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II. World Peace, International Order, and Classical Liberalism: A Comment on Shtromas and Anderson

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Since the end of the Great War in 1918, the world has searched after world peace through the political method of international organizations. The League of Nations, so forcefully propounded by Woodrow Wilson, was seen as the first hope for global peace and security. Its failure in the years between the two World Wars was taken as proof that a better and stronger organization was needed if yet a Third World War was to be prevented.[1] Out of the ashes of the Second World War's destruction arose the United Nations. Once again were heard the heralds proclaiming that world peace and security were in man's reach. And, once more, mankind's hopes were dashed during the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.[2]

Now, in the post-Cold War, as the world looks ahead to a new century that threatens ethnic conflicts and regional wars, hopes have arisen again that global peace and security can be obtained through international organizations—a refashioned United Nations or perhaps a new League of Peace. The quest for world peace through political internationalism is a false path, as I shall try to explain in the context of the recent exchange between Dr. Aleksandras Shtromas and Professor Gordon Anderson on, "What is Peace and How Could It Be Achieved."[3]

On the surface it seems a peculiar paradox that during our century, while our world has searched so intensely for peace through international organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations, that same world has suffered so much from wars, civil wars, global tensions and mass murder on a scale that practically exceeds the capacity of the human mind to fully comprehend. Wars and domestic political murder by the governments of the world have resulted in the deaths of more than 370 million people during the 20th century.[4]

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And how equally peculiar on the surface seems to be that hundred years between 1815 and 1914 when no global political organizations for world peace existed, yet at the same time wars were few, relatively short in their durations and (in comparison to our own century) fairly limited in their destructive effects on both life and property.[5] For many people in the first half of our century who had an adult memory of the period before First World War, that era before 1914 seemed like a golden age.[6]

The distinguishing characteristic of nineteenth century Europe and North America is that, however inconsistently and imperfectly it might have been practiced, that hundred year period between 1815 and 1914 can rightly be said to have been the product of the Classical Liberal spirit.[7] The guiding principle that directed much of public policy in practically all the countries of the "civilized world" was the *depoliticizing* of social life. With the triumph of free trade over mercantilism in the early and middle decades of the nineteenth century, with the elimination of many of the domestic regulations, monopoly privileges and restraints on enterprise, the State was dramatically removed from affairs of everyday life. In its place arose civil society, the blossoming of the "private sector," an extension of the network of "intermediary institutions" of voluntary association and market relationships.[8]

The "cosmopolitan ideal" that inspired many of the thinkers of the eighteenth century became a reality in the nineteenth.[9] Men, money and material goods increasingly traveled freely from one corner of the globe to another, with few political impediments standing in their way. Knowledge about and the sharing of both the arts and sciences became internationalized for an expanding circle of the general public.[10] It was, as Gustav Stolper expressed it, the era of the "three freedoms":[11]

> "They were: freedom of movement for men, for goods and for money. Everyone could leave his country when he wanted and travel or migrate wherever he pleased without a passport. The only European country that demanded passports (not even visas!) was Russia, looked at askance for her backwardness with an almost contemptuous smile. Who wanted to travel to Russia anyway?...There were still customs barriers on the European continent, it is true. But the vast British Empire was free-trade territory open to all in free competition, and several other European countries, such as the

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> Netherlands, Belgium, Scandinavia, came close to free trade. For a time the Great Powers on the European continent seemed to veer in the same direction. In the sixties of the nineteenth century the conviction was general that international free trade was the future. The subsequent decades did not quite fulfill that promise. In the late seventies reactionary trends set in. But looking back at the methods and the degree of protectionism built up at that time we are seized with nostalgic envy. Whether a bit higher or a bit lower, tariffs never checked the free flow of goods. All they effected was some minor price changes, presumably mirroring some vested interest. And the most natural of all was the free movement of money. Year in, year out, billions were invested by the great industrial European Powers in foreign countries, European and non-European...These billions were regarded as safe investments with attractive yields, desirable for creditors as well as debtors, with no doubts about the eventual return of both interest and principal...The interest paid on these foreign investments became an integral part of the national income of the great industrial Powers, protected not only by their political and military might but—more strongly—by the general, unquestioned acceptance of the fundamental capitalistic principles: sanctity of treaties, abidance by internal law, and the restraint of governments from interference in business."

