Author: Warren Gibson

Bank Deregulation: Friend or Foe?

Warren Gibson Economics, History, Law , , , , ,

Banking has changed a lot during my lifetime—for the better. The changes are partly due to technology (ATMs, online access), but also to deregulation that subjected banks to a lot more competition. What were the major deregulatory moves and how might they have contributed to the recent crisis? Before addressing those questions, a little personal history.

I got interested in money and banking at a very young age. My mother often took me along on shopping trips, explaining what money was, why we needed it in stores, and how my father got it for us. Trips to the bank were a special treat. The Cleveland Trust branch near us was an imposing affair, with a limestone façade, high ceilings, and tellers ensconced behind ornate barred windows. The architecture was intended to instill confidence, but to me it was just a magic place.

Later, my sixth-grade class operated a student branch of another bank, the Society for Savings. Twice a month our classroom was rearranged like a bank branch. Tellers (all boys, as I recall) would accept student deposits of a dime, a quarter, or sometimes a whole dollar. Assistant tellers (girls) would write the amount of the deposit in the student’s passbook, while the boys handled the cash. After closing we tallied the deposits and packed the loot—perhaps $50—into a canvas bag, and a privileged student would trundle it off to the principal’s office under the watchful eyes of two “guards.” What great lessons we learned: thrift, honesty, attention to detail!

By the time I was 14 I was earning good money shoveling snow, raking leaves, and mowing lawns. I had become something of a saving fanatic. I soon found out that the local savings and loan (S&L) offered higher interest than commercial banks, so I opened an account there. Savings passbooks seem quaint in hindsight, but mine was a treasured possession, a tangible reminder of my growing nest egg. Continue reading →

An Act of Self-Defense: A Review

Warren Gibson Books, Liberty , ,

“The Tree of Liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants,” said Thomas Jefferson.  Erne Lewis does a terrific job of adapting this theme to 21st-century America in his new novel, An Act of Self-Defense.

Like Atlas Shrugged, his story is set in an immediate future where the economy is collapsing, and more so than in Atlas, personal freedoms are vanishing.  Unemployment is at 20 percent and all communications are recorded and tracked by the NSA.  RFID badges are worn by all federal employees and will soon be required for all citizens.  A small group of patriots takes matters into their own hands, and the action is fast and furious.

Lewis draws the correct battle lines of our time: not left versus right but libertarian versus fascist.  The f-word correctly describes anyone on the left or right who would use government power to suppress personal or economic freedom while leaving nominal ownership in private hands.  The novel’s villains are of both stripes, some of them decent people who entered politics with good intentions but became corrupted.  That leaves libertarians as the only consistent defenders of what Ludwig von Mises called the “Free and Prosperous Commonwealth” founded on the rule of law, particularly respect for property rights.

I had to wonder, when reading his portrayals of  atrocities committed by government agents: How much of this is fiction?  Can they do such things?  Are they close? Have they already?  The Patriot Act is law, so the atrocities seem disturbingly plausible. Continue reading →

Rare Earth Elements: Stockpile or Markets?

Warren Gibson Economics , , , , , , , , , ,

Quick, what do you know about lanthanum, praseodymium, neodymium, or dysprosium? If you said they are chemical elements, you are right: numbers 57, 59, 60, and 66, to be exact. They and their neighbors on the periodic table, collectively “rare earths,” were once mere curiosities tucked in between barium and tungsten. Now they’re having their day in the sun, thanks to new technology, as did uranium and plutonium when atomic energy was developed. The military may begin stockpiling them.

Good idea or not?

My first encounter with these elements was a project that developed high-tech shock absorbers to protect a replacement camera for the Hubble telescope during the camera’s rough ride to orbit. These devices, called M-Struts, pioneered the use of permanent magnets for shock mitigation. The only material our team found that would provide sufficient magnetic flux density (a measure of the strength of a magnetic field at a given point) was a rare earth alloy, NdFeB (neodymium-iron-boron). This material could only be procured from China.

M-Struts were a one-off project that had no discernible effect on the demand curve for neodymium. But now the demand curve is crowding up against the supply curve largely because of rare earth applications in “green” energy devices such as wind turbines (extra points if you knew that). Continue reading →

Global Warming: Be Skeptical

Warren Gibson Current Events, Liberty

I have been teaching advanced high school physics as a substitute teacher recently and enjoying it very much. But I was disturbed by what I saw in the text chapter entitled “Waves, Light and Climate Change.”

First of all, I don’t think a discussion of climate change belongs in an introductory chapter on light and its wave properties. Elementary texts should stick to firmly established science and mention complex, controversial issues as footnotes if at all. The authors thought otherwise – not only did they tack this topic onto the light/wave chapter, they headed the chapter with this alarmist quote:

Quite simply, I think it is no exaggeration to say that climate change is the biggest problem our civilization has ever had to face up to in its 12,000 years, because it requires a collective response.

What does “collective response” mean? Such bland phrases often translate into coercive wealth grabs by politicians. More importantly, the notion that human activity is having or will have a significant deleterious affect on our environment, which is what “climate change” means these days, is not firmly established at all in my view. (I have no expertise in climatology.)

