobles had wrested from the kings at the time. Therefore, it is a great risk that the number of regulations is such that the rule becomes that only what is specially expressly regulated can be done, depending on the dynamics of the change of the decision of the authority taken in administrative files, and that such is the segmentation of regulations according to pressure groups and interest groups, that they return to a system of privileges instead of equality before the law.

It is not difficult to find numerous current examples: the public transport system could reach levels of regulation such that it could practically be said that only such activity can be carried out with the express authorization of the public authority to that effect. The alternative is not the absence of regulation, on the contrary, the alternative is the modern State of Law: a set of positive norms, dictated by the competent authority and formulated in general terms. These rules that regulate public transport do not have an abstract content, but rather a concrete one: the set of objectives expressly set by public policy. While the rules of private law have an abstract content, that is, they lack a specific purpose, the rules of public law not only have a specific and specific purpose, but that such purpose must be expressly declared, in such a way that justice they can evaluate whether the willing means disposed by the public authority are related and proportional to the purpose of the rule of public law and, in turn, the citizens consider whether such ends are worth pursuing.

To continue with the exemplification of public transport of passengers and merchandise: there is a sphere that corresponds exclusively to private law. This refers to the rules that attribute legal responsibility between the transporter and the transported: the obligation of the transported to pay the ticket or the freight, the obligation of the transporter to transfer the people and goods without them suffering damages. In this sphere there is no concrete purpose of the norm. It only limits itself to stating the set of expectations that the parties can count on, regardless of who they are specifically and what the specific purpose of the transport is.

Correlatively, the regulation of public transport, which belongs to the orbit of public law, does have certain specific purposes. For example, take care of public safety and ensure an efficient distribution of the cost of accidents. For this purpose, it may provide that public transport companies register, periodically review the status of their units, which must meet certain minimum standards, and establish the obligation to contract civil liability insurance. Anyone who complies with these provisions, for example, could devote himself to the activity of public transport, passengers or merchandise. How many and who will be the transporters is something that the public transport regime should not compete with. The number of carriers will be fixed by the price system. Nevertheless, to the control of public transport must concern that the units that circulate are in good condition, that their drivers are suitable and have an insurance that covers their civil liability, so that the transported does not have to face the cost of accidents before an eventual bankruptcy of the carrier. On the other hand, the system of private law, in a parallel and autonomous way, distributes the responsibilities between the parties, without addressing who is each one.

[Editor’s note: Part 6 can be found here, and the full essay is here.]

Notes On Liberty

Spontaneous thoughts on a humble creed

Author: Federico Sosa Valle

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 7 of 12)

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 6 of 12)

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 5 of 12)

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 4 of 12)

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 3 of 12)

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 2 of 12)

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 1 of 12)

Efficient markets as normative systems

Discovery Processes

There is no such thing as a sunk cost fallacy

Institutions, Machines, and Complex Orders (Part 9); Conclusion: legal-political institutions and systems

Institutions, Machines, and Complex Orders (Part 8): Inequality before the law, de facto

Institutions, Machines, and Complex Orders (Part 7): The open texture of the words of the law

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