Governments of the "civilized world" did form international associations and reached various agreements with each other in the nineteenth century. But for the most part (and separate from various changing political and military alliances) their associations and agreements were designed to facilitate the smooth functioning of private intercourse between their citizens and subjects. They included international river commissions, railway and transportation agreements, telegraph and postal unions, health rules and guidelines, procedures for uniform weights and measures, respect for patents and copyrights. Governments might still try to influence the construction of these international standards and procedures to benefit some domestic interest and limit the commercial penetration of some foreign competitors, but to a great extent the thinking behind them was to establish general "rules of the game" to assist in the further globalization of private commercial and cultural exchange. (Whether even these matters of standards, measures and procedures should also have been left to voluntary private association and agreement is a separate historical issue.)

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Distinct, though not completely separate from this, were the attempts in the nineteenth century for designing international procedures for arbitration of disputes among governments, and the establishment of "civilized rules" for combat on land and sea and for the treatment of non-combatants and neutrals if wars should break out. They were meant to establish restraints on the destructiveness of modern warfare, to limit the damage to human life and private property. If wars were still to be fought, then at least the negative consequences for civil society should be confined as much as possible.[12]

In this Classical Liberal era before 1914, a vast international order was created that facilitated a globalization of trade, commerce and investment, that fostered a cosmopolitan climate in which national borders no longer inhibited the movement of either men or ideas, and in which wars were considered wild things that were to be tamed, confined and prevented from excessively harming normal life. The fundamental force behind all of this, of course, was the idea of individual liberty and the sanctity of private property as an inseparable extension of that freedom of the individual. Governments were endowed with legitimacy and authority to preserve and protect the individual and his property from violence and spoliation. Their function was negative and defensive. International order and a high degree of international peace was maintainable because to a greater or a lesser degree all of the governments of the "civilized world" shared the belief that this was among their most essential functions. No special global organization for world peace and security was needed, since the leading nations of the world all tended to follow the same "rules of the game" because they all shared the same liberal-oriented outlook concerning man, society and government.

I appreciate that I am making a broad generalization against which numerous particulars concerning each of these countries during the nineteenth century could easily be used to argue against my sweeping conclusion. Yet, I would still contend that when looking over an historical period it is sometimes possible to see an idea or a belief that can be argued to capture the "spirit of the times" and which can be seen to have influenced the course of events in various ways. And in this sense, the liberal idea restrained governments, set free the individual, and served as the underlying conception that determined the type of "rules of the game" that

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international relationships required among governments in a era of free men, private enterprise and civil society. International peace, in this sense, was inseparable from the liberal ideas of private voluntary association, peaceful competition and a globalized system of division of labor.[13]

In the last decades of the nineteenth century another idea began to challenge and finally supersede the liberal ideal. That idea was political and economic Collectivism. In the late nineteenth and 20th centuries it took various forms: Marxian socialism, fascism, Nazism, welfare statism, social democracy, neo-mercantilism, protectionism and imperialism. But regardless of its permutation, its conceptions of man, society and government have been opposite to those of Classical Liberalism. Individual liberty, civil society and market relationships have been made subordinate to, and in the extreme forms of political and economic Collectivism suppressed by, political-collective ends. Man and society have been *repoliticized*.

It was the new idea of Collectivism that set the world on the course that lead to the First World War: the drive for monopolized markets, domestic regulation of trade and commerce, militarization of international relationships with the ascendancy of "great power" politics to which private interests were to be subservient and obedient to the interests of the State, and welfare statism with its nationalization of income and redistribution of wealth.