There is a spectrum of viewpoints on global warming, ranging from outright denial at one extreme to hysteria on the other. Neither position is defensible. At one extreme, I was very disappointed to hear Ron Paul, a long-time hero of mine, describe global warming as a massive hoax. It’s not. The other extreme is represented by quotes like this, one of many printed in the margins of the physics text:

We are playing Russian Roulette with our climate … the Earth’s climate system is an angry beast subject to unpredictable responses …

Some facts that are not in dispute:

  1. There are “greenhouse gases” in the atmosphere that block some of the re-radiation of solar energy; that is, light that bounces off the earth’s surface and would otherwise escape into space. This blockage increases atmospheric temperature, other things being equal. Without any greenhouse gases, so much solar energy would be re-radiated that we would freeze to death.
  2. The primary greenhouse gases, in order of their importance are H2O (water vapor), CO2 (carbon dioxide), CH4 (methane) and N2O (nitrous oxide).  Water vapor is self limiting – when its concentration reaches saturation, it rains. So there is no point in to trying to reduce atmospheric water vapor concentration. So if global warming is significant and we want to do something about atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, we have to concentrate on CO2.
  3. It is a fact that concentrations of CO2 have increased substantially, from about 280 parts per million in pre-industrial times to about 380 at present. Most of this increase can be attributed to burning of fuels.
  4. The arctic ice sheet has exhibited marked melting in recent years. But some reports have ice increasing in the antarctic.
  5. Solar flares are a major driver of climate change on earth.

Now it gets murky. To begin with, it is very difficult to generate a meaningful average temperature for the entire earth. Temperatures vary widely from place to place and from time to time. Therefore extreme care must be taken in aggregating and interpreting temperature data.

Secondly, computer modeling is a very tricky business. I know; for many years I did computer modeling of systems far simpler that the entire earth’s atmosphere, and there are lots of pitfalls, notwithstanding the sophistication of contemporary methods. In finite element analysis or computational fluid dynamics the analyst lays an imaginary gridwork over the system in question, with independent variables like temperature and pressure at each node point. He makes simplifying assumptions about the behavior of variables between grid points and may end up with hundreds of thousands of simultaneous equations to be solved repeatedly as the virtual clock is stepped forward in time. If the grid is too coarse or the time steps are too large or the assumptions too gross or the starting conditions are inaccurate or the integration algorithms are not robust or the software has bugs – the whole undertaking can go haywire.

Third, increases in temperatures or sea levels must be put in perspective. A small amount of warming – one or two degrees C – would be a benign outcome for almost all of us – perhaps reduced heating costs or shifts in agricultural production. A one foot increase in sea level would be trivial almost everywhere.

But what about the strange weather we’ve been having? Given the media propensity for focusing on disasters, it’s no wonder it seems that way but hurricane intensity, for example, compares with that of past seasons. Recent weather isn’t particularly strange.

We need to think through all sorts of approaches, including geo-engineering, and conduct cost/benefit analyses for each. The end goal – human welfare – must always be kept in sight. I highly recommend Bjørn Lomborg’s thoughtful book, “The Skeptical Environmentalist.” Lomborg is a careful scientist who acknowledges the reality of global warming and pleads for careful examination of all plausible approaches.

Lastly, we must realize that this is a global problem. Anything the U.S. might do to reduce CO2 emissions would be dwarfed by increased CO2 emissions in China, where automobile ownership is surging and new coal-fired power plants are being built. Certainly California’s program, which went into effect this year, will have no noticeable effect on global concentrations, unless it sets an example that the Chinese decide to follow. Even if they do, cap-and-trade schemes such as California’s may not work out as theory says they should. Such has been the record in Europe.

Gold and Money, II

Warren Gibson Economics, Liberty , , , , , ,

Last [blog post], we examined some propositions about gold as money, drawing from theory and history. [In] this [blog post] we ask whether and how gold might once again serve a monetary function.

Money of any sort, commodity-based or not, derives its value in large part from what economists call a “network effect.” Like a fax machine, whose value depends largely on how many other people have fax machines, we value money because other people value it. We feel confident our money will buy us what we need tomorrow. A strong network effect means that something drastic has to happen before people will give up their familiar form of money.

Something drastic was happening when U.S. Rep. Ron Paul’s Gold Commission was set up in 1979. By the time the commission’s report was issued in 1980, inflation had reached alarming levels: The consumer price index was at 14 percent and rising. The prime rate was over 20 percent, and in 1980 silver exploded to $50 an ounce and gold surpassed $800 (about $2,300 in today’s dollars). Bestselling books urged people to buy gold, silver, diamonds, firearms, and rural hideouts.

We now know that inflation was peaking and that the silver price spike was a fluke caused by a failed attempt to corner the silver market. But none of this was apparent at the time, so it was reasonable to wonder whether our monetary system would survive. What did happen, of course, was that the new Fed chairman, Paul Volcker, stepped on the monetary brakes hard enough to break the back of inflation. Two back-to-back recessions resulted but were followed by a long period of recovery in which both inflation and interest rates dropped steadily. The Gold Commission was largely forgotten, though the U.S. Mint did get into the business of producing gold coins in a big way. Continue reading →

Gold and Money

Warren Gibson Current Events, Economics, Liberty , , , , , , ,

Nothing seems to arouse passions—pro and con—quite like suggestions that gold should once again play a role in our money. “Only gold is money,” says one side. “It’s a barbarous relic,” says the other. Let’s turn down the heat a bit and look into some propositions about gold. That should lead us to some reasonable ideas about whether or how gold might return.

Propositions About Gold

Gold has intrinsic value. Actually, nothing has intrinsic value. The value of any good or service resides in the minds of individuals contemplating the benefits they might derive from it. What gold does have is some rather remarkable physical properties that make it very likely that people will continue to value it highly: luster, corrosion resistance, divisibility, malleability, high thermal and electrical conductivity, and a high degree of scarcity. All the gold ever mined would only fill one large swimming pool, and most of that gold is still recoverable.

Only gold is money. Although gold was once used as money, that is no longer the case. Money is whatever is generally accepted as a medium of exchange in a particular historical setting. Right now, government-issued fiat money, unbacked by any commodity, is the only kind of money we find anywhere in the world, with some possible obscure exceptions.

