A Reflection on Information and Complex Social Orders

In the year 2020, occidental democracies face a time of lock-downs, social distancing, and a sort of central planning based on epidemiological models fueled by testing methodologies. An almost uniform consensus on the policy of “flattening the curve and raising the line” spread worldwide, both in the realms of politics and science. Since the said … Continue reading A Reflection on Information and Complex Social Orders

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 4 of 12)

Different degrees of law enforcement Law enforcement systems range from ideal types of pure blind and automatic rule enforcement to pure discretion. The ideal of automatic law enforcement denies the reality of errors, the fragmentation of knowledge of special circumstances of time and place, and information costs. Meanwhile, complete discretion is the very negation of … Continue reading Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 4 of 12)

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 6 of 12)

It could happen that a government feels very comfortable collecting a certain amount of money in traffic fines for crossing a red light. For example, the fine amounts to $1,000 – and the probability of application is 1%. In this way, drivers have little experience of having been fined despite the fact that they know … Continue reading Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 6 of 12)

Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 2 of 12)

Obviously, there is a whole question of information and transaction costs surrounding the game between empirical social norms and positive legal norms. The former are more agile and immediate, better adapted to the circumstances, but at the same time they are not enough to guarantee peace when the interests at stake gain social relevance. There … Continue reading Liberal Democracies and Authoritarian Regimes: The Case for Law Enforcement. (Part 2 of 12)

Three Lessons on Institutions and Incentives (Part 5): “Spontaneous” institutions

When Friedrich A. Hayek referred to the coordination problems among rational agents as a consequence of the dispersion of information in the economic system -and that made him worthy of the Nobel Prize in Economics- he did not refer to an information problem that could be solved with better statistical tools. This is also a … Continue reading Three Lessons on Institutions and Incentives (Part 5): “Spontaneous” institutions