Human Action

Human Action, Ch. 1

Bill Rein Philosophy , , ,

Well, I finally started reading Human Action. One connection stood out to me from the first chapter. 

First, there’s much more attention paid to fundamental philosophy than I expect from economic treatises. This is understandable given that Mises felt he had to set the stage — sparring, as he says, with the irrationalists, polylogists, historicists, positivists, behaviorists, and other economists within the youngest science. Every undergrad, cracking open Hobbes’ Leviathan, is startled to find lengthy remarks on human cognition in what they thought was only a work of political philosophy; this was a similar experience. 

There are noticeable allusions between von Mises and pre- and post-Tractatus Wittgenstein. Both Austrians and both Ludwigs, the economist writes that “It is impossible for the human mind to conceive logical relations at variance with the logical structure of our mind. It is impossible for the human mind to conceive a mode of action whose categories would differ from the categories which determine our own actions” (p. 25). Similarly, for the philosopher, the logical structure of thought (and language) was a central theme of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus; one of the young Wittgenstein’s conclusions was that some (ethical, aesthetic, metaphysical) postulates go beyond the limits of language and, when crunched into such human linguistic straightjackets, create sheer nonsense (leading to such maxims like, “What can be said at all can be said clearly…”) (TLP, §7).

Each Ludwig, of course, limited their inquiry to the human mind, discovering, like Kant, universal conditions of rational beings (or so I garner so far from Mises). 

Another methodological point in common. Ludwig von Mises, in section The Alter Ego, remarks on “the ultimate given,” an idea which, I believe, is unpopular in contemporary epistemology. The empirical sciences must reach final points of inquiry, upon which their tools fail to produce deeper insight. This is so because, to Mises, there are only “two principles available for a mental grasp of reality, namely, those of teleology and causality” (p. 25): teleology belonging to purposeful behavior, and causality to non-purposive objects of study. The former, applied ad infinitum, must stop at the unmoved mover, and the latter can only invoke an infinite regress. This point is important for deploying praxeology as a deductive science.

This doesn’t seem like a new insight, but it’s also one that Wittgenstein touches upon in a different way in Philosophical Investigations, writing in the first segment “Explanations come to an end somewhere.” The use of language in daily life does not imply ultimate, elucidated concepts between speakers; we never ask for these and likewise we do not need them to communicate. Reaching deeper into shared insight also leads to confusion; we talk of objects and ideas as ‘wholes’ and ‘composites,’ but these categories are not unambiguous. Wittgenstein situates the sense of concept-analysis only within a language game: “The question ‘Is what you see composite?’ makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity — that is, which particular use of the word — is in question. If it had been laid down that the visual image of a tree was to be called ‘composite’ if one saw not just a single trunk, but also branches, then the question ‘Is the visual image of this tree simple or composite?’, and the question ‘What are its simple component parts?’, would have a clear sense — a clear use.” So therefore, “To the philosophical question: ‘Is the visual image of this tree composite, and what are its component parts?’ the correct answer is: ‘That depends on what you understand by “composite”.’ (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question.)” (PI, §47).

In the future I might post on Mises’ short use of terms like “being,” “change,”and “becoming,” which he uses in a sense reminiscent of Parmenides.

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations. G. E. M. Anscombe trans.

von Mises, Human Action. Scholar’s Edition. Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Physics in Human Action

Fred Foldvary Liberty , ,

Some Austrian-school economists dislike analogies from physics in economics, because they don’t regard economics as mechanical. But since human action is physical, we can understand economics better if we understand the basics of physics.

We begin with space. For human action, space encompasses distance in three dimensions. For economics, space constitutes the sites in which activity takes place. The economics of space includes three-dimensional volume as well as a location. For human purposes, spacial land is fixed relative to the earth. Space is not altered by use, but it is consumed by using its value, as reflected by its rent, over time. There is also another type of economic space in the electromagnetic spectrum, made up of frequencies that travel through three-dimensional space.

The second rudiment of the universe is time, which has two meanings, a moment and a duration. Time is not an input into production, but a dimension of all activity. An analysis that examines a phenomenon over a duration is called “dynamic,” in contrast to the static analysis of a moment.

The third universal rudiment is mass, or its synonym, matter. Mass is what takes up space and has inertia. Economics categorizes mass as land (natural resources), human beings, capital goods, and trash.