Perhaps people who say this mean that gold is the only form of money that can ensure stability. That’s what future Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan thought in 1967, when he wrote “Gold and Economic Freedom” for Ayn Rand’s newsletter. “In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation,” he said. When later asked by U.S. Rep. Ron Paul whether he stood by that article, Greenspan said he did. But he weaseled out by saying a return to gold was unnecessary because central banks had learned to produce the same results gold would produce. Continue reading →

Who Owns the Fed?

Warren Gibson Economics, History, Liberty , , ,

Have you heard? The Federal Reserve System raked in profits of $79.3 billion last year, almost triple what runner-up ExxonMobil made. The Fed’s business model is a snap—just print money—and unlike poor beleaguered Exxon, the Fed has no competition to worry about. This means a gigantic windfall for the big banks because, although they don’t like to admit it, they actually own the Fed.

Or not. These are all half-truths and distortions, all too easy to find on the Internet. Bloggers like to begin with the discovery that commercial banks hold shares of Fed stock and those shares pay an annual dividend. A further discovery that the Fed makes big profits is all it takes to send some of them off on a conspiracy tangent. Because shareholders in a profit-seeking corporation are its owners, so it must be with the Fed, they think. Profiteering, world-government schemes, and who knows what else, must surely follow. As I will show, these half-baked ideas are distractions from the serious issues that surround the Federal Reserve System.

Yes, commercial banks hold shares of stock in their local Federal Reserve branch, but these shares do not confer ownership in any meaningful sense. Ownership is defined as the legal and moral right to use and dispose of some asset. Ownership can be conditional or temporary, as when you lease an apartment and acquire the right to occupy it for a limited time, but not to run a business in it or do major renovations. Your purchase of shares of stock in a public corporation gives you rights to vote in shareholder elections, receive any dividends declared, and sell your shares—but that’s about all. You may not walk into the corporate offices and start giving orders; on the other hand, you may not be held liable for any misdeeds of corporate officers or employees. If you acquire shares in a nonpublic company like Facebook, you accept additional restrictions on when and to whom you may sell your shares.

Member banks receive a fixed 6 percent annual dividend on their Fed stock and enjoy limited voting rights. But there the resemblance to ordinary shares ends. The banks are obliged to acquire shares when they become members of the Fed, and they may not sell their shares or pledge them as collateral. An initial issue of stock was seen as a good way to capitalize the Fed when it began, but there has been no need for additional capital and those shares are no longer significant.

Each branch has a board of directors with six members elected by local member banks and three appointed by the central board of governors. However, board members are not all bankers. Moreover, under a rule recently enacted by Congress, only nonbankers may serve on committees that select Fed bank presidents. This new rule is one way in which the ground has been shifting under the Fed recently; more about this below.

In the beginning the Fed was quite decentralized. A dollar bill in my wallet is imprinted “Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco,” a remnant of the formerly dispersed power. The headquarters operation was initially a modest one, operating out of an office in the Treasury Department, but it now has its own imposing building, greatly expanded powers, and a correspondingly larger staff. With so much power now centralized, the branches engage mainly in monitoring local conditions and passing recommendations up to the board of governors. They have also become known for differing interests and points of view. The St. Louis Fed, for example, has an excellent collection of data available to the public. The Cleveland Fed is known for innovative research.

The Fed is a nonprofit institution, but that designation means only that profits are not its primary mission. The Red Cross is also a nonprofit, and like the Fed, it does earn a profit during any year in which gross income exceeds expenses. From an accounting point of view, such profits are essentially the same as those earned by firms in competitive markets, but not from an economic point of view. Competitive profits serve the vital function of directing scarce capital resources to the most urgent unmet demands of consumers. The Fed’s profits serve no such function.

Its income consists primarily of interest earned on its securities portfolio. Until recently the portfolio was made up almost entirely of Treasury securities. It has expanded greatly since 2008 to include mortgage-backed securities, loans to such pillars of the financial system as Harley-Davidson, and other assets including direct real-estate holdings. It incurs operating expenses of the usual sort: salaries, buildings, supplies, and more.

Remember that $79.3 billion profit? The 2010 figure, far higher than the $47.4 billion recorded for 2009, did not benefit the Fed’s managers or member bank shareholders because the money was remitted to the Treasury. That’s the law. It happens every year. If any private firm earned that much in a year it would be headline news and a boon to stockholders. For the Fed this is just an interesting statistic.

Who Calls the Tune?

The answer to the question “Who owns the Fed?” is that it’s the wrong question. Instead, we should ask: Who calls the Fed’s tune? That’s not such an easy question, yet it’s the only way to reach an understanding of why the Fed acts as it does and why it has done so much economic damage.

First and foremost, the Fed was created by Congress and can be modified or abolished by Congress. Clearly Congress is the Fed’s most important constituent.

The U.S. president also holds substantial sway over the Fed. He appoints the seven-member board of governors subject to Senate confirmation. The powerful Open Market Committee, which makes monetary policy decisions, consists of those seven plus the president of the New York Fed and four seats that are rotated among the 11 regional presidents.

But even though it exercises ultimate control, Congress has given the Fed a degree of independence that no other federal agency enjoys. Although its profits are swept back to the Treasury, the Fed enjoys a sweet deal that is unavailable to ordinary Federal agencies, which must plead with Congress for an annual appropriation. The Fed spends whatever it wants on operations, constrained only by the necessity to keep up appearances—not to look like fat-cat bankers. Its profit is whatever remains after all expenses have been paid, and, in contrast to ordinary corporate accounting, after dividends have been paid.

The Fed’s vaunted independence is a good thing, the thinking goes, because we don’t want the stewards of our money to be caught up in the swirl of day-to-day politics. But independence trades off against accountability. After all, in a democracy the bureaucracies are supposed to be accountable to Congress. The purse strings are the primary means of accountability among the other agencies, but there are no such strings tying Congress to the Fed.