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In the Collectivist era of the 20th century everything has become an affair of state because nothing is outside of political consideration. Trade and commerce are no longer matters of private individuals searching for mutually advantageous gains-from-trade, instead they are now issues of national prosperity, national employment, national industrial development, national standards-of-living.[15] Ownership and control of resources and raw materials in various parts of the world have become matters of "national security," rather than an accident of geography which under Classical Liberalism is unimportant because the market peacefully allocates the distribution and use of those resources based upon the private competitive forces of supply and demand.[16]

International frictions among states, the rattling of sabers, threats of political and economic retaliation as a response to the political and economic actions of other governments, the unleashing of war; these were among the consequences of the end of the Classical Liberal era following the end of the First World War.[17] Nazism and fascism were nothing less than extreme forms of the anti-Classical Liberal trend in the post-World War I era.[18]

In the post-World War II era an "armed truce" between the United States and the Soviet Union, with flare-ups of real and deadly wars, "revolutions," insurrections and civil wars in various parts of the globe, created four decades of arms races, huge military budgets, global military alliances, vast expenditures on foreign aid to bribe third world despots, violations of civil liberties and misdirections of private sector resources in the name of war-preparedness.[19]

Furthermore, the international agreements concerning trade and travel, money and finance, culture and communications have been noticeably of a different type in the post-World War II era. While motivated by the desire to avoid the political and economic nationalistic traps of the interwar period, these international agreements have not been like those in the Classical Liberal era of the nineteenth century. Those in the recent post-War era often have been designed by governments to influence and determine the directions and outcomes of international trade, finance and commerce. They have been agreements among governments about what shall be traded and how products must be manufactured to be allowed to cross borders, about who shall be allowed to travel or change residence

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among countries and under what conditions, and about when foreign artistic and entertainment forms of communication will be permitted to penetrate a domestic market.[20]

Every aspect of life, every human relationship, every form of commerce, enterprise and exchange have been politicized, have been made affairs of state, and therefore have been raised into issues that both domestically and internationally at any moment can have the potential to become the basis for conflict and coercion.

What has motivated this shift from the Classical Liberal to the Collectivist era? Two forces have been at work in our century: the power of special interests and the appeal of social engineering. The principle of an equality of rights before the law for all has been replaced with the idea of group privileges and entitlements for some at the expense of others both at home and abroad. And Adam Smith's conception of a system of natural liberty, in which each man is free to peacefully follow his one interests with the cumulative results of men's interactions being a spontaneous pattern more complex than any human mind could ever imagine or design, has been replaced with the hubris of the planner who considers himself wise and knowledgeable enough to reorder society according to a higher vision of the proper, fair and just relationships that he thinks should be made to prevail among men.

This fetish of the social engineer did not pass away with Nazism in World War II or with the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. It is the essence of the Welfare State and has been the implicit agenda behind several of America's military interventions since the end of the Cold War. Michael Mandelbaum captured the essence of this foreign interventionism when he entitled his recent article in *Foreign Affairs*, "Foreign Policy as Social Work."[21] Asking what the recent foreign adventures in Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia all have in common, Professor Mandelbaum suggested that they "each involved small, poor, weak countries far from the crucial centers that had dominated American foreign policy during the Cold War...In these peripheral areas the administration was preoccupied not with relations with neighboring countries, the usual subject of foreign policy, but rather with the social, political, and economic conditions within borders. It aimed to relieve the suffering caused by ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, starvation in Somalia, and oppression in Haiti...[T]he Clinton interventions were

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intended to promote American values...[The Clinton Administration] tried...to turn American foreign policy into a branch of social work."[22]

Whether undertaken by the United States on its own, or jointly by several nations under a flag such as NATO's or even in the name of the entire world with authorization from the United Nations, such a policy of global social engineering in the name of good works can only lead to an arrogance of power, anti-democratic international elitism and a vast expenditure of life and money in the name of making the world over in ...well...in someone's image. As Professor Mandelbaum points out, "The world is a big place filled with distressed people, all of whom, by these lights have a claim to American [and the rest of the world's] attention."