A fundamental law of physics is that of conservation, that matter (and its sibling energy) cannot be created or destroyed, but only changed in form. But there is no conservation of value. In economics, production is the creation of economic value, processing inputs to make them more desirable. Consumption is the using up of economic value. Capital goods are items that have been produced but not yet consumed.

Linear velocity is the rate of the motion of a mass object in some direction. In economics, activity has a velocity as a mass of inputs gets processed into outputs, or objects get transported. There is also angular velocity in the speed of rotation, including the velocity of money as its turnover as measured during a year. Momentum equals mass times velocity, including a velocity of zero. Human action has momentum when activity proceeds at a constant speed and direction.

However, economic dynamics involves changes in speed or direction, which is acceleration (including negative acceleration or deceleration). A fundamental equation in physics is F=MA, force equals mass times its acceleration, Newton’s second law of motion. Newton’s first law of motion is that of inertia, that a body will retain its momentum unless an external force is applied. Force makes mass objects accelerate. On earth, mass has a weight due to the force applied by gravity

In human action, force can mean either a physical action, as inputs are moved and combined, or else a coercive action by either criminals or governments. The initiation of coercive force alters what people would otherwise voluntarily do. Such forceful intervention imposes a net loss of value on society by accelerating the mass of human action into directions or speeds that reduce its net utility. The economy and society maximize well being with rules that prevent coercive force.

Newton’s third law of motion is that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. When one body exerts force on another body, the other body exerts an opposite force on the first body. This law is what propels a rocket, as the force of the ejected fuel makes the rocket go in the opposite direction. Economic action encounters resistance to motion, or friction, which is good if we want to walk (as without friction we would slide around), but is bad if the friction consists of obstacles imposed by coercive force.

In economics, energy is the generation of heat, light, and movement. There are many forms of energy. In physics, potential energy is mass that can be accelerated into motion, such as an object that can fall down, or molecules that can be combined to create heat and light. There is kinetic energy of motion, with the equation: e = ½ mv2. Einstein’s equation reflecting the convertibility of mass and energy is e = mc2, but that has no relevance in the human scale of action.

In physics, work is force times displacement. Applied to human action, work is done when a person applies force (human exertion and tools) to a mass to change its location or composition, even if the change is only of bits in a computer memory. Work can also be a change in the kinetic energy of a system.

Another physics concept that has been applied to economics is equilibrium, a state of constant momentum, including zero velocity, where there is no incentive or force for acceleration. In economics, equilibrium is the exhaustion of gains from trade. At the moment you pay for goods at a store, you are in equilibrium, as you do not wish to trade any more money for goods. But a moment later, you are in disequilibrium, as some goods now have more value than the money you exchange for them. Market prices and quantities move towards equilibrium to remove a shortage or surplus or to gain from extra production, consumption, and trade.

We can see that the application of physics to human action is not mechanistic, as people act on their subjective values and beliefs and psychological inclinations, but their physical action is necessarily subject to the laws and concepts of physics. F=MA applies to human action as it does to physical particles.

Methodological Individualism

Warren Gibson Books, Liberty , ,

I am just now rereading Ludwig von Mises’s magnum opus, Human Action.  What a joy it is to get reacquainted with Mises’s masterful work and to use it as a benchmark to gauge my own intellectual odyssey since first reading it more than 40 years ago.

Early on the reader encounters the term “methodological individualism.”  This mouthful may seem at first to be some abstruse epistemological concept that can be forgotten once the foundations for Mises’s economics have been established.  On the contrary, revisiting Mises has made me realize just how thoroughly I have internalized the concept and what a big difference it has made in my thinking about political and economic controversies.

Let’s start with what methodological individualism is not.  It has nothing to do with “rugged individualism.”  It is not ideology at all.  It is a term that describes the essential nature of human thought and action.  It is a bedrock principle on which Mises grounds his entire exposition of economics.

“The Hangman, not the state, executes a criminal.”  This is Mises’s pithy summary of methodological individualism.  Mises does not deny that the hangman acts under the influence of his relationships to others in society.  He is an employee or a servant of some penal system and is obliged to carry out executions when so ordered. He may fear consequences if he fails to act as ordered.  He may have a family that he provides for.  He may wish to secure his place in Heaven. None of these conditions alters the basic sequence of events: The hangman ponders the action he is set to perform, thinking carefully or hardly at all.  He believes his best choice is to pull the rope that opens the chute.  He causes his arm to move and the deed is done. Continue reading →