Such control as commercial banks exert is not so much a function of their nominal stockholdings as it is of their connections through the network of good ol’ boys that weaves through government and “private” financial institutions. The Fed surely looks out for the interests of major private institutions, especially big banks, insurance companies, and securities firms. It does not want big-bank failures or a stock-market crash. It must be cognizant of foreigners who hold $3 trillion in U.S. Treasury debt and are keenly aware of the Fed’s actions and pronouncements.

These incentives have little to do with the Fed’s official dual mandate: stable prices and high employment. That mandate was established by the Employment Act of 1946 and the Humphrey-Hawkins act of 1978. These were times when no one questioned the Keynesian idea that inflation and unemployment always trade off against each other (the Phillips curve) and that monetary and fiscal policy must steer a course between two extremes. If the proponents of the mandate could see the relatively stable prices of recent years coupled with high unemployment, they would call for major Fed “easing.” If they then found out how much easing we have already had and the consequent monstrous increases in debt, they would surely be speechless.

Swift Changes

Some congressmen are calling for reassessing the dual mandate. This is just one way in which things are changing fast for the Fed. This once-staid institution is under increasing attack and is finding it necessary to defend itself, as when Chairman Ben Bernanke came out of his cloister to appear on 60 Minutes, a decision he may regret given the reaction to his astonishing claim that further “quantitative easing” will not increase the money supply.

New rooms are being added to the Fed mansion even as the sand shifts under it. Congress has given it extensive new powers unrelated to monetary policy, most notably a new consumer protection agency. The idea is that the Fed’s independence will ward off regulatory capture, something that always seems to happen to ordinary regulatory agencies. We shall see.

Rep. Ron Paul is the Fed’s most prominent critic. Last year his bill to require an audit of the Fed garnered a great many cosigners in the House. He reintroduced it at the start of the 2011 session, this time with his son Rand Paul on hand in the Senate to file the same bill there.

But in some ways the Fed is already quite transparent. Its website has extensive reports, updated regularly and more detailed than any releases from commercial banks or private corporations. And while deliberations of the powerful Open Market Committee are secret, detailed minutes are now made available shortly after each meeting.

In other ways it is quite secretive. For example, the Fed refused to disclose the names of banks that got loans during April and May 2008, denying Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests filed by Bloomberg and Fox News. Responding to lawsuits, the Fed did not claim it was a private institution and therefore exempt. Instead it cited potential harm to the banks that had borrowed, but the court sensibly ruled against a “test that permits an agency to deny disclosure because the agency thinks it best to do so. . . .” The information was released.

“End the Fed” has become a rallying cry for Ron Paul and his supporters. His little book by that name will not earn any academic awards, but as a mass-market polemic it does a good job of making his case without conspiracy theories or private-ownership sideshows. There is, however, room for honest debate about fractional-reserve banking, which he opposes.

About the Fed, though, Ron Paul is right. Whatever good intentions its managers may have, the Fed, like all central banks, exists ultimately as an enabler of ever bigger government. My colleague Jeffrey Rogers Hummel may be right when he says the Fed is becoming the central planner of the U.S. economy. But when we argue for replacing the Fed with market institutions, we must take the time and effort to get our facts straight and to expose the complex network of special interests that supports the Fed. Wrongheaded and simplistic arguments only hinder the cause.

[Editor’s note: this essay first appeared in the Freeman on April 21 2011] 

What’s Up with Inflation?

Warren Gibson Current Events, Economics, History, Liberty

Inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has been almost nonexistent for several years, though it started creeping higher in the first half of 2011. Yet many prices have been rising at double-digit percentage rates. Are official figures trustworthy? And what of expectations? There is a great deal of buzz right now about inflation but also talk of renewed stagnation with the Fed’s QE2 program having ended in June. Could renewed stagnation trigger enough deflation to counter inflation? Or might we get the worst of both worlds—stagflation—as in the 1970s?

We can’t get anywhere with these questions until we agree on the meaning of inflation. At one time the word referred to an increase in the money supply. Over time it came to mean a general increase in prices, an unfortunate turn of events not just because we lost the nice metaphor of an inflating balloon, but also because the shift in meaning tended to obscure the relationship between the two phenomena. Some free-market authors hold out for the old definition, but I suggest this is wasted effort. In my classes I use the phrases “price inflation” and “money inflation” to keep the distinction alive without getting too sidetracked by semantics.

In 1970 Milton Friedman said, “[Price] inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” This is not entirely true but understandable because he was writing at a time when the causal relationship had nearly been forgotten. We can have price inflation without money inflation when there is a supply shock. An overthrow of the Saudi government, for example, might well disrupt the flow of oil from that country. A surging oil price, because it is so important to our economy, would likely pull up the price level with it. In this situation the monetary authorities can help things by doing exactly nothing—letting higher energy prices do the work of encouraging marginal users to cut back. Supply shocks, as such one-time events are called, do not of themselves generate sustained price increases and are therefore not classified as inflation by some economists. Continue reading →

Open Season on White Males

Warren Gibson Liberty , ,

California has a statute (I hesitate to say “law” but that’s another story) called the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act. Will all those in favor of child abuse or neglect please raise their hands? Nobody? So how could anyone object?

Some background: the statute designates certain people as “mandated reporters” of child abuse or neglect. These “reporters” include people whose duties involve regular contact with children, or supervisors of such people. Some higher-ups at the California State University System, which includes San Jose State where I teach a single class, hit the panic button recently and decided every employee in the whole system, tens of thousands of people, would be designated a “mandated reporter.” This would include not just teachers but also janitors, clerks, administrators, etc.

This decision sets up some really nasty incentives.