Professor Shtromas, in his essay on, "What is Peace and How Could It Be Achieved?" offers a vision of a new League of Peace, an association of nations that would be able to devise a set of rules and standards to maintain international peace and have avenues to alleviate some of the social wrongs in society. Yet to establish such a new League and hope for any success from it, Professor Shtromas states that "the basic prerequisite for the establishment of such a global commonwealth is the ability of the participating states to agree on the basic principles of politics and justice on which it is to be founded."[21]

However, in fact, there is no such consensus in the world about the principles of either politics or justice. This, too, is one of the consequences of the demise of the Classical Liberal ideal in this century. Western Europe and North America may have a fairly common agreement about the principles of representative government, certain basic civil rights for all citizens before the law, and a respect for an (unfortunately) increasingly narrow domain of rights to private property, but the rest of the world does not. And many of the people in those other parts of the world—and certainly many of their political leaders—seem to have limited or no interest in adopting even the degrees of individual freedom still recognized in the West.

If the League of Peace is only to apply to those countries that share such common principles and values, and will enforce their rules for the prevention of war only among themselves, then the League members will have to be satisfied with watching from behind their wall of common peace the remainder of the world periodically falling into cataclysms of conflict,

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cruelty and carnage. If the League is to take upon itself the task of setting the rest of the world right, it will face the dilemma of undertaking a campaign of perpetual war for perpetual peace. There are numerous controversies, disputes and injustices both within and between nations. How will the League determine which ones are worth the cost in men and material to straighten out? By what impartial standard acceptable to the participants in the controversies and conflicts will the League decide who is in the right and who has been wronged? How many of the people on one side of one of these conflicts will the League be willing to kill if they refuse to surrender to the League's "ultimatums" because they really believe that in spite of what the League says, God or "right" is really on their side? And how and who will decide if the human price has exceeded the benefit of setting this dispute "right"?

How shall the decision to intervene be made? What if even one member country does not agree with the interventionist decision of the majority, or does not agree with the evaluation as to who is in the right in a dispute? As sovereign states (as Professor Shtromas says they are to remain) shall any member of the "global commonwealth" be able to refuse to participate or contribute to the intervention? What if members of the commonwealth support opposite sides in a regional conflict?

I am in complete agreement with Professor Shtromas when he quotes Ludwig von Mises to the affect that international peace will have the greatest possibility to prevail only when Classical Liberal thinking permeates the nations of the world. But as Mises pointed out, also, "As long as nations cling to protective tariffs, immigration barriers, compulsory education, interventionism, and etatism, new conflicts capable of breaking out at any time to open warfare will continually arise to plague mankind."[23]

Yet, this is the very condition most lacking in the world today. The world has turned its back on market liberalism, private ownership (meaning control) of the means of production, free trade, free movement of men, unregulated competition and market determination of relative income shares. It shows just how far the Western world has moved from its Classical Liberal past that politicians, the mass media and many scholars commenting on the state of the world since the end of the Cold War can say that the free market philosophy has triumphed over Soviet-style central planning and is the basis of economic policy in an increasing part of the

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globe. What the world practices is Neo-Mercantilist Welfare Statism. What free market is it when governments all over the world subsidize industries, regulate practically every stage of production, manage international trade flows and patterns, guarantee incomes, redistribute wealth, run pension programs and health care and insurance plans? International relations, as a result, have become extensions of these domestic interventionist economic policies, with unending trade conflicts, tariff controversies, domestic content battles, immigration restrictions, and financial regulations.

If there was an attempt to establish Professor Shtromas's "global commonwealth" in the Neo-Mercantilist Welfare Statist climate of today, is there any doubt that these differences in "national interest" would constantly plague issues and problems laid before the member states, as they do now under the various international political and economic organizations to which many of the countries of the world belong? Or that these differences would frequently arise in debates over whether to initiate an international "police action" and on whose behalf to threaten or introduce force?

