Ukraine

From the Comments: Musings on the Ukraine Fiasco

Brandon Christensen Comments, Current Events, Politics , , , , ,

Riffing off of my post about the current crisis in Ukraine, Matthew writes:

Based on the track record of Russia vis a vis the West, I imagine the following scenario unfolding:

Russia (continues) to occupy the Crimea, while America and Europe (continue) to demand the withdrawal of Russian forces from the province. Putin, calculating that the West lacks the stomach for direct confrontation, refuses. Hysteria in the media and in government publications, which are ultimately the same thing, rises. A lack of direct conflict between Russian and Ukrainian forces, however, lends little credence to the mass panic broadcast over Western media. The furor dies down in time. Russian presence becomes normalized in the Crimea.

Or, the interim government, bolstered by further illicit monetary aid from America, pulls a Georgian move and attacks the Russian forces stationed in Crimea. Russian forces will quickly rout the Ukrainians sent against them, and most likely march towards Kiev – whether they take it or not will depend on the response of the international community, as with Georgia. Regardless of who instigated the violence, the Western media will blame Russia, and the war drums will grow louder. UN sanctions are unlikely, since Russia is a permanent member of the Security Council, but some form of economic punishment will occur. Russia will draw closer to China, Iran, and Syria. The status quo ante will be upended in no one’s favor: Ukraine will be in shambles, Russia and America will be set at odds.

Regardless of the above two scenarios, meanwhile, the Ukrainian economy is in free fall, and the IMF offers the dual poisons of austerity and liberalization to the interim government. Facing an intransigent Russia and the wolf-faced smile of the West, the interim government accepts the IMF’s offer. Like Russia before it, Ukraine is left even worse for wear by the rapid pace of economic liberalization, and is thus too weak to resist the Russian presence in Crimea. Thus, the West has succeeded in breaking off a chunk of post-Soviet Ukraine and bringing it into its influence, while Russia largely retains what it had beforehand: its Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, along with the de facto annexed province of Crimea. It is too early to tell, but perhaps the rest of Russified Ukraine will also join their brothers in Russified Crimea, and the state will break up along linguistic lines.

Who can tell what will occur? My money is on Russia, but maybe Obama will come up with some game winning stratagem (don’t snicker!).

Does anybody else care to make their predictions? You know where the ‘comments’ sections is!

О ситуации с Украиной и Россией

Evgenii Grigorev Current Events , ,

Являясь единственным автором постов в сообществе Notes On Liberty, который живет в России и может как-то “иначе” рассказать о текущей ситуации между двумя странами, хочу сделать небольшое заявление, которое, скорее всего, поддержит большая часть населения России. Я хочу обратиться ко всем авторам и читателям сообщества из других стран: будьте умнее ваших новостных лент и газет. Большинство ресурсов освещают ситуацию крайне односторонне – с той позиции, которая выгодна лишь одной стороне. “Правый сектор” (украинская неонацистская организация, которая сейчас имеет влияние в стране) рисует нас зверями и оккупантами, зарубежные газеты также поддерживают позицию нового правительства Украины, которое пришло к власти в результате переворота и пока что не может считаться легитимным. Сейчас против России ведется настоящая информационная война! Нам не нужна Украина, и нам не интересен и не нужен раскол этой страны, так как все мы “братья-славяне”. Совет Федерации России одобрил введение ограниченного контингента российских войск в Крым исключительно для защиты Черноморского Флота от возможных провокаций, а также для защиты русских граждан, проживающих в Крыму, так как в условиях нестабильности местные органы защиты вряд ли смогут в полной мере пресекать провокации анти-российских группировок. Еще раз повторю: фраза “совет федерации одобрил введение ограниченного контингента” по Российским законам означает лишь одно – у президента Российской Федерации теперь есть законное право на введение войск, НО не факт, что он им воспользуется. Разумеется, вооруженный конфликт никому не нужен, и нам в первую очередь. У нас всех есть друзья-украинцы, у многих на Украине живут родственники. Мы, по-правде, с недоумением относимся ко всем этим событиям, которые происходят сейчас.

Пожалуйста, не судите о конфликте лишь с одной стороны. Не знаю, какими новостными ресурсами вы пользуетесь там, CNN, BBC, Russia Today или чем-либо еще – потрудитесь разобраться в проблеме со всех сторон, потратьте свое время на всестороннее изучение вопроса, не удовлетворяйтесь первыми полученными результатами, которые скорее всего будут отражать позицию вашего президента или правительства.

Ukraine, Russia, the West and a Coasean Bargain?

Brandon Christensen Current Events, Politics , , , , , ,

Economist Tyler Cowen worries about the events in Ukraine:

For Russia, matters in Ukraine are close to an existential crisis, as Ukraine is intimately tied up with Russia’s sense of itself as presiding over a mini-empire of sorts.  Nor could an autocratic Russia tolerate a free and prosperous Ukraine, developing along the lines of Poland.  America cares about Ukraine less, and cares more about Syria and Iran, or at least cares about saving face in those latter venues.  Therefore there is a Coasean deal to be had between America and Russia, where Russia gets to partition part of Ukraine, create a buffer against Europeanization and democratization, keep the larger Ukraine unit weak, and also keep its Black Sea fleet.  In turn Russia would do something less than totally sabotage all American plans for Syria and Iran.  (Of course that is Coasean for the leaders, and not necessarily for the citizenries.)