First, designated reporters are subject to fines and/or jail time if they fail to report an incident. Nothing is said about penalties for filing false reports. Therefore, sure as God made green apples, reports will surge. Anyone who even remotely suspects something that smacks of child abuse will file a report because they have nothing to lose by doing so and a lot to lose by not doing so.

Second, those who file reports are not civilly or criminally liable for their reports. Their identities are kept secret. Here we have a door wide open for anonymous attacks on anybody for just about any reason. Anybody can concoct a story and then hide out, knowing their target could well spend ungodly amounts of time and money digging himself out from under the accusation.

Notice I said “himself.” White males are prime targets, especially those who are “politically incorrect,” including this humble writer.

It’s true that I and many of my colleagues have almost no contact with children. An under-eighteen student might on rare occasions find her way into one of our upper division classes. So it would seem we are at minimal risk. But in fact we are at great risk from charges of something similar to child abuse: sexual harassment. As far as I know there isn’t a mandated reporter law about sexual harassment but that hardly matters – I’m sure we can get in just as much hot water if charged with sexual harassment as with child abuse. All it would take is some female student, unhappy with her grade, to concoct some story about goings-on in my office, or merely some remark or look I supposedly gave her in class. Again, I’d be toast.

We have been ordered to sign a form acknowledging our status as child-abuse reporters. We’ll see. And that’s not all: an online indoctrination course is coming our way. I endured a similar course at Santa Clara University and I cringe at the prospect. Note to students with an entrepreneurial bent: start a business taking these “courses” on behalf of recalcitrant faculty.

Incidentally, where is the union when I need them? Yes, there’s a faculty union which has been helping itself to part of my paycheck for many years now without my permission and with no discernable benefit to me. As yet I have heard nothing from the union on this matter, and I don’t expect to.

Boombustology: A Review

Warren Gibson Books, Economics , , , , , , , , , , ,

These days commentators near and far are announcing booms and bubbles in Treasury securities, gold, China – perhaps even a bubbles. Vikram Mansharamani is in the China camp, but his arguments stand out from the others. If you can get past the title of his book – Boombustology – you will be rewarded with a thorough, well-documented, yet mercifully brief and readable exposition of a theory of booms and busts applied to past events and China’s future.

Most macroeconomists see the boom-bust cycle as an unsolved problem. Like physicists in search of a Grand Unified Theory, they long for a model that accounts for all the major aspects of the business cycle. Perhaps they are hampered by looking through the wrong end of a telescope. Mansharamani uses not just one but five “lenses” to examine the subject. In addition to micro- and macroeconomics, they include psychology, politics, and biology. He is not the first economist to invade these fields. Rather his accomplishment lies in assembling ideas from each of those areas, applying them to past boom-bust cycles, and putting his ideas on the line by issuing a brave prediction of a forthcoming Chinese economic train wreck.

Austrian Business Cycle Theory

The author’s macro lens includes Austrian business cycle theory. That theory says inflation of the money supply causes a drop in interest rates, which is misinterpreted as an increased aggregate preference for saving over consumption, leading to investments in more roundabout means of production. When it becomes clear that there has been no such preference shift, these undertakings are seen to be at least partial mistakes, requiring write-offs and retrenchment – a bust. The boom is the problem, not the bust, which is the market’s attempt to realign itself to the realities of time preference. Austrian business cycle theory has great merit but leaves some things unexplained.

Mansharamani’s micro lens includes the concept of reflexivity. Market participants don’t just observe prices but also influence them. Reflexive dynamics occasionally give rise to instabilities in which rising prices lead to increased demand.  A simpler term would be a “bandwagon effect.” I recall an office party in 1980 where one of the secretaries asked about buying gold – precisely at the peak, as it turned out. All she knew about gold was that it was way up and therefore must be going higher. I should have realized that when you see financially unsophisticated people like her climbing on a bandwagon, you can be pretty sure there’s no one left to sell to and nowhere for prices to go but down, which is where gold and silver prices went in 1980, and in a big hurry.

From psychology Dr. M. borrows ideas and data about cognitive biases. For example, subjects asked to guess some bland statistic, like the number of African countries that belong to the UN, are influenced by the spin of a wheel of fortune: When the wheel lands on a high number, they guess higher. He translates this and a dozen other cognitive biases into irrational market behavior that can foster booms and busts.

He introduces his biology lens with an analogy to the spread of an infectious disease. When the prevalence of a disease reaches a high level, the infection rate necessarily slows and the disease begins to wane, just like the 1980 gold market.  But it is devilishly difficult to “inoculate” oneself against infectious ideas. Individual investors who can do so have a decent chance to beat the market averages over time, I believe. (Those who would pursue these ideas in greater depth would do well to find James Dines’s quirky and expensive but worthwhile book, Mass Psychology.) Continue reading →

Inside Insider Trading

Warren Gibson Economics, History, Liberty

Insider trading is something we hear a lot about these days. To most people, the practice smells of foul play, and federal law restricts it. But the inside story of insider trading is something very different, as we shall see. The alleged ill effects on shareholders in particular and on the economy in general are mostly illusory, and in fact insider trading produces benefits that are little understood.

If I may first indulge in a little personal history: I was once a corporate insider. Two friends and I started an engineering services firm in 1982, and we set it up as a corporation. The paperwork required to register the corporation was minimal, but the law allowed us to offer shares only to specially qualified individuals, in addition to ourselves and our employees. Actually this rule wasn’t binding on us. We didn’t want to be answerable to strangers so the only “outsiders” we sold to were a couple of relatives, whom we later bought out.

Most Silicon Valley firms like ours aim to “go public” at some point—that is, sell shares to the general public to raise additional capital and reward early investors. We had no such ambition. We did not want to jump through all the hoops required in an initial public offering, nor did we want the continuing hassle of running a public corporation. (Since that time hassles have been multiplied by Sarbanes-Oxley.) However, we might have benefited from something short of a full public offering, where we would have offered shares to a wider but still limited set of shareholders.