The concept of justice has been transformed into what Friedrich Hayek called, "the mirage of social justice," in which powerful group interests and political pragmatism have become the forces behind an ideology of redistributivism.

At the same time, the concept of justice has been transformed into what Friedrich Hayek called, "the mirage of social justice," in which powerful group interests and political pragmatism have become the forces behind an ideology of redistributivism.[23] When government's take on as one of their primary responsibilities the maintenance and guaranteeing of relative income shares in their societies, it is inevitable that political and economic frictions will arise among nations when the political and economic policies of one or a group of countries threatens to undermine the income patterns and State-sponsored employment opportunities that another government deems part of its "national interest."[24] I fear that Professor Shtromas fails to fully appreciate how conflict-generating such notions of social justice really are for both domestic and international politics when he suggests that his new League and "global commonwealth"

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could readily transfer to its authority the upholding of such documents as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the U.N. in 1948 (30). As Hayek clearly demonstrated, like so many other U.N. declarations and resolutions, the Universal Declaration attempted to synthesize the Western conception of "bourgeois" rights with the socialist notion of "social" rights, the blending of which merely confused the meanings of rights and justice and reinforced class-conflict conceptions of human relationships.[25]

I also find it surprising that after seemingly endorsing Ludwig von Mises's position that the potential for international conflicts would be minimized with the comprehensive privatization of the means of production and the freeing of market activities from government regulation and control, Professor Shtromas calls for his "global commonwealth" to be endowed with the "supreme authority" to coordinate "governmental and non-governmental management and protection" of the natural environment, "development, management and regulation of safety standards" in the various energy fields, "development and management of global communications and information networks; regulation and management of demographic problems (e.g., rational use of manpower resources)" and a variety of other activities (32).

Surely nothing is as likely to generate international conflicts and global political warfare than to endow his "global commonwealth" with responsibility for these activities. First of all, the very purpose of having a free economy is to use competitive market prices to discover what products are most highly demanded by consumers, what are the value and opportunity costs of various resources and labor in alternative uses, and to have a profit and loss incentive system to attract people to use their knowledge and ability in such a way that the possible supplies of goods offered on the market tend to correctly match the pattern of consumer demands. It is precisely for this reason that we should not want any political authority, neither the government of a nation-state nor a "global commonwealth," to have allocational control and regulatory power over natural resources, information and communication networks or the training and distribution of "manpower resources." These all should be privatized and have their uses and applications determined by the competitive forces of the market.

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And, second, the handing over of authority to the "global commonwealth" for these activities would soon produce global disputes as to which country's natural resources are to be open for development and which country's are to preserved as "an inheritance for future generations." If one country's natural resources are to be set aside by order of the "supreme authority," shall the affected country have a right to financial compensation for lost revenues, and if so, who shall pay, and based on what "fair distribution" of the global burden? If the resources to be set aside for ecological reasons are presently owned by private individuals, shall the "supreme authority" have the power to force these private individuals from continuing to utilize their land and resources in a manner they find most profitable? Will these peaceful individuals be coerced into sacrificing for the global collective? What if they resist? Shall they be imprisoned or even killed so a tree can be preserved by the "supreme authority"? It is precisely by politicizing the issues of whether a portion of a forest is to be cut down, or whether various types of land are to be used in certain ways instead of for other purposes or maybe set aside and not used at all, or whether one country is to be eligible for global funding for some types of manpower training but not for others that such a "global commonwealth" could degenerate into a cauldron of controversy, conflict and confrontation, since member nations could easily see that the decisions made would influence their respective material well-being in the global order-of-things. I think that Professor Anderson has the stronger of the arguments when he suggests that these matters are better left to the private sector and private channels of financing and control, since these welfarist, redistributive and interventionist policies have merely tended to aggravate and intensify disagreements and disputes among the members of society (44-45).