The thing is…China.  What kind of signal would such a Coasean deal of partition send to China?

That is what I worry about.

I argee that there is a Coasean bargain to be had between the US and Russia in this case, but it’s not the one Dr Cowen sees. Let’s assume that the US does have more interest in the Middle East than it does in Russia’s backyard, but even with this assumption I don’t think it follows that the West will give up Ukraine for Syria and Iran.

The West has been down in the doldrums lately, it’s true, but there is still plenty of fight left in it and plenty of resources with which to do the fighting.

Really quickly: I know I’ve mentioned this before, but making two states out of one (“partitioning Ukraine”) will be a good deal for almost everybody involved (the minorities in Russian Ukraine will not fare so well). As it stands today, Ukraine is simply too big to be governed effectively. This is a problem with many, if not most, post-colonial states in Asia, Africa and Europe.

International recognition is something that would be observed by almost all sides (minorities in Russian Ukraine will not like it), which is one of the requirements I’ve pointed out that needs to be completed before secession (or partition) is undertaken in post–colonial states.

The other major requirement is that the new states are part of regional or international trading unions of some sort. The more the better, but any is a start. Russian Ukraine will be good to go, as it would be in Russia’s orbit, and the West could easily ensure that the Ukrainian Ukraine gets more attention than it now currently has. This is where the West should dig in its heels and fight: After partition. Ukrainian Ukraine will need to be drawn into the West’s economic orbit rather than offered up as a sacrificial lamb, and this definitely doable. This is the Coasean bargain, not Ukraine for Iran and Syria.

The China angle Dr Cowen brings up is also an interesting one. Beijing is authoritarian not stupid. Here is what conservative military leaders in Beijing probably see:

Ukraine might get no love from the EU or the US, but it is much weaker than Japan or South Korea or even Taiwan. So China could not take any of these states militarily without high costs, while Russia could conceivably take all of Ukraine without significant military losses (the political damage would be too much for Moscow, so it won’t happen; but it is a possible scenario).

Русские и Евромайдан

Evgenii Grigorev Current Events , , , ,

Думаю, что все в курсе последних событий на Украине. Постоянные митинги в поддержку Евроинтеграции, подозрительное молчание со стороны правительства, силовой разгон мирных акций демонстрантов, захват правительственных кварталов… На фоне этих событий отношения между Россией и Украиной изменились не только на “высшем” уровне, но и на уровне общения отдельных граждан. Для тех, кто не сильно разбирается в вопросе, поясню, что руководство Украины решило временно заморозить проект о интеграции с Европой, мотивируя это тем, что Украина испытывает на себе давление со стороны России. Вроде как и в Европу хочется – и “старший брат” (то есть Россия) не пускает. С нашей стороны, точнее, со стороны правительства России идет что-то типа шантажа или давления, я пока никак не могу понять. Казалось бы, события мирового уровня не должны были отразиться на взаимодействии простых людей братских народов, однако это далеко не так. Сейчас очень много украинцев считают русских виновными в том, что правительство Украины приостановило Евроинтеграцию. Как будто каждый отдельно взятый гражданин России виновен перед народом Украины. Отсюда следует определенное ухудшение отношений между гражданами двух стран. По крайней мере по общению в интернете, многие злы на русских. При этом, как мне кажется, президент Украины просто пытается усидеть на двух стульях: и в Европу попасть, и с нами отношения не испортить, но такого в принципе не может быть. Украина находится в таком положении, что необходимо принять какое-то одно твердое решение. Как по мне – так лучше бы президент Украины подписал соглашение о Евроинтеграции, по крайней мере отношения между людьми бы нормализовались. По большому счету, это является главным.

Интересно, какие мнения по этому вопросу у моих заграничных коллег, и как в Америке относятся к событиям в Киеве? Я читал, что Барак Обама крайне негативно отозвался о действиях властей Украины и в частности о применении силы против мирных демонстраций. Но меня больше интересует не мнение правящей элиты, а комментарии обычных жителей. Жду развития дискуссии в комментариях!

Is the European Union “socialist”?

Brandon Christensen Current Events , , , , , ,

The short answer is ‘no’, but first, Justin Raimondo writes:

The EU is a failed socialist experiment that exists to fund a huge (and hugely arrogant) bureaucracy and impose a bloodless ideological abstraction over and above the authentic nationalisms it seems to subsume. It is deeply authoritarian in that it provides no mechanism for member states to withdraw, and its super-centralist model is a prescription for tyranny if ever there was one. When a referendum is held on EU membership, and the results aren’t to the pro-EU side’s liking, the election is simply ignored and the Eurocrats mount yet another campaign until the “right” result is achieved.