Yet SEC rules allow only a very restricted offering or a full public offering, and nothing in between.

What if we had gone public? The law would have restricted our ability to trade our own shares for reasons roughly as follows: Insider trading would violate our fiduciary responsibility to our shareholders. As managers of a public corporation we would have placed ourselves under a board of directors answerable to shareholders. Our job would be to watch out for shareholder interests, not subordinate them to our own private gain.

There is some truth in these arguments. Shareholders can never be totally sure that management is looking out for their interests. Corporate regulations and employment contracts can do a lot to minimize these “agency problems,” as they are called, but perfection is not possible. Purchasers of shares should be aware of the risks they take and act accordingly. But none of this justifies insider-trading restrictions. Continue reading →

The Long and Short of Short Selling

Warren Gibson Economics, Law, Liberty

Short selling is a little-understood, much-maligned tactic by which traders can profit from their belief that a company’s stock is overvalued.

Following the financial problems of the last two years, short selling has come under fire, with new or revived regulations proposed to curb the practice. It is unpatriotic, destructive, and destabilizing, say the critics. Such complaints are nothing new. President Hoover blamed short sellers for the continuing market declines of 1931 and 1932, threatening regulation or even outright prohibition. “Individuals who use the facilities of the [stock] Exchange for such purposes are not contributing to the recovery of the United States,” he grumbled.

Defenders say short sellers add liquidity to markets. When short sellers are present, buyers encounter a more liquid market because they face a larger pool of sellers than they would otherwise. More sellers—more liquidity—means more predictable prices and smoother price changes. Shorts can put a damper on runaway enthusiasm, and when they are right, they can hasten the demise of failed businesses.

The mechanics of short selling are simple. You borrow stock and sell it, hoping its market price will decline so you can repay your loan with stock that you buy cheaply. In the meantime, you are said to be “short” that stock, the opposite of the situation of someone who owns the shares and is “long.” For widely traded stocks, brokers can easily find shares to borrow, either from their own inventory or from customers who have agreed to make their shares available. For thinly traded stocks it may be difficult or impossible to find shares to borrow. The short seller must pay the lender the amount of any dividends that the stock pays while he is short. And most brokers require cash on deposit to cover the obligation to buy the stock later on. Continue reading →

I Bid $100,000,000,000,000,000

Warren Gibson Liberty

The debt ceiling was technically reached on Dec. 31 and the Treasury is now engaged in shell games that will keep the lights on until about March 1.  After that, the consequences could be pretty messy, as explained here.  The Treasury will not have the cash needed to pay current bills and will have to stiff somebody — Social Security recipients, federal employees, suppliers or who knows.  I wouldn’t be surprised if some smart people are trying to think of ways to get money from the Fed, which has a monopoly on money creation, to the Treasury while sidestepping the Debt Ceiling.

If the Republicans try to use the debt ceiling as leverage to get the spending cuts they say they want (not defense cuts of course), they will lose.  Obama will cross his arms, there will be chaos for a few days, and then the Republicans will cave and the president will win.  Another tactic is needed.  Here’s my modest suggestion to the Republicans: raise the debt limit to $100 quadrillion ($100,000,000,000,000,000).  For one thing, it’s time we learned a new “illion.”  I know, it wasn’t long ago that we learned to say “trillion” but we might as well get quadrillions teed up and ready to go.  More seriously, this move would focus on the Obama spending orgy and the explosion of debt that could follow.  Default on the debt or hyperinflation would not just be financial upheavals but could rend the very fabric of society.  This is where the Republicans should focus, not on the debt ceiling.

Federal Deposit Insurance: A Banking System Built on Sand

Warren Gibson Economics, History, Law, Liberty ,

Federal deposit insurance grew out of a turbulent time in American history: the Great Depression. During two waves of bank failures in the 1930s an astonishing 9,000 banks closed and millions of depositors lost some or all of their savings. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) began operations in 1934, insuring deposit accounts up to $5,000 per person (roughly $80,000 in today’s money).

The bank failure rate then dropped dramatically and never again rose anywhere close to the level of the 1930s. And such bank failures that have occurred have cost insured depositors nothing; many uninsured depositors were made whole as well. Bank runs are a distant memory, revived occasionally by reruns of It’s a Wonderful Life.

Yet it may be premature to pronounce deposit insurance a success. It can take a long time for an unsustainable program to unravel: Witness Social Security and Medicare. Seventy-five years after the start of Social Security and 45 years into Medicare, it’s common knowledge that both programs are headed for a financial cliff. A closer look at deposit insurance will show cracks in its edifice, raising questions about its sustainability as well as the distortions that it has introduced into the economy.

Before we take that closer look we might ask whether, as is widely assumed, the bank failures of the 1930s were an example of unregulated free markets run amok. During that time, as Milton Friedman and Anna Schwarz pointed out in their classic, A Monetary History of the U.S., the number of bank failures in Canada was exactly zero. Canada is closely linked to the United States economically and culturally, making this episode as near to a controlled experiment as any macroeconomist could wish for.

The difference? Canada had just ten nationwide banks with about 3,000 branches, while branch banking across state lines, and often within states, was prohibited by U.S. law. Thus smaller communities could only be served by relatively weak, poorly capitalized banks. A hailstorm might be enough to topple the local bank in a small farming community as surely as if it were built from straw.

The banking system was also caught in the downdraft of a plummeting money supply. When banks hold only a fraction of their liabilities as reserves, deposit inflows cause the money supply to multiply, but the reverse happened during the Depression as worried depositors began to cash out their accounts. The economy could have adjusted to a declining money supply in one of two ways: either by lowering prices and wages or by Federal Reserve injection of new money. Hoover’s jawboning and Roosevelt’s New Deal legislation precluded the first solution, while the Fed, out of ignorance or confusion, failed to inject new money. With economic adjustment prevented by government policies, a vicious cycle of souring bank loans, liquidation of deposits, further declines in the money supply, and more business failures took hold.