Professor Shtromas argues that an essential element in any new world order of the future needs to be a more comprehensive recognition of the right to national self-determination. For too long, he says, there has existed a tension between the liberal-democratic ideal of majority rule and the right of self-determination. As a minority in a particular nation-state, an smaller ethnic or national group will often be at a disadvantage, unable to legislatively obtain consent to their wish for national independence. This tension between national or ethnic majorities and minorities within the same state, Professor Shtromas says, leads him to the conclusion that "it is

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on the whole doubtful whether multinational nation-states could be fully liberal democratic," since the minority would always face rejection of its aspirations for national independence from "majorities dictatorship" (25).

It is worth remembering that some prominent Classical Liberals, notably Lord Acton, considered it a hallmark of an advanced and developed state to incorporate a number of national groups within its boundaries. Indeed, a state would be poorer for not doing so:[26]

> "The co-existence of several nations under the same State is...one of the chief instruments of civilization...and indicates a state of higher advancement than the national unity which is the ideal of modern liberalism. The combination of different nations in one State is as necessary a condition of civilized life as the combination of men in society. Inferior races are raised by living in political union with races intellectually superior. Exhausted and decaying nations are revived by the contact of a younger vitality. Nations in which the elements of organization and the capacity for government have been lost, either through the demoralizing influence of despotism, or the disintegrating action of democracy, are restored and educated anew under the discipline of a stronger and less corrupt race. This fertilizing and regenerating process can only be obtained by living under one government. It is in the cauldron of the State that the fusion takes place by which the vigor, the knowledge, and the capacity of one portion of mankind may be communicated to another. Where political and national boundaries coincide, society ceases to advance, and nations relapse into a condition corresponding to that of men who renounce intercourse with their fellow-men."

Nonetheless, it became a principle of Classical Liberalism that the right to self-determination was a reasonable and just application of the concept of liberty. If individuals who happened to share a common language and cultural background wished to form a common political community, then that was merely a logical extension of the individual right of freedom of association. Furthermore, in an expanding international order in which more and more countries respected private property and recognized free trade and open immigration, the presence of political boundaries need not inhibit the types of interactions and shared experiences that, for example, Lord Acton considered essential for men to learn from each other and be stimulated for self-improvement.

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In a Classical Liberal order the minimizing of the State's functions and intrusions into social and economic life would limit opportunities for a dominant group to use the power of government to abuse, harm or exploit an ethnic, religious or linguistic minority. Under a regime of free market liberalism, ethnic, linguistic and national differences and tensions are depoliticized. When the state is separated from the economy, when all market activities are fully and completely privatized—with the government prohibited from intervening on behalf of any group or special interest—each individual is freed from the fear of coerced cultural, ethnic or linguistic annihilation. Members of different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds can be neither forcibly segregated nor compulsorily integrated into extinction.

Each individual is free to associate predominantly with those of the same group as himself, or interact with and integrate himself into other groups, if he finds it culturally or economically advantageous to do so. Each individual is free to enter the market and privately acquire resources, open businesses, and practice the trade, profession and occupation he chooses.

Each individual is free to send his children to the private school of his choice, in which the curriculum reflects the values he cherishes and the traditions he wishes passed on to his progeny. He may earn his living and raise his children in blissful cultural isolation, or he may become a cosmopolitan—a citizen of the world—speaking many languages and sharing in the customs and cultural contributions of a variety of the national heritages represented in his own country and those beyond the borders of his own state.

It is under forms of socialism and the regulated market economy that the individual's access to employment opportunities, his ability to open or operate a business, his degree of freedom to practice his religion and educate his children in the language and customs of his choice, or even to live where he wants, are made subject to the policy decisions of those who possess political control of the state. Under socialism and the regulated market economy, the state, by definition, has been assigned the responsibility to make decisions to manage or intervene into the economic affairs of life in ways that inevitably must influence the production of goods, the distribution of income, access to resources, and the prices at which commodities may be bought and the wages that may be paid to labor.