I thought I’d highlight this paragraph for a couple of reasons:

1. It explains the tensions inherent in the EU from a nationalist viewpoint (as opposed to the internationalist view most often espoused on this blog), and the tensions between defining the place of centralized and decentralized power in a society. Although Raimondo’s hyperbole might cause some of us to blush, I think it actually adds to the depth of the nationalist argument as it better captures the sentiments of these factions. That is to say, I think the nationalists in this debate are a bit more boorish than the internationalists and as such Raimondo exemplifies their arguments despite being an American.

2. It shows why facts are important and in the long run much more valuable. Socialism, by definition, is the state ownership of the means of production. Is there anything about the EU that suggests it wants to “nationalize” industry? Anything at all? Of course not, which is why you often find populists – even of the “libertarian” kind – to be hyperbolic, arbitrary and vague in their arguments (for a better treatment of populism, see this old piece here at NOL). In the long run getting these definitions right is important. Slandering a faction or an organization you don’t like as ‘socialist’ (or ‘bourgeois’) may earn you a couple of brownie points from the peanut gallery, but you are very likely to steadily lose influence in the arena of ideas by peddling such drivel.

The EU is a confederation of states (much like the pre-Civil War US) and entry and exit are entirely voluntary. The EU, more than any other institution save for perhaps the US military, is responsible for the unencumbered peace throughout Western Europe since the end of World War 2. To suggest that the EU is somehow ‘socialist’ not only confuses younger, more susceptible readers but it also weakens one’s own arguments. If, for example, Raimondo is going to label the EU as ‘socialist’ when it clearly is not, what should I think about his arguments when he labels Israel as ‘fascist’ or Russia as a ‘defender of national sovereignty’?

Foreign policy is an important component of libertarianism, and if we continually allow our arguments to be defined by populist organizations like Raimondo’s antiwar.com then I fear libertarians will continue to be (rightly) ignored in the more traditional venues of foreign policy discussion.

Bad News Bears: Ukraine, Russia and the West

Brandon Christensen Current Events, Politics , , , , , , , , , , , ,

No, I’m not talking about the Bruins choking in Pasadena earlier tonight. I’m talking about the Ukrainian government’s decision to balk at the latest Western offer for integration.

Well, at least I think it’s bad. The New York Times has all the relevant information on what happened between Kiev and the West. According to the Grey Lady, Kiev either balked at an IMF offer or had its arm twisted by Moscow. Both scenarios seem plausible, but I’d like to dig a bit deeper.

Ukrainians have been hit hard by this global recession, and last year they elected a government that is much more pro-Russia than it is pro-West. Unfortunately, I think the economy is only a small fragment of what ails the people in the post-colonial, post-socialist state of Ukraine (some people have started labeling “post-” states as “developmentalist” states; I like it but I’m not sure readers would). First of all, here are some relevant maps:

Ethno-linguistic map of Ukraine
2012 presidential election results in Ukraine
Map of per capita income in Ukraine

Notice a pattern? Yeah, me too. Basically, Ukraine is split along ethnic lines between Russians and Ukrainians and instead of recognizing this fact and focusing on property rights reforms first and foremost, the Ukrainians have decided to try their hand at democracy (on the inability of democracy to solve political problems in multi-ethnic states, see Ludwig von Mises’s Nation, State and Economy 72-84).

The conflation of democracy with property rights as freedom has been the single biggest mistake of all societies in the post-war world. From Ghana to Indonesia to Iraq to India to Ukraine, elites have focused their efforts on implementing democracy rather than property rights, and the inevitable, unfortunate results (“dictatorship and poverty”) continue to frustrate me. I’m sure the people who actually have to live under these conditions don’t like it much either.

Wouldn’t it be better if the current Ukrainian state  split into (at least) two independent states? I ask because it seems to me that having (at least) two different states will cut the number of losers in half (losers of elections in “post-” societies truly are losers; it’s nothing like having to “live under” Obama or Bush) and make the new, smaller governments more accountable and more accessible to the people.

The other aspect of Kiev’s rejection of Western integration that troubles my mind is that of the attitudes towards liberalization of Ukrainian society that many people obviously harbor.

For example:

  • Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians overwhelmingly support more integration with the West. There are demonstrations (and I use this term loosely; riots may soon start) against the government’s decision to balk at the West going on right now.
  • And Russian-speaking Ukrainians (being Ukrainian can be either an ethnic thing or political thing [“citizenship”], which just goes to show you how stupid anything other than individualism is, but I digress) overwhelmingly support Moscow.

Yet it seems to me that both sides take the “pro-” and “anti-” stances that they do more out of spite for the other side than out of an understanding of what liberalization actually entails (I base this hunch on my watching of the recent elections here in the US). It’s also not clear to me that a pro-Western tilt would actually lead to more liberalization.

It may be easy for the Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians to integrate and work with the West, but I think the Russian-speaking Ukrainians have good cause to look upon pro-Western deals with suspicion. After all, the Russian speakers are the richest faction in Ukraine, and freer trade with the West  would seriously undermine their political power (why do you think Russian-speaking Ukrainians have all the good jobs?).

Perhaps Evgeniy can enlighten us on the Russian perspective.

If Evgeniy doesn’t have the time you could just read Daniel Larison’s thoughts on the matter (Dr Larison is a historian with a PhD from the University of Chicago who specializes in the Slavic world).