Interestingly, Milton Friedman and Murray Rothbard, both free-market economists, reached opposite conclusions about the declining money supply. While Friedman blamed the Fed, Rothbard celebrated what he saw as the people’s attempt to overturn fractional-reserve banking, which he believed is inherently fraudulent. Either way, the fingerprints of government were all over the bank failures of the 1930s and the Great Depression generally.

With the failure of so many banks, U.S. Representative Henry Steagall vigorously pushed deposit insurance legislation. Franklin Roosevelt was among his opponents. Indeed, when asked about guaranteeing bank deposits four days after his inauguration in March 1933, Roosevelt said he agreed with Herbert Hoover:

“I can tell you as to guaranteeing bank deposits my own views, and I think those of the old Administration. The general underlying thought behind the use of the word ‘guarantee’ with respect to bank deposits is that you guarantee bad banks as well as good banks. The minute the Government starts to do that the Government runs into a probable loss. . . . We do not wish to make the United States Government liable for the mistakes and errors of individual banks, and put a premium on unsound banking in the future.”

FDR was right. Deposit insurance generates moral hazard: an incentive to engage in more reckless behavior when one’s misdeeds are covered by someone else. Bank managers tend to make riskier loans than they would without insurance, and depositors don’t worry about the lending practices of the banks they patronize. Currently many people, including me, buy bank certificates of deposit through online brokers, perhaps not even learning the name of the bank that got our money. The magic letters FDIC are all we look for.

Savings & Loan and Moral Hazard

The savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s saw a catastrophic explosion of moral hazard. Deregulation had lifted interest rate caps for S&Ls and allowed them to expand from residential mortgages into commercial and consumer lending. Competitive pressures sent managers scrambling into these markets, which were mostly unfamiliar to them, while at the same time they had to compete vigorously for deposits. With deposit insurance offered to all chartered institutions regardless of risk, S&Ls made many preposterous loans. When the dust settled, roughly half had failed. A massive taxpayer bailout followed and, as very rarely happens to failing government agencies, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation was abolished in 1989—though its responsibilities were shifted to the FDIC.

Moral hazard is an aspect of all insurance, public or private. But private insurance companies, if they wish to survive and prosper, must find ways to limit policyholders’ risky behavior. Deductibles, copays, threats of cancellation, and rewards for prudent behavior return some monetary incentive to policyholders. In addition, insurance companies try to educate policyholders about prudent behavior. Crucially, in a free market private insurance companies’ profit-and-loss statements tell whether they’re getting it right. Government agencies lack profit-and-loss discipline and are inevitably subject to political pressure. The FDIC’s legally mandated requirement to hold reserves to back its liabilities may resemble market discipline, but as we shall see, when the mandate was violated, no one lost his job and no investors lost any capital.

Private insurance companies invest most of their reserves in productive activities such as corporate securities or real estate. They count on earnings from these investments to balance low or even negative returns on their pure underwriting activities. The FDIC, by law, holds its reserves in the form of Treasury securities. Any alternative would certainly be riskier and more politically charged. Yet we must recognize that this arrangement, as with the Social Security Trust Fund, is merely a pass-through of the FDIC’s liabilities to U.S. taxpayers.

The FDIC reserve fund is called the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). For most of its history, the DIF was kept within its statutory limit, which has varied over time but is currently a range of 1.15 to 1.25 percent of insured deposits. At least, that’s the statutory range. It’s actually essentially zero. But are the statutory numbers the right ones? No one can be sure, but again, the FDIC lacks a profit motive to help get it right.

A spate of bank failures in 2008 and 2009, while far less severe in number and magnitude than in the 1930s, left the DIF with no unencumbered assets at all. The pace of bank failures continued during the first three months of 2010, while the number of problem banks on the FDIC’s secret list jumped 27 percent in the fourth quarter of 2009, to 702. In short, the FDIC is in trouble.

A restoration plan has been proposed to get the DIF back to 1.15 percent of insured deposits by about 2017, a date that has been pushed back more than once. The plan relies heavily on an assumption that the economy will soon resume robust growth and that “only” about $100 billion in failure costs will be incurred between 2009 and 2013, with most of those costs coming in 2010. For the shorter term, the proposal calls on commercial banks to prepay their deposit insurance premiums through 2011. When they do so, a new asset will appear on their balance sheets: a prepaid expense. To gain their acceptance and cooperation, the FDIC proposes that this prepaid expense be counted as an asset that is just as safe as U.S. government securities and therefore does not require additional capital backing. This shuffle will be pretty much a wash for the commercial banks, and the upshot is that the FDIC will indirectly borrow its own future premium income, hoping that income will materialize in amounts sufficient not only to cover future bank failures but also to rebuild the DIF. We shall see.

The DIF is not the FDIC’s only problem. When closing a failed bank, the agency tries to sell as many of the bank’s assets as possible, including branches, loans, and securities holdings. The FDIC’s goal is usually to make all depositors whole, not just insured depositors. It sometimes takes possession of assets for which it can’t get an acceptable bid. In doing so it acquires assets that are difficult to evaluate and thus greatly complicate estimates of future liabilities.