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Control over the socialist or interventionist state becomes crucial in a social environment in which the members of different ethnic, national or linguistic groups reside side-by-side. One's own group must attempt to control the state if it is not to be threatened by another national or linguistic group trying to use the mechanisms of political power for cultural or linguistic dominance. The state can control access to land and resources to build churches and construct schools. The state can manipulate the tax structures and business licensing procedures to make it more or less difficult for members of one ethnic group or another to operate newspapers in their native language, or to enter certain trades, occupations or professions. The state can mandate the use of a particular language or set of customs in public and private discourse and commerce. The individual's material well-being and cultural or linguistic autonomy are completely in the hands of any other group that can gain control of the national socialist or interventionist state.

The right of self-determination is most important, therefore, in an environment of political Collectivism and is of less importance in one of Classical Liberal individualism. But in recognizing the right of self-determination, it is important to be clear upon whose right this is based. Professor Shtromas, if I understand him correctly, defines the right of self-determination on the basis of nationality (25-26; 50-51). Thus each national group has a right to his own nation-state, if it so chooses. On this point I, again, think that Professor Anderson has the stronger argument when he says that the right to sovereignty should be considered to reside in individuals and not in groups (45-46). I do not see how any group of individuals can possess rights to sovereignty or "independence" not already possessed by each of the individuals comprising that group. Hence, any right to self-determination is a right belonging to individuals, not a group whose members just happen to speak the same language and share similar cultural customs or traditions.

Since Professor Shtromas refers to Ludwig von Mises as a proponent of national self-determination in a way that can be taken to suggest that the latter held a view not much different than his own, it is worth pointing out that Mises did not believe in the "right of self-determination of nations." (27) Mises argued, instead:[27]

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> "To call this right of self-determination the 'right of self-determination of nations' is to misunderstand it. It is not the right of self-determination of a delimited national group, but the right of the inhabitants of every territory to decide on the state to which they wish to belong...whether it be a single village, a whole district, or a series of adjacent districts...If it were in any way possible to grant this right of self-determination to every individual person, it would have to be done...So far as the right of self-determination was given effect at all, and wherever it would have been permitted to take effect, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, it led or would have led to the formation of state composed of a single nationality (i.e., people speaking the same language) and to the dissolution of states composed of several nationalities, but only as a consequence of the free choice of those entitled to participate in the plebiscite. The formation of states comprising all the members of a nation group was the *result* of the exercise of the right to self-determination, not its purpose."

The importance of a right of self-determination, therefore, is not to create or assure the creation of carefully delineated nation-states, but to give *individuals* the freedom to select the political entity to which they think it would be best for themselves to belong. In principle, if a group of individuals chose to belong to a nation-state dominated by another linguistic and cultural group because they viewed their own language and culture "backward" and wanted to completely absorb the national characteristics of the larger group, they would have to be permitted to do so, even if their free choice meant the end of their own language and culture. Indeed, peoples have acted in ways that in principle could bring this about. If an entire linguistic group were to emigrate from their home territory and disperse themselves among other countries and assimilate themselves completely in their adopted lands, then their original language and culture would disappear from use and that "nation" would soon be extinct— voluntarily and peacefully. And if, when emigrating, the original occupants were to freely sell on the market all the land and other property on that territory to others—others who spoke a different language and practiced different customs within a different culture—that territory would now be the "home land" of this second group because it would now be the private property of these new owning individuals.

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Finally, what should be the "peace-making" conduct of countries and governments around the world in the face of the problems and ambiguities with any type of League of Peace and "global commonwealth" as outlined by Professor Shtromas? In essence that conduct should be one of non-interventionism. Each government should refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other countries and can make its contribution to world peace by not extending wars and conflicts by entering them as declared allies or associates of either side. Strict governmental neutrality should be the watchword of the day in foreign affairs.