Disguised Risk

Now let’s take a longer look at the business of banking. The very words we use, like “bank” and “deposit,” can distort our thinking. The word “bank” comes from the bench or counter where medieval money changers did business. The word “deposit” suggests something like an ore deposit in the ground: the minerals are there and can be gotten out. We think of banks as custodians of our money, keeping it safe for us and making it available whenever we need it. But present-day banks are not deposit banks, locking our money away in a vault as the term would suggest, but rather loan banks. Most of our deposits are loaned out and not all of them could be redeemed on short notice. This works fine as long as there is no large and sudden short-term demand for withdrawals. But we have come to believe, in part due to misleading terminology, that we can have rewards without risk. Interest paid on bank deposits is now essentially zero but as depositors, we still reap benefits such as ATMs and online banking with no fee and no apparent risk. In short, as in so many areas of contemporary life, we have been led to expect something for nothing.

Thus proper labeling could help rationalize banking. Those who want utmost safety in the form of true deposit banking should be free to pay for it with fees for storage of their currency or gold. Liability insurance for true custodial service should be very cheap. Those who wish to entrust their money to loan banking should accept the risk, and if they want insured accounts, they—not taxpayers—should be prepared to pay for the insurance, at least indirectly.

While there is nothing inherently wrong with loan banking, we get too much of it when it is disguised as deposit banking and backed by mispriced and politically motivated government insurance. The result is a banking system that is more highly leveraged than it otherwise would be. This in turn increases the severity of business cycles—booms and busts.

FDIC Incentives

Back to the FDIC. As we have seen, banks pay for its service in the form of insurance premiums. Coverage is not mandatory, so the organization looks somewhat like a private business. But in fact it is a monopoly supplier to banks (with a parallel institution serving credit unions). Private competitors are locked out, perhaps not by statute, but by the FDIC’s implicit and explicit backing by the Treasury (explicit in the form of a line of credit). Without a profit motive, the FDIC lacks the incentive to serve its bank customers and its indirect depositor customers by offering innovative services with effective moral-hazard controls.

Though the FDIC lacks market incentives, it is awash in political incentives. Thus in 2008 Congress voted for an increase in deposit coverage from $100,000 to $250,000 with little or no discussion of the costs of this move. This “temporary” increase has been extended once and will likely become permanent. Members of Congress are of course motivated by the campaign contributions of bankers and others, and may not know or care about the long-term consequences of such actions.

Private Options

How might private firms handle bank deposit insurance? Before the government takeover of the banking system, private clearinghouses sometimes provided mutual aid among member banks. The Suffolk Bank in Boston was a notable example in the early 1800s. It supported country banks in New England for many years by clearing their transactions and accepting their currency at par. It earned a profit doing so.

But could private firms ever be big enough to provide bank deposit insurance in today’s multitrillion dollar economy? Reinsurance firms offer evidence that they could. As their name indicates, General Re and other such firms insure insurance companies. Who insures the reinsurance companies? No one. Absent government intervention, these firms would experience diseconomies of scale when they grow too large, provided it is clear that they would not be in line for a government bailout should they get into difficulty.

Failure is an important aspect of the free market. Economist Joseph Schumpeter’s pithy phrase “creative destruction” captures this notion and reminds us that failures, which will always be with us, should be liquidated so that others can pick up the remains and apply them to more promising enterprises. Shouldn’t this idea apply to banks as well? Rothbard actually celebrated occasional bank runs as a way of putting the fear of God into bank managers and depositors alike. Amazingly, Roosevelt’s initial response to the deposit insurance proposal echoed Rothbard’s: “There are undoubtedly some banks that are not going to pay one hundred cents on the dollar. We all know it is better to have that loss taken than to jeopardize the credit of the United States Government. . . .”

Washington-Wall Street Banking Cartel

Make no mistake, our current banking system is, and has long been, a cartel run for the mutual benefit of Wall Street financiers and their regulator friends in Washington. Case in point: Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were allowed to convert to bank holding companies so that they could receive federal bailout money. The $180 billion AIG bailout provided Goldman with 100 cents on the dollar for its holdings of AIG credit default swaps.

Let us not be so naive as to believe that government deposit insurance is any different. Any benefit this system provides to small depositors is incidental to its real objective: to serve the cartel.

The banking system is in need of real reform. More regulation? More virtuous regulators? Only the naive, the ignorant, or the disingenuous can believe these answers in the face of regulation’s long history of failure, the practical impossibility of detailed oversight, and the perverse political incentives that always operate. The solution lies not in wiping out risk—there can be no real economic growth without risk. Instead, we need rational incentives: Let risks be borne by those best able and willing to take them.

[Editor’s note: this essay first appeared in the Freeman on May 20 2010]

GDP: Who Needs It?

Warren Gibson Current Events, Economics, History, Liberty

“For so it is, oh my Lord God, I measure it, but what it is that I measure I do not know.” –St. Augustine

Gross Domestic Product (GDP) gets a lot of attention these days. It’s fair game for bloggers, talking heads, perhaps your local barber.  While most agree that higher GDP is better than lower, there are problems, some better-known than others. Some theorists have considered the concept hopeless, such as Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern, who called GNP (the predecessor to GDP) “primitive in the extreme and certainly useless.” Lamenting the idea that the whole of a nation’s economic activity could be captured in a single number, he said that “very few men, even few economists, or should I say regretfully, especially economists, have a real appreciation and understanding of the immense complexity of an economic system.”

Let’s get the formal definition out of the way. GDP is the market value of all final goods and services produced in a particular country in a given year. The federal Bureau of Economic Analysis computes this number and releases it quarterly. The level of GDP is used as a basis for evaluating other things, like the national debt, which currently stands at about 85 percent of one year’s GDP in the United States. GDP growth rates are closely followed. These are inflation-adjusted, seasonally adjusted, and annualized, and are of course supposed to tell us how well the economy is doing.

Simon Kuznets gets credit for the first serious attempt to calculate national income figures, publishing his first work on the subject in 1941. Following in his footsteps, calculation of GDP and other “national income accounts” has become a core area of the economics profession. The explosion of economic and financial news has thrust GDP into the limelight in recent years. Continue reading →