Who, then, would help the oppressed or those aggressed against in other lands? What I propose is *the depoliticization, the privatization of foreign intervention*. In our private life we have many friends, neighbors and family members whom we care about and desire to help; we desire to help them in getting through times of trouble and hardship, and we want to help them in trying to find better principles to guide their life, so many of the problems that have been caused by their past choices do not happen again. Sometimes these tasks are more than we, ourselves, can try to solve, so we form voluntary associations, organizations and clubs to pool our efforts with those who share the same desire to help and see value in the same peaceful methods for attaining the end. Others "go it alone" in their endeavors to assist their fellow men, and still others form different associations because, though they believe in the same end, they think there are better means to achieve it than the ones we decide to try. And others in the society choose not to participate at all in these types of tasks, because they place a higher value on other things, in terms of an expenditure of their time, money and efforts. No one is compelled to care or to help, nor is any one forced to

The depoliticization or privatization of foreign intervention means an approach analogous to the private institutions of voluntary association for the handling of domestic "social problems." Those who see distress and hardship among peoples in other lands, and who desire to assist them, should not be restricted in forming associations and charities to pool their resources to supply such help.

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accept one way of doing things as the only correct method. Such voluntary associations and institutions are among the essential foundation stones of civil society. They are also the Classical Liberal society's private solutions to what are called "social problems."

The depoliticization or privatization of foreign intervention means an approach analogous to the private institutions of voluntary association for the handling of domestic "social problems." Those who see distress and hardship among peoples in other lands, and who desire to assist them, should not be restricted in forming associations and charities to pool their resources to supply such help. But neither should others who do not share that same concern, or who consider there to be other answers to solve those foreign problems, be compelled to provide assistance if they choose not to.

If oppression reigns in a foreign land, if a peaceful people in another country are threatened or aggressed against by another state, any citizen in a free society should have the liberty to volunteer his help. This help can include financial contributions or personal service. He can offer to fight along side the "freedom fighters" resisting their own government's tyranny, or he can offer his services in the military of that foreign country to help repel the aggressor nation. He can choose to do so for free or for pay. He can form associations and societies to pool his own resources with those of others to buy military equipment, medical supplies or emergency food and clothing. He can try to persuade others in his own country to see the rightness in the cause and join him in fighting the good fight to win freedom for others in those other lands.

The depoliticization and privatization of foreign interventionism seems to me to be the logical extension of the Classical Liberal ideal of the depoliticization of domestic economic and social life to foreign affairs. The fundamental duty of the state in the Classical Liberal conception of the free society is the protection of the life, liberty and property of the citizenry within its own territorial jurisdiction. If the state goes beyond this, it can only do so by taking the wealth, income and resources of some to improve the circumstances of others, i.e., by means of coercive meddling and social engineering. Either we have the protection of equal individual rights for all before the law or we have unequal privileges for some at the expense of others. This is the choice concerning the role of the state whether in domestic or foreign affairs.

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If in the next century countries begin to reject the remaining forms of political and economic Collectivism which they now practice, a peaceful international order similar to and hopefully even better than the one developed in the nineteenth century during the zenith years of the Classical Liberal era will naturally and spontaneously emerge as governments restrict themselves to new forms of international "rules of the game" consistent with individual liberty, private property, and the network of voluntary associations that form the structure of civil society. And if this occurs, we will have gone beyond artificial and inherently unworkable makeshifts like the League of Nations, the United Nations and alternative proposals for Leagues of Peace and global commonwealths.

Notes

[1]See, William E. Rappard, *The Quest for Peace Since the World War* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1940) for a detailed account of the attempts and failures of the League to maintain world peace.

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[5]For a comparison of the nature of war and the treatment of non-combatants and property in the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century, see, Guglielmo Ferrero, *Peace and War* [1933] (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1969) pp. 1-96 and Ferrero, "Forms of War and International Anarchy," in *The World Crisis*, ed. by William E. Rappard [1938] (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries

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